THE SEIZURE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA The conference of the 6th November 1937 made it quite plain, that the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon.
The only question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On the 4th March 1938 the defendant Ribbentrop wrote to the defendant Keitel with regard to a suggestion made to Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war arms against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies. In the course of this letter Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would he in formed about this.
On the 11th March 1938 Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized the continued earnest endeavour on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual relations. On the 12th March, Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, and repeated these assurances.
This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was absorbed was a typical manoeuvre on the part of the defendant Goering, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous same day, the 12th March, the defendant von Neurath spoke with efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle.
On the M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak arbitration convention concluded at Locarne in October 1935.
The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the German Army on the 12th March, and the annexation of Austria on the 13th March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on the 28th March. On the following day, at a conference in Berlin, when Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, the general situation was discussed, and later the defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"After the annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to be digested first.
Nevertheless, preparations for Case Gruen ( that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strate gic position because of the annexation of Austria."
On the 21st April 1938 a discussion took place between Hitler and the defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen", showing quite clearly that the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully considered. On the 28th May 1933 Hitler ordered that preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October, and from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was constantly under review. On the 30th May 1938 a directive signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future."
from the files of the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the In June, 1938, as appears from a captured document taken employment of the SD in Czechoslovakia had been proposed.
This plan provided that "the SD follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany ..."
Gestapo officials were assigned to co-operate with the SD in certain operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent sabotage and these agents were to be notified "before the attack in due time.. in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves, avoid arrest and deportation. . . " "At the beginning, guerilla or partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary.
..."
Files of information were to be compiled with notations as follows: "To arrest" . . . "To liquidate" . . . "To confiscate" . . . "To deprive of passport" etc.
The plan provide for the temporary division of the country into larger and smaller territorial units, and considered various "suggestions", as they were termed, for the incorporation into the German Reich of the inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia. The final "suggestion" included the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions.
The plan was modified in some respects in September after the Munich Conference, but the fact that the plan existed in such exact detail and was couched in such war-like language indicated a calculated design to resort to force.
On the 31st August 1938 Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl dated the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the question of defense 24th August 1938, concerning the timing or the order for measures.
This memorandum contained the following:
"Operation Gruen will be set in motion by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia, which will give Germany provocation for military interven tion.
The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importa nce."
These facts demonstration that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had been planned in detail long before the Munich conference.
In the month of September 1953 the conferences and talk with military leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical situation which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, flew to Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see Hitler. On the 22nd September Mr. Chamberlain met Hitler for further discussions at Bad Godesberg. On the 26th September 1938 Hitler said in a speech in Berlin, with reference to his conversation:
"I assured "him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territory al problems for Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from the moment when Czechslovakia solves its other pro blems, that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities, peacefully and without oppression, I will be no longer interested in the Czech State, and that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee it.
We don't want any Czechs.
" On the 29th September 1938, after a conference between Hitler and Mussolini and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the Munich Pact was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce In the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany.
The "piece of paper" which the British Prime Minister brought back to London, signed by himself and Hitler, expressed the hope that for the future Britian and.
Germany might live without war. That Hitler never intended to adhere to the Munich Agreement is shown by the fact that a little later he asked the defendant Keitel for information with regard to the military force which in his opinion would be required to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Keitel gave his reply on the 11th October 1938. On the 21st October 1938 a directive was issued by Hitler, and countersigned by the defendant Keitel, to the armed forces on their future tasks, which stated:
"Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany."
On the 14th March 1939 the Czech President Hacha and his Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and attended a meeting at which the defendants Ribbentrop, Goering and Keitel were present, with others. The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical force. The defendant Goering added the threat that he would destroy Prague completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary agreement at 4.30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of Germany.
the 16th March the German decree was issued incorporating Bohemia and On the 15th March German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and on Moravia in the Reich as a protectorate, and this decree was signed by the defendant's Ribbentrop and Frick.
THE AGGRESSTON AGAINST POLAND By March 1939 the plan to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of the 5th November 1937, had been accomplished, The time had now come for the German leaders to consider further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment because of that accomplishment.
On the 23d May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler's study in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision might have on other countries. In point of time, this was the second of the important meetings to which reference has already been made, and in order to appreciate the full significance of what was said and done, it is necessary to state shortly some of the main events in the history of German-Polish relations.
As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settlement of all disputes between the two countries. On the 26th January 1934, a German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was made, signed on behalf of the German Government by the defendant von Neurath. On the 30th January 1934, and again on the 30th January 1937, Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he peace.
On the 20th February 1933 Hitler made a third speech in the Reichstag expressed his view that Poland and Germany could work together in harmony and in the course of which he said with regard to Poland:
"And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning With Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.
Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us peace."
On the 26th September 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the Sudetenland, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been quoted, and announced that he had informed the British Prime Minister that when the Czechoslovakian problem Has been solved there would be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on the 24th November of the same year, another OKW directive was issued to the German armed forces to make preparations for an attack upon Danzig; it stated:
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
(1) Preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise."
In spite of having ordered military preparations for the occupation of Danzig, Hitler, on the 30th January 1939, said in a speech in the Reichstag:
"During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the most reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."
Five days previously, on the 25th January 1939, Ribbentrop said in the "Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the course of a speech in Warsaw:
future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations."
Following the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on the 15th March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich Agreement, Great Britain gave an assurance to Poland on the 31st March 1939 that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist With their national forces, Great Britain would feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in its power. The French Government took the same stand. It is interesting to note in this connection, that one of the arguments frequently presented by the defense in the present case is that the defendants were influenced to think that their conduct was not in breach of international law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could be held no longer.
On the 3rd April 1939 a revised OKW directive was issued to the armed forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and stated:
"The Fuehrer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss:
(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from the 1st September 1939 onwards.
(2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the Armed Forces."
On the 11th April 1939, a further directive was signed by Hitler and issued to the armed forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the "Quarrels with Poland should be avoided.
Should words occur:
Poland however adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, "a final settlement" will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with Poland.
The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and to create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of defense.
The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest.
Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France, and British rest Print as a result of this."
In spite of the contents of These two directives, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag on the 28th April 1939 in which, after describing the Polish Government's alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to Danzig aid the Polish Corridor, he stated:
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government.
, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland like Czechoslovakia a year ago believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man, and had not thought of proceeding in anyway against Poland.
..The intention to attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented by the international Press.
.."
It was four weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on the 23d May 1939, held the important military conference to which reference has already been made. Among the persons present were the defendants Goering, Raeder and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that by was Lieut.-Col. Schmundt, and he made a record of what happened, certify it with his signature as a correct record.
The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the heads of the armed forces and their staffs of his views on the political situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political situation and reviewing the He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over Danzig was not the reason for course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland.
this attack, but the necessity for Germany to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies. He said:
"The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle by which one Wades solving the problem by adapting oneself to Circumstances is inadmissible.
Circumstances must rather be adapted to. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property."
Later in his address he added:
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
There will be war.
our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation Will be decisive.
..
The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics."
Lt.-Col. Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland could not be achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should attack Great Britain and France first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and France would be a life and death struggle, which might last a long time, and that Preparations must be made accordingly.
During the weeks which followed this conference, other meetings were held and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The defendant Soviet Union.
Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the On the 22nd August 1939 there took place the important meeting of that day, to which reference has already been made.
The Prosecution have put in evidence two unsigned captured documents which appear to be records made of this meeting by persons Who were present. The first document is headed: "The Fuehrer's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on the 22nd August 1939...." The purpose of the speech was to announce the decision to make war on Poland at once, and Hitler began by saying:
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later.
I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East.
.. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West.
But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed since essential points have changed.
It became clear to me that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West."
Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most favorable moment had arrived for starting the war. "Now," said Hitler, "Poland is in the position in which I wanted her ... I am only afraid that at the last moment some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation ... A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony."
This document closely resembles one of the documents put in evidence on behalf of the defendant Raeder. This latter document consists of a summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it was made, by one Admiral Boehm, from notes he had token during the meeting. In substance it military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany and the West says that the moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by was unavoidable in the long run, the likelihood of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance was not great, and that even if a war in the West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing of the Polish military strength.
It also contains a statement by Hitler that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant, since "the Right lies in Victory."
The second unsigned document put in evidence by the Prosecution is headed: "Second Speech by the Fuehrer on the 22nd August 1939", and it is in the form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some of these are as follows:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.
Struggle for life or death ...
destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective.
I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war - never mind whether it be plaus ible or not.
The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not.
In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory ... The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morning."
(That is to say, the 26th August.)
In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are sufficient points of similarity with the two previously mentioned documents to make it appear very probable that this is an account of the same speech, not as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same.
These three documents establish that the final decision as to the date the year, was reached by Hitler Shortly before the 22nd August 1939.
They of Poland's destruction, which had been agreed upon and planned earlier in also show that although he hoped to be able to avoid having to fight Great Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a risk of this happening, but it was a risk which he was determined to take.
The events of the last days of August confirm this determination. On the 22nd August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to, the British Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said:
"Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur."
On the 23rd August Hitler replied:
"The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision.
Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany."
There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from forcing the Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President Roosevelt on the 24th and 25th August; from His Holiness the pope on the 24th and 31st August; and from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of France, on the 26th August. All these appeals fell on deaf ears.
On the 25th August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual assistance with Poland, which reinforced the understanding she had given to Poland earlier in the year. This coupled with the news of Mussolini's unwillingness The invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on the 26th August, was to enter the war on Germany's side, made Hitler hesitate for a moment.
postponed until a further attempt had been made to persuade Great Britain not to intervene. Hitler offered to enter into a comprehensive agreement with Great Britain, once the Polish question had been settled. In reply to this, Great Britain made a counter-suggestion for the settlement of the Polish dispute by negotiation. On the 29th August Hitler informed the British Ambassador that the German Government, though skeptical as to the result, would be prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a Polish emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary powers by midnight for the following day, August 30th. The Polish Government were informed of this, but with the example of Schuschnigg and Hacha before them, they decided not to send such an emissary. At midnight on the 30th August the defendant Ribbentrop read to the British Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first precise formulation of the German demands against Poland. He refused, however, to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated that in any case it was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these negotiations were conducted by Hitler and Ribbentrop showed that they were not entered into in good faith or with any desire to maintain peace, but solely in the attempt to prevent Great Britain and France from honoring their obligations to Poland.
Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful attempts made by Goering to effect the isolation of Poland by persuading Great Britain not to Dahlerus, a Swede, Dahlerus, who was called as a witness by stand by her pledged word, through the services of one Birger Goering, had a considerable knowledge of England and of things English, and in July 1939 was anxious to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany, in the hope of preventing a war between the two countries.
He got into contact with Goering as well as with official circles in London, and during the latter part of August, Goering used him as an unofficial intermediary to try and deter the British Government from their opposition to Germany's intentions towards Poland. Dahlerus, of course, had no knowledge at the time of the decision which Hitler had secretly announced on the 22nd August, nor of the German military directives for the attack on Poland which were already in existence. As he admitted in his evidence, it was not until the 26th September, after the conquest of Poland was virtually complete, that he first realized that Goering's aim all along had been to get Great Britain's consent to Germany's seizure of Poland.
After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement of her dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler, on the 31st August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that the attack on Poland would start in the early morning hours of the 1st September, and gave instructions as to what action would be taken if Great Britain and France should enter the war in defense of Poland.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately preceding the 1st September 1939 demonstrate the determination of Hitler and his associates to carry out the declared intention of invading Poland at all costs, despite appeals from every quarter.
With the ever increasing evidence before him that this intention would lead to war with Great Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not to depart from the course he had set for himself, The Tribunal is fully satisfied by the evidence that the war initiated by Germany against Poland on the 1st September 1939 Was most plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in the commission of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of war, and against humanity.
THE PRESIDENT:Now I shall ask M. Falco to continue the reading of the judgment.
M. TALCO:
THE INVASION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning.
The aggression of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country. In point of time the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway.
On the 31st May 1939 a Treaty of Non-Agression was made between Germany and Denmark, and signed by the defendant Ribbentrop. It was there solemnly stated that the parties to the Treaty were "firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all circumstances." Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on the 9th April, 1940.
On the 2nd September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland, Germany sent a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms.
"The German Reich Government is determined in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstance to prejudice the in violability and integrity of Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State.
In making this de claration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and till not by any third party Reich might occur.
Should tolerate any breached of Norwegian neutrality the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate."
On the 9th April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was invaded by Germany.
The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. On the 3rd October 1939 Raeder prepared a memorandum on the subject of "gaining bases in Norway," and amongst the questions discussed was the question; "Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?" Despite this fact, three days later, further assurances were given to Norway by Germany, which stated:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States and neither has she any today."
Three days later again, the defendant Doenitz prepared a memorandum on the same subject, namely bases in Norway, and suggested the establishment of a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supplying fuel in Narvik. At the same time the defendant Raeder was in correspondence with Admiral Karls, who pointed out to him the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. On the 10th October Raeder reported to Hitler the disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have. In the months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the "Rosenberg Organization," The,"Rosenberg and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge of it.
Early in Organization" was the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP, December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor, visited Berlin and was seen by the defendants Rosenberg and Raeder.
He put forward a plan for a coup d'etat in Norway. On the 12th December, the defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together with the defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling's views. On the 16th December Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters.
In the report of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP for the years 1953-1943, under the heading of "Political preparations for the military occupation of Norway," it is stated that at the interview with Quisling Hitler said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire to extend the theatre of war, or to draw other nations into the conflict. If the enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled to guard himself against that undertaking however he promised Quisling financial support, and assigned to a special military staff the examination of the military questions involved.
On the 27th January 1940 a memorandum was prepared by the defendant Keitel regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On the 28th February 1970 the defendant Jodl entered in his diary:
"I proposed first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer that "Case Yellow" (that is the operation against the Netherlands) and Weser Exercise (that is the operation against Norway and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed."
Exercise which contained the words:
On the 1st March Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser "The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces.
This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Swede a and give our Navy and Air Force a Wider start line against Britain.
.. The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously.
.. It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures."
On the 24th March the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were issued, and on the 30th March the defendant Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. On the 9th April 1940 the German forces invaded Norway and Denmark.
From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense that has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack Norway to forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore preventive.
It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (The Caroline Case, 1808.6.C.Rob.461). How widely the view was hold in influential German circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government. The German Legation at Oslo disagreed with this view, although the Naval Attache at that Legation shared it.
January 13th 1940 stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for Staff thought that the most favourable solution would be the maintenance of the neutrality of Norway, but he harboured the firm conviction that England intended to occupy Norway in the near future relying on the tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government.
The directive of Hitler issued on March 1st 1940 for the attack on Denmark and Norway stated that the operation "should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the defendant Raeder's memorandum of the 3rd October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the Allies, but is based upon "the aim of improving our strategical and operational position."
The memorandum Itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway", The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to the memorandum of the defendant Doenitz of October 9th 1939.
Furthermore, on the 13th March the defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise). He is still looking for an excuse."
(Justification?)
On the 14th March 1940 he again wrote:
"Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise'". On the 21st March 1940 he recorded the misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between taking up readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and added:
"Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America, If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken."