As the Tribunal will recall, there was considerably controversy about this relationship which we claimed between Funk and the SS.
We called another witness, puhl, and still another witness who was his subordinate, and I would assume that counsel would prefer to cross-examine Pohl. We are perfectly happy to have him do that; and then at a later date, if Funk has an opportunity, as I am sure he will, to make his statement, he could make his denial I don't know what more he could say except that it isn't so and I thought he had said that rather fully when, he was on the stand and rather fully denied that he had really any relationship with Himmler or with the SS. I am also fearful, Mr. President, that if the Court permits this procedure in this case, there may have been some other instances where other defendants will want to be heard fully and the thing will go on with sur-rebuttal and I am afraid it will take much of the Tribunal's time.
THE PRESIDENT :Dr. Sauter, we have heard you fully upon the subject already.
DR. SAUTER:Mr. President, may I point out one fact ? This witness Pohl, arrived at the Nurnberg Prison on the 1st of June and was questioned for the affidavit on the 15th ......
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Sauter, you have expressed yourself that you do not want to cross-examine him. What is the relevance of the fact that he arrived here at a certain time if you don't want to cross-examine him ?
DR. SAUTER :Mr. President, my point of view is that on principle it cannot be permitted for the prosecution to present further evidence against a defendant whose case is closed. The Witness Pohl arrived on the 1st of June and on the 15th of July, six weeks later, he was examined for the affidavit. That was the same day on which I made my final plea for the defendant Funk and again, several weeks later, the affidavit was submitted. I do not believe that this corresponds to the demands of justice, that after a case is completely closed the prosecution submits further evidence against a defendant, without the defendant having an opportunity to comment on it on the witness-stand. In the Pohl Affidavit completely new facts are alleged. For example, Pohl, says that at a dinner in the presence of ten or twelve persons, this gold tooth question was discussed.
That is something entirely new and of course completely improbable and that is why I ask, Mr. President, that you permit us to have the defendant Funk examined on this point on the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT:You must understand that it is a matter for the discretion of the Tribunal at what time they will end the evidence and it is necessary that the evidence should be ended at some time. The Tribunal has heard fully what you have had to say and they will now consider the matte
DR. SAUTER:Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT :With reference to the application by Dr. Sauter, the affidavit by Pohl, will not be struck out. It will remain upon the record. But in view of the particular circumstances of this case, the defendant Funk may be recalled to give evidence upon the subject and he will be recalled after the evidence has been given on behalf of the Organizations.
With reference to the objection of Dr. Laternser to the use of the statement made by Major General Walter Schreiber, the Tribunal is not inclined to admit any evidence so late as this, or to reopen questions which have been gone into fully before the Tribunal; but on the other hand in view of the importance of the statement of Major General Schreiber, and its particular relevance not only to the case of certain of the individual defendants but also to the case of the High Command, the Tribunal will allow General Schreiber to be heard as a witness if he is produced before the end of the hearing of the case. Otherwise no use can be made of this statement.
With reference to the time within which General Schreiber must be brought here if he is to be heard as a witness, the Tribunal thinks that it will be proper to order that he might be heard as a witness if he is brought here at any time before the final speeches with reference to the organizations are concluded.
And, of course, counsel for the organization would have an opportunity of commenting upon any evidence which General Schreiber might give. That is all.
The witness may retire.
********** Dr. Laternser, will you call your other witness?
DR. LATERNSER:With the approval of the Tribunal, I call as my last witness Field Marshal von Runstodt.
**********
GERT VONRUNSTEDT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY TIE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name please?
AGert von Runstedt.
QWill you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT:You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER:
QField Marshal, you are the oldest officer of the former German Army. What was your last position?
AI was a soldier for over fifty-four years. My last position was Commander-in-Chief West, until the 9th of March, 1945.
QDuring what period of time were you Commander-in-Chief in Berlin?
AFrom the first of October, 1932, until the 31st of October, 1938.
QWhat was the attitude of the military loaders to domestic and foreign politics?
A We generals did not concern ourselves with politics. We did not take part in any political discussions, and we did not hold any political discussions among ourselves.
I should like to quote the famous English Field Marshal Montgomery, who said, "as a servant of the nation, the Army is above all politics, and that must remain so."
QDid the Reichswehr, in 1933, help Hitler into power?
ANo.
QWhat was the attitude of the any generals toward the Party and its methods ?
AThe generals either rejected the Party or were indifferent. As for the methods regarding the Jewish question, they absolutely rejected them, particularly because many comrades were severely affected by the Aryan laws.
The so-called "Master Race" is nonsense. Germany is a mixture of races, partly Slavic and mixed races.
We also rejected the attitude on the church question, and we retained a chaplain in the Army up to the end.
QWas this attitude also true of the younger generals who, during the course of the war, came into positions falling under the Indictment?
AAs far as my own friends are concerned, absolutely.
QDid you, as the senior officer in 1934, have an opportunity to do anything in regard to the punishment of the murderers of Schleicher?
ANo. Reich President von Hindenburg was still at the head of the State. In the second place, I was not the senior officer, We had a commander chief of the army and a minister of war, whose duty that would have been.
QDid the troop maneuvers, on the trips of the General Staff after 1935, indicate any intention or plan for wars of aggression?
ANo, in no way. The big maneuvers on the General Staff or Fuehrer trips always dealt with war in our own country.
QDid you, as Commander-in-Chief resident in Berlin, have anything to do with the declaration of Wehr Hoheit (Armed Sovereignty)?
ANo.
QDid you know Colonel General von Fritsch well?
AVery well; he was my subordinate for a time.
QAs his representative, after 1937, did he tell you of Hitler's intent to wage wars of aggression?
ANo, he could not do so because there is such a thing as an official secret.
QYou were his representative when, in the winter of 1937-1938 he went on leave to Egypt. On that occasion did he tell you of Hitler's intention, contained in the minutes of the meeting of the 5th of November 1937?
AI represented Colonel General von Fritsch; his official representative was Chief of the General Staff Beck. At that time General von Fritsch did not give me or General-oberst Book any information.
QWhat were the results of the measures of Hitler on the 4th of February, 1938, in the military field?
AHitler had eliminated the Minister of War as intermediary between himself and the Wehrmacht; thus, he now had command over all three branches of the Wehrmacht. He took advantage of the opportunity to dismiss higher military leaders whom he did not like.
QIn February of 1938 you had a private conference with Hitler. What did he tell you about the attitude of the German generals?
AHe complained about the supreme military leaders. He alone was the one who forced rearmament through. The supreme loaders had always said it was going too fast. In the occupation of the Rhineland, he charged the leaders with a certain cowardice when they asked for withdrawal of the troops behind the Rhine because France was not taking up a threatening attitude.
QIn this talk was the secession of Fritsch discussed?
AYes, At first, Hitler suggested Professor General von Reichenau. I refused him, in the name of the Army, He then suggested General von Brauchitsch, whose appointment I approved in the name of the Army.
QWhen did you, as Commander-in-Chief in Berlin, learn of the planned march into Austria?
AI suddenly had to represent von Brauchitsch in Breslau, at a edebration, and it was only there that I learned of the actual occupation of Austria.
QHe were the commanders-in-chief informed of intentions?
A We were told of the intentions of the Supreme Command by our Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, but he was only allowed to tell us what concerned us.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, I should now like to examine the witness on affidavits 3 and 5 of Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Blaskowitz. They are USA 536 and 537, and they are in the first document books of the prosecution.
I should like to call the attention of the Court to the fact that these affidavits in the paragraphs in question agree, word for word, although they were made on various days by different persons. BY DR. LATERNSER:
QField Marshal, in two affidavits by Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Blaskowitz, they say that the group of German staff officers considered the solution of the Polish question by war necessary, which, was the reason for secret armament. Is this true?
A In the first place, there never was a group of German staff officers.
QWhat is meant by staff officers?
AA staff officer is an officer in a rank of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. Then colic the generals.
QPlease continue.
AIf the statement of Blomberg means that a war of aggression on our part against Poland was indispensable, that is not true. On the other hand, if he means that we had to expect an attack from Poland at any time, I can say that in the first years after the World War, I counted on this possibility. That is the reason for the border protection and fortifications on the eastern border of the Reich against Poland. But as I said, no sensible person though of a war of aggression. We were in no position for such a war.
QGeneral von Blaskowitz then, at the end of this affidavit No. 5, USA Exhibit 537, says that the front commanders in chief were the actual supervisors in the OKW, and as an example gives the battle of Kudno. Is this true?
AThis is not true. The commanders in chief never played a supervisor role. Only our commander in chief of the army was the one who had to give advice to the supreme authorities. As for the battle of Kudno, advice to Hitler was absolute nonsense. The orders for the battle of Kudno I gave as commander in chief of army group west according to the instructions which I had from General von Brauchitsch and General von Blaskowitz only had to obey orders and could not have given any advice to Hitler. That must be a mistake.
QWhat impression did the discussion on the 22nd of August, 1939, make on you -- the conference at the Obersalzberg?
AWhen we left the conference we were of the opinion that this undertaking would end just like the so-called Sudeten war in 1938. That is primarily because Russia was on our side. When on the 26th of August suddenly the movement was stopped, and on the first of September was to begin again, we said, "Aha, that is a bluff, just like in 1938." We did not take the decision for war seriously.
QUp to the conference of the 22nd of August did you talk to other commanders? Did you exchange ideas on the impressions created by this discussion?
AI remember with certainty I talked to General Fieldmarshal von Bock about it. I left the Obersalzberg very quickly. I talked to von Harms to in and later with my staff and exchanged the same opinion which I have just mentioned.
QDid you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station?
ANo.
QIn what way did you learn of the intention of occupying Denmark and Norway?
AI learned of the accomplished fact through official channels.
QHow about the entry into Yugoslavia and Greece?
AIt was the same.
QYou participated in the conference in March, 1941, when Hitler spoke of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?
AYes.
QWhat was told you about Soviet deployment?
AUp to the time I had been in France, and of the ostensible preparations for the Russians I had no knowledge whatever. At the conference to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were very strongly armed, were preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese military attache was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were true.
QWas this impression confirmed after the entry?
AYes. The resistance at the border was not too great. It became stronger more and more in the interior. Very strong tank forces of a better type far superior to ours appeared and an enormous number of airfield troops. Newly built roads were found and maps were also fund, showing German territory such as Silesia, so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right.
QAt the conference in March, 1941, Hitler announced the Commissar order. What was your attitude toward this order?
AOur attitude was unanimously against it. Immediately after the conference we approached Brauchitsch and said that this was impossible.
Our commanders in chief of the armies were of the same opinion.
The order was simply not carried out, and as I learned later, the order was later rescinded. General von Brauchitsch, to make this order more or less inactive, issued a very strict order on the correct conduct of German soldiers in the coming war. He issued this order to the troops. I know of no case in which this order was. used in any way.
Q.At this conference was the intention announced to remove the Jewish population in the East?
ANo. Hitler would never have expressed such intentions to officers.
Q.According to the Russian Prosecution, in November 1941, in Kiev 33,000 Jews are said to have been shot. Where was the army of Army Group West in November, 1941?
AMy army was from Rostov over Stalino on the Doenitz to the district east of Kharkov. The limits of the army district was east of Kiev and along the Dnieper. Beyond that was civilian administration.
QThen Kiev was not in the operation area of an army under your command?
ANo.
QDid the commanders in chief of army groups and armies in the cast has any powers outside of this district?
ANo.
QWas the operational area kept as small or as large as possible?
AThe operational area of the army was kept as small as possible, in the first place, so that the army would have as little to do with affairs in the rear, and also so that the civilian district of the Ukraine would be as large as possible and would be removed from the influence of the army.
QAnd now for the commando order. What was your attitude toward the commando order?
AWe military commanders were absolutely opposed to the commando order and in oral discussions with our staff made it ineffective.
QAs commander in chief, was a single case reported to you in which the order was applied?
A Not a single case was reported to me, and my chief-of-staff, when I asked about it here in Nuremberg also knew of no case.
I must assume that this commando order had not been in effect on the enemy, for I know of no case in which any commando undertaking took place aside from the island of Sar* but where we took no prisoners.
QWhat side committed offenses?
AThe side Which had undertaken the commando operation.
QNow, the invasion came, or it was expected. Document 531 PS showsthat you wished to have the Commando Order rescinded. For what reason?
AIn the invasion, strong air landings far behind the front, perhaps as for as Paris, had to be expected. The distinction between commando troops would not have been possible. In addition, it was a good opportunity finally to receive this order, all the more, since the majority of the new division did not have it.
QYou said when you asked to have it rescinded that the order had been obeyed up to that time. How about that?
AI had to express it in that way. I had evaded the order. I could not say, "I have not carried out the Commando Order." It was an excuse which had to be made.
Q I would like to ask a few questions about the struggle against the resistance movement in France.
what agencies were responsible for peace and order in the occupied territories in France?
AFor peace and order in occupied France, the military commander was responsible. South France had a special general who worked closely with Petain. The resistance movement in southern France became stronger and it became a great threat for the troops fighting on the Mediterranean, In the winter of 1943 and 1944, the Commander-in-Chief was made responsible for the southern part of France. Thereupon I appointed a special general in Lyons. He was under the command of the Army Group Gustav at Toulon. He was responsible for creating order in the South of France.
QWas the French Government and the French population warned?
AThe French Government was repeatedly warned to oppose this movement with all its strength, The warnings to the French People were always. submitted to the French Government for examination, first. When the invasion threatened, I, personally, asked the old gentleman to speak himself on the radio to warn his people not to do such things in his own interests. He promised to do so. Whether he did, I do not know.
QWere these warnings observed?
AUnfortunately, no. Finally the French Police, whom we had armed better to combat the movement, even went over to the enemy, that is to the revolutionists.
QThen, did the Germans fight against them
AAs far as we could. For example, full bombs were never destroyed from the air. Single planes were sent against single places of resistance. Mass uses of artillery, tanks, did not take place. The excesses such as at Oradur, we regretted greatly. At that time, I immediately demanded a report since I could not order a judicial investigation. I reported this unfortunate occurrence to the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.
QWhy could you not order a judicial investigation?
AThe troop units of the SS were subordinate only to Himmler. I had no disciplinary power nor judicial power over them. I could not give them leaves or issue awards. I was responsible only for the technical employment of these divisions, much as I might use an Italian, Hungarian or Slovakian Division.
QWas the legality of the resistance movement recognized?
AGeneral Eisenhower and De Gaulle declared it by radio. We inquired of the High Commander of the Wehrmacht as to their attitude. Only after the allied troops had landed on the Mediterranean coast was it recognized.
QWhat is your attitude toward illegal warfare?
AMy point of View is the following from understandable patriotic feeling: Behind the front of the enemy army, unregulated war is started which brings great misery on the population of the country in question. No army in the world can, in the long run, permit such a thing. In the interest of its own security and possibility of existence, it must take sharp energetic measures. My comrades and I sharply condemn that. We did not like to see the attempted German Weirwolf movement. If it had been carried out, it would have brought enormous misery on our Fatherland, unjustly. I would consider it good fortune for humanity if through international agreement for the future, such illegal wars were made impossible. That is my point of view.
QWhat measure did you introduce to relieve the position of the French population during the war?
AI can speak only briefly on that point. I cannot give many detail. Marshal Petain, with whom I had a very confidential relationship, did everything to help. I asked Hitler what position France was to have in the future Europe. I tried to create a new army form. Unfortunately it did not become more than a regiment. The French railroad men who were in charge of all our transports, I introduced measure to give them more food and I tried to get back their relatives who were prisoners of war. This was just after the Dieppe undertaking. It was approved. We did what we could to supply the city of Paris with coal and food, and a transportation situation which was almost unbearably poor for us Germans, militarily. These are the main points.
QI should like, to ask one other question: In the last few days, a witness said that from 1944 on, the concentration camps were manned by soldiers from all branches of the Wehrmacht. How do you explain this?
A I know nothing about that. Himmler was Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army.
He could issue such an order. If he did issue it, my feeling is that he wanted to charge the Army with all these incidents.
QHow I would like to ask you a few questions about the Ardennes offensive. Before or during this offence, was an order issued to shoot prisoners?
ASuch an order was not given by Hitler. On the contrary, he considered it important to take as many prisoners as possible in the offensive. A subordinate military office is said to have issued such an order. I consider that impossible. That is contrary to our ideas.
QDid you not oppose this offensive?
AI opposed the offensive for the following reasons: The operational ideas can almost be called a stroke of genius, but absolutely all condition for the possible success of an offensive were lacking. Field Marshal Mode and I suggested attacking the American troops cast of Aachen from several sides. Then one could think over what to do next. These suggestions were not listened to by anyone. We had inadequate forces on the ground and in the air. It was thought we could only fail.
QDid you oppose Hitler on other occasions also?
ANot Hitler personally, because I had no opportunity to do so; but to his staff I repeatedly objected to measures ordered from above, especially in the case of the Normandy invasion and the Ardennes offensive after it failed and operations in Holland. All of those undertakings were in vain.
QWhen did you consider the war lost?
AIn my opinion the war could not be went after Stalingrad. I considered the war lost after the Allies succeeded in establishing a strong beachhead on French soil. Then it was finished.
QDid you or other Commanders-in-Chief attempt to stop the continuation of this war?
A General Field Marshal Rommel and I attempted twice to persuade Hitler to change the conduct of the war or to put an end to it, especially for a change in the evacuation, a withdrawl on the front to the German border; and as could not otherwise be expected, these suggestions were not listened to.
QIf Hitler refused to listen to such advice, did you not consider bringing about a violent overthrow?
AI would never have entertained such thoughts. That would have been absolute treachery, and could not have changed the facts. The army and the population still believed in Hitler at that time. Such an overthrow would not have been successful; and even if I, perhaps with the aid of the allies, had brought about an overthrow, the conditions of the German people, according to the statement of the Big Three, would have been exactly the same as it is now, and I would have been considered for all tire as a traitor to my fatherland.
QYou lost your position three times during the war. What were the reasons?
AIn 1941, a quite impossible order of a technical nature was issued from above, which would have led to the destruction of the entire Kleist Panzer Army near Rostov. I objected to it, and asked for the recall of the order, because otherwise I would have considered that there would be no confidence in my leadership. I asked that another commander be selected. And thereupon in the light of my request as such, I was removed from my post on the 1st of February. That was the first case.
The second case was on the 2nd of April 1944, and by a very cordial letter, because of the state of my health, I was replaced by another commander.
The third case was on the 9th of March, 1945. I could not be expected, as an old general, to continue to perform the duties of the commander-in-chief.
Those were the three cases.
QAnd you found one of these cases against the will of Hitler?
AIn the first case one could say so. But he did not hold it against me for in the following March I was made commander-in-chief in France.
QNow I come to the last question. You know, Field Marshal, that the Prosecution has asked that the military leaders should be declared criminals. As a general officer of the German Army, you know the attitude of these leaders toward international law.
Please tell the Court about it briefly.
AThe rules of warfare and international law as set down in the Geneva Convention and the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were always binding on us older leaders. Their strict observance by the troops was demanded, and steps were taken against excesses which appear in war in all armies., The court-martial records of the various divisions can give information on this point. Property of the inhabitants was to be protected against plundering; strict punishments were given out to keep up discipline. Severe punishments were also declared against atrocities.
All that we could do to protect the inhabitants of countries ravaged by war was done as far as possible. The wounded or conquered enemy was no longer considered such, but had a claim to decent treatment. Despite our effort to be chivalrous, We old officers who had lived through the cavalry, infantry and bayonet battles saw with regret the increasing mechanization of warfare. Today the greatest man is helpless against the force of material. All the more were we leaders of the opinion that while there was fighting on land, the old forms of battle should be maintained, and this had to be told to the troops again and again.
As senior soldier of the German Army, I will say this. We accused leaders were trained in the old tradition of the soldier, the old chivalrous traditions. We lived according to them, and endeavoured to pass then down to the younger officers. DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
QField Marshal, in time of war, the military commander must keep in close touch, must he not, and know the opinions of his immediate subordinates, is that right?
AThat is not necessary to that extent. My subordinates only had to know my operational and tactical, opinion. They were free as army leaders within their sphere.
QI want to quote to you one sentence from the evidence which has been given by your former commander-in-chief. The translators already have it. It is on page 2 of Affidavit No.4:
"During operations, the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with Army Groups by means of telephone, radio and code.
The commander-in-chief of the army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them."
Is that, generally speaking, correct?
AThat is absolutely correct. And another thing concerning the conduct of the war -- that is, operations and tactical actions -- is that such an exchange also took place from the army groups to the commander-in-chief of the
QI shall read you one more sentence. From the evidence that has been given by Colonel General Blaskowitz. He has said -- and I want you to tell me whether you agree with this -- that it was common practice that the commanders of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of a situation, and for their recommendations, by telephone, teletype or wireless, as well as by personal records.
AIt is not quite true that they had to. They could.
QNow I have sons questions on the Russian campaign. You yourself at a conference with Hitler and your Army colleagues raised a question of a gap which existed between your army group and that of Field Marshal von Bock is that right?
AThat is right.
QAnd you knew from your former experience that although on the map that was shown as swamp land, it could be used by troops; and you therefore offered advice about the steps that should be taken to prevent its exploitation by the enemy?
AI pointed out that according to my experience from the former war against Russia, the Russians could operate unhampered in this swamp area, and for that reason it would be practical for German troops to be moved through this area. This suggestion was not listened to. As the operations later showed, the Russians had strong forces in the area, and from there they constantly threatened the left wing of my army.
QYes. I am not concerned with whether the advice was listened to or not. But you agree that you offered it?
AThat was not advice, but was a question which I had to present to the Fuehrer in the description of the intended operation which occurred to me.
But that war not advice.
QI want to mention one other conference about which we have already head a certain amount, and that was the meeting which took place -- I think it was the house of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch -- May, 1938, when there was a question of seizing the Sudetenland. Is it not a fact that at that conference von Brauchitsch asked for the opinion of you and your fellow officers on the proposals which Hitler had laid before you?
AAt that time, a memorandum was read which the Chief of the General Staff von Beck had drawn up, which warned against a war over the Sudetenland. It was to be submitted to Hitler later by von Brquchitsch. We were asked for our opinion on this memorandum, and we were unanimously of the opinion that war should hot be waged.
QYou were unanimously agreed with General Bock that the sort of war that was likely to happen at that time, if Hitler had his way, should not be waged at that time in that way?
AAccording to the memorandum, the German army was not in a position to wage this war if France, England, and America would possibly be our enemies. That was the basic thought of the people. We could have dealt with Czechoslovakia but never if the countries just mentioned had turned to the aid of Czechoslovakia. And Hitler was to be warned against this.
QThen it is fair to say, is it not, that in order for Generaloberst Beck to support himself in the objections which he proposed to make to Hitler, Brauchitsch assembled a circle of leading generals who were of the same opinion as himself? That strengthened his hand, did it not?
AYes; one could say that.
QYou all agreed in giving similar advice to the advice which had been given by Generaloberst Book?
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a convenient time to break off?
MR. CALVACORESS: Yes, My Lord.
(The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 12 Aug.
1946) GERT VON RUNSTDEDT -- Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION -- Continued BY MR. CALVACORESSI:
QYou have given evidence, Field Marshal, to the effect that you had little or no knowledge of such moves as the occupation of the Rhineland and the seizure of the Sudetenland is that correct?
ARegarding the occupation of the Rhineland, I had no previous knowledge; regarding the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1939, I had no previous knowledge, either. I was inactive at the time, retired.
QWhat was the highest post you held when you were in service between 1938 and the outbreak of the war in 1939?
AAs I reported earlier, from the first of October 1932 until the 31st of October, 1933, I was Supreme Commander of Group I, Berlin. And then I was retired.
QTherefore, during the period up to the outbreak of the war, during such time as you held the post, and when you received little or no information about what was going on, you were not a member of the indicted group, as defined in the indictment?
ANo, I was not a member of that group.
QAnd as far as the invasion of Norway is concerned, you were at that time active in a different theater of war, is that right?
ADuring the period which the Norway enterprise commended, I was Supreme Commander of Army Group A stationed at Koblenz of the West.
QAnd in any case, the Norwegian invasion was not an affair of the OKH; but of the OKW?
AAbout that I can't give you any information, whether it was a matter for the navy or a matter for the OKW.
QNow, in general, before the war, you would say your picture is: the generals who left alone to occupy themselves with training exercises and the training of a relatively snail details and units. Is that a fair summary of the evidence you gave before the commission?
A That probably is a misunderstanding. The training exercises were a matter for the divisional commanders and commanding generals, and only Colonel General Von Fritsch asked the Supreme Commanders that they too should concern themselves with smaller details, as I lock at it.
QAnyhow, during this period when the boundaries of Germany were rapidly expanding, you say that the problem of defense came first in the minds of the military leadership of Germany?
AThat I didn't quite understand. Did you say the borders of Germany were expanding? They didn't do that. It was only in 1938 through the Sudeten affair and until -
QI mean from the beginning of the period of the Anschluss until the outbreak of the war with Poland?
AYes, quite.
QAnd you said this morning the exercises which were held at that time were defensive exercises, defensive maneuvers?
AI have not held any exercises any more after the Sudeten war in '36, I was pensioned. Whether and to what extent exercises were carried out in '38, '39, that I don't know.
QAnd you referred this morning to prewar, 1939 maneuvers, and as I understand it, you spoke of these as simply defensive exercises?
AYes. These were the maneuvers in '36 and 1937. During the latter, myself, as an army commander, was leading a party against an enemy attack against Germany.
QWould you also describe as defensive exercises those which were held with stukas and other weapons at Groenika in Spain?
AAbout that, I can't give you any information because the rearmament in 1933 or '36 had been concluded; and in my opinion, after that the air force introduced stukas, that I don't know. At any rate, at that time any type of weapon was justified to my feeling within the rearmed Army.
QWe will pass on to another point. You told us that German officers were severely aloof from politics?
AYes.
QIs it not the case that this policy is very closely associated with the name of General von Segt?
A General Von Segt was taking; the greatest care in the Reichswehr that no officer was concerning himself with political matters.
What he himself did politically, that is another chapter, and about that, I cannot give you any information.
QIs it not true to say that the reason why General von Segt was determined to keep the army out of politics is the fact that at the time when he took over there had just been the Kapt Putsch?
AThat I don't believe. It is a very ancient Prussian tradition that an officer does not concern himself with politics. And Colonel General Von Segt was as loyal a man as possible both as far as the Reich Kapt Putsch as well as the left, as far as the Communists were concerned, and to the constitution supporting the weimar Government. That was cur general conception.
QI have no doubt that all it is perfectly true, but I suggest to you that this whole Prussian policy was revised and insisted upon by Von Segt because as a result of Kapt Putsch, he saw how important it was to keep the army out of entanglements with incompetent politicans?
AThat is entirely my view. All the more since Hitler Putsch in 1923 placed the army in a very difficult position because the Bavarian division was commencing to detach itself from Segt.
QNow, Rapt was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the republic?
ANo. Segt never tried to overthrow the republic.
QI said Kapt.