Mr. President, I intend to read two long documents which will take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT:We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February, 1946, at 1000 hours).
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom of Great Bri tain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 12 Feb ruary 1946, 1000-1245, Lard Justice Lawrence, presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:Are you going to recall the witness who was being called yesterday, Fieldmarshall Paulus, are you not, for the defendants' counsel to have the opportunity of questioning him? Will you do that now.
DR.NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): Yes, if it is convenient to the Tribunal, the witness can come up.
(FIELDMARSHALL PAULUS resumed the stand.)
THE PRESIDENT:Fieldmarshall Paulus, I want to remind you that you should pause after the question has been asked you before you answer it in order that the translation shall get through. Do you follow what I mean?
THE WITNESS:I have understood.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY DR. NELTE:
QI would like to ask Several questions. On the 3rd of September, 1940, you came as General Quartermaster I to the High Command of the Army; is that correct?
AThat is correct.
QWho was at that time the High Command of the Army?
AIt will be very well known to you that at that time the Commanderin-Chief of the Army was Fieldmarshall von Brauchitsch.
QI believe that the phraseology that you have used is not correct because I did not put this question for any other reason than just to explain the situation to the people who are assembled here. It is known to us but maybe not to the Tribunal. Who was at that time the Chief of Staff of the Army?
AIt was Colonel General Halder.
QWere you asGeneral Quartermaster No. I the representative of the Chief of Staff?
AI was the deputy of the Chief of Staff for those cases where he told me to do so and, besides, I had various tasks with which he charged me.
QIn this case were you the special referent for the plan which we have later known as "plan Barbarossa"?
AYes, to the extent as I have told you yesterday.
QFieldmarshall Brauchitsch, who was then Chief of Staff, has said in an affidavit which has been presented by the prosecution about the treatment of military plans--he has made a statement. With the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to ask you to tell me whether this statement by Fieldmarshall von Brauchitsch is also your opinion.
"If Hitler had decided to use milita ry pressure for his political aims or military means of power, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he had anything to do with it, first received orally a sort of orientation or a definite order."
Is that your opinion also?
AI could not say. I have no knowledge of that.
QCol. Gen. Halder, who was your immediate superior, has said about the handling of such military operational things in an affidavit, which also has been submitted by the prosecution, the following:
Military affairs were the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and the parts of the Wehrmacht which were immediately under him, that is army, navy, and air force.
Is that your opinion likewise?
AI may ask you to repeat this once more because I could not understand exactly what you meant.
QIt is about the question: Who were the military persons who were responsible to Hitler in large planning? And in respect to that, von Brauchitsch said what you have just said and Halder said the following:
Special military affairs were to be handled by the parts of the Wehrmacht which were directly the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe.
Is that so?
A I have witnessed it myself. We received the orders about military measures by the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.
Such was the Directive No. 21. I thought the people responsible were, first, the superior Military advisors of Hitler.
QIf you have seen Directive No. 21, then you must also know who signed it. Who was that?
AAs much as I can remember, that was signed by Hitler, furthermore, by Keitel and Jodl initialed it; that is to say, as much as I can remember.
QBut, at any rate, signed by Hitler as all directives; is that correct?
AAt any rate, most of the directives, unless they were signed by other people in his name.
QIn other words, may I conclude that the man who gave the order was the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, Hitler?
AThat is correct.
QFrom the statements of von Brauchitsch and Halder we can see, in my opinion, that the General Staff of the Army with its large machinery was to work out ideas which Hitler conceived, work them out in detail? Don't you believe that?
AThat is correct. They had to execute the orders which were given them by the Commander-in-Chief.
QIt is clear that the High Command, that is the Commander-in-Chief, was given these orders. There was in all planning, as I can see from your statement also, in the execution of such plans there was a close collaboration between Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the Army; is that correct?
AThis cooperation exists between the High Command and all parts which are charged to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
QFrom your explanation, I believe I can conclude that the plan which you found on the 3rd of September, 1940, that you have developed that, and that then, after a certain measure of completeness was reached, it was presented to the Commander-in-Chief personally or through Col. Gen. Halder?
A The detailed completion of the plan was presented by the General Staff or by the-
QThat is, it had to be accepted by Hitler or refused?
AYes.
QDid I understand you correctly yesterday that you said you had already in the fall of 1940 understood that Hitler wanted to attack the Soviet Union.
AI have said yesterday that the preparation of that plan of operations was the theoretical preparation for an attack.
QBut at that time already you thought that it was Hitler's intention, didn't you?
AFrom the way in which this task was started one could see that after the theoretical preparation, a practical-
THE PRESIDENT:You must go slower.
QFurthermore, you have said yesterday that no news of the Abwehr had been received by the Abwehr that the Intelligence which would prove that there were any intentions by the Soviet Union to attack.
AYes.
QIn the circle of the General Staff of the Army did anybody speak about these things?
AYes, very frequently. They had serious doubts about it, but there wasn't any news, in fact, about any preparations for war on the side of the Soviet Union; at least I didn't know anything about that.
QSo you were firmly convinced that it was a straight attack on the Soviet Union?
AThe signs for it did not exclude that.
THE PRESIDENT:The witness must speak slower.
QThe witness has said that, if I understood, correctly, there were signs which did not exclude the conclusion that an attack was prepared.
AThe order for the execution of this theoretical study of the conditions for attack was considered not only by myself but also by other people, other informed people, as the first step for the preparations for an attack, that is to say, an aggressive attack on the Soviet Union.
Q In realizing these facts, have you or the General Staff of the Army or the High Command of the Army made any protests to Hitler about it?
APersonally I do not know in what form and whether the Supreme Commander of the Army has made any protests.
QHave you, yourself, protested to Col. Gen. Holder or von Brauchitsch? Have you spoken about your personal doubts?
AIf I judge correctly, then I believe that I am supposed to be here as a witness for the events with which the defendants are accused. I ask the Tribunal, therefore, to relieve me of the responsibility of answering these questions which are directed against myself.
QFieldmarshall Paulus, you don't seem to know that you also belong to the circle of the accused because you belonged to the organization of the High Command which is indicted here as criminal.
AAnd, therefore, since I believe that I am here as witness for the events which have led to the indictment, I have asked to be relieved of the responsibility of answering these questions which concern myself.
DR. NELTE: I ask the Tribunal to decide.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal considers that you must answer the questions that have been put to you up to date.
THE WITNESS:Then may I ask for a repetition of the questions,please?
Q.I have asked you, Fieldmarshall, whether, since you realized that there were serious doubts, you have talked to your chief, Halder or von Brauchitsch, about these things?
A.I cannot remember having talked to the Supreme Commander of the Army about it, but with the Chief of the General Staff Col. Gen. Halder.
Q.Was he of the same opinion?
A.Yes, he was of the same opinion, that is to say, of the opinion of great concern for such a plan.
Q.For military or moral reasons?
A.For several reasons, both military and moral.
Q.It is certain then that you and the Chief of Staff von Halder realized these facts which would have stamped the war against Russia as a criminal attack and just the same that you have done nothing about it? In your statement you have said that later you became Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Army; is that right?
A.Yes
Q.With knowledge of all these facts you have accepted the command of an army which was to push against Stalingrad. Did you have any serious doubts to be made a tool of that attack which in your opinion was a criminal one?
A.As the situation at that time presented itself for the soldier in connection also with the extraordinary propaganda which was put into play, I had at that time, as so many, believed that I had to do my duty toward my fatherland.
Q.But you knew about the facts which were against that opinion?
A.The facts which became clear to me afterwards, due to my experiences as Commander of the Sixth Army which found the climax at Stalingrad, well, the facts I didn't know at that time. Also, about that criminal attack, that knowledge came later, when I thought about all the details because before I could only see part of it.
Q.Then I have to consider your expression "criminal attack" or any other expressions for the war mongers -- I have to consider that as something that you found out later?
A.Yes.
Q.And I may say then that in spite of your having serious doubts and knowledge about the facts which marked the war against Russia as a criminal action of aggression, that in spite of your knowledge you have considered it your duty to take the command of the Sixth Army and to hold Stalingrad until the last moment?
A.I have just explained that at that time, when I took over the command of the Sixth Army, I did not see the extent of the crime which was considered in the beginning and execution of this war; that I did not see the entire extent of it and could not see it as my experiences as Commander of the Sixth Army have shown me later.
Q.You speak of the extent, but the fact is that you knew the causes. Maybe you were one of the few that knew them. You have not mentioned that.
A.I knew the introduction as a war of agrression. At that time, and, as it was the attitude of the Officers' Corps, I found it in the fact that the policy of the Reich was based on power politics and it was nothing unusual.
Q.So you agreed to these ideologies?
A.No, not the tendency which was to be seen later, but I did not exclude that also the fate of the country was based upon power politics. It was a mistake that at that time in the Twentieth Century only the democracies and the realization of the nationality principle were the important factors.
Q.Would you grant, also, the others ggod faith who were not so near to the sources, that they just wanted the best for their fatherland?
A.Yes, I do. BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants von Schirach and Funk):
Q.Yesterday you mentioned that you consider as the guilty ones the Hitler Government; is that correct?
A.Yes.
Q. In your written deposition of the 8th of January, '46, as it says here, in a prison camp, there is nothing about that; at least, I have not found anything about it.
A.This letter has nothing to do with it. What is a letter to the Soviet Government, in which I explained several questions which have come up at the Sixth Army in Russia and several of my own experiences were mentioned here.
Q.In this letter of the 8th of January, '46, you said explicitly:
"Today, where the crimes of Hitler and his helpers are judged, I found myself obliged to tell you everything which I have known and which may serve as proof for the guilt of the crimes in the Nurnbert trials and to present all that to the Soviet Government."
In spite of that, in this written declaration there is nothing about it.
THE PRESIDENT:If you are cross-examining this witness on this letter, you must put the letter in evidence, the whole letter,
DR. SAUTER:That is the statement which the witness has given.
THE PRESIDENT:If you are cross-examining him on the letter and put the letter to him, you must put the letter in evidence. You have a copy of the letter?
DR. SAUTER:Yes. It is the statement which the Soviet prosecutor yesterday put up to the witness and in regard to which the witness made the statement that he considers it correct and he will repeat it.
THE PRESIDENT:I wasn't sure whether it was actually put in or nor or whether it was withdrawn upon the promise to produce the witness. Is the letter actually in?
DR. SAUTER:But the witness has said, after the prosecutor asked him, that he will repeat that statement. In fact, he has repeated it.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Willey, has the letter been put in?
MR. WILLEY:It has not been put in.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well, you can go on cross-examining about it, but the document has to be put in. That is all.
DR. SAUTER:Yes.
Q.Now I would like to know, witness, what do you mean by "Hitler Government"? Do you mean the Reich Cabinet, or what exactly do you mean?
A.I mean everyone who is responsible.
Q.I would like you to answer the question more precisely.
A.In my statements yesterday I have only explained, what I have seen myself, what I have experienced myself. About the individual personalities of the government I had no intention to make any statements because that would not be within my knowledge.
Q.But you spoke about the Hitler Government, didn't you?
A.I just mean the fact of the Hitler Government.
Q.That means, first, the Reich Cabinet, doesn't it?
A.Yes, inasmuch as it is responsible for the directives given by the government.
Q.For this reason I would like to know the following:
The defendant Funk, who is sitting over there, was also a member of the Reich Cabinet and the defendant, von Schirach is also counted as one member of the Reich Cabinet by the prosecution. Do you know anything about the fact whether the defendant Funk and the defendant von Schirach as, for instance you, have known anything about these plans of Hitler?
A.I don't know.
Q.Do you know whether during the war, since you were at the OKW, there were any meetings of the Cabinet?
A.I don't know that either.
Q.Do you know that Hitler in the interest of secrecy of his warlike plans has even ordered that conversations between himself and his military advisors, the members of the Reich Cabinet, not be present?
A.I don't know about that.
Q.Didn't it come to your knowledge by Jodl or from Keitel that Hitler even prohibited that many members of the Reich Cabinet should be present at such military conferences?
A.I don't know anything about that at all.
Q.Another question: After Stalingrad was encircled and the situation had become hopeless, there were several telegrams of devotion to Hitler from Stalingrad; do you know anything about that?
A.If you speak of telegrams of devotion, I only know of the end, where it was tried to give news about the catastrophe that had happened there and to try to find a science for all the suffering and dying of so many soldiers and that, therefore, had been depicted, as heroism in the telegram. I am sorry that at that time -- and that came from the entire situation -- that I had to let that pass and that I have not stopped it.
Q.The telegrams were sent by you?
A.I do not know to which telegrams you are referring, with the exception of the last one.
Q.Several telegrams in which there was promised that you would hold out until the last man, those telegrams which the German people could not understand. They were very much against them. They should have had your signature.
A: I would like to have them presented to me because there is nothing known to me about them.
I don't know anything about them. Q: Then you don't know anything about them? A: These telegrams of which you speak, with the exception of the very last. Q: Do you have any idea what was in the last telegram? A: In the last telegram there was a short description of what the army had done, of the achievement of the army, and it was pointed out that this did not mean to capitulate, and that should be an example for the future.
Q: The answer was your promotion to General Fieldmarshall? A: I don't know that this would have been the answer. Q: But you were promoted to General Fieldmarshall, and you still have that title because the statement which I have submitted to the Court is signed "Paulus, General Fieldmarshall". A: Well, I have to say .... Do you mean this statement?
Q: Yes, this statement. A: Yes, I had to take that title which was conferred upon me. Q: In this statement which I have submitted to the Court as proof there is the last sentence:
"I bear the responsibility for the fact that - - with regard to the Order of 14 January '43 about turning over of the prisoners, that is the Russian prisoners to the Russians - - that I have not watched that, and for the deaths which have resulted from that I am responsible and, furthermore, that I could not do more about taking care of the prisoners.
I would like to hear your statement about that. In that detailed letter why didn't you mention the one hundred thousands of German soldiers which were under your command and who lost under your command their freedom, their health, and their life?
There is no word about that. A: That is not the question in this letter. This letter to the Soviet Government was concerned with what happened to the Russian population in the area of Stalingrad and the Russian prisoners of war.
In this place I could not say anything about my soldiers, of course not.
Q: No word?
A: No, that had to be done at a different place. Of course it is so that all the operational orders which have led to the conditions of Stalin grad, that all these orders, although I have protested against them, around the 20th of January, as I said, the conditions had reached a measure of misery and of suffering by cold, hunger and epidemics, that the conditions have become unbearable and that a continuing of the fighting would be beyond human possibilities.
The answer was "Capitulation is impossible.
The Sixth Army will do its historic duty by Stalingrad until the last man and to facilitate the straightening out of the lines at the Eastern front."
Q And that is why you have collaborated in the continuation of what you call the crime, after your own description that everything from the very beginning was clear to you as a crime?
AI didn't say that, that it was clear to me from the very beginning as a crime, but that after I looked at it later I had that impression, because my impression resulted from my experience at Stalingrad.
QI would not like to know at the end. Didn't you know from the very beginning, quite really, when you were charged to work on plans for the attack against Russia, and especially for certain tasks -- didn't you know from the very beginning that this attack on Russia could only be done under violations of international law, to which Germany was bound?
AYes, by violation of treaties, but not in those conditions I saw later.
QI asked whether it was clear to you that this plan could only be executed by violation of treaties.
AIt is clear that an attack of that kind could only be done under violation of the treaty which existed with Russia.
DR. SAUTER:I have no more questions. Thank you.
(Dr. Exner took a position before the microphone.)
THE PRESIDENT:Doctor Exner, I have already told the witness, and defendants' counsel have been told over and over again, that it is of the utmost importance that they should ask their questions slowly, that they ask one question at a time, and that they should pause between the question and the answer and between the answer and the next question. Will yon try to observe that rule? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. EXNER (Counsel for Jodl):
QWitness, in September of 1940 at the OKW you were charged with the execution of a plan of an operation against Russia, that is, to continue work on a plan which existed already. Do you know about how strong the German forces in the East were at that time?
AI can only clarify that I didn't know in the OKH; that is the High Command of the army, not of the Wehrmacht. I don't know any more how strong the forces in the East were at that time.
It was at a time shortly after the end of the campaign against France.
QYou don't know about how many divisions were at that time for the protection of the German border on the East?
ANo, I cannot remember that.
QIn February of 1941 our transport to the East began. Can you say how strong at that time the Russian forces were along the German-Russian demarcatic line and the Rumanian-Russian border?
ANo, I cannot say that. The information which came about the Soviet Union and their forces were so extraordinarily scarce and incomplete that for a long time we had no clear picture at all.
QBut didn't Halder at that time talk to the Fuehrer frequently about the strength and deployment of the Russian forces?
ANo. That is possible, but I cannot remember it, because I had nothing to do with these questions at that time -- with the theoretical development of our ideas. In September the Operations Department of the army took care of it.
QAt this time you had maneuvers?
AThat was in the beginning of December.
QThen, you probably used as a basis of these maneuvers information you had about the plans of the enemy?
AThat was just what we thought about the strength.
QYou have collaborated very intensively on the working out of that plan. You have tried it out by maneuvers. Tell me what was the difference between your work and Jodl's at that time?
AI don't think I am able to judge that. I don't understand.
QThat was General Staff work, wasn't it?
AYes, it was General Staff work, with which I was charged by the Chief of Staff.
QYes, and so was the activity of Jodl as Chief of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab?
A The difference is that he had the entire picture from the point where he was, whereas I could only see a small section, only that which I needed for my work, and that is all the information I received.
QBut the activity in both cases was one of General Staff preparation for the war?
AYes.
QI would also be interested to know something about Stalingrad. In your written statement, or declaration, you have said that Keitel and Jodl were guilty with regard to the prohibition of capitulation, which had such tragic consequences. How do you know that?
AI just wanted to say it was the High Command of the Wehrmacht who was responsible for that order. It has the responsibility, and it makes no difference whether it was one of the immediate persons. At any rate, they are responsible, their office as such.
QAt any rate, you don't know anything about the personal participation of any one of these two gentlemen? You know only that the OKW -
AThe OKW, which is represented by these persons -
THEPRESIDENT (Interpolating): Mr. Interpreter, do not say each time "question" and "answer", but just give the words of the question and the words of the answer. Putting in the words "question" and "answer" takes up your time and makes it more difficult, I think. I am not certain. BY DR. EXNER:
QWhy when the situation at Stalingrad was so hopeless and terrible didn't you, in spite of the order by the Fuehrer to the contrary, try to give up?
ABecause at that time it was represented to me that by holding out with the army which I led the fate of the German people would be decided.
QDo you know that you enjoyed the confidence of Hitler in a special measure?
AI don't know about that.
QDo you know that he had already decided that you would become the successor to Jodl if the Stalingrad Operation would be successful, because he wouldn't like to work with Jodl any more?
A I don't know about that in this form, only there was a rumour late in the summer or early in the fall of 1942 that a change was planned in the leadership.
That was a rumour which theChief of Staff of the Luftwaffe told me, but I didn't get any official information about that. There was other information that I should be relieved of the command of that army and should be used to lead a new army group along the Don River.
QDo you remember the telegram which you sent to the Fuehrer when you were promoted to the rank of Field Marshal at Stalingrad?
AI didn't send a telegram then. After my promotion I did not send a telegram.
QHaven't you thanked the Fuehrer in any way?
ANo.
QThat is quite contrary to statements which other people have made. You are said to be a teacher at the Military Academy at Moscow.
AThat is not right.
QDid you have another position in Moscow?
AI was never in Russia before the war, but now, of course, I have been in a prisoner of war camp, like my other comrades in Russia.
QWere you a member of the German Freedom Committee?
AI was a member of a movement of German men, soldiers of all ranks, and men of all classes, who have made it their aim to warn the German people the last moment before the abyss, and to call for an attack to lead to the end of the Hitler government that brought all that misery to the German people. I have done that with the proclamation of the 8th of August, 1944.
QAugust 1944?
AYes.
QDid you do anything about that before?
ANo, I did not.
DR. EXNER:Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the OKW, High Command of the Wehrmacht.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER:
QWitness, did you know when you took over your office as O.Q.I. that these preparations which Major General Marx had begun, and which you have continued, were intended only for an eventual case?
AOne could think so, of course, but very soon in the course of the work things appeared which made it look very probable that the theoretical preparations would find their practical use, because in connection with this plan of operations, in which from the very beginning we were thinking in terms of using the Roumanian area -- at that time we saw the dispatching of the first military mission just into that area for which the theoretical preparations for an offensive into Russia had been made; so by and by more impressions of that kind led to the opinion that this was a plan which should be executed.
QThe reason for my question is this: I believe the date which you mentioned during which the plan existed already, since the fall of 1940, is a little early, isn't it?
AThe materials which I was given for that plan I explained yesterday. On the 3rd of September they were there, and on the basis of this information everything was developed and everything went like that in fact. I mean this: that first this plan was considered or conceived for an eventual case, and then at a later date, after a decision had been taken, it was used. In looking back, it works well together, the theoretical preparation and then the practical preparation and then the execution.
QDo you know Directive No. 18 of November 1940?
AI cannot remember it.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, I refer now to a document which has already been submitted by the American Prosecution, No.444-PS.
QI submit it to you, Mr. Witness. Page 8 is the one I am referring to (handing a paper to the witness).
AI cannot remember that I have ever seen this.
Q Witness, would you like to repeat that answer?
AI cannot remember to having known anything about this letter before at any time.
DR. LATERNSER:To inform the Court I am going to quote the passage -it is very short -- which I have just shown to the witness. It is page 8 of the Document 444-PS, this paragraph. I quote:
"5. Russian political conferences with the aim of clarifying the attitude of Russia for the near future have been started."
QWitness, after you have seen that passage you will have to be of my opinion that the time at which the decision was taken to attack the Soviet Union must have been later than the time you told us yesterday.
AI can only say from my personal experience and my own opinion as I look back now that when I follow the whole development there was a clear plan from the beginning, the conception of that plan on 3 September 1940, and then the directive 21 of December until its execution. Just at which precisely measurable date the decision was taken I couldn't tell you.
QDid you know that in 1939 the Soviet Union in the opinion of German military experts marched into Poland with very strong forces? There must have been opinions of military experts about the strength of the invasion?
AI didn't know anything, only about the fact, but I have never heard anything about the size of the forces that were sent into Poland. I have never heard anything about that.
QDo you know that before the German deployment on the Eastern border much stronger Soviet forces had been deployed along that border, especially very strong Panzer forces in the area of Bialystok?
ANo, in that form I have never known about it.
QWeren't the first divisions from West to East transferred only after strong Soviet forces were standing along the Eastern border?
AAbout relations between the moving of troops from West to East -with the practical execution of the plan I don't know anything, because I had nothing to do with the practical execution. First of all, in the months of April and May I was only a very short time present in the High Command of the Army.
Q Witness, you said yesterday that at the end of March 1940, there was a conference at the Reichschancellory, and there Colonel General Halder gave you, as a reason for the intended attack on Yugoslavia, several points during that conference.
You mentioned first the elimination of danger to the flank; second, the rail line to Nish; third, the fact that in case of attack against Russia the right flank would be free to move. Were the reasons for this attack not different ones? Weren't there reasons which were more important than the ones you mentioned?
AI don't know of any others.
QAs to this attack upon Yugoslavia, shouldn't that also be done to relieve the Italians?
AYes, of course. That was the initial reason why an operation against Greece was considered, and therefore that menace to the flank had to be eliminated.
QWasn't there at that time some concern about cooperation between Yugoslavia and Greece, which would have put England into position to land on the Greek coast and receive a base for operations against Roumania?
QYes, but it would also have made impossible the attack Case Barbarossa, which would have been menaced on its right flank and stopped.
QI have received different information. In the decision to attack Yugoslavia the Plan Barbarossa did not play the important role which you said it did.
AEven Barbarossa was absolutely impossible if the area of Greece and Serbia, after reinforcement by the British landing, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT:This is a good time to recess.
(A recess was taken.)