Here again I must limit myself to a few instances, as a complete enumeration would exceed the time limits of this plea. re-introduction of general military service. The British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, with a statesman's far-sighted objectivity, as reported by the press and by wireless-broadcasts, and therefore universally known, and consequently of value as legal evidence, replied to those measures as follows :
"There is no doubt that it had been expected that upon the forced disarmament of Germany, a concerted reduction of the armaments of other big nations would follow". developed a while agao, in spite of the blaming of Hitler's action that follow ed them. The same applies to the fact that the visit of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin took place eight days after this so-called treaty violation, namely on March 24th 1935. It would not have taken place, if this measure of Hitler's had been considered abroad as a militarily aggressive one. As you also know, I may only make a short reference to the history of the discussion of this question at the Council of the League of Nations, as it is well-known, Should Schacht, as a German and a German Minister judge it in a different manner from that of the foreign governments? in March 1935.
THE PRESIDENT: The date of the occupation of the Rhineland was not March 1935 but March 1936.
DR. DIX: I made a mistake. The main thing is the fact of the occupation of the Rhineland. This action was not a breach only of the treaty of Versaille but also of the Locarne Pact; that is, of an undoubtedly voluntarily contracted treaty. Two days later Mr. Baldwin stated in the House of Commons, in a speech made public and therefore of value as legal evidence, that, while the way Germany acted could not be excused, there was no reason to assume that this action contained a menace of hostilities. Was the German and German Minister Schacht to take a more sceptical attitude in regard to the aggressive significance of the act than foreign countries? And in particular when he was forced to register the fact which also belongs to history and is universally known, that 10 days after this breach of treaty the Lecarne Powers, apart from Germany submitted to the Council of the League of Nations a Memorandum proposing the reduction of the number of German troops in the Rhineland to 36,500 men, and wishing only to avoid the strengthening of the SA and SS in the Rhineland, and the erection of fortifications and aredromes. Should this Memorandum not be interpreted as a ratification of an alleged breach of the treaty?.
was hardly noticed by the contracting parties and called forth from Eden, in a historical public speech to the House of Commans on July 29, 1936, merely the remark that it was not considered appropriate to increase the difficulties of the debate by individual questions like the foregoing. Was the German Minister Schacht to take up another and sharper attitude?,. moreover Schacht was no longer Reich Minister for Economy? Had foreign countries gathered from this action the conviction that Hitler was preparing a war of aggression, they would not have renounced the use of force. Should the German Minister Schacht hold a different opinion and act accordingly? He already held it and was already eagerly at work with Witzleben and others to eliminate Adolf Hitler and his regime by means of a revolt. The efforts of these patriotic conspirators were however frustrated, according to the unequivocal testimony of witness Gisevius, because Hitler was able to register one sucess after another in external politics. effects of the Munich Agreement on the striking power of the opposition group working with Schacht. I will recall the evidence of Gisevius regarding the warnings and hints which in this connection were sent beyond the German frontiers to responsible personalities of foreign countries. Is it fair to require from the German Minister Schacht a more critical attitude in respect to those political developments than that taken by foreign countries, the interests of which had been injured? He had, as we know from Gisevius, and also from Vockes and all the affidavits submitted, a far clearer opinion after 1937 in which year he began treading the dark ways of a conspirator. I will recall his first contacts with the then General von Kluge. I could multiply examples such as those just mentioned. I do not criticize this attitude of foreign countries; that is not my business, quite apart from the fact that I have a complete understanding for this responsibility conscious pacifist attitude resulting there from. It is, however, my duty to point out that no war-like intention can be imputed to Schacht or account of his opinions and attitude, when the same opinions and attitude can be identified in the affected foreign countries. If foreign countries could entertain the hope of further maintaining friendly relations with Hitler, the same right must be conceded to Schacht, as long as he claims the same right.
He does not claim it for himself at least after the Fritsch crisis of 1938. the danger, This, according to the evidence of Gisevius, is undeniable, and he personally did all he could at the greatest risk of liberty and life, to maintain peace by attempting to overthrow Hitler. That all these revolts be the war and after the outbreak of war were unsuccessfull cannot, according to all the evidence submitted be imputed to him as his fault, The responsibility for the failure of this German resistance movement does not lie within itself but somewhere else within and without the German frontiers. I shall revert to this later.
There remains therefore the fact of re-armament as such. Here also I can refer to the statements Schacht made for his justification during his examination. This was exhaustive and a repetition would be superfluous. It is therefore also superfluous to enter into an academic discussion as to whether Schacht's views were right; that is to say, whether it is right that a certain amount of military force sufficient for defensive purposes was necessary for any country, and particularly for Germany, and whether his opinion was right that the non-fulfilment of the obligation be disarm by the parties to the Versailles treaty justified the re-armament of Germany. the sole question in point is whether these opinions and motives of Schacht were honest or whether he pursued secret aggresive intentions under over of these defensive armament. But nothing can be confirmed against the honesty of those opinions. Of cours it can be contended whether the proverb "si vis pacen para bellum" has an immediate validity or whether objectively any strong rearmament does not carry an inherent danger of war, since good armies with competent officers naturall strive for possibilities of active service. Of course the thesis can be defended that moral strength is stronger than any armed strength. The cohesion of the British empire and the world-wide influence of the Vatican's foreign politics could here be cited as proof. All these questions carry a certain relativity in themselves, at any rate, one thing is certain, and it is that all large countries of the world till today the warning is always and always renewed that one must be militarily strong to preserve Peace. Nations whose individualism and love of liberty rejected universal defensive service and a strong standing army now do the contrary and believe honestly to serve peace thereby.
Let us take as an example a nation whose love of liberty nobody in the world, even the most mistrustful can question, namely Switzerland. Even this peace-loving nation has always taken pride in maintaining the defense capacity of its people just in order to protect its freedom and independance in a peaceful manner. One may academically call this idea of discouraging foreign aggression by the maintainance of a sufficiently strong defensive army imperialistic. It is at any rate honestly entertained by peaceful and liberty loving nations, and perhaps serves the cause of peace more effectively than many so-called anti-military or pacifist doctrines. This reasonable point of view has really nothing to do with militarism. He who still today recognizes i as justified for great and small nations may not contest the honesty of their representation by Schacht in the years 1935 to 1933. I have no more to say about this. statements, that this part of rearmament which Schacht first financed with 9 milliard and then reluctantly with a further 3 Milliard, was by no means sufficient for a war of aggression, not even for an effective defense of the German frontiers. The answers that the witness Keitel, Bedenschatz, Hilch, General Thomas, Kesselring etc. have made to this in their depositions and affidavits are available and have been submitted or have been officially brought to the knowledge of the Tribunal. In this respect they are unanimous that Germany even at the outbreak of war, i.e. one and a half years later, was not armed sufficiently for an offensive war; that therefore it was not only a crime'against humanity but also against his own people, confided to his leadership, if Hitler led this people in August 1939 into a war of aggression. Blombergs' statement is correct, that Schacht was aware of the progress of rearmament or the statement of Schacht and Vockes that this was not the case, I admit without further discussion the bona fides of Blomberg's statement. But as he had more to do with the technical side of rearmament than the Reichsbank, personal experience shows, that the memory of Schacht and Vockes is more reliable on this point than Blomberg's to whom this report to the Reichsbank was a matter of secondary importance for his department.
For the Reichsbank, the desire to be informed about the technical progress of the armament and not only about the financial expenditures was a very important thing. One remembers such facts more reliably then unimportant secondary matters. In any case it is established that until the budget-year 1937/30 only 21 billions were spent for armament, of which 12 billions were financed by credits of the Reichsbank and that according to Jodl's statement June 5th, on April 1st 1933 only 27 to 28 divisions were ready, whereas in 19. However, there were already 73 to 75 divisions. April 1st was entirely insufficient for a war of aggression. Hitler indeed was also of the same opinion when, in his memorandum of August 1936, which has been submitted to the court, and which was handed over to Speer in 1944 he pointed out, along with many disapproving remarks about Schacht's economic leadership, that four precious years had gone by, that one had had time enough in these four years to determine what we could not do and that he was hereby ordering that the German army would have to be ready for action in four years, and so in the course of the year 1940, I recall to the memory of the court, that after Schacht's withdrawal as president of the Reichsbank 311/2 billions were spent on armament during the two budget-years 1938/59 and 1939/40. The issuing and expenditure of moeny on armament therefore went on without Schacht too, and, indeed, to an even more considerable extent. At that time, Schacht had written to Blomberg, that he couldn't produce money out of the air.
He exorcised a constant pressure on Blomberg along this line. I now refer to his letter to Blomberg of December 21st 1935 which has been submitted to the court. He exercised a restraining influence by means of explanatory lectures to officers of the war ministry and of the Armed Forces Academy. He refused the railway loan of 1936 presented by the Minister of Communications, which we indirectly in the interest of armament and Stopped the credits of the Reichsl as early as the beginning of 1937 by making a compromise on the final 3 billion He refused the credit which the Reich Finance Minister requested from him in December 1938.
the Mefe bills, which from the technically financial point or view was a rather bold measure, but still legally tenable. These served first of all to finance the armament expenditures, but restricted further armament expenditures after their expiration on April 1st 1939, because the Reich was bound to honor them. Schacht's foresight proved true. The increase in employment brought such a rise in the states revenues, that it would net have been difficult liquidate the Mefe bills at their expiration after 5 years.
Keitel's statement has proved that during the budget year beginning April 1st 1933, five billions marks more were spent for armament than during the preceding year, although after April 1st 1932 the Reichsbank credits had completely ceased. Half of these 5 billions would have sufficed to honor the Mefe bills-which matured during the budget year beginning April 1st 1939. This money would have been saved from further armament. But this was exactly what Schacht intended. From the beginning to had limited the validity of the Mefe bills to five years; he stepped the credit assistance of the Reichsbank on April 1st 1939, in order to limit the armament. It was impossible for Schacht to foresee that Hitler would simply break a strict credit obligation and not pay the bills. These feacts in themselves show that his attempts to resign could have had no other reason than opposition to any further armament, and the refusal to accept responsibility for this. In this sense, the assertion of the prosecution that he wanted to evade responsibility, is completely correct facts just mentioned caused him to make this endeavor to relinquish his duties. If the prosecution says that the reason was his antegonism to Goering, this is also right insofar as Schacht was an opponent of the Four Year Plan, of which Goering was the chief. That the reason was a rivalry of power is a pure supposition, an interpretation of the actual events, which justifies the quotation :"Interpret to your heart's desire, because if you do not interpret, you are just quoting someone else".
The Reichsbank's memo of November 1938, which led to the dismissal of Schacht and most of his collaborators, including Veeke, is also unequivacaly and forcibly opposed to armament. It naturally had to contain a justification which was derived from the departmental jurisdiction of the Reichsbank.
Iys aim was generally known. Hence Hitler's remark : "This is mutiny". The memorandum ends with the demand for the capital and loan market, as well as the management of taxation, to be controlled by the Reichsbank. Compliance with this demand would have taken away from Hitler every possibility of raising money for further armament. This demand was, therefore, unacceptable, to Hitler, Schacht and his colleagues know this. Acc ordingly , they deliberately sought a break by this step. Schacht new bore no responsiblity. From new on Schacht could devote himself exclusively to the plans for a coup d' etat by the conspiratorial group to which he belonged. He became a traitor to Hitler. By remaining minister without portfolio, he hoped to learn about events for the aims of his conspiratorial group more than if he resigned altogether. I shall return to this point later. for the assertion of the prosecution, that Schacht deliberately contributed to the preparation of war of aggression. ment in the modern sense. On the German side, this was already recognized for the first time at the beginning of the first World War, and even by two very important German Jews, namely the founder of the Hamburg-America line, Albert Ballin, and the great German industrialist Rathenau. It is this same Rathenau, who made that wonderful speech on peace during the Conference at Genoa, surrounded by the wild applause of these very Powers which had opposed his country but four years perviously as enemies, and who as the German Foreign Minister, fell as a sacrifice in the beginning of the twenties to an anti-Semitic outrage. I may presumably suppose the personality of Albert Ballin to be known to the Court. Both men recognized already at the start of the first World War the error of a discontinued economic mobilization. Rathenau then organized the so-called War Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry. The first Plenipotentiary for far Economy, since this is all he was, therefore was ideologically a pacificist. nation which does not allow purely military armament to be accompanied by a corresponding economic preparation for war.
Therefore the creation of a General Rhenipotentiary for War Economy, even if he had become effective, which, as the evidence demonstrate most convincingly, he never did become, does not prove anything of the intention to wage a war of aggression. This post is necessary for any armament for defense. The same applies to the institution of the Reich Defense Council, the Reich Defense Committee, etc. As such they are the some harmless self-explanatory factors. Only thisr misuse for the purpose of a war of aggression would be incriminating For this, however, the delus of Schacht has not been established. I therefore refrain from evaluating the details in this field. so-called maintenance of secrecy regarding certain mobilization measures and mobilization arrangements, as for example the maintenance of secrecy concerning the second Reich Defense Law. In this case also, a natural wordly way of thinking relieves these findings of any incriminating character. All nations are accustomed to carry out mobilization and armament measures in "secret". In thinking this over mere closely and from closer observation this practice can be recognized as quite superfluous routine matter. Only drafts and technical details can be really kept secret. The fact of rearmament as such can never be kept secret. The same applies to the existence of a large body which is to serve the purpose of this rearmament. Either this becomes known when it starts functioning, or, like the ominous Defense Council it remains hidden and secret only because it does not function. Russe-Japanese war I found, the following humorous description :"If I, as a member of the General Staff, wished, an incident to become known, I had it classified as "secret" and my wish was fulfilled. If I had the wish, so difficult to carry out, to keep something secret, I unobtrusively sent it unstated and at times my wish was fulfilled." one must consider the basis of experience of the hard foundation of facts.
the seizure of power by Hitler and the subsequent rearmament wasnever a secret to the world. The main proceedings have brought much evidence to thiseffect. We know the report of Consul-General Messersmith; we know his sworn testimony of 30 August 1945, submitted by the Prosecution under No. P.S. 2385, according to which the armament program - he speaks of a giant armament program - immediately after the seizure of power -- and the rapid development of the air program had been apparent to everybody. It had been impossible to move in the streets of Berlin or in any other city of importance in Germany without seeing pilots or aviators in training. He expressly states, on page 8 of his testimony, that this giant German rearmament-program was never a secret and was publicly announced in the spring of 1935. Ambassador Dodd, where he wished to point out to Schacht that the German Government had bought high-grade war planes from American airplane manufacturers alone for one million dollars, and that they had been paid for in gold. Even if Ambassador Dodd has perhaps made a mistake in this detail, yet all this still proves that German rearmament -- the extant of which was surely overestimated even at that time -- musthave been, at the very best, an open secret. Therefore , it is not even necessary to refer to mutual visits of the general chief of staff, to which von Milch and Bodenschatz testified -- the visits of the British Intelligence Service Courtney, the permanent presence of military attaches of nearly all the countries in Berlin -- to recognize that the so-called secret rearmament was a public one, which only safeguarded a few technical secrets like every rearmament in every State. The outside world knew the existence of this rearmament, and held it as endurable in any case for thepreservation of world peace longer than Schacht did. critizice the attitude of the outside world. Each part played in life has its own laws of tact, even the part played by the defendant and his defense counsel. Their task is the defense and not the blame and the attack con nected with it.
I want to take precautions explicitly against a misunder-
standing that I intend to appear as an accuser or critic in any way. I only present all this from the viewpoint that the indirect evidence submitted by the prosecution is not valid. member of the Reich Cabinet, and this from the time of his dismissal in January 1933 as Minister of Economy, at least as Minister without portfolio until January 1943. The prosecution makes the Reich Cabinet responsible for the belligerent invasions of Hitler, namely as criminally responsible. This argumentation has an attractively convincing power on somebody who reckons with the normal concept of a Reich Cabinet. The effect disappears once it has been ascertained that the so-called Reich Cabinet was not such in the ugual sense of a constitutional State. Penal judicial establishments must not, however, be based on outward appearances and form, on a fiction, but only on actually established conditions. This makes it necessary to penetrate sociologically the nature of the Hitler regime, and to examine if a member of the Reich Cabinet, hence of the Reich Government, as such, in this his capacity, has to bear the same criminal responsibility as if he was in another normal State structure, be it a democratic republic or a democratic monarchy or a constitutional monarchy or an absolutistic, but nevertheless rightfully in the State established monarchy or some other state legal structure which bears the character of a somehow lawful legislative State. We can therefore not omit to fathom the actual sociological structure of the Hitler regime. We have heard excellent and profound explanations about the Fuehrer order in this connection from the mouth of Professor Jahrreis. Here, to , I want to avoid repitition and only quote from the following abbreviated form: a misunderstanding, that, if I speak here about the Hitler regime, I am doing this without any connection with the persons sitting in the defendant's dock, naturally with the exception of Schacht. For the latter, I am doing this in the negative sense, that he did not belong to the Regime as such, in spite of the fact that he was a member of the Reich Government and president of the Reich Bank.
I leave the question completely open as to whether any of the other defend-
ants shouldbe considered a member or supporter of the regime. That question is subject only to the judgment of the Tribunal and its valuation by the respective competent defense counsel. someone who lived in Germany during the Hitler regime it as difficult to differentiate between the seeming and the apparent distribution of power and the actual influences of this power but that this is bound to surpass the ability to judge of people who lived outside of Germany, and only be made possible through findings obtained by the presentation of evidence before this Tribunal. We have established here that the Reich Cabinet which Hitler termed a club of defeatists, was convened for thelast time in 1938 -- and that it met for the last time, for deliberation and to make decisions -- in 1937, and that Hitler intentionally withheld all matters of political importance from the Reich Cabinet, as is also brought out by the so-called Hessbach Minutes of 10 November 1937. During this meeting the Fuehrer called the attention of these present -- Schacht, of course, was not present and did notlearn about the Hessbach Minutes until he came here -- that the subject matter of the meeting was of such great importance that it would result in full Cabinet meetings in other countries, but that just because of its great significance he had decided not to discuss the matter within the circles of the Reich Cabinet. Reich Cabinet can no longer be considered the architects and supporters of the political aspirations of the Reich. The same holds true for the members of the Reich Defense Commission, which in itself was nothing but a bureaucratic routine affair. Because of this, Hitler also, in the spring of 1939, explicitly excluded the Reich Defense Commission from further war preparations in the following words: "Preparation takes place on the basis of peace legislation."
Despotism and tyranny had reached their purest form in 1938. It is a characteristic quality of the Fascist as well as the National Socialist regime to concentrate formation of the political will in thehead of the Prty, who, with the help of this Party, subjugates and masters this Party and State.
Justice Jackson also recognized this when he stated, on 23 February, 1946, that the apex of power existed outside of the State and in a power group outside the Constitution.
To speak, in the case of such a regime, of a responsible Reich Government and of free State citizens, who through various organizations could exert influence on the formation of political will, would mean proceeding from entirely wrong hypotheses. Only inconceivable greatness always gain irresponsible influence on the head of State and Party in such regimes. The formation of the political will can be recognized in its crystallized form only in the head of the State himself; near to him and behind him it becomes opaque. It is another characteristic of such a regime -- and again this belongs to the chapter of its inner untruthfulness -that behind the facade of seemingly absolute harmony and union, several power groups fight each other. Hitler not only cordoned such contrasts, he even encouraged them and in part used them as a basis for his power. during the war in contrast with the First World War, I, on the contrary wish to stress that hardly at any time during its history was the German nation so torn internally as it was during the Third Reich. The apparent unity was merely the stillness of a churchyard enforced through terror. The conflicts between the individual high functionaries of the German people, which we have here reflect the inner strife-torn condition of the German nation, hidden artificially only through the terror wielded by the Gestapo. between Himmler and Frank, between Himmler and Keitel, between Sauckel and Seldte, between Vehrmacht and SS, between SF and Justice, between Ribbentrop and Neurath, and so forth. The list could be continued as desired. Even ideologically the Party in itself was divided into strongly pronounced contrasts which became clear already at the very beginning of the presentation of evidence from Goering's testimony. These contrasts were fundamental, and they were not bridged by Hitler but rather deepened. They were the keyboard of his source of power on which he performed. The Ministers were not responsible, governing persons, such as any other State where Law is the foundation; they were nothing but employees with specialized training we had to obey orders.
If a specialist such as Schacht did not wish to submit to this, it resulted i conflict and resignation from his department. department, because they were not exclusively competent for it. A Minister, i accordance with Constitutional Law must, first of all, also have access to the Chief of State, and he must have the right to report at any time. He must be in a position to reject interference and influences by a third irresponsible Party. called Ministers of Adolf Hitler. Schacht was surprised by the Four-Year Plan. Similarly, the Minister of Justice was surprised by such extremely important laws as the Nurnberg Decree. The Minister was not in a position to appoint his staff independently. The appointment of every civil service employee needed the consent of the Party Chancellery. Meddling and influence by all possible agencies and persons of the various Chancelleries - Chancellery of the Fuehrer, Party Chancellery etc.,- asserted themselves. They, however, were agencies placed above the Ministires and they could not be controlled. Special deputies governed through the departments. Ministers- yes, even the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, as we have heard from Lammers- had to wait for months for an audience, while for Messrs. Bormann and Himmler it was a coming and going to and from Hitler all the time. as regards the circles of which they are composed, have at all times been difficult to comprehend. They are not the irresponsible influences exerted over Hitler and affecting him.
Colonel-General Jodl described to us here how Hitler's spontaneous actions having the most serious consequences could be traced back to influences of that type, through entirely obscure third persons, due to mere accidents, conversations at a tea party, etc., For the objective facts this bears out what I already mentioned in the beginning. The very fact of the existence of such conditions eliminates even the possibility of the planning of a crime such as a war of aggression, within a clearly defined circle of persons or, for that matter, within the so-called Reich government. But where there is no planning possible, there is also no plot possible, no conspiracy, of which the most striking characteristic is the common planning, though with various roles.
Let us assume themost widely conceived interpretation of the public fact of the conspiracy. I am following Justice Jackson. He who takes part in a counterfeiters' plot is guilty of conspiracy, even though he may have written only a letter or acted as bearer of the litter. He who participate in a plot for robbing a bank is guilty of murder if, in the wake of the pla ning, a third party in the group of planners committed murder. At all time however, the prerequisite is a body of persons capable of executing a comm plan. Such a thing was not possible for Adolf Hitler's Ministers; it was not possible at all under Hitler. From this it fellows that no plotters could participate in the crime of having forced upon his own people and the world a war of aggression except those who served Hitler as assistants.
The power situation of the third Reich as depicted thus permits ffense such as conspiracy.
Whether such accomplicity or such committed by Hitler exists for the individual defendants personally To investigate this is my task only for the person of Schacht.
A collective crime such as conspiracy (" conspiracy",) on the basis of the actual conditions already established is however excluded as inconceivable and unrealizable. But even if this were not the case, the subjective aspect of the deed is completelylacking in the case of Schacht. Even when the objective facts of a conspiracy exist within a circle in the prisoners' dock, and even with the most liberal interpretation of the concept of conspiracy, the conspirator must accept a plan of conspiracy and the aim for conspiracy in his volition, at least in the form of the delus eventualis. significance from comparison with a pirate ship. In the abstract every crow member of the pirate ship, even in an subordinate position is an outlaw. But someone who did not even know that he was on a pirate ship, but believed himself to be on a peaceful merchant vessel, is not guilty of piracy. He is also innocent if after realizing the pirate character of the ship, he has done everything to prevent the execution of piracy as well as to leave the pirate ship.
Schacht did both. As far as the latter is concerned, scientific Theory on conspiracy also recognizes that he is not guilty who has withdrawn from the conspiracy by a positive act before attainment of the goal of the conspiracy, even in case he cooperated previously in the preparation of the plan for conspiracy as was not done by Schacht.
In this connection, I also consider in my favor Mr. Justice Jackson's answer when I put up for discussion within the compass of Schacht's interrogation whether the persecution of the Jews is also charged to Schacht.
Mr. Justice Jackson affirmed this in case Schact ad helped prepare the war of aggression before he withdrew from his plan for aggression and its group of conspirators and went over inreservedly to the opposition group, that is to the conspiracy against Hitler. This desertion would then be the positive act mentioned by me above where by a person at first participating in a conspiracy could separate himself from it. desired to participate in the preparation for a war of aggression. As already explained, this accusation of the subjective fact of the conspiracy has been proved neither by direct nor by indirect evidence previously. From 1938 on at the latest, it has been proved that from this time on Schacht waged the most conceivably severe battle against any possibility of war in such a form that he attempted to overthrew the carrier of this danger of war, the carrier of the
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess.
(A recess was taken)
DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for having been delayed. I was prohibited from coming in. the matter of the Putsch; and I should like to continue. of Schacht's course of action. It is beyond doubt that, according to human reckoning to a successful putsch before the outbreak of war putsch after the outbreak of war would at least have shortened the duration of the war. Therefore, such sceptical considerations about the political value of those putsch attempts do not render any proof against the seriousness of putsch plans and intentions. Those are all that counts. For they prove first of all that one who has seen pursuing them since 1938 and, ( if one thinks of the attempt ith Kluge, ) even since 1937, could impossibly have had warlike intentions.
One does not try to overthrow a regime, because it involves longer of war, if one has oneself worked for the war previously. One does this only if by all ones actions, even that of inancing armament, one wished to foster peace.
For this reason, These proven repeated putsch attempts on the part of Schacht do not perhaps have the legal significance of a so-called active repentince for a previously shown criminal behavious, but they are ex post of proof that he cannot be accused even before 1938 of consciously working for war, because the latter is logically and psychologically incompatible with Schacht's activity of conspiracy against Hitler.
These putsches thus prove the credibility of Schacht in respect 15 July A LJG 18-1 to his representation of the reasons and intentions which caused him to enter actively into the Hitler government and to finance an armament to the extent of the financial aid he granted, namely to the amount of 12 billions.
They prove ex post the purely defensive character of this financing of armament; they prove the credibility of Schacht's contention of producing besides this defensive effect tactically a limitation of armament. But if one believes this description of Schacht, then one cannot speak of Schacht 's cooperation in instigating a war of aggression, at least in its subjective aspect.
This credibility is also proved by another circumstance. Schacht has contradicted the testimony of Gisevius and my questioning along the same line that he had admired Hitler at the beginning and had unreservedly considered him an ingenious statesman. He described this in his interrogation as an erroneous assumption. He said that he had recognized from the beginning many a weakness of Hitler, especially his sketchy education, and only hoped to be in a position to control the disadvantages and dangers resulting from them. By this, purely objectively speaking, Schacht hereby made his defense more difficult, but he is wise enough to have recognized this. Thus wha t he consciously lost hereby for his defense in the technique of evidence and surrendered, he is gaining in respect to his credibility upon objective recognition of evidence based on psychological experience. For he deserves increased credibility who serves the truth by contradiction oven when the suggested untruth or the halftruth is more advantagious to him technically and tactically by way of evidence. Schacht as a leader in the activities of the various conspiracies about which Gisovius testified precisely on the basis of the credible testimony of Gisovius. But if Mr. Justice Jackson presented in the cross examination to Schacht photographs and films which superficially document a close connection with Hitler and his paladins, then this could only have happened in order to put doubt on the seriousness of his active opposition to Hitler.
I therefore must deal briefly with 15 July A LJG 18-2 this photographic argument anyhow.
Mr. Justice Jackson has related this accusation with another one in quoting speeches which show superficially even during the putsch period a great devotion on the part of Schacht toward Adolf Hitler. This accusation is on the same level. I believe that this argument can stand up neither before the experience of life nor before the observation of history. History teaches us that conspirators in particular, especially if they belong to the closer circle of dignitaries of the threatened head of state, for purposes of camoufalge show a special devotion. Now has it over been observed that such people show their intentions to the threatened victim in a contradictory loyalty. One could accumulate and cite from history. which concerns itself with the murder of Czar Paul by his first minister Count Palen. The Czar trusts to the very end the devotion of Count Palen which is shown ostentatiously even at the time when the latter is already sharpening the murder knife. And in the historical documents left behind, there is an instruction by Count Palen to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, very shortly before the attempt, in which Count Palen cannot do enough to speak about " Notre auguste Emperour ". Significantly, this drama boars the title "The Patriot". to the servant of the nation. It approaches the psychological truth much more if one would utilize a presumptive devotion assumed for the sake of appearances and assurances of loyalty during this period more in favor of the objective credibility of the description of Schacht than vice versa.