A. If you speak of telegrams of devotion, I only know of the end, where it was tried to give news about the catastrophe that had happened there and to try to find a science for all the suffering and dying of so many soldiers and that, therefore, had been depicted, as heroism in the telegram. I am sorry that at that time -- and that came from the entire situation -- that I had to let that pass and that I have not stopped it.
Q. The telegrams were sent by you?
A. I do not know to which telegrams you are referring, with the exception of the last one.
Q. Several telegrams in which there was promised that you would hold out until the last man, those telegrams which the German people could not understand. They were very much against them. They should have had your signature.
A: I would like to have them presented to me because there is nothing known to me about them.
I don't know anything about them. Q: Then you don't know anything about them? A: These telegrams of which you speak, with the exception of the very last. Q: Do you have any idea what was in the last telegram? A: In the last telegram there was a short description of what the army Q: The answer was your promotion to General Fieldmarshall? A: I don't know that this would have been the answer. Q: But you were promoted to General Fieldmarshall, and you still have is signed "Paulus, General Fieldmarshall". A: Well, I have to say .... Do you mean this statement?
Q: Yes, this statement. A: Yes, I had to take that title which was conferred upon me. Q: In this statement which I have submitted to the Court as proof there is the last sentence:
"I bear the responsibility for the fact that - - with regard to the Order of 14 January '43 about turning over of the prisoners, that is I would like to hear your statement about that.
In that detailed letter why didn't you mention the one hundred thousands of German soldiers freedom, their health, and their life?
There is no word about that. A: That is not the question in this letter. This letter to the Soviet in the area of Stalingrad and the Russian prisoners of war.
In this Q: No word?
A: No, that had to be done at a different place. Of course it is so that fighting would be beyond human possibilities.
The answer was "Capitulation is impossible.
The Sixth Army will do its historic duty by Stalingrad at the Eastern front."
you call the crime, after your own description that everything from the very beginning was clear to you as a crime?
A I didn't say that, that it was clear to me from the very beginning as a crime, but that after I looked at it later I had that impression, because my impression resulted from my experience at Stalingrad.
Q I would not like to know at the end. Didn't you know from the very beginning, quite really, when you were charged to work on plans for the attack against Russia, and especially for certain tasks -- didn't you know from the very beginning that this attack on Russia could only be done under violations of international law, to which Germany was bound? later. executed by violation of treaties. violation of the treaty which existed with Russia.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions. Thank you.
(Dr. Exner took a position before the microphone.)
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Exner, I have already told the witness, and defendants' counsel have been told over and over again, that it is of the utmost importance that they should ask their questions slowly, that they ask one question at a time, and that they should pause between the question and the answer and between the answer and the next question. Will yon try to observe that rule? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. EXNER (Counsel for Jodl): execution of a plan of an operation against Russia, that is, to continue work on a plan which existed already. Do you know about how strong the German forces in the East were at that time?
A I can only clarify that I didn't know in the OKH; that is the High Command of the army, not of the Wehrmacht. I don't know any more how strong the forces in the East were at that time.
It was at a time shortly after the end of the campaign against France.
Q You don't know about how many divisions were at that time for the protection of the German border on the East?
Q In February of 1941 our transport to the East began. Can you say how strong at that time the Russian forces were along the German-Russian demarcatic line and the Rumanian-Russian border?
A No, I cannot say that. The information which came about the Soviet Union and their forces were so extraordinarily scarce and incomplete that for a long time we had no clear picture at all.
Q But didn't Halder at that time talk to the Fuehrer frequently about the strength and deployment of the Russian forces?
A No. That is possible, but I cannot remember it, because I had nothing to do with these questions at that time -- with the theoretical development of our ideas. In September the Operations Department of the army took care of it.
Q At this time you had maneuvers? you had about the plans of the enemy? plan. You have tried it out by maneuvers. Tell me what was the difference between your work and Jodl's at that time?
A I don't think I am able to judge that. I don't understand.
Q That was General Staff work, wasn't it? Chief of Staff. Fuehrungstab?
where he was, whereas I could only see a small section, only that which I needed for my work, and that is all the information I received. for the war? In your written statement, or declaration, you have said that Keitel and Jodl were guilty with regard to the prohibition of capitulation, which had such tragic consequences. How do you know that? was responsible for that order. It has the responsibility, and it makes no difference whether it was one of the immediate persons. At any rate, they are responsible, their office as such.
Q At any rate, you don't know anything about the personal participation of any one of these two gentlemen? You know only that the OKW -
THE PRESIDENT (Interpolating): Mr. Interpreter, do not say each time "question" and "answer", but just give the words of the question and the words of the answer. Putting in the words "question" and "answer" takes up your time and makes it more difficult, I think. I am not certain. BY DR. EXNER: didn't you, in spite of the order by the Fuehrer to the contrary, try to give up? with the army which I led the fate of the German people would be decided. measure?
A I don't know about that. successor to Jodl if the Stalingrad Operation would be successful, because he wouldn't like to work with Jodl any more?
A I don't know about that in this form, only there was a rumour late in the summer or early in the fall of 1942 that a change was planned in the leadership. That was a rumour which theChief of Staff of the Luftwaffe told me, but I didn't get any official information about that. There was other information that I should be relieved of the command of that army and should be used to lead a new army group along the Don River. were promoted to the rank of Field Marshal at Stalingrad?
A I didn't send a telegram then. After my promotion I did not send a telegram.
Q Haven't you thanked the Fuehrer in any way? You are said to be a teacher at the Military Academy at Moscow.
Q Did you have another position in Moscow? in a prisoner of war camp, like my other comrades in Russia.
Q Were you a member of the German Freedom Committee? and men of all classes, who have made it their aim to warn the German people the last moment before the abyss, and to call for an attack to lead to the end of the Hitler government that brought all that misery to the German people. I have done that with the proclamation of the 8th of August, 1944.
Q August 1944?
Q Did you do anything about that before?
DR. EXNER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the OKW, High Command of the Wehrmacht. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Witness, did you know when you took over your office as O.Q.I. that these preparations which Major General Marx had begun, and which you have continued, were intended only for an eventual case? work things appeared which made it look very probable that the theoretical preparations would find their practical use, because in connection with this plan of operations, in which from the very beginning we were thinking in terms of using the Roumanian area -- at that time we saw the dispatching of the first military mission just into that area for which the theoretical preparations for an offensive into Russia had been made; so by and by more impressions of that kind led to the opinion that this was a plan which should be executed.
Q The reason for my question is this: I believe the date which you mentioned during which the plan existed already, since the fall of 1940, is a little early, isn't it? On the 3rd of September they were there, and on the basis of this information everything was developed and everything went like that in fact. I mean this: that first this plan was considered or conceived for an eventual case, and then at a later date, after a decision had been taken, it was used. In looking back, it works well together, the theoretical preparation and then the practical preparation and then the execution.
Q Do you know Directive No. 18 of November 1940?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I refer now to a document which has already been submitted by the American Prosecution, No.444-PS.
Q I submit it to you, Mr. Witness. Page 8 is the one I am referring to (handing a paper to the witness).
Q Witness, would you like to repeat that answer? any time.
DR. LATERNSER: To inform the Court I am going to quote the passage -it is very short -- which I have just shown to the witness. It is page 8 of the Document 444-PS, this paragraph. I quote:
"5. Russian political conferences with the aim of clarifying the attitude of Russia for the near future have been started." my opinion that the time at which the decision was taken to attack the Soviet Union must have been later than the time you told us yesterday. I look back now that when I follow the whole development there was a clear plan from the beginning, the conception of that plan on 3 September 1940, and then the directive 21 of December until its execution. Just at which precisely measurable date the decision was taken I couldn't tell you. military experts marched into Poland with very strong forces? There must have been opinions of military experts about the strength of the invasion?
A I didn't know anything, only about the fact, but I have never heard anything about the size of the forces that were sent into Poland. I have never heard anything about that. much stronger Soviet forces had been deployed along that border, especially very strong Panzer forces in the area of Bialystok?
Q Weren't the first divisions from West to East transferred only after strong Soviet forces were standing along the Eastern border? with the practical execution of the plan I don't know anything, because I had nothing to do with the practical execution. First of all, in the months of April and May I was only a very short time present in the High Command of the Army.
was a conference at the Reichschancellory, and there Colonel General Halder gave you, as a reason for the intended attack on Yugoslavia, several points during that conference. You mentioned first the elimination of danger to the flank; second, the rail line to Nish; third, the fact that in case of attack against Russia the right flank would be free to move. Were the reasons for this attack not different ones? Weren't there reasons which were more important than the ones you mentioned?
A I don't know of any others.
Q As to this attack upon Yugoslavia, shouldn't that also be done to relieve the Italians?
A Yes, of course. That was the initial reason why an operation against Greece was considered, and therefore that menace to the flank had to be eliminated.
Q Wasn't there at that time some concern about cooperation between Yugoslavia and Greece, which would have put England into position to land on the Greek coast and receive a base for operations against Roumania? Barbarossa, which would have been menaced on its right flank and stopped.
Q I have received different information. In the decision to attack Yugoslavia the Plan Barbarossa did not play the important role which you said it did. Serbia, after reinforcement by the British landing, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: This is a good time to recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that if the interpreters use the words "question" and "answer" before the question and answer it assists the shorthand writers and the press. Therefore, the interpreters can continue to say "question" and "answer" before the question and answer is given. That only makes it more obvious that the real remedy for the difficulties which arise is in counsel and witnesses pausing after the question has been asked and after the answer has been given, and it seems to the Tribunal that counsel and witnesses ought to be able to hear when the translation of the question has been given, and the witness then give his answer. And when the translation of the answer has been given, which counsel can hear, he should then put a further question. Is it clear what I mean? QUESTIONS BY DR. LATERNSER: slavia. If I understood you correctly, you said that this attack had to be carried out before the Case Barbarossa was made operative, as in any other case there would have been a serious threat to the flanks. Did I understand you correctly? was thecause for Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia. Do you know where these plans for that attack existed before the revolution in Yugoslavia? Do you know, furthermore, that particularly the plan of attack against Yugoslavia came at a very inconvenient moment, which was the reason that a delay of the attack against the Soviet Union occurred?
A That is exactly what I said yesterday. It caused a postponement of the attack, which had originally been planned for the middle of May, if weather would permit, and this delay became necessary.
Q But then there is a sort of controversy here, isn't there? You say the attack against Yugoslavia took place in spite of the fact that the question of the attack came into play?
A I don't see any contradiction in that. As far as I saw the situation, it was that the old Yugoslavia government had made an agreement which placed at the disposal the railway line from Belgrade to Nisch, and that after that agreement was concluded a revolution took place in Yugoslavia which made a policy of a different kind probable.
Therefore, one would come to the assumption that this plan of attack would be necessary to eliminate that danger. In other words, I do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia, and the consequence that Barbarossa would be delayed, -does not contain a contradiction. I merely see that one is a condition for the other. in February, 1941? Soviet Russian troops was estimated at 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions; that that strength was reported by major General Halder?
A I cannot recollect that at all. Nor am I sure whether Colonel General Halder was actually present during that conference.
Q But witness, such a conference must have been an unusual one? was present the impression that there was a very strong concentration of troops on the Eastern front? you OK-1? the tasks of that service department to make positive suggestions regarding military operations; is that correct? but when I was in that Department 1 I did not get that task as part of my job. The operational department was not under my control but immediately under the control of the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff Department, first of all, gave me the task of running the training department and then the organization department, and that was in Autumn 1941. There fore, it was not part of my sphere of activities to make suggestions to the Chief of the General Staff regarding operations which were in progress.
I merely had to carry out the tasks which he gave me. prisoners of war were treated in the Soviet Union? has been made, which led to the suicide of so many German officers at Stalingrad -- officers and men -- on that question. I felt it my duty -
THE PRESIDENT: Cross examination is the questioning on questions which are either relevant to the issues which the Tribunal has to try or questions relevant to the credibility of the witness. Questions which relate to the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union have nothing whatever to do with any of the issues which we have got to try, and they are not relevant to the credibility of the witness. The Tribunal, therefore, will not hear them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I give a reason why I ask that question? May I make a short statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put that question for the reason that I could ascertain whether, in fact, treatment of prisoners of war -- how it was actually handled, so that a large number of German families, who are extremely worried on that subject, could in that manner be given information on the subject, so that their worries would decrease.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that that is not a matter with which the Tribunal is concerned.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness. QUESTIONS BY DR. FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritsche):
Q Witness, do you know the Defendant Fritsche? he was with your Army? with the OKW, which I believe you remember having been brought up. One of the imprisoned commissars of the Russian Army had to be shot. Are you aware of that order?
A Yes. It came to my knowledge. in the East, became aware of or got knowledge of that order; that he made a proposal to you and your second in command, according to which that order should be canceled as far as your sphere of activity was concerned?
A I cannot recollect that incident. I think it is perfectly possible that Mr. Fritsche did discuss that question with the Supreme Command of the Army, but when I took over that army on the 20th of January, 1942, that order was not carried out in my zone. As far as I know, this order, which in practice did not become operative, was in fact canceled later on. tion: Do you recollect, perhaps, that Fritsche suggested to to you or your 1-C officer to distribute pamphlets with a corresponding content in Russia?
A I certainly can't recollect that, but I consider it perfectly possible that such a discussion with the 1-C officer, who was responsible for that sort of thing, took place.
Q Then one last question: As far as you know the type and character of the Defendant Fritsche, would you consider it perfectly feasible and probable that he did make such a proposal? QUESTIONS BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Organization of the Political Leader Staff): in spite of the fact that you knew the full truth that aggressive war was conducted. How far could the political leaders know of this?
A I can't give you an answer on that question, merely because I had no knowledge of it.
Q What do you understand, are the political leaders?
A May I ask another question in return? What does the Defendant's Counsel understand by political leaders, since you want me to understand your question?
Q Witness, the organization of the Party doesn't seem to be clear to you. There is an organization of political leaders which is indicted in this trial. They are meant to be declared criminal; that is, the Reichsleiter and Blockleiter, which may be punished because of their participation in the conspiracy to all the acts which are being tried here. That organization of political leaders is composed in such a way that 93 percent are local group leaders with their staff and subordinates.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you can ask this witness about this. He doesn't know anything about it. He is not concerned with the charge against the political leadership. I don't think that is proper cross examination at all.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I was going to ask him how far these political leaders might have had knowledge, and then I was going to ask a second question, whether he would be aware that he, as a witness, in his capacity, has contributed materially that these people, political loaders, supported Hitler because they believed in that body which he himself -
THE PRESIDENT: He has already answered you "I had no knowledge of the state of knowledge of the political leaders."
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case I have another question. I am; also appearing for the Defendant Sauckel, who was responsible for the labor. in Russian armament industries?
A I have no authentic or personal information on that subject. The prisoners of war whom I have seen myself were in camps where I myself was detained, and they worked for the immediate requirements for the camp or in the near vicinity of the camp. They worked in agriculture or in the forest on forestry, and I have gained knowledge of the fact that German workers who volunteered and had formed groups were working in industry, and that they were proud of the result of their work. But in particular in which branches of industry these people worked, that I am afraid I have no knowledge of.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you. I have no further questions to put to this witness.
QUESTIONS BY DR. KUBUSCHOK(Counsel for the Reich Government): discussed once more today, namely, how far the knowledge of individual members of the German government regarding decisive resolutions would go, I gathered from your reply that the Reich government did not, as far as their individual personalities were concerned -- could not be regarded as one homogeneous, whole body. In this trial the difficulties repeat themselves regarding the fact that normal conditions are presumed. In particular, one is continuously under the impression that most important political and military decisions are, as is usually the custom, made by the body of the whole of the government or originate from the whole of the highest military departments, that is to say, that they are made by a number of high ranking persons who decide these resolutions.
Is that, witness, on the strength of the knowledge which you have gained in your high military rank, also applicable to the government of Adolf Hitler? In his personality, has he ever discussed questions like that politely? Is he not a man of an unusual type, and has he not employed a completely different procedure? Is it right to say that he always made his own decisions independently, or that, if anything, he made these decisions in consultation with very few immediate assistants, and that, consequently, we have here a case where leading personalities of a political and military nature had no knowledge of impending events?
A This is the way I shall answer it: As far as my military employment is concerned in the General Staff of the Army, it would be wrong to say that that gave me an inside into procedure of the German government. I just didn't have such an inside. On the other hand, I imagine that under the what you call "Gremium of Reich Government", I imagine that to be a group of people who, no matter what the head of the state decides to use as methods, would be feeling responsible towards the people for what is being decided by the head of the state, so that even if the head of the state in such a case even exceeds his own brutal way of deciding on them, they would concur with whatever decisions he makes, and that they would not, as they should, take counter-measures for the welfare of the people. That should have been done at the latest at a time when the whole world must have been aware that such a government was a criminal one and heading for world disaster.
Q Mr. Witness, you belong to the second, circle of people which I mentioned. It is an established fact that that second circle had interfered. In that connecti on, there must have been important reasons which were the cause. I believe that it would be better if, as far as other personalities are concerned, you would not pass judgment, but answer my questions as far as actual facts are concerned. military position, but also according to the knowledge which you gained in an exposed and leading position -- whether this was right or wrong is unnecessary for establishing the fact -- you knew that the methods in military and political matters were such or whether they were not. Were resolutions made by using a large body of military and political personalities who met and passed these resolutions, or were decisions made and these resolutions passed, in a very much smaller circle of people, probably sometimes only Hitler alone? which, as I have already said, is unknown to me. As I said in my previous reply, I have merely given you my basic conception regarding your question, and I thought that in that manner I had answered it. I cannot imagine that one man alone could have done everything that was done. After all, to exert his influence in a small circle he needed the cooperation of his immediate assistants. It was, in other words, quite impossible to act otherwise. believe that certain expert ministers, say, for instance, a labor minister, a man who was a trained expert, were asked by Hitler about plans for aggression?
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the witness has already said it is a matter of fact he doesn't know how the decisions of the Reich Government were arrived at, and what he may think about is is really not relevant. He didn't know. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Have you, Witness, gathered the impression that plans for aggression were made by Hitler many years ago, many years previously, or are you of the opinion that they arose from the prevailing circumstances, the intuitive plans which he always stated he had?
A That is entirely outside my knowledge. My observations began on September 3, 1940 and continued from that time until January 1942, and what I observed during that period is something I explained yesterday. As far as the previous period is concenned, I have nothing to say. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for the defendant von Ribbentrop): which had the aim of keeping Germany away from disaster. My question is: What possibilities to carry out these intentions were at the disposal of yourself and the other members of that group? people. Not only after the events of a military nature, but also after the events of the 20th of July, we thought it our duty to make our conception of things known to the German people, our conception regarding the findings and the conviction we had since obtained. of those who were led by me at Stalingrad. There we experienced how, through orders of those military and political leaders who were appearing at the head of the State, more than 100,000 soldiers died in frost, cold, and snow. There we experienced the terrors of conquering war in large concentrations.
Q Did you have any other possibility apart from propaganda? and those newspapers which we had created, apart from that propaganda to the German people, we had no other facilities.
THE PRESIDENT: What has the Tribunal got to do with this?
DR. HORN: I merely wanted to ascertain what conclusions I could draw on the credibility of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I can't see that it has any bearing on his credibility.
DR. HORN: It is perfectly possible that we have knowledge of other possibilities which were available which the witness has not mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that what the witness thought or did when he was a prisoner of war in Russian hands has got nothing to do with his credibility, at least so far as the questionsthat you have put are concerned, and they will not allow the questions to be put.
DR. HORN: May I have permission to ask the witness one more question?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. BY. DR. HORN: opportunity to place your military experiences in any way at the disposal of anybody else?
THE PRESIDENT: Then, I understand that concludes the cross examination.
Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any more questions?
GENERAL RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. BY THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle)
Q. General, you said that when you became Quartermaster General of the Army on September 3 of 1940, you found an unfinished plan for an attack against the Soviet union. Do you know how long that plan had been in preparation before you saw it? but I would estimate that it lasted two days to three weeks. plan? OKW via the Supreme Command of the Army, and that the Chief of the General Staff had given them the same documents or the same information as myself.