They pronounced death sentences and deported a certain number pf persons who were considered to be Communists and whose internment they had in a prior period requested. After this date of August 29, 1943, the king, the government and the parliament ceased to exercise their functions. The administration continued under the direction of high officials who in indispensable cases took measures called, "Laws of Necessity." During this same period there existed three German authorities in Denmark:
First of all the plenipotentiary, who was still Doctor Best:
In the second place the military authority under the orders of General Hannecken, replaced subsequently by General Lindemann;
And finally in the third place the German police.
Setting up of the German police in Denmark was followed indeed a few days later by a crisis, of which I have just spoken to you. The SS Standartenfuehrer, Colonel Dr. Mildner, arrived in September as chief of the German Security; and the first of November there arrived as the supreme chief of the police in Denmark the Obergruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of the Police Gunther Pancke, of whom I shall speak again. General Gunther Pancke and Doctor Mildner, whose names I have already cited -- Doctor Mildner was replaced January 4, 1944, by SS. Standartenfuehrer Bovensiepen.
The Tribunal will see in the Danish Government report an appendix where you will find the information, a chart relative to the German officials in Denmark. This chart is found in the second memorandum page two. It is interesting -- although we are not concerned here with individual cases -it is interesting because it shows the organization of the German network in this country. During the whole period which we are speaking about now, among the three German authorities already mentioned, the police played the most important role and was the principal organ of usurpation of sovereignty by the Germans. We may, for that reason, consider that at the time then Norway and Holland represent cases of civil administration, if Belgium and France represent military administration, and Denmark represented the typical case of police administration. We must never forget the different sorts of administration are always somewhat overlapping. And in all occupied countries the seizure of authority by the German police in Denmark during the period which begins September 1943 and lasts until liberation unleashed an extraordinary number of crimes.
Differing from other administrations, the police did not act under regulations, but they interfered forcefully in the life of the country by exercising force which was orderly and systematic. I will have the opportunity of treating certain aspects of this police administration in the fourth chapter of my brief. For the moment, within the scope of my subject, I would like simply to cite the facts which constitute direct and general violation of sovereignty. From this point of view I believe that it is indispensable to point out to the Tribunal a rather special event which took place on September 19, 1944. At that ate the Germans did away with the Danish police -- I mean the national police of Denmark -- and abolished totally this same institution which is indispensable and essential in all states.
I am going to read on that point the terms of the government report, second memorandum, that is to say, the third booklet of the dossier, page twenty-nine. I will begin in the middle of the paragraph, after the first sentence. The extract is found in my brief. I quote:
"The fact that the Germans had not succeeded in obtaining any influence over the Danish police neither among their leaders nor in the ranks contribute, to the fact that the German military authorities at the end of the summer of 1944 began to fear the police. Pancke explained that General Hannecken and he himself were afraid thatthe police, numbering eight to ten thousand well-trained men, would not fall to the Germans in the event of an invasion. In the month of September 1944, believing that an invasion of Denmark was probable, Pancke and Hannecken began the disarming of the police and the deportation of a part of the police. Pancke submitted the plan to Himmler, who consented to it in writing, adding to theletter that the plan had been approved by Hitler. He had moreover discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner. The operation was carried out by Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner and Mueller of the RSHA, and the regular troops aided this operation organized with the consent of General Hannecken.
"At eleven o'clock in the morning on the 19th of September 1944, the Germans caused a false air alarm to be given.
Immediately afterwards the soldiers, who were policemen, penetrated forcibly the police prefecture in Copenhagen as well as the different police headquarters in the city. Some policemen were killed. They acted in the same way throughout the whole country. Most of the policemen on duty were captured. In Copenhagen and in the large cities of the country the prisoners were taken to Germany by ships, which Kaltenbrunner had sent for this purpose or in freight cars. As it has already been said before, the treatment which they were subjected to in German concentration camps cannot be described too horribly. In the little cities of the country the policemen were freed.
"At the same time Pancke decreed what he called a state of police emergency. The exact meaning of this expression has never been explained, and even the Germans do not seem to have understood what it meant. In practice the result was that all police activities, not only simple, ordinary, but judicial were suspended. Maintenance of order and of public security was left to the inhabitants themselves.
"The last six months of the occupation, the Danish nation found itself in an unheard of situation -- unknown in other civilized countries -of being deprived of their police force to maintain order and public security, This state of affairs might have ended in complete chaos if the respect for laws and the discipline of the population -- strengthened by the indignation because of this act of violence -- had not avoided more serious results."
Despite the bearing of the Danish population, the absence of the police for these last six months of the occupation naturally resulted in the recrudescence of criminality under all forms. You can get an idea of this if you consider that the premiums of insurance companies were raised to 480 percent, when previously they were limited to only the normal rate. It is only just to consider that the crimes committed under these conditions entail the responsibility of the German authorities who could not fail to foresee and who accepted this state of affairs. You see here a new demonstration of the total indifference of the Germans so far as consequences or results are concerned of acts which they decided from their point of view to be in their own interest.
Finally I would like to conclude this chapter which relates to Denmark by quoting to the Tribunal a passage of a document which I presented under the number 902. This document comes from the American documentation under the number 705-PS, but it has not yet been submitted or lodged with the Tribunal, and I would like to read an extract, one quotation, which seems interesting to me. This is a transcript established.
at Berlin January 20, 1943, of a meeting of the SS Committee for the Study Group Concerned with Germanic Space.
At this meeting were present fourteen personages of the SS. There is in this transcript a special paragraph which concerns Denmark. On the other hand, other paragraphs of the same document are of interest as far as the following chapter, which will follow this, is concerned. In order to avoid to have to quote this document twice, I shall read all the passages which I would like to submit as in evidence. I quote-page 3 of the Norwegian document, the lower part of the page. "Norway" is underlined.
"In Norway the Minister of Fuglesang became subsequently the successor of the Minister Lunde who had died by accident. Despite the promises made by Quisling's party, we must not expect that Norway furnish an important quota.
"Denmark. In Denmark, because of the seizure of power by the Gruppenfuehrer SS Doctor Best, the situation is extremely encouraging. We may be convinced that the SS Gruppenfuehrer Doctor Best furnish a classical example of the ethnical policy of the Reich. The relations with the leaders of the Clausen Party have recently become delicate. Clausen has not been sympathetic to the establishment of a body of combatants as the prime organization for the Germanic defense of Denmark, except upon the condition that those who belong to this corps will not belong to the Party. The parties relative to the grouping, this indispensable grouping of front combatants, was continued. The position of the monopoly of the Party not being maintained, all the elements as recruiting must be utilized even if Clausen, but without his clique, must figure personally in the foreground.
"In Holland Muessert was at that time proclaimed fuehrer of the Dutch people by the Reich Commisar, Doctor Seyss-Inquart. This measure had in other Germanic countries, and particularly in Flanders, an extremely troublesome influence. The decisive role was that of the general commissariat of which the principle of exploiting Muessert and then dropping him subsequently must be rejected in favor of a Germanic policy of the Reich with the view of using the SS.
"Flanders. In Flanders the development of the VNV, the Flemish National Movement, continued to be unfavorable.
Concerning this, the very clever policy of the new leader of the VNV, Doctor Elias, was not able, nonetheless, to deceive the people.
Did he not, moreover, express the opinion that Germany was ready for a confession in the ethical domain only when its situation was difficult?"
This information, which is quite characteristic on the one hand-
it is established that Germanic space should include Norway, Denmark, Holland and Flanders.
I speak naturally only of the Western countries.
In the second place, we see how the Germans used the local party of National Socialist inspiration of sovereignty.
In the third place we see it is quite accurate that the German diplomatic agents were also instrumental in the policy of usurpation and exceeded totally their normal functions.
In the fourth place the document emphasizes the inter-dependence which existed between the different agents of German interference, inter-dependence which we emphasized just now and which we cannot too much emphasize.
The case of Doctor Best is a good example.
Doctor Best was a Minister with plenipotentiary powers, and in that capacity a diplomatic agent.
And we see also that Doctor Best was previously an agent of the military administration, and we see in this document that beyond his capacity or function of Plenipotentiary Minister he is a General in the SS.
And in this capacity they stipulate in this document that he seize power in Denmark.
The information that in these documents concerns Norway and the Low Countries is a transition for the following part of this chapter, and I ask the Tribunal to take the brief entitled, "Norway and Holland."
The establishment of the Reich Commissar was applied in Norway and in Holland, and only in these two countries that corresponds to a definite concept in the over-all plan of Germanization, in which these two countries had no voice.
In both cases the establishment of civil administration follow closely the military occupation of the country.
This Ministry was only concerned with measures concerning public order.
In Norway by decree of April 24, 1940, a certain Terboven was Reich Commissar.
This decree is signed by Hitler, Lammers and the Defendants Keitel and Frick.
In Holland there was a decree of May 18, 1940, which appointed the Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissar.
This decree is signed by the same persons as the preceding decree, and it bears moreover the signatures of the Defendant Goering and Ribbentrop.
The degrees of appointment of Reichskommissars defined at the same time the function and fixed the sharing of the functions between the Reichskommissar and the military authorities.
I do not submit these as documents showing, these were direct acts of German legislation. The degree concerning Norway provides in its first article that the Reichskommissar has the concern of safeguarding the interests of the Reich, and of exercising supreme power in the civil domain. The decree adds: "The Reichskommissar is director under me and receives from me directives and instructions."
As far as the division of powers or functions is concerned, here is the text of Article 4: " The Commander of the German troops in Norway exercises rights of military sovereignty. His orders are carried out in the civil domain by the Reichskommissar."
This decree was published in the official Journal of German decrees for 1940, No. 1. The same information is given in a similar decree of May 18, 1940, applying to Holland. This establishment of Reichskommissars was accompanied at the beginning with some information that was supposed to reassure the public. Terboven proclaimed that he had decided to limit to the maximum the inconveniences and expenses of the occupation. This is found in a proclamation of April 26, 1940, which is in the official journal, page 2.
Likewise, after his appointment the defendant Seyss-Inquart addressed to the Dutch people an appeal, which is found in the official journal for Holland of 1940, page 2, where he expressed himself as follows. The first is a catagorical phrase: "I shall take all measures, including those of a legislative nature, which will be necessary for carrying out this mandate"; and he adds: "It is my will that the laws in force up to now shall remain in force, and that the Dutch authorities must be associated with the carrying out of governmental affairs, and thatthe independence of justice be maintained."
But these promises were not kept. The Reichskommissar, evidently, in Norway and in Holland was the principal agent of the usurpation of sovereignty. He acted, however, always in close relation with a second agent of usurpation, which is the National Socialist organization in the country. This collaboration of the local Nazi Party with the German autho rity, represented by the Reichskommissar, took on forms perceptibly dif-ferent in each of the two countries under consideration.
As a result, the exercise of power by the Reichskommissar presented in itself between Norway and Holland differences which were more apparent than real.
In the two countries the local National Socialist Party existed prior to the war. It developed under the inspiration of the German Nazi Party and in the general scope of war preparations and of their plan for Germanization. I should like to give a few bits of information relating to Norway.
The National Socialist Party is called there the National Samling. For leader it had the celebrated Quisling. It constituted a perfect imitation of the German Nazi Party. I submit to the Tribunal as Document 920 the text of the oath of fidelity subscribed to by members of this National Samling Party. I quotes:
"My promise of fidelity: I promise on my honor: First, unflinching fidelity and loyalty towards the National Socialist Movement, its idea, and its Fuehrer."
This is the third page of the Document 920.
"Second, to work energetically, tirelessly, and boldly for the cause. Always in my work I shall be worthy of confidence and show discipline. I shall, do all that I can to acquire the knowledge and aptitude which is required for my activity in the movement.
"Three, as far as I can, I shall live according to the National Socialist spirit, and towards all my companions in the struggle I shall show solidarity and comprehension and be a good comrade to them.
"Four, to obey any administrative decision taken by the Fuehrer or by trusted advisors when the latter do not act against or in disagreement with the directions of the Fuehrer.
"Five, never to reveal' to others (to foreigners or enemies) details of N.S. methods of work or anything whatsoever which might harm the movement.
"Sixth, to use extreme efforts at all times to contribute to the progress of the movement and to the realization of its purpose, and to fulfill the place in the organization of the struggle which I charge myself to do under promise of fidelity, quite conscious that I will be guilty of an unworthy and wretched action if I broke this promise.
"Seventh, if the circumstances make it impossible for me to continue as a member of the organization for struggling, I promise to withdraw in an honest fashion.
"I shall remain bound by the secret, I promise, and I shall do nothing of detriment to the movement. Our purpose, the purpose of the National Samling, is this: a new state in Norwegian and Nordic association, which are a joint association in the world's community, organizally constructed on the foundation of work, under a powerful and stable leadership, the union between the communal utility and the private utility."
This applies in a complete way to the Fuehrer principle. The very day of the invasion the Nazis forced the establishment of an alleged Norwegian Government, over which Quisling presided. This experiment, however, did not last very long. Beginning with the following April -- the 15th, in fact -- the Germans decided "to hold in reserve" their protegee, according to their own expression. At that time the Norwegian Supreme Court proceeded to appoint a board of officials who were invested under the title of Administrative Council, with powers of higher administration. This Administrative Council constituted then, under the exceptional circumstances in which it was appointed, a qualified authority, at any rate, for keeping up the appearance of representing the legitimate sovereignty. It functioned only a short time. Beginning with the month of September the Nazis observed it was not possible for them to obtain the complicity, or even passive acceptance, of the administrators. They then appointed themselves thirteen Kommissars, of whom ten were selected among the members of the Quisling Party. Quisling himself did not exercise any nominal function, but he remained the Fuehrer of his party.
Finally, a third period began;the 1st of February 1942. At that date Quisling returned to power as Minister and President, and the Kommissars themselves took on the title or name of Ministers. This situation lasted until the freeing of Norway. Thus, with the exception of a period of a few months in 1940, the Germans seized in an absolute manner all the sovereignty in Norway. This sovereignty was shared between a direct agent, the Reichskommissar and their indirect agents, first called the State Council and then the Quisling Government, all, however, emanating from the National Socialist Movement.
It is incontestible that the independence of these organizations in their relations with the German authorities was absolutely nil. The fact that the second organization was qualified as governmental corresponded to no strengthening of autonomous authority. There were only differences of power form, of which I shall point out the major to the Tribunal. I present, in relation to these two documents, No. 921 and No. 922. By comparing these two documents you will see the exactness of which I have just affirmed. These two documents are instructions addressed by the Reichskommissar to these organizations concerning legislative procedure. I shall point out to the Tribunal the date when these documents were numbered. I shall consider first Document 922 and subsequently Document 921. The two documents, however, are closely allied.
The first document is dated October 10, 1940, and it is about the beginning of the period of the State Councils. I quote an extract from this document:
"All the decrees of the State Counselor must be submitted beofre their publication to the Reichskommissar."This is to be found in the second paragraph. It is the only point which I would like to make in this document. All the decrees of the higher Norwegian administration were under the control of the Reichskommissar.
The second document, Document 921, is dated 8 April 1942. It relates to the period shortly after the establishment of the second Quisling Government. I read a part of the second sentence of this document:
"Given the formation of the National Norwegian Government, the Reichskommissar decided that henceforth this form of agreement -- a prior agreement in writing -- is no longer required. Nevertheless, this modification of form of legislative procedure should not have for a result the proclamation of law decreed by the Norwegian Government and instituted by the competent service of the Reichskommissariat. His Honor, the Reichskommissar, expects every department chief to inform himself through close contacts with the competent Norwegian bureaus of all legislative measures which are in preparation, and he should examine in each case to see that these measures concern German interests, and that he will assure himself, in case of need, that German interests will be taken account of."
Thus, it is a close family control with written authorization, and it is an internal control by information handed over between the different offices; but the principle is the same.
The establishment of local authority under one form or under another form corresponded only to the search for the best way of deceiving the public. When the Germans put Quisling into the background it was because they thought the State Counsellors, being less well known, might more easily deceive the public. When they had Quisling return, it was because the first maneuvers had failed obviously, and because they thought that perhaps the official establishment of a qualified authority would give the impression that the sovereignty of the country was not abolished. One might, however, wonder what was the reason for these artifices and why the Nazis used them instead of simply and purely annexing the country. There is a very important reason for that. It is valid for Norway and it will be valid for Holland. The Nazis preferred to keep the fiction of independent states and to insure for themselves a definite empire from within by the utilization and by the development of a local party. It is with this view in mind that they granted to the party in Norway advantages of prestige, and if they did not act in Holland in an identical manner, we shall see that their general conduct is, however, inspired by the same point of view.
This policy of the Germans in Norway is perfectly illustrated by the Norwegian law, an alleged Norwegian law of March 12, 1942, official Norwegian Journal, 1942, page 215, which I offer in evidence as Document No. 923, I quote:
"Law concerning the party and the State, March 12, 1942, No. 2, paragraph 1: In Norway the National Samling is the fundamental party of the State and closely allied with the State.
"Paragraph 2: The organization of the party, its activity, and the duties of its members are fixed by the Tribunal of the National Samling.
"Oslo, March 12, 1942, signed Quisling, President of the Council."
On the other hand, the Nazis organized on a large scale the system of reduplication which exists in the higher authority. It is the transposition of the German system, which includes constant parallelism between the State Administration and the party organizations. Everywhere the German Nazis were appointed and established to second and supervise the Norwegian. Nazis who had been in official positions.
This point is interesting from the point of view of seizure of sovereignty (and the way in which it was carried out) and the administration. I would like to submit two documents, which are Documents 924 and 925. These are extracts of judicial interrogations by the Norwegian Justice of two German high officials of the Reichskommissariat at Oslo. Document 924 refers to the interrogation of George Wilhelm Mueller, interrogation dated January 5, 1946. Wilhelm Mueller was the leader of the Bureau for the Education of the People and for Propaganda. The information which he gives is relative to the functioning of the Propaganda Bureau, and also analogous methods which were used for all bureaus, as this deposition documents. I quote Document 924:
"Question: In 1941 no one thought in your country that there would be military difficulties. At that time they certainly tried to form the Norwegian people in the Nationalist Socialist sense?
"Reply: That is what they did until the very end.
"Question: what were the measures practised for this National Socialist formation?
"Reply: They Supported the M.S. Samling as fat as possible, and they did it, in the first place, by strengthening from the organizational point of view the structure very strongly."
I may point out that this translation of French is not very elegant, but it is comprehensible.
"Question: In what way was it strengthened?
"Reply: In each fylking, or province, they appointed National Socialists who had been particularly selected to aid the Norwegian National Socialists.
"Question: Were there other measures which were carried out?
"Reply: That was done in all documents, even in the domain of propaganda, the Einsatzstab putting propagandists at their disposal. They also did it at Oslo under the central direction of the N.S. Samling.
"Question: How did these propagandists work?
"Reply: They were in close relation with similar Norwegian propagandists and also to the leaders suggestions. Grell did that in a double capacity as Chief of Propaganda in the Reichskommissariat and the leader in the Landsgruppe.
"Question: What was the method that was utilized?
"Reply: These constant conferences were continued to the very top of the hierarchy. There was a man who was particularly entrusted, first Wegener, then Neumann, then Schnaubusch, who had the position of intensigying National Socialist ideas within the N. S. Samling.
"Question: In the Einsatzstab there were experts in the different branches who were to be in contact with Norwegians in order to advise them. In what domain?
"Reply: There were organizers, and especially counsellors, far the Hird, the leaders of the SA and SS. We had as a leader one man for the press, a propagandist, Mr. Schnaubusch, until be became himself leader of the Einsatzstab a financier, a counsellor for social questions, as with the NSV in Germany. " The Tribunal will notice in this document the name of Schnaubusch as being the leader of the Einsatzstab, which was the organization which had control of the local party.
I would like now to read an extract of the interrogation of Schnaubusch, which is found in Document 925.
THE PRESIDENT:Are you putting these documents in?
M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT:Will you say, for the purposes of the shorthand note, that you offer them in evidence?
M. FAURE:Will you excise me?
I offer Document 925 as well as Document 924, of which I spoke just now. I offer these documents in evidence.
This is from the interrogation of 8 January 1946 in Oslo of Heinrich Schnaubusch, leader of the liaison service in the Reichskommissariat:
"Question: How did the German departments try to carry out this National Socialist transformation?"
I wish to point out to the Tribunal that the three first questions I did not consider to be of any great interest, so I omitted them.
"Reply: We sought to strengthen this movement with all the customary ways of leading the masses as we re accustomed to do in Germany. The National Samling took advantage of the fact that they had all means of transmission and propaganda. But we see very cl early that the purpose could not be obtained. After September 25, 1940, the atmosphere in Norway changed from one day to the other when some State Counsellors were appointed as N. S. State Counsellors, and that because the acts of Quisling during the days of April, 1940 were considered as a betrayal.
"Question: In what way did you assist from the material point of view the N. S. Samling in this propaganda? In what way did you give your advice to the N. S. Samling?
"Reply: At the time I was in office was when propaganda activity was to be carried out. It harmonized with the propaganda which was taking place in Germany.
"Question: Did you issue any directives for the N. S. Samling?
"Reply: No. In my time the N. S. Samling worked in an autonomous manner in this domain, and even in part contrary to our advice. The N. S. Samling invoked the fact that it understood the public, the Norwegian mentality, but it committed numerous mistakes.
"Question: Were pecuniary means put at its disposal?
"Reply: In every fashion. Financial means were given, but I don't know the exact sum."
THE PRESIDENT:Shall we adjourn for ten minutes?
(Whereupon at 1120 hours a ten-minute recess was taken.)
I should like first of all to point out to the Tribunal that, with its permission, I should like to have heard this afternoon the witness Van der Essen, about whom a regular request has already been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
M. FAURE:This witness can then be called at the beginning of the afternoon session.
The observations which I have just presented had to do with Norway.
In the Netherlands, unlike what happened in Norway, the Nazis did not utilize the local Party as an official agent of the government. The government authority belonged, in an integral fashion, to the Kommissar of the Reich, which was made up of a sort of Ministry, including four general Kommisars, respectively competent for government and justice, for public security, for finances and the economic affairs, and for special matters. This organization was created by a decree of 3 June, 1940, Official Journal of Holland, 1940, Number 5. As the Dutch official Journal has been submitted in evidence to the Tribunal, I shall not again submit each text, which is a part of it. I shall, therefore, simply ask the Tribunal to take notice of it and I shall consider it as proof.
The holders of the posts were nominated by the decree of 5 June, 1940.
The local authorities are represented in the superior echelon only by the Secretaries General of the Ministries, who are entirely responsible to the Reich Kommissar and to the General Kommissars.
The ordinance of 29 May, 1940, which is in the Dutch official Journal, 1940, page 8, specifies in its first article;
"The Kommissars of the government exercise the powers given until now to the King and to the Government."
And in Article 3 of the same document:
"The General Secretaries of the Dutch Ministries are responsible before the Reich Kommissar."
If the Nazi Party did not constitute the government, it nevertheless received an official consecration.
I shall quote on this point the decree of 30 January, 1943, which likewise is in the Dutch Official Journal, 1943, page 63. I read the following passage:
"The representative of the political will of the Dutch people is the National Socialist movement of the Netherlands.
I have ordered that all the German offices under my orders, in order to assure the coordination between the tasks of the administration and that of the National Socialist movement, maintain close relations with the Chief of the movement, as concerns the execution of important administrative measures and particularly for all matters concerning personnel."
The Tribunal knows already, through public knowledge and as much as is necessary through the witness who has been heard, how outrageously inaccurate it was to claim that the Dutch National Socialist Party represented the political will of the people of this country.
Having observed these forms of utilization of the local Party as agents of sovereignty, I should now like to point out to the Tribunal the essential lines, the various ways in which these usurpations were committed by the Germans.
A first directive must be defined by the attempt to bring the occupied countries to participate in the war and at the very least, to develop in them recruiting for the German Army. In Norway the Nazis created the "SS Norge", an organization which later was to be called the "Germanske SS Norge." I submit as evidence Document 926, which is an ordinance of 21 July, 1942, concerning the Germanske SS Norge, and I quote paragraph 2 of this ordinance, which is an ordinance of Quisling.
"2. The Germanske SS Norge is a National Socialist order of soldiers which is to be composed of men of Nordic blood and ideas. It is an independent subdivision of the National-Samling, directly under the NS Foreren (that is the Fuehrer of the National-Samling and is responsible to it). It is, at the same time, a section of the Stor Germanske SS, (the SS of Greater Germany) and is to contribute to the carrying out of the following work:
"Directing the Germanic people toward a new future and creat the basis of a Germanic community."
We see here again, by this example, that the intervention of a so-called Norwegian government, is perfectly clear the undertaking of Germanization.
In order to facilitate the recruiting into this Legion, the Nazis did not hesitate to upset the civil legislation and to violate the constant principles of the rights of family by having a law which dispenses minors from the consent of their parents, put into effect.
This is a law of the first of February, 1941, Norwegian Official Journal, 1941, 153, which I submit in evidence as Document 927.
In Holland the Germans were obliged to upset even more the national legislation in order to permit military recruiting. As they did not create any factious government and as the legitimate government was still at war with the Reich, the volunteers fell under the force of Article 101 the Dutch penal code, which punished the enrolling in the Army of a foreign power and likewise the fact of giving aid to the enemy.
By reason of the de facto occupation of the country there was little chance of these penalties being effectively applied but it is very curious and very revealing to observe that the Reich Kommissar referred to a decree of 25 July, 1941, Dutch Official Journal, 1941, Number 1935. This decree declares that the taking into service of Dutchmen -- into the German Army, the Waffen SS or the Legion of Netherlands Volunteers -- did not fall under the provisions of the penal texts quoted above and this decree is declared retroactive to 10 May, 1940. It is therefore quite convenient when one commits a criminal act, according to the general code to modify the law to suppress or eliminate the crime in question.
Another decree of 25 July 1941, Official Journal of 1941, page 546; stipulates that enrollment in the German Army does not involve loss of Dutch nationality.
Finally, a decree of 8 August, 1941, Official Journal of 1941, page 622, declares that the acquisition of German nationality is no longer punishable by the loss of Dutch nationality. Although this last text seems to refer to a point of detail, it may be regarded as an initial attempt to create later a double nationality, which would be Dutch and German and which is a procedure which fits into the whole plan of Germanization.
In regard to this measure taken for military recruiting, I should like to indicate in detail the intent of the accusation. This results from the examination or cross-examination of the witness Vorrink, who was heard on Saturday. The accusation does not consider that the criminal character of this military recruiting is subordinate to the fact of having recruited persons by force, by pressure against their will.
These pressures and these restraints are an aggravating aspect and a characteristic one butnot a necessary one for the criminal enterprise or undertaking which we reproach. The fact of having recruited persons, even on a voluntary basis, in the occupied countries into the German Service, is considered by us as a crime, which is punishable by the domestic legislation of all these countries, such as the legislation which is applicable to the acts which were committed in these countries, and in terms of the rules of law in matters of legislative competence.