I did not know Seyss-Inquart's attitude at that time for sure.
independent Austria?
First, if you ask me, "Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor and was that demanded from Hitler?"
--yes.
And if you ask me then, "Did he become Chancellor under the assumption that he should send the telegram for troops to march in?"
-
If you ask me thirdly, "Did he become Chancellor under the assumption that he would be able to maintain an independent Austria?"
-
then I have to say again that the final turn of events on that evening \ was not clear even in the Fuehrer's mind.
Q Isn't it true that you expected that he might want to remain the troops were marched in?
A No. Excuse me, there are two questions. I absolutely and it would not have been necessary.
I gave my reasons for the were in control of Austria's fate?
Is that a fact?
A That was certainly not told to him before the Fuehrer. As
A I did not say "legally," I said "diplomatically."
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a convenient time to break off?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, your Honor.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 19 March 1946.)
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): With the approval of the Tribunal, I call as witness Mr. Dahlerus, from Stockholm. follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you tell me your name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: whole truth, and nothing but the truth,so help me God.
(The witness repeated the oath). BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Mr. Dahlerus, would you please tell the Court how it happened that you, as a private individual and a Swede, made efforts for reaching an understanding between England and Germany? years, and I also knew Germany very well. I had seen the First World War from both sides, having lived in Germany and England during the first war. number of cities, Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester and London, and I found all around a very determined position that the British public wouldn't stand for any aggression any longer from the German side. and we discussed the position and they summed up the general opinion in England in a rather clear way. As this summary of the general opinion in England was a basis for my discussions afterwards with Goering, I think I shall quote it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Russian translation is not coming through. I am told it is coming through with interruptions.
DR. STAHMER: Should the witness repeat his testimony?
THE PRESIDENT: Would you just repeat the last sentence that you stated You said that on the 2nd of July you met friends in the Constitutional Club and discussed the general situation.
AAnd they summed up the position in a rather clear way. This formed the basis for my discussions afterwards with Goering. I therefore think I shall quote exactly the summary they made up of the opinion in Great Britain: England and from discussion with ordinary people.
A. Agreement that Berchtesgaden and Czechoslovakia have shaken confidence. Immediately after Berchtesgaden and before Czechoslovakia possibly could have obtained by cooperation many things decided by Germany.
B. British public opinion now exasperated. Decided that we go so far and no further.
C. Britain now had commitments which did not exist at the time of the Berchtesgaden meeting.
Poland and Danzig. Invasion of Danzig means war with Poland and Britain.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid the French translation isn't coming through properly now. The French and Russian are coming together. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Now, Witness, would you go on with the document. You have given us a, b, and c, I think.
A Well, the end of c is as follows:
"Britain automatically involved by virtue of new commitments. Therefore, automatically war with Britain.
"d. Britain does not advertise her strength: not even fully appreciated by general British public."
Then follows Statement No.2, about Lord Halifax's sp "Own personal observation indicates that Britain solid behind his statement."
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. I am afraid the Russian is coming through on the French again.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Before the witness goes on with his evidence, the Tribunal ants me to say that the system by which the earphones are connected with the interpreters was checked over after the Court rose last night, was checked over gain at 9:30 this morning, and again at 9:35 this morning.
But everyone who comes into this Court must realize that it has not been possible to bury these cables so as to make them altogether safe. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance that everybody who comes into this Court should take real care to avoid, if possible, treading upon these cables, which may become injured by being kicked and broken, and in that way the faults in the system occur. It, therefore, rests with those who use this Court to see that they do their best o assist in keep ing the system efficient. DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED):
Q Would you please continue, witness?
A Point Number Two: Lord Halifax's speech. Own personal observation indicates that Britain solidly behind his statement. Lord Halifax understates is case, as is British custom; that is to say, understates the strength of Great Britain's force. Is perhaps not fully understood by Germany.
Number Three: Britain desires peace, but not peace at any price. erman people very acceptable to British, and does not appear to be any good reason for armed conflict. As in past, Germany will certainly be defeated and rill obtain far less by means of war than by peaceful methods of negotiation. Britain and her friends will also suffer very heavily. May be end of civilization.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. *eich to forward unfavorable reports, I felt it was both my duty and it might be of great value if this exact opinion in Great Britain was brought to the highest quarters in Germany.
Q Mr. Dahlerus, one question. Were these friends of yours members of the English Parliament?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Stahmer.
Q What were their names?
A May I save time and hand in the list of names to the Court?
THE PRESIDENT: Their names are not of any great importance, are they, if they were people inthe business world? July, four o'clock in the afternoon, at Karinhall. the necessity to take such actions that no risk of war might occur. Goering doubted if these observations may not refer to an attempt on the British side to bluff and also emphasized that he was of the opinion that Great Britain wanted to control developments on the Continent.
at our disposal for such a meeting. I left on the 19th of July for
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, can't you take the witness on, in order to save time, to the actual negotiations?
All these Can't you take him on to the actual negotiations?
DR. STAHMER: I can, yes. He is about to speak of the
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q If the witness could please describe that meeting. You were about to say that on the 19th of July you flew to London.
Did you there meet Lore Halifax on the 20th?
Q I consider this report essential. Could you please tell us about that?
What took place during this conference with Lord Halifax?
to participate, but His Majesty's Government would, with interest, follow the results of the meeting.
The meeting took place at wife.
Seven Britishers, Goering, Bodenschatz, and Dr. Schoettl were
Q On what day was this?
10 o'clock. The meeting started, and Goering invited the Britishers to put any questions they liked.
Thereafter a long discussion took Munich.
The British representatives emphasized the necessity of possible.
The conference ended late at night, and next morning the to four nations, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany.
I went
Q Were British members of Parliament present at this meeting?
Q Has a report been given to Lord Halifax about this visit?
continue as before?
political questions. On the 23rd I was requested by a phone call from Goering early in the morning, 10.
30, if possible to come to
Q Was the danger of the situation discussed?
A Yes. Goering mentioned that in the meantime the situation
Q Then when did you meet Goering?
A I arrived in Berlin on the 24th and saw Goering at 2 o'clock
Q What took place in your conference?
Germany was perfectly prepared to reach an understanding with England?
A Yes. Goering explained that Germany was anxious to come to
Q When did you leave for London?
Q Was this trip undertaken with Hitler's understanding?
Q With whom then did you have a discussion in London on the 25th?
A Before the evening. It was late in the afternoon, 6.30, with
Q What did Halifax tell you then?
and Henderson was expected in London on Saturday, the 26th. Then he opened, a settlement should be possible.
He thanked me for what I call with Goering?
Q What did you say?
A I tried at 8 o'clock in the evening to get him on the was it possible to establish connection.
Goering then told me that
Q Did you inform Lord Halifax of this conversation?
A Yes. Mr. Roberts, from the Foreign Office, obtained what was the content of that discussion?
A I met Lord Halifax on Saturday, the 26th, at 11 o'clock.
prevent war?
Q What suggestion did you make to Lord Halifax?
Q Did he agree to your proposal?
out the desire of His Majesty's Government to obtain a peaceful
Q Did you then fly back to Berlin with this letter?
A Yes. I reached Berlin in the evening and met Goering about 10 o'clock in the evening.
conference with Goering regarding your conference with Halifax?
headquarters. I told him about conditions in London and emphasized to avoid a crisis.
After having explained to him, I handed him the letter.
He tore it open, and after having read through it, he put to inform Hitler of the letter.
I followed him in the car to Berlin, and exactly at 12 o'clock midnight he stopped outside the Reichkanzlei, morning of the 27th of August?
Did you have a conference with Hitler?
of German policy. It lasted about twenty minutes, and I thought that no useful purpose would be served by my visit.
At a suitable England and the British people.
Afterwards, he started to explain to me how well the armed forces of Germany had been equipped.
He in a very excitable stage and told me that, if it same to war, "I will build U boats, U boats, U boats--U boats I will build," and he seemed to be speaking as if he didn't realize somebody was present.
After he would build and he would win the war.
After a while he calmed down and began to speak about England and said, Mr. Dahlerus, tell me Government.
You seem to know England so well, you might be able to explain?
I hesitated, but told him that with my intimate knowledge
A The conversation went on. He gave me a long resume about to go ever to London at once and explain his viewpoints.
I naturally that I should came over I was prepared to go.
The condition was, proposals that he wanted to make.
We spent an hour and a half, during
Q What specific proposals did you make?
A In condensed form, they are as follows:
(1) German to sign a pact or alliance with Great Britain.
(2) England was to help Germany to obtain Danzig and to obtain Corridor, (3) Germany pledged herself to care for Poland's populace.
(4) An agreement should be reached about Germany's colonies.
(5) Adequate provisions should be made for the treatment of the German minority in Poland.
(6) Germany pledged herself to defend the British Empire with the German Wiermacht whenever the former might be attacked.
Q Regarding point (2), was not Poland assured that it would have a free harbor in Danzig?
A Yes. That is true. This is only a condensed form of the proposals, of course.
Q Is it true that Poland did have a free harbor?
Q What was the further course of this conversation? with London, and met Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Horace Wilson, and Sir Alexander Cadogan.
Q This is or the 27th of August, is that not so?
A The 27th of August, at Downing Street No. 10. Chamberlain?
A We discussed the proposals made in great detail. On certain points, as will be seen from the blue books, these proposals differed from these made to Henderson. I therefore suggested to the British Government, if they had full confidence in me as an intermediary, they should tell me how far they could accept he proposals or not, and I should go back to Berlin the same day and discuss the British viewpoints with Hitler and Goering. They should retain Henderson in London until Monday so that their reply could be given after they knew how Hitler viewed the British standpoint. adegan?
had a long conversation with Cadogan.
Q Did you receive specific proposals from him?
Q What were they? respectable way with the various points. Naturally, point (6), the offer of defending the British Empire, was turned down. Similarly, they refused to discuss colonies before Germany had demobilized, and in reference to the boundaries of Poland, they wanted these boundaries to be carried by five great powers: Russia, Germany, England, Prance and Italy. Poland.
In reference to point (8), rather to point (1), England was in principle willing to come to some agreement with Germany.
Q Did you then return to Germany with these proposals? promised to send Henderson back the same day, and obtaining confirmation from Berlin that they agreed with Henderson's delay in returning on Monday, I left that evening and arrived shortly before midnight at Berlin.
Q Did you then immediately have a conversation with Goering?
A I met Goering about 11:10 on Sunday evening and told him about the results.
Q Can you describe that conversation a little more exactly? events during recent years, he could hardly expect Great Britain to be satisfied with the Corridor of Poland. And in reference to the colonial question, I explained to him that any British Government trying to force this point in Parliament as long as Germany's forces were mobilized would be bound to fall at once. Britain, or the British Empire, wouldprefer to look after their own interests.
In the end, he said that it would be better if he saw Hitler alone. He left for Reichskenzlei and I went back to my hotel.
About 1:00 on Monday morning, the 28th, I received a telephone call that Hitler accepted the British viewpoints subject to the reply Henderson gave the next day would in general be the same as I had given.
Q Did you not then, on the same evening, talk to the English Ambassador?
A Yes. I went straight to the British Ambassador and reported to Sir George Ogilive Forbes the results of my conversation with Goering and he cabled to London.
Q Did you inform Goering of what happened during that conversation? intended to do so it was with full knowledge of the German Government that I discussed it with Forbes.
Q When did you then meet Goering next?
Q Wasn't this Tuesday?
A No, Monday morning. It was Monday morning, the 28th.
Q What took place during this conversation with Goering? the fact that Forbes had cabled to London.
Q Did you then visit Forbes again?
Q Then on Tuesday you met Goering again, Tuesday morning? or just after midnight, 1:15, on the 29th, I received a telephone call from the Reichskanzlei on the request of Goering, from Oberstleutnant Konrad, that Henderson had given his written reply and this was most satisfactory and there was every hope that there would be no risk of war. me his great pleasure that things had developed so well.
Q Didn't he make a statement as follows: We want peace and peace is assured? again by Goering. Why?
A I was at my hotel late in the evening, about 10:30. I was called up by Forbes, who told me he had to see me at once. He came to my hotel and explained that a meeting between Hitler and Henderson on Tuesday evening had been most unsatisfactory and they departed after a great quarrel. And he asked me what I could suggest under the circumstances. asked me to come to his house in Berlin. He told me the same thing, and seemed very upset at developments. He showed me the German reply to the British note and went through it carefully and tried to explain the reasons for the formulation of the note. In the end he asked me at once to proceed to London again and try to explain this unfortunate incident to the British Government, and if it is not, by explaining that Hitler was busy on a proposal to Poland that probably would be ready the next day.
a new visit to England, I left on Wednesday morning, 5 o'clock. Immediately after my arrival in London I met the same members of His Majesty's Government.
Q Whom did you meet there?
A I met some of the members, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Halifax, Mr. Horace Wilson, and Cadogan.
Q What took place during the conversation? suspicious, and rather inclined to feel that whatever efforts were made from their side nothing would prevent Hitler from declaring war on Poland. The British Government did everything they could. They sent their ambassador to Warsaw to request the Polish Government to do everything they possibly could to avoid incidents along the border, but they explained to me that it was hardly fair to expect the Polish Government to send delegates to Berlin to negotiate after the experience the other countries had had during recent years when they had been on similar missions to Berlin. of trying to persuade him to arrange for a meeting outside of Germany for the delegates, but he only said that this was impossible; that Hitler was in Berlin and the meeting had to take place in Berlin. They indicated proposals to Poland, but members of the British Government viewed these proposals with great suspicion. The Polish government was going to have a meeting in the afternoon, and cable results to Berlin. In the meantime I returned to Berlin.
Q When did you meet Goering there?
THE PRESIDENT: Could you make this a little bit shorter, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: Since these are very essential matter, I believe it is being shortened as much as possible, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dahlers, the Tribunal wishes you to get to the crucial matters as soon as possible.
THE WITNESS: Well, I met Goering just after a midnight on a Wednesday. He first informed me about the proposal made to Poland, and he showed me the note. I telephoned Forbes to obtain results. He then told me that Ribbentrop had refused to give him the note after he had read the proposal. I immediately told Goering that it would be impossible to treat an Ambassador of an empire like that, and suggested he should allow me to telephone Forbes, and to give Forbes the contents of the note on the telephone. I did this about one o'clock on Thursday morning.