BY DR. STAHMER:
QIn other words, did Goering tell you that he was taking a great responsibility on himself?
AYes, that it was on his own responsibility.
QDid you then on the next morning go to the British Embassy in order to convince yourself whether your telephonic communications had been correctly understood?
AYes, I met him the first thing Thursday morning, the 31st, at 10 o'clock and discussed the note with him, and he requested me at once to proceed to Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, and to give him a copy.
QDid that happen?
AHe sent Forbes with me to Kipski, and I read the note to Lipski, but he did not seem to grasp the contents. I, therefore, left the room, dictated a note to the secretary, and handed it to him. In the meantime Lipski explained to Forbes that he was not interested in discussing this note with the German Government.
Q Did you give this conversation as closely verbatim as you can?
It seems very important to me.
AWhen he said that he had no reason to negotiate with the German Government if it came to war between Poland and Germany he knew because he had been living for five and a half years in Poland, that there would be a revolution in Germany and they would march on Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, Dr. Stahmer, are you not going on? BY DR. STAHMER:
QPlease continue, witness.
Did you then inform London of your conversation by telephone?
AI did phone at once from the British Embassy and told Sir Horace Wilson about the conference we had.
QWas there another discussion with Goering in the afternoon?
AI saw Goering at one o'clock in the afternoon. He then received a copy of a cablegram from the Polish Government to Lipski, to the effect that Lipski should not without special instructions from Warsaw negotiate with the German Government. It is obvious that the Poles during the existing circumstances were most scared what actions they took but this telegram did upset the German Government very much.
QOn that afternoon did you again meet Goering along with the British Ambassador?
AThe situation seemed to be impossible. Hitler called Sir Nevil Henderson. Ribbentrop had quarreled with him and I thought the only possibility was if Goering could come to an understanding with Henderson. I suggested a meeting between them. It took place at 4:50 in the afternoon at Goering's house. Forbes was present and I was present myself.
QWhat took place during that talk?
AAlready before the meeting Henderson expressed his suspicion that the German Government would try to arrange a settlement with England and make a split between England and Poland. Hendersonwas therefore very careful during the two hours conversation and the result of the conversation was only that both parties agreed it would be necessary to arrange for a meeting between delegates from both countries if that possibly should avoid war.
QOn this occasion did you suggest that Goering should meet English delegates immediately?
AI suggested that a meeting should at once be arranged in Holland and Goering should represent Germany.
QWhat was Henderson's attitude to this proposal?
AHenderson promised to submit the proposal to his government. But I had the impression that he already knew that the German forces were moving and it did not seem as if he put great faith in the possibilities.
QDo you know of a statement on the part of Goering that if the Poles did not submit Germany would crush these people and is quite prepared and "if we had to declare war we would regret it but that would simply be Great Britain's fault?
AI can't recollect those words but it is possible that during the two hour conversation they were uttered.
QHow did this talk conclude?
AAt 7 o'clock in the evening they parted and both parties agreed but tried to arrange for the meeting in Holland.
QDid you then on the first of September meet Goering again?
AOn the first of September I met Goering at eight o'clock in his headquarters. After some hesitation he told me that war had broken out due to the fact that the Poles had attacked the radio station at Gleiwitz and blown up the bridge at Birschau. Later he gave me more details from which I gathered that the full force of the German Army was attacking Poland.
QDid you then on the 3rd of September meet Goering again, and did you on that occasion, make the suggestion that Goering should fly to London for a direct conference?
AWell, before I mentioned what happened then, I think I should mention that I met Hitler in the Reichskanzlei on the first of September immediately after his speech before the Reichstag in the corridor. He was then exceedingly nervous and very agitated and he told me that he had all the time suspected that England wanted a war and he told me that he was going to smash up Poland and take the wholecountry.
Goering interrupted, indicating that they would advance to certain points. But Hitler was in an uncontrollable frame of mind and started to shout he would fight one year, two years and he started up in a great excitement saying that he would fight ten years.
Then on Sunday, the third of September, I obtained early in the morning information from Forbes that an ultimatum would be given at nine o'clock. Conditions immediately ceased and withdrew the forces to the German border. I immediately went off to Goering's headquarters near Potsdam. He was there and not with Hitler. I appealed to him at least to try to arrange for a sensible reply to the ultimatum. I had the impression that certain members of the German Government were in favor of war and I was afraid if a written reply was given it would not be framed to help to prevent war with England. I therefore suggested that Goering should declare himself prepared to go to England at once before eleven o'clock to negotiate.
QHow did Goering react to this suggestion?
AHe was -- he accepted the proposal and phoned Hitler and Hitler agreed
QDid you then telephone London?
AYes, I phoned up London, obtained contact with the Foreign Office and they gave the replythat I did expect, that they could not consider this proposal before they received a written reply to the ultimatum.
QDid you communicate this to Goering?
AYes, I told Goering.
QWhat impression did that make on him?
AGoering seemed to be sorry it was not accepted.
QThen on the 4 of September did you speak once more with Goering?
AYes, I had a short interview with Goering on the 4th but not of any great importance.
Q On this occasion did Goering say to you that, come what may, we would carry out the war as humanely as possible and that Germany would under no circumstances undertake war action against England but if England should shoot on Germany then Germany's answer would be inevitable?
AYes, that is correct.
QDid you publish a book called "Last Attempt"?
AYes.
QIs the account you give there true?
AYes, it is written with great care. The record as far as I humanly could is absolutely exact and correct.
QIs what you say there based on notes that you took at the time?
AYes.
QWhen did you finish these notes?
AI made them immediately on my return to Sweden on the 5th of September, 1939.
DR. STAHMER:Mr. President, I have three more small questions. Should I ask them now or should we now adjourn?
THE PRESIDENT:I think you could ask them now.
DR. STAHMER:Very well. BY DR. STAHMER:
QOn the 24th of September, 1939, did you speak with Forbes in Stockholm?
ANo, I met Forbes on the 24th of September in Oslo, that was after the occupation of Poland, in an endeavor to try to ascertain if there still was a possibility of preventing a world war. He gave me in writing the viewpoint of the British Government, summarized as follows: "The British Government had to put up -- "
THE PRESIDENT:Wait a moment. What has this to do with the defendant Goering?
DR. STAHMER:This is evidence that he made efforts even later to bring about peace.
I have now only one more question which affects Goering immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: The fact that he met Sir George Ogilvie Forbes in Oslo on the 24th of September does not at present appear to have anything to do with Goering.
DR. STAHMER:It is significant to the extent that Dahlerus did this in order to put London and Berlin once more in touch with each other in order at this stage of events to bring about peace.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, go on with your next question then.
THE WITNESS:The provisions were: "To redeem Europe from perpetually recurring fear of German aggression and to enable peoples of Europe --"
THE PRESIDENT:Wait a minute. What has the letter that Sir George Ogilvie Forbes wrote got to do with Goering?
DR. STAHMER:The content of this letter was told to Herr Dahlerus on the 22 of September and Dahlerus discussed it with Goering and he attempted to reach some sort of agreement on that basis.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:Your Honor, may I enter a further objection?
It has nothing to do with the Indictment. We have not charged that a war against England was an aggressive war. The charge is that the war against Poland was an aggressive war. All of this negotiation to keep England out of the war while they took Poland is utterly irrelevant to the Indictment. I respectfully submit, and that because it has nothing to do with the Indictment, with the charge, it should be rejected.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, if the witness had an interview with Goering afterwards you can come to that but not to preliminary conferences with Sir George Ogilvie Forbes.
DR. STAHMER:It would not be comprehensible unless I do so. He had to tell Goering what Forbes told him. Forbes made certain suggestions to him and Dahlerus took these suggestions to Berlin and communicated them to Goering, told him what Forbes had told him.
THE PRESIDENT:Let the witness give the account of his meeting with Goering.
DR. STAHMER:Very well.
BY DR. STAHMER:
QHerr Dahlerus, it was on the 26th of September that you looked up Goering in Berlin?
AWell, I met both Goering and Hitler on the 26th of September.
QDid you inform Goering of what suggestions Forbes had made to you?
AI had discussed with Hitler on what conditions he was prepared to make good the harm he had done to Poland and make peace, and to my great disappointment he then definitely declared that he was not prepared at all to discuss the question of Poland. Poland was occupied and that was no business any longer of Great Britain. I then realized that the aim, his aim had been to split Poland and England and with the consent of Great Britain have the opportunity of occupying Poland without running the risk of war with Great Britain and France.
QIn July 1940 did you again meet Goering?
AYes, Goering suggested in July, 1940, that His Majesty, the King of Sweden, should endeavor to approach the various powers for negotiations about peace.
DR. STAHMER:No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:10 p.m.
(A recess was taken until 1410 hours).
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of:
The United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom of Great Bri tain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hormann Wilhelm G oering et al, Defen dants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany,on 19 March 1946, 1400-1700, Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.
BIRGER DAHLERUS -- resumed.
THE PRESIDENT:Does any member of the defendants' coun sel wish to ask any questions?
DIRECTEXAMINATION--Continued.
BY DR. HORN: (counsel for the Defendant Ribbentrop)
Q.Witness, can you tell us the reason why the conference between Hitler and Henderson on the 29th of August had no res ults?
A.No, I only had the report that they disagreed and got into a quarrel.
Q.Do you know about which of the six points the quarrel started?
A.As far as I recollect, it was on the wordking of the G erman reply saying that they expected representatives from Poland during the next 24 hours.
A.Were you not later told by Hitler in the presence of Goering that he put these demands because the two armies, the Polish and the German, were already standing in readiness,and at any moment a serious conflict was to be expected, and there fore Hitler did not want to put an ultimatum regarding the calling of a man from Poland, but only wanted to avoid the outbreak of a conflict A. Yes, explanations to that effect were given.
Q.Is it correct, witness, as you wrote in your book, that in the Polish Embassy, the Polish Ambassador, N. Lipski, told you that in case of a war the Polish Army would march to Berlin in triumph?
A.No, he did not say that to me, but he made remarks to that effect before Forbes.
Q.And Forbes transmitted these rewards to you. How did it come about that you had a meeting with Mr. Forbes on the 24th of September in Oslo?
A.I took the initiative and went to Oslo to see him.
Q.Please, could you tell us about the content of the letter from Forbes, briefly?
A.I read that -
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal have already said that they don't want to hear that. And I don't see what it has to do with von Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN:Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is under indictment on the basis of leading the entire German policy. I consider it, therefore, important that this letter which will give information about the further course of the foreign policy such as Ribbentrop saw it, that this letter was decisive for his later attempts toward peace, for instance.
THE WITNESS:To redeem Europe from perpetual German aggression BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q.Was this letter ever shown to von Ribbentrop?
A.No.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal has already ruled that they will not have the letter read. BY DR. HORN :
Q.Then on the 26th of September 1939 you had a conference with Hitler. Is it correct that at that time Hitler told you he could negotiate with England concerning Poland because the major part of Poland was occupied by Russia and Russia to his knowledge would not ceded it?
A. He said that he was not prepared to discuss the question of Poland, and he added afterwards that apart from his decision he did not think Russia was prepared to discuss the territory occupied by Russia.
Q. Well, at the time you were negotiating were you poli-
tically independant?
A.Absolutely.
DR. HORN:Thank you; no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT:Is there any further examination by members of the Defense? BY DR. LATERNSER (counsel for the General Staff and OKW):
Q.I have only one question, Witness: During the numerous negotiations which you heard, were there German officers there? Did high military leaders participate actively at any time?
A.Never.
THE PRESIDENT:Do any of the others of Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions?
(No further examination here by Defendants' Counsel) CROSS EXAMINATION BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q.Mr. Dahlorus, will you tell me whether I got all of your last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say that "I then realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his, Goering's aim, had been to split Poland and grab and occupy Poland with the consent of Great Britain?" Is that right?
A.Yes, it is correct, but I should like to say it was the German Government's, including Goering's, aim.
Q.The German Government. I am grateful. Now, I want you to tell the Tribunal quite shortly why you didn't realize that aim earlier.
DR. STAHMER:As far as I understand the answer of the witness, he said in answer to my question that that was Hitler's opinion of Goering. The witness has not spoken -
THE PRESIDENT:I think you are right in that, but the witness has now corrected it to say it was the German Government. You will be able to re-examine.
Q.Now, I just want to explain to the Tribunal -- and listen to the question I put to you -- why you didn't understand at that time. Your original object in seeing Goering at the beginning of July was to inform him that British public opinion had hardened and wouldn't stand another act of aggression, isn't that right?
AYes.
QThe reason you went to Goering is shown in page 6 of your book, if you've got the English version.
AYes
QAnd, Mr. Dahlerus, I want you to be absolutely sure that when I quote your book I don't take anything out of its context. Just before the break on page 8 you say this:
"The essence of National Socialism was bellicose and aggressive and completely devoid of all moral scruples in its dealings with other nations. Hitler thirs ed after conquest. It was said that Goering had energetically striven for a peaceful solution of the Munich crisis and this had lessened his popularity with the German Government."
That was the reason you went to Goering?
AYes.
QAnd when you put your point of view to Goering, his first reaction was that the British Government were bluffing over Danzig and Poland.
AYes.
QAnd you wanted and succeeded in arranging the first meeting in order to convince Goering that according to British public opinion the British Government wasn't bluffing, is that right?
AYes, that is correct.
QNow, I just want you to turn to page 29 of your book -- the very top of the page--where you describe the end of your conversation with the Defendant Goering in the train before the meeting at the beginning of August. Do you remember?
AYes.
QGoering explained what his aim was. And if you look at the second line " This was a mutual agreement regarding the holding of an Anglo-German conference." And note the next words, Mr. Dahlerus "with plenipotentiary representatives from both Governments." One matter which Goering had always made clear was that he would demand the return of Danzig and certain rights over the Corridor -- the polish Corridor -- isn't that right?
AYes.
QAnd from the very start he wanted a plenipotentiary conference at which territory could, if necessary, be ceded to Germany, didn't he?
AEvidently.
QNow, I want to come straight on to the 24th of August, when you saw Goering and he asked you to go to London. One of the points he wanted you to stress was that he and the German Government thought that there had been a great improvement in their military situation because of the German-Soviet Treaty.
AThat's correct.
QAnd the other --if you turn to the bottom of page 35 in your book and then look at the top of page 36: "The reason was his disbelief that the German Foreign Office would be able or willing to establish a sufficiently close contact with the British Foreign Office."
AThat is correct.
Q New, you remember that day that you had the conversation with him and later on he rang you up at 11.
30 before your departure?
AYes.
QI just want you to tell the Tribunal one or two of the things that he didn't tell you that day. He didn't tell you, did he, that two days before, on the 22nd of august, at obersalzburg, Hitler had told him and other German leaders that he -- Hitler -- had decided in the spring that a conflict with Poland was bound to come. He didn't tell you that, did he?
AI never had any indication or disclosure as to that policy on the 11th of April or the 23rd of may, or the 22nd of August.
QYou never heard of that -- that is Document 798-PS, the one of the 22nd of August --as you have told us, you never heard of the Fall Weiss prepared in April, but I want to get it quite clear about the other one, GB-75 the 23rd of May. He never told you that Hitler had said to him on that day that Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. "It is a question of expanding our living space in the East." And I think he also didn't tell you that Hitler said on that day, "Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive." He never mentioned to you about isolating Poland.
ANever indicated anything in that direction at all.
QBut I think he did tell you in the earlier interview that he was going to see M.Lipski, the Polish Ambassador.
AYes.
QHe didn't tell you, as I understand you, that he was going to inform M. Lipski that the main obstacle to any diminution of the tension between the two countries was Poland's alliance with Great Britain. He didn't tell you that, did he?
ANo.
QThat is GB-39, PS-72, page 119. Do that while he was asking you to go to England to deal with one side of the matter he was dealing with Mr. Lipski on the other. I just want to got clear the situation on the 24th Did he tell you that the decision had been made to attack Poland on he morning of the 26th?
A. No, in no way whatsoever.
Q.Now, you asked to go for those general purposes, as I put them to you. You know now, Mr. Dahlerus, that on the next day our "note verbale" was given to Sir Nevil Henderson by Hitler, on the 26th.
A.Yes.
Q.And that note, as distinguished from what was said to you later on, said in general terms that the Polish question must be solved, so that the effect of the plans as they stood on the evening of the 24th when Goering rang you up, was that you were going off in the morning with the expression of a general desire for a peaceful solution, the "note verbale" was to be given to Sir Nevil Henderson on the afternoon of the 25th and at that time the plan was that Poland would be attacked on the morning of the 26th when you had delivered your message and Sir Nevil had sent out the "note verbale". That was the position?
A.Yes.
Q.Now, did Goering ever tell you why the plan of attack; neither that it was changed.
Q.He didn't tell you that -- and this Document PC-90, GB 64 -- I quote Goering's own words: "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland" -- that was the 25th -- "the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, "No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.' So then I asked him, 'Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?" Goering never told you that at the time you were being sent to London all that was wanted was to eliminate British intervention?
A.Not at all.
Q.Well, now, I just want you to take again, quite shortly -- you went and came back with Lord Halifax's letter. I want to make this quite clear, Mr. Dahlerus: Throughout Lord Halifax made it clear that Great Britain was going to stand by her obligations to Poland, did he not?
A. Yes.
Q.And then on the 27th of August, the night of the 26th, 27th, at 12:30 midnight, you had this interview with Hitler. Now, to you, Mr. Dahlerus, Hitler for the first time made it clear that his terms were that Great Britain should help Germany in securing Danzig and the Corridor.
A.Yes.
Q.Not "rights in the Corridor, " but "the Corridor". Do you remember when you told Mr. Chamberlain that he was caught between praise and that given Mr. Mr. Henderson?
A.That's correct.
Q.Now, I am not going to go through it all again, but I just want you to help me from your own book, which you say was carefully and objectively written, as to the state of mind of the rulers of Germany at that time. Now, would you first of all look with regard to Hitler on page 47? That is the passage you hove already told the Tribunal about, when he was shouting, "Dann werde ich U-Boote Bauen, U-Boote, U-Boote," to begin with?
A.Yes.
Q.Now, just let me put it to you -- it is quite short -- how you described it at the time, and you tell me if it is right. "If there should be a war, he said, 'Dann werde ich U-Bootc Bauen, U-Boote, U-Boote,' and raised his voice each time?"
A.Yes.
The voice became more indistinct and finally one couldn't follow him at all.
Then he pulled himself together, raised his voice as though addressing a Flugzeuge, und werde meine Feinde vernichten" and then you go on to say, "Just then he seemed more like a phantom from a story book than a real person. I stared at him in amazement and turned to see how Goering reacte, but he didn't turn a hair."
Now would you mind turning to page 53? There is one sentence before the bit I read on page 47. I just want to get that clear. You say, "His voice became blurred and his behavior was that of a completely abnormal person," Will you turn to page 53?
I want youto tell the Tribunal your impression of the way he treated the defendant Goering. The Tribunal has heard a great deal about the relations between them. At the bottom of the page you say that:
"From the very beginning of our conversation I had resented his manner toward Goering, his most intimate friend raid comrade from the years of struggle His desire to dominate was explicable, but to require such obsequious humility as Goering now exhibited from his closest collaborator seemed to me excessively repellant and unprepossessing."
Will you just turn over to page 54, the fifth line from the end?
"I realized that I was dealing with a person who could not be considered normal."
That was your considered view, wasn't it, Mr. Dahlerus?
AIt was the opinion I formed the first time I mot him.
QThat was the Chancellor of Germany, Now I want you for a moment to deal with the Foreign Minister of Germany according to the impressions you formed. Generally, I think you got the impression that von Ribbentro p was doing everything he could to interrupt and spoil your endeavors?
AThat is correct.
QBut according to Goering, he went farther than that. Will you look at page 76? This is, you remember, when you were just saying goodbye to Goering on, I think, your last visit to London after he had drawn the map, which I will come to in a moment. Did you say this?
"Before we parted he again went over the German standpoint, saying finally that if we never met again he would like to take the opportunity of thanking me for what I have done and for my tireless energy in the cause of peace.
I was somewhat surprised by this farewell and could not help replying that in all probability we should meet again soon.
"His expression changed and he said solemnly, "Perhaps. But certain people are doing what they can to prevent you getting out of this alive."
That was said seriously and solemnly, Mr. Dahlerus?
AExactly,
QAnd yougo on:
"At a meeting in October of the same year Goering told me that Ribbentrop had tried to arrange for my plane to crash. Hence Goering's solemn*mien when he bid me farewell."
AHe mentioned Ribbontrop's name one minute beforehand, and then when he spoke about the plane crashing he said the name "he." I assume it was Ribbontrop.
QThat was the Foreign Minister, according to Goering.
I want you just toturn to page 100; I want to correct a few things. This is a description of the 1st of September,in the afternoon of the day on which Poland had been attacked,'and you saw the defendant Goering, I think, in the Air Ministry or at one of his offices. Do you see this just before the second break?"
"To him," that is, to Goering, "everything was lined up according to a plan which nothing could upset. Finally he ca**d in the Secretaries of State, Koerner and Witzbach, gave them a long harrangue, and presented each of them with a sword of honor, which he hoped they would carry gloriously through the war. It was as if all these people were in some crazy state of intoxication."
Are these your words?
AYes.
QThat was your impression? Of course you mean that they were mentally intoxicated with the idea of war?
AThe had changed their frame of mind within a short time.
Q So that of the three principal people in Germany the Chancellor was abnormal, the Reichsmarshal, or the Fieldmarshal, as he was then, was in a crazy state of intoxication, and according to the defendant Goering, the Foreign Minister was a would-be murderer who wanted to sabotage your plane?
A (The witness nodded)
QJust let us proceed quite shortly with what happened after that.
On the weekend of the 26th and 27th of August you went to England. You have told me that you didn't know about the calling off of the attack on the morning of the 26th, and you didn't know that the intention of Hitler was to eliminate English intervention. You didn't know those points, so you went back to England on the 27th with those fuller terms, and the English answer was that while they maintained their obligations, they hoped and recommended that the German and polish governments might begin negotiations between them..... selves with regard to the point?
AYes.
Q And that was the answer that you brought back.
Now, I just want you to think for a moment of the interview that you had at breakfast time with Goering, I think in his train or in headquarters, on the 29th of August. You will find it at page 65 of the book, if you want to refresh your memory. At that time, didn't Goering try and convince you that the return of Danzig and the Corridor would make no difference to Poland's military situation?
AYes.
QBecause, illustrating it from his own war maps, he thought that Germany was in a position to defeat the Poles anyhow, whether they had the Corrido or whether they hadn't?
AYes.
QAnd his air force and the troops were all in position to carry that ou f? Yes.
QNow, I want now to cone to the question of the meeting at which terms were given to Sir Nevile Henderson. That was at 1915 hours, 7:15 in the evening, on the 29th of August, so the meeting went on for some time. Do you remember that meeting?
AYes.
QAnd then, as I think one of the counsel has elicited from you, the difficulty arose over the demand for a plenipotentiary to be back in 24 hours, as you have explained.
AYes.
QNow, I think Sir George Ogilvy Forbes told you that that meeting had gone very badly, and then, at 11:30, you saw Goering and Goering said much the sane as Sir George Ogilvy Forbes as to how the meeting had gone.
AYes.
QAnd he said that what had upset the Chancellor was that Sir Nevile Henderson had characterized or implied that this demand that the plenipotentiary should come within 24 hours was equivalent to an ultimatum.
AYes.
QDo you remember that at that time Goering underlined certain of the terms?
To turn to the preface of the book -