AI must repeat what I said before, namely that the Italian theater of war cannot be compared with the ether theaters of war, and that particularly as far as the cooperation of Hitler and Mussolini was concerned, there was a great deal of understanding all around, and therefore, these orders made by OKW can not simply be applied to the Italian theater of war.
QThey were applied everywhere, so far as you know, except in the Italian theater, then?
AThat is something I can't say. I have repeatedly been allowed to say that I was confining myself to my own sphere of influence, which was considerable
QYou testified, as I understand you, that you punished looting on the part of your soldiers in Italy.
AAs soon as I heard of these instances, I punished them, and I ordered the Army commanders and Air Force commanders to be extremely strict.
QNow, the punishment was very mild that you ever inflicted for any looting, wasn't its A I punished even up to having someone shot on the spot.
In that manner I succeeded in remedying the difficulties which had arisen.
QSo a German general, dealing with a German soldier, considers shooting the proper penalty for looting?
AThis far-reaching consequence is something I can't quite admit. I want to add to that, that if an army--as the 14th Army at the time -gets into a certain rut, then the most severe measures are just sufficient. They have to be taken in the interest of the reputation of one's army and to bring about orderly conditions amongst the civilian population. Particularly because of that problem I had a pretty bad quarrel at headquarters.
Apart from that, I represent the view that penalties which are too severe should be out, and therefore, for some time I made penalties an educational measure and didn't really regard them as penalties. That is one reason why, for some time, penalties were rather mild.
QYou testified that you took vigorous steps to protect the art treasures of Italy.
AAs far as the art treasures are concerned, yes.
QThat steps did you take, and against whom did you take them?
APrimarily they were preventive measures, first, by excluding cultural towns and art treasures from the military field; second, by having these places cleared which caused the enemy to bomb; and third, by cooperating with General Wolff and having these art treasures removed to secure places. I am reminding you of the art treasures of Cassino, Florenz.
QDid you know that any art was removed from Mount Cassino, for instance, and taken to Berlin?
AMuch later, at Mondorf, I heard about that, but at the time all I could recollect was that they were handed over to the Vatican in Rome.
QOh. Did you know that art treasures were taken and delivered to Goering from Mount Cassino? Did you ever hear that?
AI heard something about some holy statue, but I can't really give you any more details.
QAnd if Goering received such a thing from Mount Cassino, was it a violation of your orders?
AThe division "Hermann Goering" was stationed in that sector. It was commanded by the former adjutant of Hermann Goering, and it is quite clear that there is a certain connection here, certainly, but just how far that went I can't tell you.
QI have a few more questions concerning your interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT:Perhaps we had better break off for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken).
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I think, Your Honors, that it will save some duplication, perhaps, and save time, if at this time I yield to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to think up, and I think he is in a better position to take up the examination than I am.
THE PRESIDENT:Whatever you wish.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think, your Honors, that we will save some duplication -- perhaps save time -- if I now yield to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who is prepared on some of the subjects I was about to take up.
I think he is in a better position to take up the examination.
THE PRESIDENT:Whatever you think, Mr. Justice Jackson. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
QWitness, you have been told why Dr. Stahmer wanted you to give evidence? Have you been told by Dr. Stahmer why he wanted you to give evidence?
AThe points in question were communicated to me, without all questions being directly defined.
QI want to read you one sentence, so that you will have it in mind Dr. Stahmer's statement: When Rotterdam became a battle-zone in May, 1940, it became a military necessity to employ bombers, as the encircled parachute troops who had no support from the artillery had urgently asked for help from bombers.
Do you remember the incident? I wanted you to have it in your mind.
AYes, certainly.
QDo you remember being asked about this incident in the interrogation on the 28th of January , by the United States Bomber Survey? Remember?
ACertainly.
QWere you asked this question, "What about Rotterdam?" And did yougive this answer, "First, Rotterdam being defended in the parts which were later on attacked. Secondly, in this case one could notice that a firm attitude had to be taken. This one attack brought immediate peace to Holland. It was asked for by Model and was approved by the OKW. It was a very small part in the heart of Rotterdam."
Do you remember saying that?
AApproximately I did say that, yes, and I repeated those words yesterday.
QI want to deal first with the strategic aspects. I will come to the tactical aspects later. Your strategic purpose and real object was to take a firm attitude and secure immediate peace, wasn't that right?
AThat wide task had not been given to me. As I said yesterday, General Wenninger reported the result of the attack to me in such a way that he said subsequent to the attack the surrender of Holland followed.
QBut I want you to think of your own words. This was approved by the OKW;
a firm attitude had to be taken. Wasn't your purpose in this attack to secure a strategic advantage by terrorization of the people of Rotterdam?
AThat I can deny with the clearest conscience. Neither did I say, when I was at Mondorf, that I wanted to adopt a firm attitude. I merely said that the support which was demanded by Student would have to be carried out under all Circumstances. We merely had the one task and that was artillery support for Student's troops.
QWhat did you mean by saying that a firm attitude had to be taken, if you didn't mean that the people of Holland had to be possibly terrorized into peace.
AMay I repeat in that connection that the conception of the expression, "firm attitude," is not in keeping with my accustomed wording. I can't admit that I said that. I can't admit the protocol, and it was not read out to me, either.
QWhat do you think you said instead of firm attitude, if you didn't say it?
AI expressed that severe measures would bring the quickest results.
QThat is exactly what I am putting to you, Witness, "severe measures" -
ABut only for the purpose of tactical results. May I once more emphasize that I am a soldier and not a politician, and didn't act as a politician. At that time I was merely and solely complying with Student's requirements.
QJust before I deal with the tactical position -- which I do with great pleasure -- have you had to work with the Defendant Raeder? Have you had to work with Raeder at all?
AAdmiral Raeder? No, only in a very distant way. Because of certain matters we had in common.
QI just want you to listen to the views which the Defendant Raeder has expressed and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with them. This is United Kingdom Exhibit 65, Document L-157, and the answer in the transcript is at page 2375. Now, just listen carefully, if you will be so kind:
"It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international Law. However, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law."
Do you agree with that?
AI cannot completely agree with that concept. As far as Rotterdam is concerned, conditions were exactly the opposite.
QWell, just for the moment we will deal with the Defendant Raeder's words. Do you agree with then?
ANo.
DR.LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW): I have an objection. I object to the earlier and this present question put to the witness, because they are irrelevant, and secondly because they don't refer to facts but opinions. The witness is here to testify to facts.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: My lord, the witness is here, as I pointed out carefully, to deal with what is military necessity.
THE PRESIDENT:Sir David, the Tribunal thinks that the question in the form in which you put it may be objectionable, by the introduction of the views of the Defendant Raeder.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, I bow to the Tribunal, but this witness is called to say that the explanation for this is military necessity. I was asking whether he didn't agree with the views of one of his colleagues on this point, what is military necessity. If the Tribunal has any doubt, I would rather pass it. But the question of military necessity is one which the Tribunal will have to consider in a number of fields, and I distinctly don't abondon that point, which will run through the questions I have to ask on other matters.
QNow, I will come to the tactical position at Rotterdam: Will you just tell us the officers involved? There was a Lieutenant General Schmidt and with him was Major General Student -- who were in charge of the troops that were attacking Rotterdam, Do you remember that?
AOnly General Student, I don't know about Schmidt.
QWell, the evidence that is given in this case is that the negotiations, the terms of capitulation were actually written out by Lieutenant General Schmidt in a creamery near Rotterdam, I suppose he would be General Student's superior officer, wouldn't he?
AGeneral Student was the highest German officer in that territory and the responsible commander. General Schmidt is unknown to me.
QSo that General Schmidt would be junior to General Student, would he?
A He may have been called in for the special purpose, but I don't know of him.
QI want you to have the tines in mind: Do you know what time in the day the bombing of Rotterdam started?
AAs far as I know, just before 1400 hours.
QWell, I was going to put you 1330.
AYes, that is quite possible.
QDo you know that negotiations for a capitulation had been in progress since 1030 in the morning?
ANo; as I said yesterday, I had no knowledge of these facts.
QAnd did you know that at 1215 a Dutch officer went to the German lines and saw General Schmidt and General Student, and that General Schmidt wrote out the suggested terms of capitulation at 1235?
ANo, unknown.
QThat had never been told to you?
AIt was not communicated to me. At least, I can't remember it.
QWell, you see, Witness, it is 55 minutes before the bombing began and -
AWhat is important is, when did Student call of the attack, but that cancellation never reached me, and didn't reach my unit either.
Q Well, I just want you to have the facts in mind, and then I will ask you some questions.
The terms that were discussed at 1235 were to expire.
That answer was called for at 1620. After Captain put up by the German ground troops under General Student.
Did you ever hear of that?
AOf this fact I have not heard. Two red lights would not suffice for the purpose.
QNo, but in addition to that, your ground troops were in excellent wireless communication with your planes, were they not?
Will you answer the question?
AYes, and no. According to what I know, there was no immediate communication from the ground to the aircraft.
As I said yesterday, the communication was from the attacking tactical force, to ground station, to aircraft.
QIf it had been wanted to pass the communication to the aircraft and stop the bombing, it could quite easily have been done by wireless, apart from putting up these two red flares?
AIn my opinion, yes.
QNow, what I am suggesting is, you see, that everyone saw these bombers coming over.
You know that. Student saw the bombers coming over.
You know that, don't you?
AYes.
QIf that attack had any tactical significance about helping your troops, it could have been called off, could it not?
AI did not understand the final sentence.
QIf the object of this attack was merely tactical, to help in the attack on Rotterdam, it could easily have been called off by a wireless message from General Student to the planes, could it not?
AYes, if the tactical situation had been communicated, or if the situation had been reported to the bombing units immediately, then you could have called it off.
Q But if in honest negotations, witness, terms of surrender have been given and are to expire three hours later, it is only demanded of a soldier that he will call off the attack, is it not?
AIf no other arrangements have been made, yes.
QBut if he can stop the attack, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to do so. I want to make my suggestion quite clear--that this tactical matter had nothing to do with the attack on Rotterdam; that the purpose of the attack on Rotterdam was, in your own words, to show a firm attitude and to terrorize the Dutch into surrender.
AMay I repeat again, that I have said explicitly that this attack was only serving the tactical requirements, and that these political considerations are denied emphatically by me.
QWell, you know that General Student apologized afterwards for the attack; you know that? Apologized to the Dutch Commander for the attack?
AI do not know it, and as I explained yesterday, General Student was suffering from a head injury, and I could not talk to him any longer.
QI am not going to take more time. I have put my point, I hope, quite clearly. I want to ask you on one other point on which you spoke yesterday in regard to bombing. You said that the attack on Warsaw on 1 September, 1939, was made bcause you considered Warsaw a defended fortress with air defense. Is that fair?
AYes, certainly.
QNow, you know that at the same time--at 5 o'clock on the morning of Friday, 1 September, the German air force attacked Augustow, Nowy Dwor, Ostrow Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrow, Radomsko, Torun, Kutno, Tunel, Krakow, Grodno, Trzebinie and Gdynia, which is in rather a different position. Just answer my question. The German air force attacked these towns?
AWith my comrades, yes, not the towns, I repeat.
Q Now, all this attack was made at 5 o'clock on the morning of 1 September, was it not?
AThe attack started in the morning, but not as you put it, on the towns, but on military targets; airdromes and staff headquarters and traffic centers were attacked. As I said yesterday, very detailed instructions were published by OKW that only these military targets should be bombed.
QYou are suggesting that all these towns I had read out were military targets?
AAs far as they were in my sector, yes.
QYou had not had time for a single reconnaisance plane to fly over Poland before that attack was made, had you?
AThat is correct. On the other hand, agents furnished sufficient intelligence on the situation, and, apart from that, the whole plan of operational considerations of air warfare were generally on record.
QOf course, the whole plan had been worked out in April of 1939 under the Fall Weiss, had it not?
AAt that time, I did not even know that I was going to be appointed, or anything like that.
QDid you not know, witness, after you were appointed that a Fall Weiss had been worked out in April 1939? You were never told that?
AThat was not said, but, on the other hand, may I say, as a soldier, that a general plan made in April would undergo so many alterations by September, and sizable alterations would have to be made at the very last minute.
QJust one other point I want you to have in mind. Do you remember that the German radio broadcast the last note to Poland at 9 o'clock the night before, on 31 August? Do you remember that?
AI believe I do.
QThat was eight hours before your attack, and you know, do you not, that the Defendant Goering had been at his secret head-quarters for a week before that, considering this matter?
AThat I can well imagine.
QNow, what I am putting to you is that this general attack on Polish towns was again a well planned scheme to try and break down national resistance for your attack?
AMay I say the following on that subject? If my statements as Field Marshall and witness under oath are considered as little as you are considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not serve any purpose. I have emphasized that it was not an attack against towns, but an attack on military targets, and that is something that I, as a soldier, should be believed about.
QThe Tribunal will decide as to the value of the evidence. I am not going to discuss it. I am just going to ask you about one or two other matters, in order to get your view on it, what you consider to be of military necessity. You remember the orders with regard to Partisans in Italy during the time of your command? -- the orders with regard to Partisans.
ACertainly.
QAnd I want to put it perfectly correctly, so tell me if I am wrong, but I understand this to be the position. The Defendant Keitel issued a general order as to Partisans on 16 December 1942. A copy was found in your headquarters or your ex-headquarters, and your recollection is that it came to your attention later on, but you are not quite sure of the date. Is that right? You are not quite sure of the time?
AYes.
QI would like you to try, because you have had time to consider it; do you think that Keitel's order of December 1942 had come to your attention before you issued your own order of 17 June 1944. Perhaps you would like to see your own order, would you?
AIt has been read out to me, yes, but in November, repeatedly in December, and subsequently in January, I had requested that on the subject of these questions I should be heard once more, since I have certain qualms about the issuing of these orders, the routing slips and the date.
QWell, I will pass you the orders, witness, because you ought to see them and recall them to your recollection. I do not think they have been put in before. Let us take first Defendant Keitel's order of 16 December 1942.
(A document was handed to the witness.)
I hope I have passed you the right document. Does it read--I'll read it very slowly.
"The Fuehrer has therefore ordered that:
"1. The enemy employs in partisan warfare Communist trained fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity. It is more than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing to do with soldierly gallantry or principles of the Geneva Convention. If the fight against the Partisans in the East, as well as in the Balkans, is not waged with most brutal means, we will shortly reach the point where the available forces are insufficient to control this area. It is, therefore, not only justified, but it is the duty of the troops to use all means without restriction, even against women and children, so long as it insures success. Any consideration for the Partisans is a crime against the German people."
Do you remember that order?
A Yes.
QAnd you in turn issued an order on the 17th of June 1944 when you were commanding in Italy? Do you remember that? I will show you in one moment, if I can get the German copy out of the file. I will just read a short passage again so that the Tribunal will have it in mind; but witness, please refer to any other passage because I want to give a fair effect of the order:
"1. The partisan situation in the Italian theatre, particularly central Italy, has recently deteriorated to such an extent that it constitutes a serious danger to the fitting troops and their supply lines as well as to the war industry and economic potential. The fight against the partisans must be carried on with all means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against partisans. In this connection the old principle holds good that a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one's orders is better than failure or neglect to act."
Do you remember that, witness?
AYes, I remember that order.
QAnd you remember three days later, so that there will be no mistake as to what you meant, you issued this further one, another "top secret" order; reading the third line after saying, "The announcement does not represent an empty threat," you say:
"It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt the severest measures. Every act of violence committed by partisans must be punished immediately. Reports submitted must also give details of countermeasures taken. Wherever there is evidence of considerable numbers of partisan groups a proportion of the male population of the area will be arrested, and in the event of an act of violence being committed these men will be shot."
Now, I just want only to take two examples, witness, of the way that that was carried out. You remember when one of your officers, Colonel von Gablenz, was captured by partisans; do you remember?
AVon Gablenz?
QI think he was a colonel at this stage, it was the 26th of June, just after your order. Do you remember Colonel von Gablenz being captured, do you?
ANo.
Q He was a colonel of the lines of communication; not a very important officer, but still a colonel.
AYes.
QNow, just look at these two documents. Is this right? -- this is a extract from the daily situation report by the commander in chief of southwest Italy for the 26th of June.
"Partisan situation. North of Arezzo Colonel von Gablenz, a member of the staff of the officer commanding lines of communication, area Tenth Army, was captured by bandits. The entire male population of the villages on the stretch of road concerned was taken into custody." It was further announced that all these hostages would be shot if the captured colonel were not set free within fortyeight hours. Remember that?
ANot in detail, but in-
QNo, no, but do you remember the incident?
AYes.
QLook at the next bit which is the two-day situation report, the report for two days later, the 28th of June, the second paragraph:
"As reprisal for the capture of Colonel von Gablenz, so far 560 persons, including 250 men, have been taken into custody."
Is that your conception of what is meant by "steps necessary to deal with partisan warfare" that 410 women and children should be taken into custody?
AThat was not necessary; it didn't become necessary. I may perhaps later on refer-
QLet us take one other example. You remember Civitella? Do you remember what was done with Civitella by your forces, do you?
AAt the moment, no.
QWell, just let me remind you what was done to Civitella -- that was on the 18th of June, one day after your order.
"Two German soldiers were killed and a third wounded in a fight with partisans in the village of Civitella. Fearing reprisals the inhabitants evacuated the village, but when the Germans discovered this punitive action was disposed. On June 29" -- that, you will remember, witness, was nine days after your proclamation to reinforce your order -- "when the local inhabitants were returned and were feeling secure once more the Germans carried out a well-organized reprisal, combing the neighbourhood. Innocent inhabitants were often shot on sight.
During that day 212 men, women, and children in the immediate district were killed.
Some of the dead women were found completely naked. In the course of investigations a nominal roll of the dead has been compiled and is complete with the exception of a few names whose bodies could not be identified. Ages of the dead ranged from one year to eighty-four years. Approximately one hundred houses were destroyed, by fire. Some of the victims were burned alive in their homes."
Next, the report of the United Nations War Crimes Commission on the incident, Now, witness, do you really think that militarynecessity commands the killing of babies of one and people of eighty-four?
ANo.
QWell new, I just want to acquaint you with one subject which you have dealt with yourself, that is the position of the Hermann Goering Division. You mentioned one of the persons I have in mind, but let me just, in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, get clear who your officers were at that time.
Did General Vitinghof -- sorry, I think it was von Vitinghof -- did he command the Tenth Army?
AYes.
QIn 1944?
AYes.
QWas he directly under your orders?
AHe was under my command.
QThen I take it he is a fairly senior and responsible general? -- I don't know his rank -- colonel general or -
AColonel general.
QAnd under him was the 76th Corps, wasn't it, commanded by General Haer; is that correct?
AYes.
QAnd under General Haer was a Hermann Goering Division, commanded by General Schmalz, whom you mentioned this morning; is that right?
AGeneral von Schmalz commanded, but previously I mentioned another name.
QI think it was Schmalz at this time. New, the Hermann Goering Division had been concerned in a number of these -- I will call them incidents; I won't say -- what I mean by incidents is the sort of thing which I have been describing at Civitella. Let me remind you of one or two. Do you remember at Stia, on the 13th to the 18th of April 137 civilians were killed, including forty-five women and children; do you remember that incident?
Civitella, that was on the 29th of June. And do you remember Buchini on the 9th of July; do you remember an incident at Buchini?
AIt is feasible, but I will have to know the details first. Q Perhaps you will remember this; I will put it to you generally, witness, because it is a perfectly general course of conduct, and there were a number of these incidents in which the Hermann Goering Division was engaged. Do you remember that?
A There have been quite a lot of incidents like that on both sides, and I would have to have exact details before I could decide on a single incident.
QWell, this is what I really want you to apply your mind to. Is it correct that the Hermann Goering Division was only under General Haer and General von Vitinghof for tactical purposes, and reported each day to Berlin to Reichsmarshal Goering as to what they were doing?
AThe Hermann Goering Division for tactical purposes was under the Supreme Command of the Army, but I must assume that there was subordination of that division under the General Command. Whether there were any matters operating outside that, I don't know.
QI will put the words exactly, and you can see where I have got the words from the way I put them:
"The First Airborne Division and the Hermann Goering Division came under the army commanders only as regards tactics; for all other question, on the other hand, directly under the Reichsmarshal, to whom they had to send daily reports. They were not permitted to receive orders from the army commanders concerning criminal proceedings, nor to report the results of such proceedings. Thus they carried on the war against guerrillas according to principles which to some extent deviated from these of the Army."
Is that a correct statement?
AThat conception is correct, but the idea, the word "tactics", can be understood in various ways.
QThe word what?
ATactics. The tactical subordination. That can be understood within large limits.
QWitness, that is why I read the whole thing to you, because it is quite clear what the person's statement I am reading means there, isn't it? He says that they were not permitted to receive orders from the army commanders on criminal proceedings or to report the results, and that they carried on the war against guerrillas according to principles which deviated from those of General Vitinghof, didn't they?
A This is the first time that I hear of this, but if another gentleman has said so then I must assume it is correct.
QWell, are you sure it is the first time that you have heard about it? It is very difficult to remember every incident. Please don't think that I want to be offensive, but I want you to try to remember. Didn't General Haer make numerous complaints to you about this anomalous position with regard to the Hermann Goering division, and did you never give any official reply to General Haer's reports?
ANumerous reports did certainly not arrive from General Haer. There may have been frequent consultations in my command post. And may I add once more that such definitions of attitude were definitely in existence within the Army group, but I must add that I do not know which sector came under the heading "tactics" and which did not.
QWell, I am not really putting the point to you quite clearly. What I am suggesting is this. If you disagree with "numerous", will you accept "some", that on some occasions General Haer reported to you that he was in difficulties through this anomalous position of the Hermann Goering division?
AThat I can assume, yes.
QYour chief of staff at this time was General Roettiger, wasn't he?
AYes.
QFrom the 10th of June onwards, just over this time, and didn't General Roettiger also talk to you about the position of the Hermann Goering division being under the special protection of Reichsmarshal Goering in Berlin?
AYes. We discussed that subject quite a lot.
QWell, as far as the particular incidents in which the Hermann Goering division is concerned, they took their orders from the Defendant Goering, who is sitting at the dock, didn't they, as to how they were to treat the partisans?
AI couldn't tell you that. Those channels by-passed me.
QYes. They by-passed you; they by-passed General Haer; they by-passed von Vitinghof; they by-passed you, and went straight to Berlin.
That's right, isn't it?
AYes, certainly. That was the exceptional channel which applied to the Hermann Goering Division.
QYes. You see, at the moment the Tribunal is dealing with the case of the Defendant Goering. That is why I ask you these questions.
Now, just one or two short points. You remember Dr. Laternser asking you one or two questions about the High Command and General Staff. Do you remember Dr. Laternser asking you some questions?
AYes, I am aware of that.
QWell, I wanted just to clear one part out of the way altogether. You must have realized, witness, that the body that is mentioned in this case has nothing to do with the Staff Corps of the German Army. I think you made that clear yourself yesterday.
AWith what did you say?
QWith the Staff Corps. You had, both in the Army and the Air Force, a corps of office as who had gone through the Military Academy and were staff officers of all ranks, I suppose down to captain, hadn't you.
AThe question isn't quite clear to me. That is why I am not giving you any answer.
QI am sorry. You had in both the Army and the Luftwaffe a Staff Corps of officers who had been to Military Academy and were thereafter staff officers. And they had, I think , the right of reporting to the Chief of Staff directly if they wanted? Isn't that so? Is that right or wrong?
AThat is not correct. Only, as I said yesterday, as far as education information was concerned. As far as the general attitude was concerned there was the right to influence General Staff officers, but the other way around, no.
QWell, that Corps went right down, I suppose, to captain, or lieutenant didn't it?
ANo, captain.
QI though that was it. May I tell you, we are not interested in that corps at all. The Prosecution are not interested in that corps at all.
Now, with regard to the persons who are named in the Indictment, you know there are nine commander-in-chief or staff positions named, and then the Oberbefehlshaber, who commanded in certain areas or commanded certain fleets of the Luftwaffe. You have looked at that, I suppose, have you?
AYes.
QI am trying to put it shortly, Witness, so that we won't take time. I just want you to consider this. Are not these people who are mentioned -that is, the heads of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, and their deputies and the Oberbefehlshaber -- the officers in the German armed forces who would have most to do with the policy and planning of wars?
AThe Oberbefehlshaber, supreme commanders of Army sectors or sections, were of course the advisory organs of the leader of the State in all military questions and military political questions. The supreme commanders of army groups had no influence whatever.
QWell, I'd like you to take the case of two examples. I think you were present at both of these. Before the attack on Poland there was a meeting on the 22nd of August, which has been mentioned here before. Did that consist of these higher officers that I mentioned, the heads of the various branches, and also of the Oberbefehlshaber?
AIt consisted of the leading officers, commanding officers, of the war in that military sector.
QYes, Well, at that time the sector which was going to be the subject of war was Poland. At that time the main purpose was considering the Polish campaign, wasn't it? The main purpose of that meeting, I suppose, was to con sider the Polish campaign with the possibility of a campaign against the Western Powers if they came in.