It would not have had anything to do with our chances.
Q What about robot attacks. Were there any robot attacks after January 1945? I have just set forth that as long as the fight was going on, we had to give return blows and as a soldier I can only regret that we did not have enough of these V-1's and V-2's, for this was the only means which perhaps would bring about an easing of the situation of the enemy attacks on our cities, if we were able to use reprisals against them. was the head of the German government, was there? solely and alone the war leadership. As long as the enemy threatened us with the fact that he would accept only unconditional capitulation, I fought up until the last breath, for that was the only thing that was left to me to perhaps have a chance to turn fate, even though it looked hopeless. to stop had no means to stop it except revolution or assassination of Hitler, did they?
AA revolution changes a situation: that is, if the revolution is successful. The murder or assassination of Hitler at that period of time, say January 1945, would have brought about my succession. If the opponent had given me the same answer, an unconditional surrender and those terrible conditions which had been handed out, I would have continued fighting under all circumstances.
Q There was an attack on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944? whereby he turned over the presidency to your co-defendant Admiral Doenitz. You know about that?
A That is correct. I read of this testament here.
to Admiral Doenitz, I call your attention to this statement: "Goering and Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole nation by secret negotiations with the enemy which they conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes and by illegally attempting to seize power in the state for themselves." offices of the state.
A I can only reply for myself. What Himmler did I do not know. with even one foreign soldier. This will or this document of the Fuehrer's rests on an unfortunate mistake and a mistake which grieves me that the Fuehrer could believe in his last hours that I would ever be disloyal to him. It all rests on a mistake of the transmission and perhaps on a wrong picture which Bormann gave to the Fuehrer. I never thought for a minute to take ever power illegally or to act against the Fuehrer in any way.
Q In any event you were arrested and expected to be shot?
such thing, as for example, the Reichstag fire of the 27th off February 1933. There was a great purge following that fire, was there not, in which many people were arrested and many people were killed? of the Reichstag fire other than those who were convicted through a court. The othertwo were exonerated, and it was not as you believed the other day, that we incriminated Thaelmann as a Communist leader. He was also exonerated as well as a Bulgarian man by the name of Dimitrov. Arrests did take place in connection with the Reichstag fire, but they were comparatively few. The arrests which you refer to are the arrests of Communist functionaries, and I have stated repeatedly, and wish to emphasize at this point, they were completely independent of this fire, and would have been arrested nevertheless; the fire just accelerated their arrest, and some of the functionaries escaped. time of the Reichstag fire of persons who should be arrested, did you not? We had established those lists prior, and they were entirely independent of the Reichstag fire.
Q They were immediately put into execution?--the arrests, I mean, after the Reichstag fire? have then go through regular channels, the Fuehrer wished to take care of those matters during the night and immediately to have all those arrests made at that time.
Q You and the Fuehrer not at the fire, did you not? had theretofore listed? established several days prior, but the action of immediate arrest took place that same night. I would rather have waited a few days, then some of the more important men would not have been able to escape.
Hindenburg suspending the provisions of the constitution which we have discussed here, was it not?
Q Who was Karl Ernst? the SA leader or fuehrer of Berlin.
Q And who was Helldorf?
Q And Heines?
A Heines was the SA leader of Silesia at that period of time; I must stress that point. ing that these three burned the Reichstag and that you and Goebbels planned and furnished the incendiary materials consisting of liquid phosphorus and petroleum which was deposited at a subterranean passage by you for them to get, which passage led from your house to the Reichstag Building. You knew of such a statement, did you not?
AA statement by the SA leader Ernst I do not know; but I do know that a story was published in the foreign press by the chauffeur of Roehm. This happened after 1934. was there not? the palace of the Reichstag president. There is a chamber for coal cars to pass through, coal which was needed in the central heating system. and without a chance to tell his story, wasn't he?
A That is not correct. The Reichstag fire took place in February 1933. Ernst was shot on the 30th of June of 1934. Together with Roehm he had prepared a putsch against the Fuehrer. He had quite a bit of time to make statements regarding the Reichstag fire if he had wished to do so.
Q Well, he had begun to make statements, hadn't he, and you were generally being accused of burning the Reichstag? You knew that, didn't you? That was the . . .
press, that alleged that I fired the Reichstag; but that did not concern me because it was not consistent with the facts; it was not of advantage to me to fire the Reichstag. I am sorry from the point of view of art that the building was burned, and did not wish to construct a new one; but I was sorry. But I was forced to find a new meeting place for the Reichstag meetings, and since I did not find one my Kroll Opera building, the second state opera, had to be used for that purpose. And it seems to me that the opera was much more important there than the Reichstag. joking?
A No. I used a joke, if that is the one you are referring to, in that I said I would not wish to rival Nero. It will soon be said that I appeared in a red toga carrying a lyre in my hand and stood opposite the fire and played, and that was the joke. But the fact was that I almost died in the flame, and that would have been very unfortunate for the German people but very fortunate for her opponents.
Q You never stated then that you burned the Reichstag?
A No. I knew that Mr. Rauschnigg, as I later heard, said in his book that fires were started in various places and that I had discussed this possibility with him. I only saw him twice, and that was very briefly, in my entire life. If I had fired the Reichstag I would have let that known to just ve* very few people, but I would not have told it to a man whom I did not know at all and about whom I can not tell you today how he locked. I would not have uttered any statements to him. That is an absolute distortion of the fact.
Q Do you remember the luncheon on Hitler's birthday in 1942 at the Kasino, the officers' mess, at the headquarters of the Fuehrer in East Prussia?
Q You don't remember that. I will ask that you be shown the affidavit of General Franz Halder, and I call your attention to his statements which may refresh your recollection. I read it:
"On the occasion of a common meal on the birthday of the Fuehrer in 1942, the people around the Fuehrer turned the conversation to the Reichstag Building and its artistic value. I heard with my own ears when Goering shouted.
that everything that is written down here is utter and complete nonsense.
It says the only one who knows the Reichstag--I am that one; but the Reichstag was known by every representative in the Reichstag. The fire was in the central arena, and hundreds of thousands of people knew it as well as I did. An utterance of that type is utter nonsense. How Halder came to make that statement is entirely un-understandable, to me, and I can not feature how he would make such a statement.
Q Can you tell us what position he held in the German Army?
A I know it very well. He was chief of the General Staff of the Army, and I repeatedly pointed out to the Fuehrer, after the war started, to find a chief who knew something about such matters.
Q Now, the Roehm purge you have left a little indefinite. What was it that Roehm did for which he was shot? What acts did he commit? be killed, Also, he wished to start a revolution which was chiefly concerned against the Army, the Officer Corps, and everything else which he considered to be reactionary.
Q And you had evidence of that fact? to tell his story as you are telling yours, was he?
A That is correct. He wanted to bring about an act of a revolutionary nature, and the Fuehrer considered it correct and right to choke back this thing in its beginning; not through a court, but through a beating-down of this revolt from the beginning. the arrest of Reohm, ever published?
Q Who physically killed, if you know, Roehm?
A That I don't know, who personally carried out this action.
Q To what organization was the order given?
A That I don't know. The shooting of Reohm was decreed by the Fuehrer and not through me, for I was competent--had my jurisdiction in northern Germany.
Q Andwho took into custody those who were destined to concentration camps, and who were taken in?
gated; those who had not been incriminated too strongly and about whom we did not know how far they were initiated into the plans or were not initiated. Some of these people were taken in right away and some of them were released later on. Just how many were arrested at that time I can not tell you. The arrests were made by the police.
Q The Gestapo, you mean? Dachau in 1935 there must have been a very much larger number arrested, since you say many were released. Do you know the number that were arrested? or the number of arrests which were considered necessary, for I was not concerned with that matter; my responsibility ended on the date when the revolt was beaten down. I understood Milch a little differently, and sent a note to my counsel to show or clarify through a question or through a motion whether Milch meant by this seven hundred people that he saw seven hundred people who had been arrested or seven hundred with the members of their families. But to clarify this statement we would have to question Milch again, for I believe five, six, or seven hundred to be far too high for the total people who were arrested in connection with the Roehm purge. was one of your political opponents, was he not? of Germany? motivated me for requesting the Fuehrer to stop this action, for in my opinion Klausner was not innocently . . . and had disagreed with him in December 1932 -- Strasser was killed, was he not?
A Strasser was not, as we say, the second man after Hitler. He had an extraordinary important role before the taking over of power, that is, within the Party, but before the taking over of power he was banned from the Party.
Strasser was participating in this revolt, and he was also shot. on the list yet to be killed you intervened and asked to have it stopped; is that correct?
A No, that is not entirely correct. I thought I had made myself clear, and I repeat not when there were just two left I intervened, but when I saw that many were shot who were not concerned with this matter at that point I intervened; and when I did so two personalities were left who had participated strongly and whose shooting the Fuehrer had decreed, one of whom the Fuehrer considered one of the chief instigators and about whom he was very, very much upset. I wish to say I said to the Fuehrer, "Dispense with executing these two men and stop the whole thing immediately," and it is to be understood that my statement is to be understood that way.
Q What date was that? Did you fix the time?
A Yes, I can give you a definite time. As far as I recall the decisive day was Saturday evening between six and seven. The Fuehrer arrived by plane from Munich, and my request for stopping the action is to be placed on Sunday, between two and three in the afternoon. they ever brought to trial?
A No. One, as far as I remember, was taken into a concentration camp, and the other was temporarily taken into a sort of house custody, if I remember correctly. a man who had a serious and definite aim; that he was not content with the defeat of Germany and with the Versailles Treaty; do you recall that? not quite follow the question. I wonder if you would care to repeat it?
Q Maybe it is the question that is inadequate. When you met Hitler, as I understand your testimony, you found a man with a serious and definite aim, as you said, in that he was not content with the defeat of Germany in the previous war and was not content with the Versailles Treaty.
say things in that order. I did set forth that I noted that Hitler had a definite view of the impotency of protest; and as a second point that he was of the opinion that Germany should be freed from the peace of Versailles. It was not only Adolf Hitler, every German, every patriotic German had the same feeling, and since I was a glowing patriot as a glowing patriot I felt that the shame of Versailles was unbearable, and I identified myself with the man who thought the same as I, who saw the results which would come through Versailles, and that he perhaps would take the right way to set this Treaty of Versailles aside. But everything that was said in the Treaty of Versailles, if I may say so, was just empty chatter.
notoriously, it was the position of the Nazi Party that the Versailles Treaty must be set aside and that protest was impotent for that purpose? us in his movement, to free Germany of the shock of Versailles; by that we meant, not from the total Treaty but from those terms which were strangling Germany and which were to strangle Germany in the future.
Q And to do it by war, if necessary?
A We did not even debate about those things at that time. We debated only about the first condition, whether everyone else talked about the peace of Versailles, but we Germans always speak about the Dictate of Versailles. The first question was to achieve and establish a different political structure for Germany which would enable Germany to object against the Dictate and not only a protest, an objection, but objection of such a nature which would actually be considered.
Q That is it: that was the means; the means was the reorganization of the German State but your aim was to get rid of what you call a "Dictate of Versailles?" continued period of time would make German life impossible and that was the aim; and in that connection, we did not say we shall have to have a war and defeat our enemies; this was the aim, and the methods had to be adapted to the political situation. became members of the Nazi Party, gave to Hitler all power to make decisions for them and agreed in their oath of office to give him obedience?
AAgain, I had several questions put to me. I am now coming to question one. The battle against the Dictate of Versailles was, for me, the most decisive factor in my joining the Party -- for others, other points may have been more vital and may have beendecisive for them; for the Fuehrer, to give him all power, that was not a condition to get rid of Versailles but was motivated through our conception of the leadership principle; to give him our oath was, under the then existing conditions, a matter of course, that is, to give him cur oath before he became Head of the State -- those of as who considered themselves his inner leadership circle.
I do not know and I cannot tell you just how the giving of the oath before the taking over of power was carried through. The only thing I can tell you about is what I did. After a certain period of time, after I got to know the Fuehrer and his personality, I gave him my hand and told him "I wish to lock my fate with yours, come what may, for better or for worse; if it means my head, my head is included, "and that is included today, here. will be quite willing to lot you give your version of this thing. In the first place, you wanted a stronger German State to overcome the conditions of Versailles. set aside Versailles, the State had to be strong, for a weak State was never listened to; that, we knew from experience.
Q And the Fuehrer's principle you adopted because you thought it would serve the ends of a strong State? modify the conditions of Versailles was a public and notorious aim in which the people generally joined -- it was one of your best means of getting people to join with you, was it not?
in my opinion, was for its modification and there was no doubt that this was a strong inducement for joining the party. here and -- for the record -- there is no doubt in your mind, is there, that Adolf Hitler is dead?
Q And the same is true of Goebbels? whom I trust completely, who told me that he witnessed Goebbel's death.
Q And you have no doubt of the death of Himmler, have you? the more certain, for he died in your internment. I was not there,
Q You have no doubt of the death of Heydrich, have you?
Q And probably of Bormann?
A I am not absolutely certain in this connection. I have no proof. I do not know but I assume so. mentioned as being responsible -- Hitler for everything; Goebbels for inciting riot against the Jews; and Himmler, who deceived Hitler (this morning); and Bormann who misled him about his will?
A His influence on the Fuehrer varied with time. The chief influence on the Fuehrer was, if I may mention influence on the Fuehrer at all, was up until the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, and that chief influence was I. Then my influence gradually decreased up until 1943, and from 1943 on it decreased speedily. All in all, I do not believe anyone had anywhere near the influence on the Fuehrer that I had, beyond or outside of myself.
If there was influence from the beginning, in certain directions Goebbels, with whom the Fuehrer was together quite a good deal --this influence varied temporarily and would be light at certain points and was increasingly large in the last four years.
A certain influence before the taking over of power -- Hess had influence before the taking over of power and after the taking over of power, and that is in his special field only. In the course of years Himmler's influence grew; after the end of 1944, this influence decreased rapidly and the decisive influence during the war on the person of Hitler and especially from the year 1942 on, after Hess had been eliminated in 1941, and after a year had elapsed, that was influence by Bormann, but this was a disastrously strong influence. It was possible only since after the 20th of July, the Fuehrer had a very strong mustrust and Bormann was with him constantly and told him everything, pictured everything to him. That, in a rather sketchy way, I described the personalities who had influence on Hitler at one time or another temporarily.
to monitoring the telephone conversations of public offices and others inside and outside of Germany, did you not?
A I have said that I had a detective system which "monitored", as you said, the telephone conversations of important foreigners to and from abroad, telegrams, wireless communications, which not only came from Germany and went into foreign countries, but those that went through Germany. Monitory of all phone conversations was; first, of all important foreigners; second, important firms; and third, personalities who for any reason were being supervised for political or police reasons. this office, which was to monitor the telephone conversations, had to have my personal permission, and uncontrollable monitoring was possible and is possible. We are aware that is being done today.
Q You kept the results of those reports to yourself, did you not?
A No, it was as follows. These reports which the Fuehrer's office was interested in were released to the Fuehrer's office. Those reports which were important to the Fuehrer went to the Fuehrer, and those reports which were important to the military went to the Ministry of War, or to the air ministry, or whichever ministry might be involved. There was a man who was responsible that these secret reports went to the chief office. I could decree that these reports would be for my own knowledge and no one else would come into possession of them. who wanted to get possession of this instrument, did you not?
A That is correct. It is correct that the police were interested in getting this instrument into their hands, but they did not receive it, and perhaps now and then they did some similar monitoring, but the decisive monitoring which was done through my authority, that I could only decree. of the defendants in this case, have you not?
was not responsible, necessarily, to carry out the plans of the Nazi Party? facts which have been proven, and if these assertions are mentioned, I must say that quite a few acts were not necessary. beyond the scope of the principle of the Nazi Party? without proof or reference to my records.
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for the Defendant Goering): Mr. President, I object to that question. I do not believe that judgment in such a general scope can be answered.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks that the question is somewhat too wide. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: certain injustices which you considered in the Treaty of Versailles, and I ask you whether it is not the fact that your program went considerably beyond any matter dealt with in that Treaty? concerned with the Treaty of Versailles. as follows:
"The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of the German nation. They did not represent either a defense of the past nor did they represent a power in the future. The German people were not supported .. nor do these battles appear, from a militarystandpoint, appropriate or militarily fair."
That is all true,is it not? exactly as you have read it. I assume what you have read is correct, but we are concerned here with a notation in a public work and not with a party program a part of Germany before the first WorldWar and had not been taken from Germany in the first war, is that correct?
Versailles only since, in this case, such determination which had been proclaimed had been influenced upon after it was denied. Slovakia. These were not taken by Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, nor were they part of Germany before the first World War?
Austria. As far as we are concerned with Bohemia and Moravia before the Versailles Treat , they were not considered part of the German land, but before that time they were connected with the German Reich. everything else. Were those territories not taken? Those territories, with the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain could have become German property through the determination right of the people. Hitler's conviction that the United States would never go to war even if they were attacked, and he thought the isolationists of that country would keep it out of any war? why I refused, from the beginning, to give my oath before the German interrogatories without having seen the German notes so that I could determine whether these translations were correct. Only once, during these interrogations, did I receive a copy, a correct transcript of what I said, and I signed it page by page. This was a Russian transcript. And I know those pages.
I would like to clarify this statement. I said that the Fuehrer said that he did not believe in the beginning that America would intervene in the war, but I, on the other hand, from the beginning, was of the opinion that America, under any circumstance, would intervene in the war.
Q Do you know Wannegrinn?
Q You talked with him about this ubject, have you not?
AAbout the subject of America entering the war, no. I talked about other matters. didn't you?
A I didn't tell him any such nonsense. For we had one democracy as our chief enemy, and that was England, which we were fighting at that time, and I spoke to him when the war with England was in full swing.
correctly that there were at all times two basic ideas in Hitler's mind, either to ally himself with Russia and seek increase in living space through the acquisition of colonies, or to ally himself with Britain and seek acquisition of territories in the east. But in view of his orientation, he would very much preferred to ally himself with Great Britain, is that true?
A That is correct. I would like to refer to the book "Mein Kempf," where these things were established by Hitler. regardless of any treaty limitations, did you not?
Q All right; tell us when you started. made by Hitler; that is, after our departure from the disarmament conference. He made several suggestions to limit, but these suggestions were not taken seriously, and at that point he undertook to rearm. At the end of 1933 some slight preparations were started by me as far as air was concerned, and perhaps in the direction of a uniformed police I took over the auxiliary police, but I had the responsibility for that personally. state affair. It was your personal affair. What do you mean by that?
A I beg your pardon. Not the auxiliary police: of the Schutzpolizei. By that we meant we had a police which wore uniforms, which was concerned with police matters, of punishing; and, second, which were grouped in formations whicn were at disposal but which were not created by us which were assisting when we took over power. But these were in units, and the armed Schutzpolizei had barracks. I made and strengthened a military instrument out of that branch, in that I took them, removed them from police duties, trained them militarily, and gave them heavier munitions. I meant that that was my responsibility. These formations were taken into the Wehrmacht as regular parts of the Wehrmacht. day of October, 1945. I will first read you the questions and answers as they appear in the interrogation, and I shall then ask you whether you gave those answers, and then you can make the explanations if you desire, I assume.
The interrogations reads: the period. When was the armament program first discussed, that is, the rearmament program? What year?
Answer: Immediately; in 1933.
Question: In other words, Schacht had assumed the obligation at that time already to raise funds for the rearmament program?
Answer: Yes. But, of course, in cooperation with the Minister of Finance.
Question: During the years 1933 to 1935, before general conscription came in, naturally, the rearmament was a secret rearmament, was it not?
Answer: Yes Question:
So that monies that were used outside of the budget would have to be raised by some secret means not to be known to foreign nations?
Answer: Yes, unless they could be raised from normal army funds.
Question: That is to say, you had a small budget for the standing 100,000-man army which was pen, and the rest of the rearmament had to be from secret sources?
Answer: Yes. substance?
A Just about; generally correct. I have to say, though, first, I was asked as to when rearmament had been discussed, not when it had been started. It had, of course, been discussed already in the year 1933, because we were sure at once that something had to be carried out different by our government than others. That is to say, demands that the others disarm, and, if they do not disarm, that we should rearm. These things required discussion. The conclusion of the discussion and reorganization into a clear order was carried out after all attempts to disarm the others had failed. As soon as the Fuehrer had recognized that his proposals were not being accepted under any circumstances, of course a gradual rearmament got underway. He had no reason about whatever we did in the way of armament to inform the world about it.