A When von Hindenberg put the condition I here mentioned, that Mr. von Neurath would have to become Foreign Minister the Fuehrer was very wellsatisfied with this condition and agreed readily.
He was satisfied with this appointment for the reason that he saw this task was in good hands; that von Neurath would keep good connections and von Neurath made every effort to do so.
QI would like to put questions of a different nature to you now.
Were you present at the meeting of the Reichscabinet on the 30 of January, 1937, during which Hitler gave a Golden Party decoration to those who were not members of the Party?
AYes, I was present.
QAnd do you know that at the same time Hitler said that it was purely a decoration such as the bestowing of an order and these gentlemen were not to be taken into the Party or were not to have obligations toward, the Party just because they received this decoration?
AI would not put it just that way. The Fuehrer said simultaneously since it was the anniversary of the taking ever of power it was his intention to show his confidence to those members of the Reichscabinet and these who did not belong to the Party and he would like to show it in that way and I believe he used the words, "I would ask you to take this Party emblem." At that time he mentioned as far as he was concerned that he considered it an order and that he intended to, and which he later did do, develop this order further. The first level of this order was to be the Golden Party emblem. Simultaneously he stepped up to the various ministerss and gave them this emblem. He neither emphasized herewith that they should or should not consider themselves members of the Party nor did he emphasize that they were not Party members.
When he came to von Elz, this gentleman asked whether with this acceptance he would commit himself with certain clerical circles. The Fuehrer hesitated for a minute and said, "You do not wish to do that?" Then von Elz said, "I do not wish to express myself that way. I just wanted to add a reservation to my taking this emblem." The Fuehrer was taken aback, turned around and left the room.
In this connection it is not correct that von Elz resigned voluntarily because of this.
I left immediately after the Fuehrer and followed him and felt as all the other gentlemen that it was rather strange on the part of the Fuehrer since membership in the Party was not the topic of conversation.
In addition, and this is very important, the Fuehrer had the plan to divide the Ministry of Transportation and to resurrect the old Postal Ministry and to take the expert of railroads, Dortmueller into the Ministry of Transportation. The Fuehrer had told me this previously and left it to me to tell von Elz this gradually and in a diplomatic way.
At this point I said, "von Elz, your behaviour is impossible and I believe the only thing for you to do is to resign at this point." He said, "I do not mean it that way" and he did not wish to resign. I was equally abrupt with him as he was and asked him to resign that same evening since Secretary Meissner told me to see him again and that it was expedient for him to leave the cabinet and resign immediately. Then I made the remark as to the postal authorities and the railroads which I have made.
That was the significance of the Golden Party emblem at that conference.
QWitness, were you present when Hitler, on the 11 of March, 1938, in the evening, told von Neurath about the marching of troops into Austria and told him the reasons for this move and asked that the Foreign Ministry be informed of that because he himself was leaving?
AI mentioned in my remarks about Austria that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop was not present. Since the Fuehrer had given the Reich leadership to me I had asked him to ask von Neurath to put him knowledge of foreign matters at my disposal. Von Neurath was asked to come to the Reichschancellory I believe it was in the evening. I rather read scope the Fuehrer told him what you have just outlined. It was as follows:
If I needed it and requested it he was to advise me on foreign matters for it was to be expected that some foreign political matters would occur, such as pretests and notes, which would come in during the absence of the Fuehrer. As long as the Foreign Minister was not present and since I was not versed in diplomatic matters and notes I needed such advice.
QThen it was to follow that von Neurath was not the deputy of the Foreign Minister but just in his absence was to serve as an adviser to you?
A He was not the deputy of the Foreign Minister; that would not have been in keeping with his position and his rank.
The deputy of the Foreign Minister was the acting State Secretary; I believe it was Mackensen. He was the one who signed all correspondence and so forth and in the absence of the Foreign Minister was only at my disposal in such foreign political matters as were expected to come up in the absence of the Foreign Minister.
QYou know of the protest which came in on the 11 of March, 1938, from the British Ambassador and which was addressed to von Neurath in which the British Ambassador protested against the marching in of German troops?
AThat is not extraordinary or unusual. On the evening of the marching in of the troops I personally, as I have already said, conversed with the British Ambassador and told him on that occasion that the Fuehrer was going to Austria the next day; that I would administer the Reich and for that purpose would consult von Neurath as a foreign political adviser whom I had requested. Henderson had made hints that there would be protests forthcoming. Therefore, I wished to inform the British Ambassador the evening before and from this piece of information we can see that he then turned to von Neurath, since I had emphasized to him that -- "If you come around with your notes of protest I personally cannot do very much in that connection."
QDid von Neurath, after the Foreign Ministry had formulated the answer to the protest, notify you by telephone of this procedure and did he ask you whether you would sanction and sign this reply as the deputy of Hitler?
AThat, of course, is so because I was the Deputy Head of State. He had to show me the reply and it is also a matter of course that I told him, "Sign the note for as Deputy Head of State I cannot sign diplomatic notes in that capacity."
QThank you very much.
BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Political Leadership Corps):
QWitness, in what connection and how far did the political leaders know of the intentions as for as foreign relations were concerned? How far in advance were they informed by the Fuehrer?
APolitical leaders is a very comprehensive concept. It includes everyone from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter or Zellenleiter, and as to informing the entire body as far as foreign political matters are concerned, such an informing never took place and it could not take place since the Fuehrer made no utterances except the public ones which he made over the radio to the entire people.
On the position of these political leaders, they were never called in one body to discuss political intentions which the Fuehrer had and which he had not already made public. He may have told one or the other of the political leaders who, at the same time, had another position of state, or who was close to him in another way. He might have told such a man of his intention as a personal matter, but I would have to really think about that, in which case it was so.
However, he never spoke to them in general. Retrospectively, after events had taken place, he spoke to the Gauleiters and referred to matters which had taken place, and talked about the political intentions which he, of course, had laready realized at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS:I have no further questions. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for the defendant von Ribbentrop):
QWitness, do you know how much von Ribbentrop knew about military plans and intentions in his capacity as Foreign Minister?
AI do not knew the exact details. In general, I can say the same principle applies, that only those people and officers who were responsible for carrying out the policies were initiated into the plans. Just how much the Fuehrer told von Ribbentrop on occasion about military plans, I did not know.
QIs it correct that Hitler set down the guiding principles of all policies, including foreign policies?
AThat is a matter of course. Foreign policy especially was the Fuehrer's own realm.
By that I mean to say that foreign policy on the one hand, and leadership of the Wehrmacht on the other hand had the greatest interest of the Fuehrer and we re his main work.
QMay I conclude that he was interested in the particulars of foreign policy?
AHe was especially interested in the particulars, as I have already stated, in both of these directions.
QDid Hitler prohibit you from making public the memorandum of the 30th of August, 1939?
AHe did not prohibit me from that expressly, I do not know whether he knew that I had it in my pocket, but generally he prohibited any such publication in that he prohibited the one who was to have given it, and that was von Ribbentrop, from making it public or giving it out, so that I had this memorandum against the express wish of the Fuehrer. I transmitted it, andmy transmitting it was a tremendous risk, and I beg of you not to misunderstand me, I assume this responsibility.
QYou mentioned a few days ago the influence which the various personalities had on Hitler. Do you knew any facts from which we might conclude that von Ribbentrop had no influence on Hitler?
AAs far as influence is concerned, influence on the Fuehrer is something which is very hard to define. I would like to confide myself to the question at hand, the influence of Ribbentrop on the Fuehrer.
As to influence in the sense that von Ribbentrop could have led him or influenced him in any way, that is what he certainly did not have. However, as to arguments of an objective nature set forth about his intentions and how they might, in a decisive way, influence him to do something or not to do it as far as foreign political matters were concerned, or influence him to change his ideas, their influence was dependent on the strength of theargument and of the facts. I cannot answer for the role that anything like that played for I was not present at 99 per cent of the conversations between the Fuehrer and von Ribbentrop.
As to influence in the sense that von Ribbentrop could have said, "Do this," or "Don't do it", I do not consider that he had such influence. If the Fuehrer was convinced of any matter, Ribbentrop never had any influence.
Q Do you know any facts or observations which might point to a con-
spiracy in the upper circles of the government?
A "Conspiracy" may be variously interpreted. In the sense that men would secretly and in the dark have talked about secret plans, that, of course, never took place. As to conspiracy in the sense that the Fuehrer had comprehensive conferences and as a result of these conferences decided to do certain things, you may mention a conspiracy only in that connection, and I beg of you again not to misunderstand me. Through the years, as to those conversations which took place, say, between '41 and '45 between the Fuehrer and myself could have conspired. No one else is concerned.
QAmerican propaganda spoke of the intentions of aggression on the part of Germany toward the Western Hemisphere. What do you know about those facts?
AThe Western Hemisphere? Do you mean America?
QYes.
AEven if Germany had completely dominated Europe, between Germany and the American continent there are, as far as I recall from my geographical background, 6,000 kilometers of water. With the smallness of the German fleet and the continuous lack of ability to cover this distance, the threatening of the American continent was never spoken of. On the contrary, we were always afraid of the danger from the other side and would have been very glad if we had not had to worry about such a danger.
As far as South America is concerned, I know that in that connection in the line of propaganda, we were accused of economic penetration in that direction. If you consider these financial conditions which Germany had before the war and during the war, and compare Germany's conditions with those of Britain or America, we can conclude the impotency of that attitude. With the very little foreign exchange and the tremendous difficulty of export which we had, we could never compete or endanger them. If that had been the case, the altitude ofthe South American countries would have been different. The mark was not the determining factor there, but the dollar.
DR. HORN:Thank you.
BY DR. SIEMER (Counsel for the defendant Raeder):
QThe Prosecution is in possession of the diary of Jodl under the number 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries concerned with the first half of 1940, to which I would like to refer, and on which I would like to have your attitude. These two entries concerned Russia at a time when Germany and Russia were on friendly terms.
These brief entries are as follows -- and I would like to add that the substance of the intentions which are contained in these entries sound rather fantastic, and that is why I would like to have your attitude as the Commas in Chief of the Luftwaffe.
I would like to quote the first entry dated the 13th of February 1940:
"Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated."
The second entry, the 3rd of May, 1940, reads as follows, and I quote verbatim:
"Fuehrer rejects request of the Luftwaffe to set up a listening post in theCaucasus."
I request you to tell me whatthoughts you, as Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, had in connection with these plans and what facts were at the basis of your thoughts and plans.
A If the entry was on the basis of intelligence or reports by Canares, who was the chief of foreign counter-intelligence and if they were entered by Jodl in connection with the special intelligence corps, Brobillion, I would like to say that because of his connection with this corps, to whom he gave counterintelligence or espionage tasks, and this squadron which I wanted to have especially secret but he heard of this.
I told the high command of the Wehrmacht what the intentions of this squadron was. My intention -- and I had personally decreed my intention was a very definite and clear one -- the expression that it was to do reconnaissance in the Caucasus, Syria and Turkey would have been much more correct. But this mistake may have happened in the report being transmitted by Canares. I had received more and more reports or intelligence that in the direction of Asia Minor there were to be enterprises against both Russian oil fields of the Caucasus, in the region of Baku, and so that the transporting of oil to Germany would be interrupted.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe I was the one chiefly interested in the bringing in of Roumanian and other oil, and the oil on the basis of trade agreement was coming in from Russia and the Caucasus. At that time we dad not have any synthetic oil and if there had been any disturbance in one of the importing centres my Luftwaffe would have been damages very heavily. In this connection I had to be extraordinarily alert, following the reports which I had regarding the disturbing of the oil situation in the Caucasus, I had the situation checked and found that in Syria there was an army under General Weygand which had the name, "Orient Army," but I was interested more in the grouping of flight squadrons in the Syrian area, not only French but English squadrons, and besides as a member -- as far as the intentions were, to establish French-British squadrons. I received these reports through confidential information in Turkey because there had been negotiations with Turkey, that is, regarding flying over Turkey, to bomb Baku, to damage the Russian oil fields, and to eliminate them as factors of help to Germany.
This was the British-French intention, I knew, and I was duty-bound to keep myself informed as to what was going on in Syria byitself. There was no purpose in knowing that aircraft were massing there at that point, and at that time. It was no theatre of war. There was no damage from Germany. On the contrary, it could have been understandable if all British and French aircraft had been in those countries, because they were needed there.
Then if my intelligence observed that the airdromes in Syria were reinforced and that reinforcements were always taking place in Turkey, this was an emphasis on the alleged intentions.
If and when I was cognizant of these facts I had to call the attention of these matters to the Fuehrer,that there was danger to Germany from Russia, and the same purpose was served by the second entry, not in the Caucasus but to erect them near the Caucasus. It was intended to have secret radio stations in the direction of the general flight line, Syria, the Caucasus, Baku, East Turkey, to have two or three of these stations to determine whether in these directions preparations and flight by French-British aircraft was being carried out, that is, whether intelligence or reconnaisance on the oil fields was being carried, so that we might have a clear picture in this direction.
At that time I did not have the conclusive and final proof in my hands. I kept everything back on my desk, concerned myself only with the things concerned with my own sector of the Luftwaffe and waited until I could get a clear picture of the whole situation. Later, after the French campaign was concluded, there was a confirmation of those intentions through the finding of confidential reports and reports on the council of war between England and France,that my intelligence had been exactly correct and that an extensive bombardment of the total Russian field was planned and to have it done with lightning rapidity, so that the elimination of the Roumanian oil fields was also planned, the intention had been communicated to the Roumanian Government but it had been prevented.
QI understood you correctly to say that these plans had been made by Britain and France generally and that the intelligence you received was to the effect that the attacks on the oil fields were to be direct against the then neutral Russia, as well as against Germany, because all oil supplies would be out off?
AYes, that is true. BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the S.A.):
QWitness, is it true, as the Prosecution accuses you, that you were leader in the SA?
AI was not Reichsfuehrer of the SA. There was no such position or such title.
In 1923 I was a commandant of the SA which at that time was present only to a varying and small decree in Wurttemburg.
QFor how long were you commandant?
AUp until November, 1923.
QWas that from 1921 -
AFrom the beginning of 1923 to the end of 1923.
QWas the connection between the leadership of the SA with the informing of such people of orders -- how was your influence before 1923 and then after 1923? What influence did you have?
APlease repeat the question.
QWhat was your influence as far as the leadership of the SA was concerned, or the informing -- before1923 and after 1923?
AFrom the beginningof 1923 until November my influence was complete and absolute, that is, I gave my instructions direct. After 1923 I had no intervention and no interference with the SA and did not doit.
QHow was it before 1923? Was the relation before 1923 the same as after?
AI have already mentioned, until November, 1923, I was the commandant of the SA and had the authority to give instructions. After 1923 I had no more authority to give instructions or orders. After 1936 I believe I was connected with the SA in an honorary capacity, but without giving any orders; I had no occasion to give any orders.
QIn the course of your testimony during the last week you referred to the SA people, and you said that they were always ready to make great sacrifices. What was the visible nature of these sacrifices?
ASacrifices of the SA men were that they gave their entire time without being reimbursed, gave their free time to the party; that they did without family life or recreation, so that in the period of our difficult time, when we had trouble at meetings, they were always at the disposal of the party. And I considered this a sacrifice, for the members of the SA were workers and very small people who had very little time, which they really needed for recreation; but they were always ready in every way to serve the party and to serve the ideal of the party.
Q Did these people receive material promises?
ANone at all.
QIs it correct that, after the taking over of power there were Communist provokers who came into the SA?
Is it correct that especially after the taking over of power Communist provokers sneaked into the SA?
AThat was a very strange matter. After the taking over of power we acted against Communists, which they had really expected, and especially in large cities where it was easier large numbers of the organization of the Red Front entered the Party.
It was very easy for then to do that, since the then head of the SA, Roehm, arbitrarily took people into the SA who did not have to be members of the party, a prerequisite which had existed before.
Anyone could have come into the SA without belonging to the Party.
At the same time the German National Party started a political combat organization called the Green Shirts, and just like the Steel Helmets, another organization, they were taken into the SA.
I remember personally one day that four to five hundred of these people assembled at the Wilhelm Strasse to receive their membership in the SA.
I saw these people from my window and noticed that we were concerned with elements which did not belong.
I had some of the Schutzpolizei come up to check.
Ninety-eight per cent of the people had their Red Front certificates in their pockets.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Boehm, the Tribunal considers that this is all cumulative to what the Defendant has already said in his examination in chief.
He has given us a long account of the SA in his examination in chief.
He has added nothing in the course of what he is now saying.
DR. BOEHM:According to the Prosecution, it is stated that the SA was made up of terror gangsters, and I believe myself duty-bound to correct this statement and to clarify this matter.
THE PRESIDENT:That has nothing to do with what I said. It may be that the Prosecution may have said that.
Probably they have. What I was pointing out to you was that the Defendant Goering has been all over this ground in the evidence he has already given and the Tribunal does not wish to hear twice the same evidence.
DR. BOEHM:Yes, this may apply to my first three questions.
BY DR. BOEHM:
QWitness, I would like to ask, how did you influence the SA in connection with the Versailles Treaty?
Did you tell these people that a revolution was to be taken peacefully or by war?
AThis question is unusually difficult to answer. If in 1923 I made a speech before the SA men I could not very well use diplomatic language and talk about diplomacy.
They would not have understood me.
Every little SA man was not concerned with the "how" of things.
That was the problem of the leadership. I didn't say, "I will obligate myself never to have a war for you," that we are completely a pacifist organization, and that we are only interested, in doing away with Versailles for a protest.
But, on the other hand, I did not say either we want to march in war during the next few years.
In reality I did not tell them anything.
I said that they would have to be obedient, to have confidence in the leadership, and to leave it to the leadership just what was to be done, and that anything the leadership would do would be right.
Every SA man knew from my speeches and from my party program how I felt about Versailles, and it was the wish of every decent German to get away from Versailles.
QAccording to your knowledge beyond 1923, let us say from 1921 to 1945, was the SA informed as to the following things, that is, the leadership of the SA as well as each individual member; that the NSDAP intended after the taking over of power to rule other states, to make war with this purpose in mind, and disregard the rules of war and the laws of humanity?
AI do not quite comprehend just how the SA, its leadership, is pictured.
It is impossible that anyone can say, "Listen, we wish to dominate and subjugate all other states," and that anyone can further say that we will always make war, that we will murder and act as inhumanly as possible, and that in no case will we ever pay attention to any law of war.
I cannot imagine that anyone but an insane person would have made utterances of this nature toward the SA or anyone else.
The SA in no form was ever politically informed. The SA was told, "You will march tomorrow or the day after; you will distribute leaflets and pamphlets," and other things.
QDuring the time of the taking over of power there were frequently excesses on the part of the SA.
Were measures of individual members concerned in this, or were these measures according to the decrees of the SA leadership?
ANever, according to the decrees of even the middle or top leading officers.
In an organization of a million young people there will always be a certain percentage of rowdies, especially in large cities, as I mentioned just a little while ago.
There will always be provokers or agents, and individual or particular excesses will occur.
That is entirely inevitable.
QDid the SA leadership sanction special actions of the SA membership?
AI have already stated that I had very little to do with the leadership of the SA.
I don't believe so, however.
QIs it correct that the Police were prohibited from acting against excesses of individuals?
AIn the beginning it wasn't the case. By that I mean, on the contrary, that the police took orders in this direction.
They had strict orders to interfere, and their Police President of Berlin, who wasn't of the Party, Admiral (Retired) von Lewitzon, intervened very strongly, and the intervention may have been the reason that two years later, because of complaints of the Berlin Gauleiter Goebbels, he was replaced by the Fuehrer.
QHow was it later on? I believe you just said, "In the beginning it wasn't so."
Was it different later when the police were prohibited from acting against the SA?
ANo, it is not to be taken that way. The excesses of individual men were always curbed by the police.
Many SA men were convicted.
QIn the Prussian police system, and in the police system the other states had, were SA members used only, or wasn't it that all Germans who at that time wished and volunteered to enter the police system were examined and investigated and used accordingly?
AThere was a cleansing of the police, a cleansing according to our concept, and by that we meant we investigated which elements were very strong for the Party and which were still influenced by hostile parties so that their use was no longer tenable, and these people were no longer used.
But that was a very small percentage, in comparison with the total number of police.
The Schutzpolizei were people who were uniforms.
They were increased, and voluntary applications came from all sides.
Of course the relatives of the existing membership were favored, but many of them were taken in who were not in the organization, and those who came from the organization had to take special adaptability tests that were given them.
Some of them did not make the grade and were not taken.
This is the system as far as I was connected with the police.
What happened later I cannot tell you exactly.
QIs it correct that the SA after 1934 chiefly was used in emergency measures and in physical training, that they were used to shovel snow, to clean up bomb damage, and so forth?
AAfter 1934 the significance of the SA declined tremendously.
It can be understood, for their chief task which they had before the taking over of power did no longer exist after the taking over of power, and they were used in the activities just set forth.
During the war they had a para-military task, and after the war it was to be the chief background for the various military clubs or veterans clubs.
It was to be a melting pot of the various veterans' organizations, and that was to be its final use.
Q Do you know that the Steel Helmets, in an agreement between the Fuehrer and Sauckel, were taken into the SA reserve in a body?
AYes.
QIs it correct that similar to the Steel Helmet organizations, after 1933, through the so-called Gleichschaltung, or coordination, these riding clubs were taken into the SA?
AI believe that is correct.
QWas the SA leadership and its membership before or after 1933, or at any time, informed of the decisions taken in the Cabinet?
AI already said a few minutes ago just how the leadership of the SA was to be considered.
The answer is, of course, no.
QThe Prosecution asserts in connection with aggressive war and the participation of the SA in such a war that the SA took part in this preparation, in that before the war annually 25,000 officers were trained by them in special schools.
Do you have any knowledge of that?
AThe training of officers of the Wehrmacht was handled solely by the Wehrmacht and in Wehrmacht schools, and I cannot understand how the SA would have been technically or militarily in a position to train officers for the Wehrmacht.
In addition, it seems to me that the training of 23,000 officers a year seems to be highly exaggerated as far as the needs of the Wehrmacht were concerned.
It would have been very nice if we had had that many, but it cannot be true that the had this number for several years, and it is no more true than that the SA trained officers.
The training of officers was done by the Wehrmacht solely and alone.
Q Some men seem to have been trained. Can you tell me where these men were trained and for what purpose?
Do you knew anything about Fuehrer schools?
AYes, there were fuehrer schools for every organization. Every organization had its schools where these were trained who in their eyes were to have leading positions. I can only imagine that the Prospectuion is perhaps confusing -- or perhaps wish to say that some of the SA leaders had preliminary military training; that is, they were trained in the reading of charts, but that is beyond the scope of my knowledge.
QMay I ask you to tell me the connection of the "Feldherrnhalle" to the SA and the Wehrmacht? There was a regiment by the name of "Feldherrnhalle." can you tell me the connection:
AAfter the SA had various "Standarten" from the Fuehrer, these units were really military units, as for instance, the "Leibstandarte", the Body Unit. The SA leadership requested to be granted one unit which it might army such as with rifles, so that it might use this unit as a parade unit, and this unit was called "Feldherrnhalle". The SA leader Luetze suggested to the Fuehrer that he make me the head of this unit, as a position of honor. We considered it a position of honor to be the head of such a unit. When I saw this unit for the first time -- I believe at a Party rally at Nurnber - it impressed me especially because there were many selected and very nice looking young men.
I was not grateful to the SA for the position they gave me, for when I saw this beautiful unit I dissolved this unit and took it into the Luftwaffe and made my first paratrooper unit, so that after a brief existence, this unit was a regiment of the Luftwaffe.
I believe that this was rather unpleasant for the SA, and it was quite some time before the SA leader undertook to have another unit by the same none, "Feldherrnhalle", and he made this unit very much smaller, and they stood guard for the top SA leadership, and he did not make me the leader of this unit a second time.
QAccording to my information, personal information I received front an SA gruppenfuehrer and other information which I had through reading, the "Feldherrnhalle" was not armed until it came into the Luftwaffe. Is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. I do not believe I can say under oath, but I believe they received rifles shortly before they were taken into the Luftwaffe, just rifles, but as I said before, I can not tell you exactly.
In this connection, I would also like to mention, because the Prosecution mentioned this point -- I would like to emphasize that this regiment was a paratrooper unit which was used in the action "Gruen" and had been Intended to be used. Since this "Aktion Gruen" -- that is, the Sudetenland -- was Solved peacefully, after the occupation of the Sudetenland, we had maneuvers and had the men jump, but purely for purposes of maneuvers, and this was the landing at Freudeuthal which the Prosecution has mentioned. At that time they landed in blue uniforms, and, as could be easily seen, they were a regiment of the Luftwaffe. As a matter of courtesy, I attended this demonstration.
QIn the war, did the SA ever have a strategic or practical role when it came to the deployment of manpower?
ANo, the SA as such was never used within the Wehrmacht as an SA unit in a tactical or any other way. They were never used in combat. It may be that toward the end in the "Volkssturm", perhaps a few SA men were.
QIs it correct that the SA in the occupation of Austria, of the Sudetenland and the Czech state, that they were operating with the Wehrmacht?
AThat case was handled by the Austrian SA. They were used as auxiliary police. The Austrian Legion, which was in the Reich was, according to my express orders and according to the express wish of Seyss-Inquart, held back and not used and was used only after the absolute consolidation of the Austrian situation and was returned home. How far units of the SA were used in the Sudetenland after the zone was given over to Germany, I do not know. I heard that Sudeten Germans were involved who had to flee prior to that time and who were now returning. When the Czechoslovakian state was occupied, I can not see that closed SA units would have had any part in the marching in of our troops.
QCould the members of the SA have known that possibly, according to the intention of the SA leadership, they might be used for the execution of penal measures?
AI did not quite get the substance of your question.
Q Could the members of the SA know that according to the intention of the SA leadership, they might possibly be used to commit crimes?
AOf crimes, never.
QNow, I have a last question, but I believe that in a certain sense you have already answered that question. Were the members of the SA cognizant of the aims of the SA? Did they know them at any time, or could they be known to them, or should they have been known to them? Or could these men have known that the intention of the SA or of the leadership might be that crimes would have to be done -- things which are considered by the Prosecution as crimes against humanity and against the peace?
AI have already answered these questions.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
DR. BOEHM: Mr. President, I should like you to permit me to ask a few more basic questions, namely, the question of honorary leadership in the SA.
BY DR. BOEHM:
QThere were honorary leaders of the SA, namely, obergruppenfuehrers down to sturmfuehrers. Witness, I should like you to tell me what significance these honorary leadership posts had, particularly in regard to permission to issue orders to the SA, and altogether what its influence could be.
AThe honorary leaders of the SA were appointed by the most heterogeneous sort of standard. They had a loose representative function, that is to say, they functioned and represented, the SA at Party meetings. They were by no means active members of the SA and were not informed of any internal activities of the SA. Their function was purely decorative. BY DR. MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo)
QWitness, can one say that the Gestapo in the year 1933, when it was created by you, was a national-socialist fighting organization or was it rather an administrative organization such as the criminal police or other state organications?
AI emphasized that this is a purely state organization in order to support the police that then existed. At this time there was not even the slightest connection with the Party; the Party had no influence or command-control or any other such thing over the Gestapo. It was exclusively a state institution. The members who were present in it already or who later came into it were ordinary state officials.
QDid this condition change after Himmler took it over, until 1945, so far as you know?
AUntil 1934 it was exactly as I described it, then it became stronger as it was expanded and tock in elements of the SS. But these elements had to pass an examination, then they became officials and remained officials. Then I heard Inter that nothing changed so far as this official character of the members was concerned, but gradually in the course of the years officials, whether they wished it or not, had to take on some rank in the SS; so that leading Gestapo officials who until the year 1939 or 1940 had nothing to do with the SS and who and come from the previous time, that is to say, from previous Weimar police, nevertheless, they remained officials, that is to say, the Gestapo was an insti tution composed of officials.
QDo you know anything about whether or not Himmler, after the seizure of power in his capacity as police president, also had something to do with the leadership of the criminal police in Bavaria?
ASo far as I know and so far as I have already said Himmler was first of all police president of Munich very shortly, one or two weeks, then he called himself police commissar of Bavaria; and after a month or six weeks I don't know what he called himself, what his title was, but de fact he became chief of police of all German countries, with the exception of Prussia.
QYou said previously that the officials of the Gestapo were taken into the SS. Did this happen voluntarily or was some cohersion put on them in order to bring about this membership?
AI heard this only from individual officials whom. I had known before and who knew about this. They were not taken into the SS, but they received an official rank in the SS. It was Himmler's idea that the SS and Gestapo, both of which he was the leader, that they should be amalgamated. What the individual instances were I can not say. Perhaps I did not state this exactly correctly before, but I did to the best of my knowledge.
QYou said before that the officials in the year 1933 from the political police that existed at that time were taken into the state police. Was this done after their voluntary application or were they commanded to do so? -- simply transferred in individual cases? -- or were they agreeable to it?
AIt is not correct for you to say that the officials of the political police were simply incorporated into the Gestapo; rather in this sector, they were, because there was a political police representative there in opposition to us and that situation had to be removed. Subsequently new people came in and the number was considerably enlarged. These new officials were taker, from the other police departments; criminal, political, and other; and as I have already stated were in part brought in from the outside after careful scrutiny of their political orientation. Now, to what extent actual replacements took place, -Mueller, for instance, was replaced, -- that I do not know. I do not believe that there were many such replacements, since I had nothing to do with the Gestapo after I had once established its general policy.