Then, the next paragraph:
"At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a Prize Ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare, and the guidance of her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however, provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into part, and Article 73 (i) (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy. These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the traditional British view but the important point is that, even in these cases, the Prize Ordinance envisages the capture of the merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own Prize Ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event, however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war with steadily increasing disregard for international law, and for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the protection of human life and property from arbitrary and ruthless attacks."
I pass to the third paragraph on the next page which sets out two instances:
"On the 30th of September, 1939, came the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of life. This was the Danish ship 'Vendia' bound for the Clyde in ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had already signalled that he would submit to the submarine orders and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship.
By November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels without warning as a regular thing.
On the 12th November the Norwegian 'Arne Kjode' was torpedoed in the North Sea without any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their lives and the remainder werepicked up after many hours in open boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew."
And then dealing with attacks on allied merchant vessels, certain figures are given.
Ships sunk...........241 Recorded attacks.
.....221 Illegal attacks.
......112 At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.
THETRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They were not illegally sunk, however?
COL. PHILLIMORE:Yes, sir.
THETRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): According to this, the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt.
COL. PHILLIMORE:Oh, yes, I should have read that sentence; I am obliged to your Honor.
I pass to the second report, 641/b. It is part of the same document and is put in as GB 191. It is a report covering the next six months from September 1, 1940-
THEPRESIDENT (interposing): Are you not reading page 3?
COL. PHILLIMORE:If your Lordship please, I have read a great deal of the report and there are passages that I had not considered important.
THE PRESIDENT:I haven't myself read it, but I think--
COL. PHILLIMORE:If I might read the first two paragraphs on page 3:
"By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet four months later the Germans were still officially claiming that they were acting in accordance with Prize Ordinance. Their own semi-official commentators however, had made the position clearer. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily or under compulsion bound for an enemy port - including contraband control harbours - thereby loses its neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which obtained a avicert from a British Consul in order to avoid putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port to another.
As regards Allied ships, in the middle of November 1939, a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of British vessels.
By that date a score of British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after that date some fifteen more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed without warning. It is clear, therefore, that not only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure, but also that neither before nor after this German threat did the German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels."
The last paragraph is merely a summing up; it does not add.
Turning to 641/b, which is a similar report covering the next six months, if I might read the first five paragraphs of page 1:
"On the 30th January, 1941, Hitler proclaimed that 'every ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed." On the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the German 'total blockade' is alleged to be in force.
"From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler's meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any given time".
THE PRESIDENT:Colonel Phillimore, isn't this document you are now reading really legal argument?
COL. PHILLIMORE:My Lord, sime of it is. The difficulty is to leave those parts and take in the facts.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE:The third paragraph, if I might leave the rest of the second, is as follows:
"The effect of the German total blockade is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sink without warning and their crews killed.
As a matter of fact, at least thirty-two neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British conveys have been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the 'total blockade'".
Then the last sentence in the following paragraph dealing with sinking of merchant ships without warning:
"Yet, though information is lacking in very many cases, details are available to prove that, during the period under review, at least thirty-eight Allied merchant ships, exclusive of those in convoys, have been torpedoed without warning in or near the 'total blockade' area, "That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the area is proved by the fact that of the thirty-eight ships referred to at least sixteen were torpedoed outside the limits of the war-zone."
"My Lord, the next page deals with a specific case illustrating the matter set out above. It is in the first paragraph of that page, the third sentence:
"The sinking of the CITY OF BENARES on the 17th September 1940 is a good example of this. The CITY OF BENARES was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the 'war zone," with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p.m. In the darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at least four of the twelve boats lowered were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were washed right out of them. In one boat alone sixteen people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children:
in a third 21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and are doing," I think the rest of that paragraph is not important.
I turn to the next document, 641/c, which is part of GB 191.
THE PRESIDENT:It is clear, I suppose, from that statement of facts that there was no warning whatever given?
COL. PHILLIMORE:No, My Lord,
THE PRESIDENT:We think that you should read the next paragraph too.
COL. PHILLIMORE:If your Lordship pleases.
"There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare he has chosen to employ."
My Lord, the rest is very much to the same general effect. The next document, 641/c, is merely a certificate giving the total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) as 2,775 British, Allied and Neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross tons. My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not quoted in the above reports of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by the defendants' U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, "The Sinking of S.S. SHEAF MEAD," That is D.644, which I put in as GB 192. If I might read the opening paragraph:
"The British s/s SHEAF DEAD was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940"-
THE PRESIDENT:This is the German account, is it not?
COL. PHILLIMORE:This is actually in the form of a British report. It includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the log,
THE PRESIDENT:In other words, Top Secret?
COL. PHILLIMORE:Yes, My Lord, this was at the time a top secret document. That was some while ago.
"The B ritish s/s SHEAF MEAD was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940 with the loss of 31 of the crew.
The commander of the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous manner towards the men cl inging to upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was kapitaenleutnant Oehrn of U 37: the following extract from his diary for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour."
Again turning to the relevant extract from the log, on the second page, the time is marked on the document as 1554.
"Surface. Stern is underwater," referring to the ship which has been torpedoed. "Stern is underwater. Bowe rise higher. The boats are new on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush with ground bounds along the deck down to the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crashing. Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved them. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head Nix Name. A young boy in the water calls 'Help, help, please." The others are very composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow. 5006 gross registered tons."
"Under the old course" means merely that the U-boat makes off.
Then the next page of that document contains an extract from the report of the Chief Engineer of the SHEAF MEAD. The relevant paragraphs are the first and the last:
"When I came to the surface I found myself on the pert side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about five yards away. The submarine Captain asked the steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our lifebuoys, but this had the name GRETASTON on it, as this was the name of our ship before it was changed to SHEAF MEAD last January."
In the last paragraph:
"She had cut-away, bows, but I did not notice a net cutter. Two men stood at the side with boat hocks to keep us off.
"They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. Then she submerged and Trent off, without offering us any assistance whatever."
THE PRESIDENT:Is there any suggestion in the German report that any warning was given?
COL. PHILLIMORE:No, My Lord. It is quite clear, indeed, that it was not.
Under the time 1444 there is a description of the sighting of the ship and the difficulty in identifying, and then at the top of the page:
"The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in quickly, but the position is still 40-50.
I cannot see the stern yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship's side a yellow cross in a small, square, dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an ack-ack gun or something similar. Fire: I cannot miss"; and then the sinking.
Now that it is possible to examine some of the actual documents by which the defendant and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of international law, you may think the compilers of the above reporters understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the defendants progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of international law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether whips were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial.
I go to the next document in the Document Book, C 191, which I put in as GB 193. That is a memorandum by the German Naval War Staff, dated 22 September 1939. It sets out:
"Flag Officer. U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights." Reading from the third sentence:
"In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English Naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by F. O. U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval War Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.
In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights."
Now I go to the next document, C 21, which I put in as GB 194. My Lord, this document consists of a series of extracts from the war diary of the German Naval War Staff of the German Admiralty. The second extract, at page 5, recites a conference with the head of the Naval War Staff. "Report on the 2 January 1940," and then reading:
"1) Report by Ia"--That is the Staff Operations Officer on the War Staff.
THE PRESIDENT:Shouldn't you read above that, Paragraph 1(b)?
COL. PHILLIMORE:Yes, if your Lordship pleases. It is important. The others are much to the same effect. If I might read it:
"Report on Ia." This is one report by Ia on Directive of Armed Forces High command of 30 December. "According to this, the Fuehrer, on report of Commanderin-Chief in Navy, has decided:
"(a) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain.
"Both measures may be taken with immediate effect."
The next extract, report by Ia, that is, the Staff Officer Operations on the Naval War Staff on Directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December, "referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with 'Fall Gelb'.
"In consequence of this Directive, the Navy will authorize, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, the sinking of U-boats, without any warning, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretence --------------------should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose."
And then the third extract, dated 6 January 1940:
"...the Fuehrer has in principle agreed (see minutes of report of C. in C. Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing without warning whilst maintaining the pretence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockaded zone."
Well, then the order is given to flag officer submarines carrying out that decision.
The next extract, dated the 18th of January, 1940, adds to some extent and if I may read it:
"The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following Directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.
"The Navy will authorize, with immediate effect, the sinking without warning of U-Boats of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended."
My Lord, that is an extension of the area.
"U-Boats must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan and Russia are exempted from these attacks."
Well, then there is a note emphasizing the point about maintaining the pretense of mine hits and the last extract is, I think, purely cumulative.
The next document, C-118 I put in as GB 195. This is an extract from the BDU War Diary, that is to say the Defendant's War Diary. It is dated the 18th of July, 1941 and it consists of a further extension of that order by cutting down the protected categories.
"Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being, attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Fuehrer has ordered the following:
"1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S. convoys, or independantly is authorized in the original operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S. to Iceland."
As the members of the Tribunal will have seen from these orders, at one date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditons could be sunk whilst those of another could not. It would be easy to put before the Tribunal a mass of orders and instances to show that the attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times.
The point is that the defendant conducted the U-Boat war against neutrals with complete cynicsm and opportunism. It all depended on the political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time whether her ships were sunk or not.
My Lord, I turn to the next document in the Document Book, D-642, which I put in as G.B. 196. My Lord, this is a series of orders, the first I should say of a series of orders leading up to the issue of an order which enjoined the U-Boat commanders, not merely to abstain from rescuing crews, which is the purpose of this order, not merely to give them no assistance, but to deliberately annihilate them.
My Lord, in the course of my proof of this matter, I shall call two witnesses. The first witness will give the Court an account of a speech made by the defendant at the time that he issued the order, describing the policy, or his policy toward the recovery of Allied troops -- that it must be stopped at all costs.
The second witness is the officer who actually briefed crews on the order.
My Lord, this document is an extract from the standing orders of the U-Boat Command, an extract from Order Number 154 and it is signed by the defendant.
"Paragraph e: Do not pick up survivors and take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship's boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in ord er to destroy us, so nothing else matters."
THE PRESIDENT:What is the date of that?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE:My Lord, that order the copy we have, is not dated but a later order, Number 173, which was issued concurrently with an operational order, is dated the 2nd of May 1940. The Tribunal may take it, it is earlier than the 2nd of May, 1940. My Lord, that is a secret order.
THE PRESIDENT: Earlier than May 1940?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE:Earlier than May 1940.
It was, however, in 1942 when the United States entered the war with its enormous ship-building capacity that the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-Boats and of the defendant and the defendant was guilty of an order, which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination.
My Lord, the next document in the Document Books shows the course of events, D-423, and I put it in as G.B. 197. It is a record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop, on the 3 of January 1942.
"The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get the U-Boat warfare going in full swing. The U-Boats are being re-organized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-Boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown."
And then, after further details:
"After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer pointed out, that however many ships the United States built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason, even merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings.
For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.
"Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer's comments, and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these methods."
My Lord, the next document, D-446, I put in as GB-198. I do not propose to read it.
It is an extract from B.D.U., War Diary of the 16th of September, 1942, and it is part of the story in the sense that it was on the following day that the order I complain of was issued, and the Defense will, no doubt, wish to rely on it.
It records an attack on a U-boat, which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied liner "Laconia," when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft.
My Lord, the next document, D-630, I put in as GB-199. It contains four documents.
The first is a top secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from the Defendant's headquarters, dated 17th of September, 1942.
"1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water.
Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.
"2. Orders for bringingin Captains and Chief Engineers still apply.
"3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for your boat.
"4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities."
Now, my Lord, that is of course a very carefully worded order.
Its intentions are made very clear by the next document on that same page, which is an extract from the Defendant's War Diary, and I should say there, as appears from the copy handed into the Court, the War Diary is personally signed by the Defendant Doenitz.
It is the War Diary entry for the 17th of September, 1942.
"The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn," and I would draw the Tribunal's attention to the word "again," "to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk, contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews.
Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand."
The last two documents on that page consist of a telegram from the Commander of the U-boat "Schacht" to the Defendant's headquarters and the reply.
"Schacht" had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the "Laconia."
The telegram from "Schacht," dated the 18th of September, 1942, reads:
"163 Italians handed over to 'Annamite.' Navigating Officer of 'Laconia' and another English Officer on board."
And then it goes on setting out the position of English and Polish survivors in boats.
The reply sent on the 20th:
"Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was wrong.
Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles."
It is a small point, but of course details the means before the bombing incident ever occurred.
And then as for the next document, D-663, that was issued later and may not yet have been inserted in the Tribunal's document book;D-663 I put in as GB-200.
My Lord, this is an extract from an operation order, "Operation Order Atlantic No. 56," dated the 7th of October, 1943, and the copy put in is part of sailing orders to a U-boat.
As I shall prove through the second witness, although the date of this order is the 7th of October, 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued very much earlier, in the autumn of 1942.
"Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoy, a special ship of up to 3000 gross registered tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U-boat attacks.
These ships are for the most part, equipped with a ship borne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly armed with depth charge throwers, and very manoeuverable, so that they are often called U-boat traps by the commander."
And then, the last sentence -- "In view of the desired destruction of ship's crews, their sinking is of great value."
If I might just sum up those documents, it would appear from the War Diary entry of the 17th of September, that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued but we have not captured them. It may be they were issued orally and that the defendant awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the "Laconia", afforded the opportunity and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent is very clear when you consider it in the light of the War Diary entry. The wording is, of course, extremely careful but to any officer of experience its intention was obvious and he would know that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.
You will be told that this order, although perhaps unfortunately phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous, as a result of the extended coverage of the ocean Allied aircraft, and that the notorious action of the U-Boat Commander "Eck" in sinking the Greep steamer "Peleus" and then amchine gunning the crew on their rafts in the water, was an exception and that, although it may be true that a copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as he himself swore, on his own initiative.
I would make the point to the Tribunal that if the intention of this order was to stop the rescue attempts in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, first of all it would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154.
Secondly, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture by the enemy.
Thirdly, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be apprehended.
Fourthly, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very differently.
And Fifthly, if, in fact, and the Prosecution for one moment do not accept it, the defendant did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a document.
My Lord, I would call my first witness, Peter Heisig.
PETER JOSEFHEISIG took the stand. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWhat is your name?
AMy name is Peter Josef Heisig.
QWill you spell it, please?
AH-e-i-s-i-g.
THE PRESIDENT:Say this:
"I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold nothing."
(The witness repeated the oath in German). BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
QPeter Josef Heisig, are you an Oberleutnant officer in Germany?
AI am Oberleutnant Zur See in the German Navy.
QAnd were you captured on the 27th of December, 1944, and are now held as a prisoner of war?
AYes.
QDid you swear an affidavit on the 27th of November, 1945?
AYes.
QAnd is that your signature?
(A document was submitted to the witness)
COLONEL PHILLIMORE:My Lord, that is the document D-566.
THE PRESIDENT:Which one?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE:It is the next document in the book.
AThat is the document I signed.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE:I put that in as GB 201.
BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
QWill you take your mind back to the autumn of 1942? What rank did you hold at that time?
AI was Midshipman at the second U-Boat Training Division.
QWere you attending a course there?
AI took part at the training course for U-Boat Officers of the Watch.
QDo you remember the last day of the course?
AOn the last clay of the course, Gross Admiral Doenitz, who was then Commander in Chief of the U-Boats, held an inspection tour of this second training division.
QAnd what happened at the end of his tour?
AAt the end of his visit -- not at the end of his visit, but rather during his visit, Grand Admiral Doenitz gave a speech to the officers who were being trained there.
Q Can you fix the date of this visit?
AI remember the approximate date; it must have been at the end of September or the beginning of October 1942.
QNow, will you give the Tribunal -- speaking slowly -- an account of what Admiral Doenitz said in his speech?
AGrand Admiral Doenitz, in his speech, made the point clear that the successes of the U-boats had gone back, and enemy activities were the cause of that. New ack ack guns had been developed, which was to make it possible for the U-boats to fight off enemy aircraft. Hitler had personally given the assurance that U-boats had received a priority over all other form of weapons and were to be equipped with these ack ack guns. It was to be expected that the old successes were to be reached again in a few months.
Grand Admiral Doenitz then mentioned his friendship and agreement with Hitler, and spoke about the German armament program.
There was a question about another matter, regarding an article in the paper. Since the United Nations were building more than a million tons of merchant shipping, Grand Admiral Doenitz covered this point. He doubted, at first, the credibility of this report and said that a figure by President Roosevelt was the basis of this report. Grand Admiral Doenitz then shortly mentioned Roosevelt personally, about the American production program and the potential program. He further mentioned that the Allies had a great difficulty, and that was commands of their ships. There was a shortage of personnel for their ships. Seamen considered the route across the Atlantic very dangerous because German U-boats were sinking Allied ships in great numbers, and many of the Allied seamen had been torpedoed more than once. News like that spreads, and seamen are kept back from going to sea once more. Some of them were trying to evade Atlantic duty so that the Allied authorities were forced, if it should be possible to impress the seamen.
These signs are considered favorable by the Germans, firstly, that the Allies are manufacturing much shipping; and, on the second point, that the Allies have many difficulties in manning these newly built ships.