the purity of historical truth, that at the beginning of Nazism-with the exception of an intervention from abroad-- there were two power groups who could perhaps have liberated Germany; the army and the working class, both of course under corresponding guidance. mental remark by such a blameless and distinguished man as Severin brings with it the danger of unjust deductions regarding my client It would have been agreeable to me if I could have been spared this explanation of Severing's incriminating testimony. Severing has further raised the reproach of political opportunism against Schact In politics, the boundary between opportunism and statesmanlike efficacious dealing is very fluid. Before the conduct of Schact in 1932 and 1933 is appraised as that of an opportunist, his past should be looked into. Since 1923 this past was lived in complete publicity. It was partly the object of those proceedings, it is partly juridical notoriety. This past speaks rather for the fact that Schacht does what he judges to be right, not only with great lack of consideration, but also with great courage. He proved his courage as conspirator against Hitler, as is necessarily proved by analysing this activity as conspirator, and as Gisevius expressly described him here.
But lot us now go back to 1923. At that time he stabilized the Mark against all parties interested in inflation; in 1924 he blocked credits against all hoarders of foreign currency; in 1927 he deprived the exchange speculators of the credit basis for exchange gamble. He fought from 1925 to 1929 against the debt and the expenditure policy of the municipalities and by this drew on himself the enmity of all mayors. He signed the Young-Plan in 1929 and thus defied the opposition of the heavy industry's circles and in pursuit of this, he fought since 1934 against the errors and abuses of the Nazi ideology and never carried out a desire or an order for himself which ran contrary to his conscience or his sense of justice.
time. Certain preachers of ethics of which there are many today ples, should not forgot that steel has two qualities, not only firmness, but also pliancy. it now, would take us beyond 1:00 o'clock. I would be grateful to your Lordship if perhaps we could have the recess now. I an now coming to my remarks in Appendix No. 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better go on until 1:00 o'clock.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, in the translated copy which you have before you, there are two appendices at the end, two pieces of additional material. The matters dealt with in these appendices happened after I had given my speech to be translated, and therefore, since I had to work in this material somehow, the only way I could do it was by way of an appendix. of the testimony given by witnesses. something beyond the translation of my pleading available to it, which I could not work into this translation because the cause for it came up at a time after the submission of my final pleading for translation, namely the statements of my colleague. Dr. Nelte against the credibility of the witness Gisevius. Since I dwell here on the evaluation of a witness, it is the proper time here to answer this.
Insofar as my colleague Dr. Nelte found fault with the objective reliability of the testimony of the witness Gisevius in respect to his statements incriminating the defendants Keitel, Gooring, and so on, I refrain from any statements. May the prosecution take any standpoint it desires. This is not my task.
But now Dr. Nelte has also attacked the subjective credibility of Gisevius in the personal morals of this witness and thus also indirectly the reliability of his testimony concerning Dr. Schacht.
This demands my opinion, and namely one of a very basic nature.
Your Honors, it is here where the souls separate. An unbridgeable cleavage opens up between Schacht's standpoint and the standpoint of all those who make these thoughts their own with which Dr. Nelte attempts to disqualify morally Gisevius, the deceased Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and so forth. I at least owe to my client this, to state the following very clearly and unequivocally: and enmity to the quick against everyone who leads the fatherland and his own people criminally into misery and destruction. Such a leader is an enemy of the fatherland; in his influence on the fatherland he is many times more dangerous than the enemy in war. Every means, and namely a corsaire un corsaire et demi is just against such a criminal state leadership. genuine patriotism and, as such, highly moral, even during war. Whoever can still entertain the slightest doubt after the findings of this trial and finally also after the testimony of Speer about the cynic statement by Hitler in respect to the destruction of the German people, that Adolf Hitler was the greatest enemy of his people, in short a criminal to this people, for the removal of whom every means would have been just and every, yes every deed would have been patriotic. Worlds separate Schacht from everyone in the prisoners' dock who does not recognize this. save myself after this fundamental clarification to disprove details of the attacks of Dr. Nelte against Dr. Gisevius. Insofar as Dr. Nelte misses readiness to ant in these resistance groups to which Dr. Schacht belonged, I only point to the many dead who were hanged on 20 July, whore Schacht belongs to the very few survivors, and he, as well, was to be liquidated yet in Flossenburg I point to the fatal victims, numbering thousands, of the political judiciary of the Hitlerian state.
The war of conspiracy against Hitler, and the necessity for cunning was not less dangerous to life and limb than exposure at the front.
Dr. Gisevius has admitted immediately to my loyally crossexamining colleague Dr. Kubuschock his error, resulting from the prohibition of I do not have to add anything further.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 15 July 1946)
DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, I have concluded so far with the consideration of the probative value of the statements made here by the witness Severing and Gesavius.
If I find up now the evaluation of Schacht's conduct up to about 1935 and enter henceforth the period from 1935 to 1937, I may emphasize once more that, for the sake of saving time, I deliberately do not repeat the arguments which fully brought out and brought to the knowledge of the Tribunal during the examination, thus the non-partipation of Schacht in the legislation, which led to the abrogation of the rights if the people, as this took place before his entry int the Cabinet. The deciding event for the stabilization of Hitler's power the amalgamation of the offices of the Reichs President and of the Chancellor of the Reich and on Hitler's personality, were also beyond his assistance and responsibility. By this decree the Army took their oath to Hitler. The Chancellor of the Reich had not only authority ever the Amy. It is not my task to investigate who we to bear the political responsibility and historic guilt for this law; in any case it is not Schacht. Similarly it was before his entering upon office that the basic anti Jewish laws were passed. He was quite surprised by the later Nuernberg laws . The decree dealing with the exclusion of Jews from the, German economic life dated 12 November 1933 and the order about confiscation of Jewish property and pessessions of 3 December 1938 were issued after he had left from the pest of Minister of Economy and thus without his active collaboration. The same applies to the decree excluding Jews from the Reichs Laber Services, which did not weigh heavily on them. The law concerning the death penalty for can cealment of Foreign currency, the so-called law of betrayal of the people, was not directed against the Jews but solely against heavy industry and high, finan it was not made by Schacht but by the Minister of finance. Schacht did not want such laws to be the cause of rupture, because he thought he had more important tasks to perform.
This does not seen to be of such great importance, because Schacht had so let himself in for unpleasantness by his advocacy of the Jews in the Jewish question by his public speeches and his exposees to Hitler, that it would be quite unjust to disqualify him politically or morally, not to mention juridically for this reason. I remember particularly the Reichsbank speech after the anti Jewish pogroms in November 1938, the speech at Koenigsberg, the exposees of the year 1935 and so forth. In the Third Reich Schacht was considered the most courageous and active protec tor of the Jews. I only refer to the letter of the Frankfurt business man Merton which was submitted to the court and to the illustrating statement of the witness Reyler. According to the latter, Himmler, when Heyler reproached him for the events of November 1938, replied that it had been ultimately the fault of the economic administration that things have gene so far. From a man like Herr Schacht one could not expect anything more the that he exorcised a constant restraining influence in the Jewish question and sot himself against the will of the party. charge of the prosecution as follows : Schacht is not being prosecuted for anti-Semitism, but for activities, which stand in causal connection with the atrocities committed against the Jews within the framework of the war of planned aggression. From this it results that a denial of the guilt of a war of aggression leads with compelling logic to the denial of any guilt of the atrocities which were committed against the Jews during the war. Justice Jacks has made some phases of the legistative treatment of the Jews during Schacht's ministry the subject of his cross-examination. The questions asked and answer herein are irrelevant according to the Charter and, the previously mentioned authentic interpretation of this part of the prosecution by Justice Jackson. The anti-semitic legistation of the Third Reich and the personal attitude toward proceedings only so far as they are connected with ether crimes, which were committed according to the Charter, as for the conspiracy to wage war, the extermination and so forth. According to the Charter they cannot be an offense in themselves, nor even one against humanity. Only those defendants are punishable for their deeds, who can be proved to have participated in the planning of a we of aggression and its unhuman consequences against the Jews.
A prequisite for their conviction, however, is that they recognized and desired this goal and its result. tion (Erfelgshaftung) in criminal law. According to the Charter, that man is punishable who desired war and also the inhuman actions connected with it, but the incriminating activity must always have occurred within the scope of carrying out such a plan. This purely legal view in itself excludes the conviction Schacht because of atrocities against the Jews. of Justice Jackson and myself, must likewise be clarified at this point, otherwise we will be talking at cross purposes.
During the testimony Justice Jackson has repeatedly pointed out that the defendant is not being charged with antiSemitism, as such, that he is not being charged with his opposition to the Versailes Treaty, that he is not being charged with his ideas and statements on the so-called, Lebensraum problem, and thus, the food problem of the Centraleuropean nations, that he is not being charged with his colonial aspirations, but that on the contrary he is being charged with all this only to the extent that it has served, with his knowledge and desire, for the preparation ,of a war of aggression. With this objection Justice Jackson tried to cut short certain, questions and discussions.
if the Prosecution would not take with one hand all it gives with the other. Because with this other hand, the course of argumentation, everything, namely his alleged anti-semitism etc. is used as indirect proof and evidence that Schacht had prepared and desired this war of aggression. The prosecution does not count all that as a criminal fact in itself, but as indirect testimony, as evidence. Therefore, in its valuation as evidence, I must take these problems into consideration. The Jewish question has, I think, been dealt with. In the problem, of vital space (Lebensraum) I can only refer, in order to save time, to what Schacht, during his interrogation, has stated forjustification ofhis statements and activities. The colonial problem was the subject of cross-examination by Justice Jackson in as much as he tried to prove by his representations and questions that colonial activity by Germany was impossible without world deomination or militarily prepared command of the seas, at least. The further development of this idea would result in the defendant Schacht being charged with the fact that his struggle for colonies logically implied the planning of a war of aggression. This is a wrong inference. I think that Justice Jackson's conception of Colonial Policyis too imperialistic a one. Whoever desires colonies for his country, without dominating the world or at least the sea, starts out with colonial aspirations under the supposition of a lasting state of peace vis a vis the stronger seapowers. Her Herchant Navy tonnage carried on the necessary traffic with these colonies. Her pre-war merchant Navy tonnage would have also been sufficient. Air communications, in reply to Justice Jackson's question, would not have been needed. Nothing supports the presumption that by his desire for colonies, Schacht would have aimed at a removal of foreign naval supremacy by war. Concerning his general conduct, one can hardly take him for so foolish. France and Holland likewise possess colonies, but certainly do not control the sea routes. This representation of the Prosecution is indeterminative. The tribunal moreover knows well, that during the years before this war nearly all the statesmen of the victorious powers have proved sympathetic to these colonial aspirations of Germany, as shown in many public speeches.
I come now to the subject of rearmament, i.e. to the activity of Schacht in his capacity as President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics until 1937, i.e. until a date when he had changed from a loyal servant of Adolf Hitler to a traitor against him, and when he chose the dark ways of tricks and dissimulation coupled with preparations for murder. Lecarne Pact and of other treaties, as indirect proof as evidence of his aggressiondelus. The first involves the question whether in general any objective treaty violations took place and whether, in the affirmative case, these treaty violations must be looked upon as indicatives of on aggressiondel in the person of a mentor of the Reich Government, i.e. also in the person of Schacht. It is impossible and also unnecessary to exhaust within the framework of this pleading the problem whether and how far treaty violations were committed. My colleague Horn has touched on this question also. Only a short remark may serve to prove at least the problematical solution of this question. This again is important for subjective estimation. There are no eternal treaties in the domain of civil jurisdiction and still less in the domain of international Law. The clausula rebus sic stantibus plays a much more important role in the domain of international law, i.e. in the political intercourse between nations, than in the lawful intercourse between individuals. One has to be very careful not to adapt the principles of the low level of civil law to the high and wide domain of the international jurisdiction.
The international law has its own dynamics. The highly political intercourse between nations is subject to other juridical aspects than the commercial and personal intercourse between individuals. The most striking proof of the correctness of this thesis is the juridical argumentation of the bill of indictment, in so far as it deals with the sentence"nulla poena sine leage peenale" and demands the individual punishment of the loading statement of an aggressor nation instead of the issue of sanctions. Particularly the man who affirms the conception of the Prosecution in this respect, thus acknowledges the dynamics of International Law and the fact, that International Law develops in accordance with its own laws.
come to an end by a formal repeal but die in the course of the evolution of facts. They die out necessarily by themselves. In individual instances one might be of a different opinion whether this is the case. But it does not also the accuracy of this established fact. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland and also the introduction of general conscription, the extent of rearmament which Schacht also desired and approved, the voluntary "Anschluss" of Austria to Germany approved of and aimed at by Schacht, certainly are offenses against the meaning and text of the above mentioned pacts, particularly the Versailles Treaty. If, however, such violations are only answered by formal protestations, whilst very friendly relations continue yes even honour is shown to the offending nation; if agreements are concluded which alter the principal perception of such a treaty, as for instance the Naval Pact with Great Britain, one can very well advocate the opinion that such a subjective point of view at least finds its justification. of an Armament Pact, as for instance the Naval Pact with Great Britain, is the recognition of the military sovereignty of both nations. The latter being denied to Germany was one of the main points of view of the Versailles Treaty. I know the Court's wish or rather prohibition in regard to this matter, and of course I shall bow to it. But I must and I may speak about the legal possibility and therefore the innocence, criminally speaking, of Schacht's subjective opinions on the question of treaty violation. Even if therefore one wished to defend the point of view that the said treaties have not become obsolete, one cannot, as far at least as its honesty is concerned, doubt the subjective justification of a contrary opinion. But if this is answered in the affirmative, these treaty violations are no longer any proof of the criminal intention of a war of aggression. But that is the only point in question. For the violation of treaties, as such, is not yet considered by the Charter as a punishable act. Here also Schacht can justify his honest belief by reference to similar ways of considering the question by loading foreign statesmen, in the case of which the suspicion of a German will for aggression is therefore, as a matter of course, logically excluded from the very beginning.
Here again I must limit myself to a few instances, as a complete enumeration would exceed the time limits of this plea. re-introduction of general military service. The British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, with a statesman's far-sighted objectivity, as reported by the press and by wireless-broadcasts, and therefore universally known, and consequently of value as legal evidence, replied to those measures as follows :
"There is no doubt that it had been expected that upon the forced disarmament of Germany, a concerted reduction of the armaments of other big nations would follow". developed a while agao, in spite of the blaming of Hitler's action that follow ed them. The same applies to the fact that the visit of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin took place eight days after this so-called treaty violation, namely on March 24th 1935. It would not have taken place, if this measure of Hitler's had been considered abroad as a militarily aggressive one. As you also know, I may only make a short reference to the history of the discussion of this question at the Council of the League of Nations, as it is well-known, Should Schacht, as a German and a German Minister judge it in a different manner from that of the foreign governments? in March 1935.
THE PRESIDENT: The date of the occupation of the Rhineland was not March 1935 but March 1936.
DR. DIX: I made a mistake. The main thing is the fact of the occupation of the Rhineland. This action was not a breach only of the treaty of Versaille but also of the Locarne Pact; that is, of an undoubtedly voluntarily contracted treaty. Two days later Mr. Baldwin stated in the House of Commons, in a speech made public and therefore of value as legal evidence, that, while the way Germany acted could not be excused, there was no reason to assume that this action contained a menace of hostilities. Was the German and German Minister Schacht to take a more sceptical attitude in regard to the aggressive significance of the act than foreign countries? And in particular when he was forced to register the fact which also belongs to history and is universally known, that 10 days after this breach of treaty the Lecarne Powers, apart from Germany submitted to the Council of the League of Nations a Memorandum proposing the reduction of the number of German troops in the Rhineland to 36,500 men, and wishing only to avoid the strengthening of the SA and SS in the Rhineland, and the erection of fortifications and aredromes. Should this Memorandum not be interpreted as a ratification of an alleged breach of the treaty?.
was hardly noticed by the contracting parties and called forth from Eden, in a historical public speech to the House of Commans on July 29, 1936, merely the remark that it was not considered appropriate to increase the difficulties of the debate by individual questions like the foregoing. Was the German Minister Schacht to take up another and sharper attitude?,. moreover Schacht was no longer Reich Minister for Economy? Had foreign countries gathered from this action the conviction that Hitler was preparing a war of aggression, they would not have renounced the use of force. Should the German Minister Schacht hold a different opinion and act accordingly? He already held it and was already eagerly at work with Witzleben and others to eliminate Adolf Hitler and his regime by means of a revolt. The efforts of these patriotic conspirators were however frustrated, according to the unequivocal testimony of witness Gisevius, because Hitler was able to register one sucess after another in external politics. effects of the Munich Agreement on the striking power of the opposition group working with Schacht. I will recall the evidence of Gisevius regarding the warnings and hints which in this connection were sent beyond the German frontiers to responsible personalities of foreign countries. Is it fair to require from the German Minister Schacht a more critical attitude in respect to those political developments than that taken by foreign countries, the interests of which had been injured? He had, as we know from Gisevius, and also from Vockes and all the affidavits submitted, a far clearer opinion after 1937 in which year he began treading the dark ways of a conspirator. I will recall his first contacts with the then General von Kluge. I could multiply examples such as those just mentioned. I do not criticize this attitude of foreign countries; that is not my business, quite apart from the fact that I have a complete understanding for this responsibility conscious pacifist attitude resulting there from. It is, however, my duty to point out that no war-like intention can be imputed to Schacht or account of his opinions and attitude, when the same opinions and attitude can be identified in the affected foreign countries. If foreign countries could entertain the hope of further maintaining friendly relations with Hitler, the same right must be conceded to Schacht, as long as he claims the same right.
He does not claim it for himself at least after the Fritsch crisis of 1938. the danger, This, according to the evidence of Gisevius, is undeniable, and he personally did all he could at the greatest risk of liberty and life, to maintain peace by attempting to overthrow Hitler. That all these revolts be the war and after the outbreak of war were unsuccessfull cannot, according to all the evidence submitted be imputed to him as his fault, The responsibility for the failure of this German resistance movement does not lie within itself but somewhere else within and without the German frontiers. I shall revert to this later.
There remains therefore the fact of re-armament as such. Here also I can refer to the statements Schacht made for his justification during his examination. This was exhaustive and a repetition would be superfluous. It is therefore also superfluous to enter into an academic discussion as to whether Schacht's views were right; that is to say, whether it is right that a certain amount of military force sufficient for defensive purposes was necessary for any country, and particularly for Germany, and whether his opinion was right that the non-fulfilment of the obligation be disarm by the parties to the Versailles treaty justified the re-armament of Germany. the sole question in point is whether these opinions and motives of Schacht were honest or whether he pursued secret aggresive intentions under over of these defensive armament. But nothing can be confirmed against the honesty of those opinions. Of cours it can be contended whether the proverb "si vis pacen para bellum" has an immediate validity or whether objectively any strong rearmament does not carry an inherent danger of war, since good armies with competent officers naturall strive for possibilities of active service. Of course the thesis can be defended that moral strength is stronger than any armed strength. The cohesion of the British empire and the world-wide influence of the Vatican's foreign politics could here be cited as proof. All these questions carry a certain relativity in themselves, at any rate, one thing is certain, and it is that all large countries of the world till today the warning is always and always renewed that one must be militarily strong to preserve Peace. Nations whose individualism and love of liberty rejected universal defensive service and a strong standing army now do the contrary and believe honestly to serve peace thereby.
Let us take as an example a nation whose love of liberty nobody in the world, even the most mistrustful can question, namely Switzerland. Even this peace-loving nation has always taken pride in maintaining the defense capacity of its people just in order to protect its freedom and independance in a peaceful manner. One may academically call this idea of discouraging foreign aggression by the maintainance of a sufficiently strong defensive army imperialistic. It is at any rate honestly entertained by peaceful and liberty loving nations, and perhaps serves the cause of peace more effectively than many so-called anti-military or pacifist doctrines. This reasonable point of view has really nothing to do with militarism. He who still today recognizes i as justified for great and small nations may not contest the honesty of their representation by Schacht in the years 1935 to 1933. I have no more to say about this. statements, that this part of rearmament which Schacht first financed with 9 milliard and then reluctantly with a further 3 Milliard, was by no means sufficient for a war of aggression, not even for an effective defense of the German frontiers. The answers that the witness Keitel, Bedenschatz, Hilch, General Thomas, Kesselring etc. have made to this in their depositions and affidavits are available and have been submitted or have been officially brought to the knowledge of the Tribunal. In this respect they are unanimous that Germany even at the outbreak of war, i.e. one and a half years later, was not armed sufficiently for an offensive war; that therefore it was not only a crime'against humanity but also against his own people, confided to his leadership, if Hitler led this people in August 1939 into a war of aggression. Blombergs' statement is correct, that Schacht was aware of the progress of rearmament or the statement of Schacht and Vockes that this was not the case, I admit without further discussion the bona fides of Blomberg's statement. But as he had more to do with the technical side of rearmament than the Reichsbank, personal experience shows, that the memory of Schacht and Vockes is more reliable on this point than Blomberg's to whom this report to the Reichsbank was a matter of secondary importance for his department.
For the Reichsbank, the desire to be informed about the technical progress of the armament and not only about the financial expenditures was a very important thing. One remembers such facts more reliably then unimportant secondary matters. In any case it is established that until the budget-year 1937/30 only 21 billions were spent for armament, of which 12 billions were financed by credits of the Reichsbank and that according to Jodl's statement June 5th, on April 1st 1933 only 27 to 28 divisions were ready, whereas in 19. However, there were already 73 to 75 divisions. April 1st was entirely insufficient for a war of aggression. Hitler indeed was also of the same opinion when, in his memorandum of August 1936, which has been submitted to the court, and which was handed over to Speer in 1944 he pointed out, along with many disapproving remarks about Schacht's economic leadership, that four precious years had gone by, that one had had time enough in these four years to determine what we could not do and that he was hereby ordering that the German army would have to be ready for action in four years, and so in the course of the year 1940, I recall to the memory of the court, that after Schacht's withdrawal as president of the Reichsbank 311/2 billions were spent on armament during the two budget-years 1938/59 and 1939/40. The issuing and expenditure of moeny on armament therefore went on without Schacht too, and, indeed, to an even more considerable extent. At that time, Schacht had written to Blomberg, that he couldn't produce money out of the air.
He exorcised a constant pressure on Blomberg along this line. I now refer to his letter to Blomberg of December 21st 1935 which has been submitted to the court. He exercised a restraining influence by means of explanatory lectures to officers of the war ministry and of the Armed Forces Academy. He refused the railway loan of 1936 presented by the Minister of Communications, which we indirectly in the interest of armament and Stopped the credits of the Reichsl as early as the beginning of 1937 by making a compromise on the final 3 billion He refused the credit which the Reich Finance Minister requested from him in December 1938.
the Mefe bills, which from the technically financial point or view was a rather bold measure, but still legally tenable. These served first of all to finance the armament expenditures, but restricted further armament expenditures after their expiration on April 1st 1939, because the Reich was bound to honor them. Schacht's foresight proved true. The increase in employment brought such a rise in the states revenues, that it would net have been difficult liquidate the Mefe bills at their expiration after 5 years.
Keitel's statement has proved that during the budget year beginning April 1st 1933, five billions marks more were spent for armament than during the preceding year, although after April 1st 1932 the Reichsbank credits had completely ceased. Half of these 5 billions would have sufficed to honor the Mefe bills-which matured during the budget year beginning April 1st 1939. This money would have been saved from further armament. But this was exactly what Schacht intended. From the beginning to had limited the validity of the Mefe bills to five years; he stepped the credit assistance of the Reichsbank on April 1st 1939, in order to limit the armament. It was impossible for Schacht to foresee that Hitler would simply break a strict credit obligation and not pay the bills. These feacts in themselves show that his attempts to resign could have had no other reason than opposition to any further armament, and the refusal to accept responsibility for this. In this sense, the assertion of the prosecution that he wanted to evade responsibility, is completely correct facts just mentioned caused him to make this endeavor to relinquish his duties. If the prosecution says that the reason was his antegonism to Goering, this is also right insofar as Schacht was an opponent of the Four Year Plan, of which Goering was the chief. That the reason was a rivalry of power is a pure supposition, an interpretation of the actual events, which justifies the quotation :"Interpret to your heart's desire, because if you do not interpret, you are just quoting someone else".
The Reichsbank's memo of November 1938, which led to the dismissal of Schacht and most of his collaborators, including Veeke, is also unequivacaly and forcibly opposed to armament. It naturally had to contain a justification which was derived from the departmental jurisdiction of the Reichsbank.
Iys aim was generally known. Hence Hitler's remark : "This is mutiny". The memorandum ends with the demand for the capital and loan market, as well as the management of taxation, to be controlled by the Reichsbank. Compliance with this demand would have taken away from Hitler every possibility of raising money for further armament. This demand was, therefore, unacceptable, to Hitler, Schacht and his colleagues know this. Acc ordingly , they deliberately sought a break by this step. Schacht new bore no responsiblity. From new on Schacht could devote himself exclusively to the plans for a coup d' etat by the conspiratorial group to which he belonged. He became a traitor to Hitler. By remaining minister without portfolio, he hoped to learn about events for the aims of his conspiratorial group more than if he resigned altogether. I shall return to this point later. for the assertion of the prosecution, that Schacht deliberately contributed to the preparation of war of aggression. ment in the modern sense. On the German side, this was already recognized for the first time at the beginning of the first World War, and even by two very important German Jews, namely the founder of the Hamburg-America line, Albert Ballin, and the great German industrialist Rathenau. It is this same Rathenau, who made that wonderful speech on peace during the Conference at Genoa, surrounded by the wild applause of these very Powers which had opposed his country but four years perviously as enemies, and who as the German Foreign Minister, fell as a sacrifice in the beginning of the twenties to an anti-Semitic outrage. I may presumably suppose the personality of Albert Ballin to be known to the Court. Both men recognized already at the start of the first World War the error of a discontinued economic mobilization. Rathenau then organized the so-called War Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry. The first Plenipotentiary for far Economy, since this is all he was, therefore was ideologically a pacificist. nation which does not allow purely military armament to be accompanied by a corresponding economic preparation for war.
Therefore the creation of a General Rhenipotentiary for War Economy, even if he had become effective, which, as the evidence demonstrate most convincingly, he never did become, does not prove anything of the intention to wage a war of aggression. This post is necessary for any armament for defense. The same applies to the institution of the Reich Defense Council, the Reich Defense Committee, etc. As such they are the some harmless self-explanatory factors. Only thisr misuse for the purpose of a war of aggression would be incriminating For this, however, the delus of Schacht has not been established. I therefore refrain from evaluating the details in this field. so-called maintenance of secrecy regarding certain mobilization measures and mobilization arrangements, as for example the maintenance of secrecy concerning the second Reich Defense Law. In this case also, a natural wordly way of thinking relieves these findings of any incriminating character. All nations are accustomed to carry out mobilization and armament measures in "secret". In thinking this over mere closely and from closer observation this practice can be recognized as quite superfluous routine matter. Only drafts and technical details can be really kept secret. The fact of rearmament as such can never be kept secret. The same applies to the existence of a large body which is to serve the purpose of this rearmament. Either this becomes known when it starts functioning, or, like the ominous Defense Council it remains hidden and secret only because it does not function. Russe-Japanese war I found, the following humorous description :"If I, as a member of the General Staff, wished, an incident to become known, I had it classified as "secret" and my wish was fulfilled. If I had the wish, so difficult to carry out, to keep something secret, I unobtrusively sent it unstated and at times my wish was fulfilled." one must consider the basis of experience of the hard foundation of facts.
the seizure of power by Hitler and the subsequent rearmament wasnever a secret to the world. The main proceedings have brought much evidence to thiseffect. We know the report of Consul-General Messersmith; we know his sworn testimony of 30 August 1945, submitted by the Prosecution under No. P.S. 2385, according to which the armament program - he speaks of a giant armament program - immediately after the seizure of power -- and the rapid development of the air program had been apparent to everybody. It had been impossible to move in the streets of Berlin or in any other city of importance in Germany without seeing pilots or aviators in training. He expressly states, on page 8 of his testimony, that this giant German rearmament-program was never a secret and was publicly announced in the spring of 1935. Ambassador Dodd, where he wished to point out to Schacht that the German Government had bought high-grade war planes from American airplane manufacturers alone for one million dollars, and that they had been paid for in gold. Even if Ambassador Dodd has perhaps made a mistake in this detail, yet all this still proves that German rearmament -- the extant of which was surely overestimated even at that time -- musthave been, at the very best, an open secret. Therefore , it is not even necessary to refer to mutual visits of the general chief of staff, to which von Milch and Bodenschatz testified -- the visits of the British Intelligence Service Courtney, the permanent presence of military attaches of nearly all the countries in Berlin -- to recognize that the so-called secret rearmament was a public one, which only safeguarded a few technical secrets like every rearmament in every State. The outside world knew the existence of this rearmament, and held it as endurable in any case for thepreservation of world peace longer than Schacht did. critizice the attitude of the outside world. Each part played in life has its own laws of tact, even the part played by the defendant and his defense counsel. Their task is the defense and not the blame and the attack con nected with it.