The examination and decision in this respect is the Tribunal's duty exclusively. That much may be said, that there is a gap between the defendant's actions and the expressions frequently employed by him which cannot be bridged. It can be stated that the defendant when assigned to take charge of some antisemitic enterprise never let coercive measures prevail against the tions made by the Prosecution were ture. question of whether the defendant Streicher with his speeches, actions, and with his publications, not only strove for, but actually attained the success claimed by the Prosecution. Streicher actually educated the German people for antisemitism to a degree which made it possible for the leadership of the German people to commit such criminal acts as actually occurred. German youth with hatred against the Jews to such an extent as charged by the Prosecution. who prepared spiritually and morally the executive organs of the persecution of the Jews to commit that act. that a great many Stuermer articles from which the Prosecution endeavors to deduce an invitation to exterminate and annihilate the Jews were not written by Streicher himself, but by his collaborators, especially by the deputy Gauleiter Karl Holz, well in an for this extremely radical tendencies. for these articles, which responsibility he expressly assumed before the Tribunal, this point of view still appears very essential for the extent of his criminal responsibility. ted statement of the defendant, the sharpest articles were written in reply to articles and writings in the foreign press, which contained very radical suggestions of destruction against the German nation.
Also, no doubt, it was due to the existing war psychosis. continually wrote articles in the Stuermer and also held public speeches, when were strongly anti-Jewish and which at least aimed at the elimination of Jewish influence in Germany. for his anti-Jewish tendencies. The first world war finished with Germany's defeat but wide circles did not want to admit the fact of a military victory Germany's opponents of that time. They imputed this defeat to a decomposition of the national will of defense and resistance from within, and designated Jewry as being the main culprit for this undermining from within. In doing so one intentionally overliiked the errors which had been committed by the Government of that time before and during the war with respect to domestic and fore policy as well as the errors of strategy. believed to have found it in the Jews. Jealousy, envy and also forgetfulness of one's own insufficiencies accomplished the rest in order to influence unfavourably the feelings towards the Jewish population. In addition to that the inflation occurred and in the following years the economic depression with its steadily increasing misery, which, as experience shows, makes any nation ripe for any form of radicalism.
On this round and from this medium arose the "Stuermer". For these reasons it met with a certain amount of interest and attracted a considerable number of readers, at the beginning. But even during the last years before the accession to power it did not have a great influence. Its distribution did not go beyond Nuernberg and its close vicinity. By means of attacks against personalities locally known in Nuernberg and in the other places, it manages to are se in these localities from time to time a certain amount of interest and to extend thereby its circle of readers. Certain groups of the population were interested in the propagation of such scandal stories and for these reasons subscribed to the "Stuermer".
oratory activity led to criminal results. But was the German nation really filled with the hatred of the Jews in the sense and to the extent asserted be the prosecution through the "Stuermer" and through Streicher's speeches. manner. It draws conclusions but it has not produced actual evidence. It alleges indeed the achievement of a result, but it cannot produce factual evidence for its assumption.
The prosecutor maintained that without Streicher's incitements which lasted for years, the German people would not have approved the persecution of the Jews and that Himmler would have not found among the German people any tool for the execution of the measures taken for the extermination of the Jews. Should however the defendant Streicher be made legally responsible for this, then not only must it be proved that the incitement as such was actually carried through and that a result was achieved in this direction butand this is the decisive point - a conclusive proof must be produced that the facts exposed can be traced back to the incitement. It is not the question of the result obtained which has first to be proved with such accuracy, but the causative connection between incitement and result.
But how is the influence of the "Stuermer" upon the German people to be estimated, and what picture do we get when we look at the Jewish problem during the years between 1920 and 1944 ?
The first period comprises the interval in the defendant's activity between 1922 and 1933; the second that between 1933 and 1 September 1933 or February 1940; the third that between 1940 and the collapse. appreciation of the tendencies which had already existed in Germany for a long time, and thereby a completely groundless exaggeration of Streicher's influence if no mention were made of the fact that long before Streicher there was already a certain anti-semitism in Germany.
For instance a certain Theodor Fritsch touched on the Jewish question in his publication "Der Hammer" long before Stretcher's time and referred especially to the alleged menace offered by the immigration of Jewish elements from the East which might overflow the country and acquire too much control in it.
Immediately after the end of the first world war the so-called "GermanEthnic Protective and Defensive League (Deutsch-Voelkische Schutz und Trutzbund)" appeared which, in contrast to the "Stuermer" and the movement brought into existence by Streicher, was spread over the whole of Germany and had set up as its aim the repression of the Jewish influence. Long before Streicher, antisemitic groups existed in the South as well as in the Forth. In relation to those large-scale efforts, the "Stuermer" could only have a regional importance. For this reason alone, it is easy to explain why its influence was never at any time or in any place of great importance. not be influenced by all these groups either in its business relations or in is attitude to Jewry and that even during the last years before the NSDAP came to power no violent actions against the Jews occured anywhere of the people's own volition. war a considerable gain of the NSDAP became noticeable, it was not due to antisemitic reasons, but to the fact that the prevailing confusion in the various parties had been unable to show a way out of the ever increasing economic misery. The call for a strong man became ever more urgent. The conviction became more and more compelling among the broad masses that only a personality who would not be dependent on the change of majorities would be able to master the situation. and to win over the nation who had sunk in despair by disseminating promises in all directions. But never did the masses think when electing the NSDAP at that time, that their program would develop in such a way as we have witnessed.
introduced. The power of the state was in the hands of the party and nobody could have prevented the use of violence against the Jewish circles of the population. to effect his baiting as the prosecution has maintained. If at that time wide circles of the people, or at least the veteran members of the NSDAP, had been brought up as radical Jew haters, as stated by the prosecution, acts of violence against the Jewish population should necessarily have taken place on a greater scale, due to the accumulation of that mood of hatred. Pogroms of the greatest scope would have been the natural result of a truly anti-semitic attitude of the people. But nothing like that happened. Apart from some mind incidents, evidently caused by local or personal conditions, no attacks again Jews or their property took place anywhere. did not prevail anywhere at least up to 1933, and the charge brought by the prosecution against the defendant that he successfully educated the German people to hate the Jews ever since the very start of his fight, can thus be dropped. The year of the seizure of power by the NSDAP also put the "Stuermer" to a decisive test. Had the "Stuermer" been considered by the broad masses the German nation as the authoritative champion against the Jews and therefore indispecsable to that fight, an extraordinary increase in the demand for the publication would have followed. No such interest was displayed, however, in any way. On the contrary, even in party circles demands were heard to discontinue the "Stuermer" entirely or at least to change its illustrations, st* and tone. It became more and more clear that the interest in Streicher's Jewish policy was steadily declining, an interest which was limited anyway. press apparatus got under the control of the party, which immediately undertook to coordinate the press, i.e. to direct it from a central agency in the spirit of a national-socialist policy and ideology. This was done through the Minister of Propaganda and chief of the Reich Press via the official "National Socialist party correspondence". Particularly Dr. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, designated by different witnesses such as Goering, Schirach, Neurath, and others, as the most inveterate representative of the anti-semitic trend in the government, was credited with giving each week to the entire press several anti-Jewish editorials, which were printed by more than 3000 news papers and magazines.
If we realize that Dr. Goebbels in addition was making broadcasts in an anti-semitic spirit, we don't need any further explanations for the fact that the interest in a onesided antisemitic journal should disappear, and that did in fact happen. suggested to forbid "The Stuermer" altogether. This is brought out clearly in the testimony of Fritsche as a witness on 27 June 1946, who stated in addition that neither Streicher nor the "Stuermer" had any influence in the Ministry of Propaganda and that the paper was considered to a certain extent as nonexistent.
It might have been for the same reason that the "Stuermer" was not even declared as a press organ of the NSDAP, and was not even entitled to bear the party's insignia. It was considered from the viewpoint of party and state administration, contrary to all papers which were held to be of any significance, as a private paper belonging to a mere private writer.
The firm which published the "Stuermer" and which belonged at that time to a certain HAERDEL, was not inclined, however, to accept so simply the shrinking circle of its readers, for it was now aided by the fact that Streicher had become the highest political leader in Franconia, and it knew how to make the most of this circumstance. Already at that time pressure was exerted on many sections of the population to the effect that they should prove their loyal political attitude and trustworthiness by taking out a subscription to the "Stuermer". The witness Fritsche has also pointed out this circumstance and has stated that many Germans only decided to subscribe to the "Stuermer" because they thought it would be a means of paying the way for their intended membership in the party. In order not to give a false impression of the number of editions of the Stuermer during the years 1923 to 1933, the following analysis will show the different stages of its development.
circulation from some 3,000 to some 10,000 copies, and this went up again to some 20,000 shortly before the seizure of power. On the average, however, between 1923 and 1931 the publication could only claim some 6,000 copies. With the transfer of power, by the end of 1934 it had reached an average of some 28,000 copies. It was only in 1935 that the publishing firm of the Stuermer became the property of the defendant Streicher, who, according to his statement, bought it from the widow of the previous owner for 40,000 RM, not a very large sum. From 1935 on the management of the firm was taken over by a professional, who succeeded by clever technical propaganda in increasing the number of copies to well over 200,000 and this figure was later surpassed in ever increasing proportion until it reached more than the double. The relatively low number of copies of the Stuermer upon the beginning of 1935 shows that despite the party's rise to power, popular interest in the Stuermer was present only in a minor degree. The extraordinary increase in the circulation which began in 1935 is to be traced back to the adroit propaganda methods already mentioned, which were employed by the new director Fink. The use of the Labor Front declared in the proclamation of Dr. Ley in No. 36 of the Stuermer of 1935 and which, Mr. President, I have taken the libertyof submitting, and the acquisition thereby of many thousands of forced subscribers must be ascribed to the personal relations of the manager with Dr. Ley. Tageblatt of 29 March 1935 which is printed in the Stuermer copy of May 1935. Here, too, it is stated that the increase of the Stuermer circulation cannot be ascribed to the desire of the German people for such kind of spiritual food. It is neither presumably nor probably in any way, that the subscripting to the Stuermer, forced on the members of the Labor Front in such a manner, could have actually turned the subscribers into readers of the Stuermer and followers of its way of thinking. On the contrary, it is well known that bundles of Stuermer copies in their original wrappings were stored in cellars and attics and that they were brought to light again only when the paper shortage became mare acute.
Document No. GB 169 - that the 15 years work of enlightenment of the Stuermer attracted to National Socialism an army of a million of "enlightened" members, he did claim a success for which there was no foundation whatsoever. The men and women who joined the party after 1933 did not apply for membership as a result of the so-called enlightenment work of the Stuermer, but either because they believed the party's promises, hoping to derive advantages from it, or, as the witness Severing expressed it, because by belonging to the party they wanted to insure themselves against political persecutions. considerably. Also the defendant Streicher, lost authority and influence in an over increasing measure even in his own district of Franconia, at least from 1937 on. The reasons her fore are sufficiently known. political influence even in his own district. The controversy between him a Goering ended, with the victory of the latter. Hitler, upon the urgent request of the defendant Goering, had dropped Streicher completely, asthe Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe at that time was naturally more important and far more influential than Gauleiter Streicher. The defendant even had to tolerate that the aryanisation carried out in the district of Franconia was being reexamined for its correctness by a special commission sent by Goering. In the course of the year 1939 Streicher was completely pushed aside and was even forbidden to talk in public. At the outbreak of the war, in contrast to all other Gauleiters, he was not even appointed to the position of Wehrkreiskommissar of his own district. had no political influence whatsoever. As of February 1940 he was removed from his position as a Gauleiter and lived on his estate in Pleikershof, out off from allconnections. Even party-members were forbidden to visit him the From the end of 1938, he had no connections whatsoever with Hitler, by whom he had been completely abandoned from that time on.
In what way now did the "Stuermer" exert any influence during the war period?
It can be said that during the war the "Stuermer" aroused no considerable attention any more. The grimness of the time, the anxiety for relatives on the front, the battles at the front, and finally the heavy air attacks, completely diverted the German people's interest from questions dealt with in the"Stuermer". The people were fed up with the continuous repetition of the same assertions. The best proof of how little the "Stuermer" was desired, as reading matter is ascertained by the fact that in restaurants and cafes the "Stuermer" was always readily available at the new stands, whereas other papers and magazines were forever taken up.
The circulation total decreased steadily and irresistibly. The influence of the "Stuermer" in the political sphere became nonexistent. During the already mentioned periods the "Stuermer" was being rejected by large circles of the population from the very start. There can be no idea of the exertion of an influence by the "Stuermer" upon the German people or even upon the party. Its crude style, its often pornographic illustrations and its onesidedness aroused manifold displeasure. Nazi propaganda, or rather because of that very fact, a journal such as the "Stuermer" could exert no influence upon its inner attitude. secution - actually been saturated with the spirit of racial hatred, other factors certainly would have been far more responsible for it than the "Stuermer" and would have contributed far more essentially to a hostile attitude towards the Jews.
But nothing of such nature can be established. The general attitude of the German people was not anti-semitic, at any rate not in such a sense or to such a degree that they would have desired or approved of physical annihilation of the Jews. The official Party propaganda in regard to the Jewish problem had exerted no influence upon the bread masses of the German people and it had not educated them in the direction desired by the State leadership.
decree of number of legal regulations in order to segregate the German population from the Jewish. The first example of this is the so-called Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor of September 1935, by the provisions of which any racial intermingling of German people with sectors of the Jewish population was subjected to the death penalty. The passing of such laws would not have been necessary, had the German people been predisposed to an anti-semitic attitude, for they would then of their own accord have insisted upon a segregation from Jews.
promulgated in November 1938, is running a long the same line. In a people hostile towards the Jews, any trade with Jewish circles would have necessarily ceased aid their business would have automatically come to a standstill. eliminate Jewry from the economic life. of the German populace to the demonstrations carried out against the Jews during the night from 9th to 10th November 1938. spontaneously by the German people but that they were organized and executed with the aid of thestate and party apparatus upon instructions of Dr. Goebbels in Berlin. which in a cynical way were portrayed abroad as an expression of indignation of the German people over the assassination of the secretary of the Embassy in Paris, vom Rath, was a totally different one, than had been visualized by the originators of this demonstration. were unanimously rejected in the circles of the party and even of its leadership. reused pity and compassion with their fate. such a way on all hands. The effect upon the public was so incisive that the defendant Rosenberg in his capacity of "Gauleiter" found it necessary to make an address in Nurnberg, warning against an exaggerated sympathy for the Jews. According to his deposition he did not do this because he approved these measures but only in order to strengthen by his infouence the heavily impaired prestige of the party. Herrwerth examined here, he refused to SA-Obergruppenfuehrer v. Obernitz to take part personally in the planned demonstration and designated the latter as being useless and prejudicial.
He publicly expressed this standpoint later also, during a meeting of the League of Jurists at Nurnberg.
In doing so he took the risk of placing himself in an open opposition to the official policy of the State. on by the Government, an actual hostility against the Jewish population did net exist in the people itself. Thus it is proved already that neither Streicher's publications in the "Stuermer" nor his speeches had a provoking effect upon the German people in the sense upheld by the prosecution. carried out and loading to a criminal end, cannot be furnished by pointing to the general attitude of the Germannation. But the prosecution has supported its reproach to that effect by the specific assertion that only a nation educated to the absolute hatred of Jews by men like the defendant could approve of such measures like the mass extermination of Jews. Thereby the repreach is made to the totality of the Germans that they knew about the extermination of the Jews and they approved of it, a reproach, the severity and consequences of which upon the whole future of the German nation cannot be estimated at all.
But did really the German nation approve of these measures?
Only an occurrence which is known can be approved of. Therefore, should this assertion of the prosecution be considered as proved, logically it must also be considered as proved that the German nation actually knew of these occurrences. Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, charged with the mass assassinations by Hitler, and his close collaborators, have surrounded this whole story with the veil of deepest secrecy. By threatening with the most severe punishments any violation of the absolute commandment of silence which was imposed, they managed to lower before the events in the East in the extermination camps, an iron curtain which hermetically shut off these facts from thepublic. and state from gaining any insight and information. Hitler didnot hesitate to supply with false informations even his closest collaborators like Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, who was heard here as a witness, and tomake him believe that the removal of the European Jews to the East meant their settlement in the Eastern territories and by no means their extermination.
Although the statements of the defendants may deviate in many points, yet in this connection they all agree so completely one with the ether and with the statements of other witnesses, that the veracity of their testimonies simply cannot be questioned. If it was not oven possible for the defendant Frank in his capacity as Governor General of Poland to get through to Auschwitz, because without Himmler's special consent he himself was denied entrance, then this fact speaks for itself. exception of a very small circle were not informed and if even they had at best very vague informations, then how could the public at large have known it? Under these circumstances the possibilities for finding out what was going on in the camps were extremely scanty. of information. Listening to foreign radio stations was threatened with the heaviest penalties and therefore did not take place. And when it did, the news broadcast by foreign radio stations concerning events in the East were, however or rather because they corresponded to facts, so coarse, so horrible beyond any human understanding, that they were bound to appear to any normal individual, and in fact did, as intentional propaganda. against Jewry only from people who either were working in the camps themselves or came in contact withthe camp or its inmates, and, lastly, from former concentration camp inmates. silent, not only because they were strictly compelled to do so, but also in their own interest. Furthermore, it is known that Himmler had threatened death penalty for any information about the camps, and that not only the actual culprit, but also his relatives, were threatened with this punishment. Finally, it is knows that the extermination camps proper were so hermetically out off from any contact with the world that nothing concerning the events which took place therein could penetrate to the public.
workers kept silence, because they had to keep silent. People who came to the camps were also under the threat of this punishment, inasmuch as they were at all able to obtain some insight, a thing which was all but impossible in the extermination camps. could not flow. measure, for every concentration camp inmate who had been released. Anyhow, hardly anybody ever came back to life from the actual murder camps. But if, once in a tine, a man or woman were released, the danger of their being sent back into the camp was hovering about than ifthey infringed on the order for silence, and this in addition to the other threatened punishments. And this renewed detention would have been tantamount to gruesome death. camp prisoners positive feats concerning the occurrences in the camps. This being the case with regard to normal concentration camps in Germany, it applied in a still greater measure to the extermination camps. in a concentrationcamp, and who was visited by them again after their release, will be able to confirm that it was net possible, even for a man holding such a position of trust and under the protection of a lawyer's professional secret, to get former concentration camp inmates to talk. standing who was highly trusted by his party comrades and who was, because of this, in touch with many former concentration camp inmates, came to know of the real facts connected with the extermination of the Jews but very late and even then to a very restricted extent, then such considerations ought to apply even more to any normal German.
It can be derived with absolute certainty from these facts that the government, that Hitler and Himmler wanted under all circumstances to keep secret the genocide, extermination, of the Jews, and this forms the base for another argument -- in my opinion, a cogent one - - against the antisemitism of the German people assorted by the prosecution.
Jewry as the prosecution affirms, then such rigorous methods for secrecy would have been superfluous. On the contrary. principal enemy, that it approved of and desired the extermination of Jewry, then he would have been forced, of needs, to publish the plans for and likewise the accomplishment of the extermination of this very enemy. Under the sign of total war as constantly propagandized by Hitler and Goebbels, there would indeed have been no hotter means to strengthen the faith in victory and the will of the people to fight than the information that Germany's principal enemy, this very Jewish people, had already been annihilated. failed to use such a striking argument if he could have taken as a basis the necessary presupposition, that is, the German people's determined will to exterminate the Jews.
However, the "final solution" of the Jewish question had by all means to be kept secret even from the German people who had, for years, stood under the hardest possible pressure by the Gestapo. Even loading persons of state and party were not allowed to learn of it. even in the midst of a total war end after decades of education and gagging by national socialism, the German nation and, above all, its armed forces, would have reacted most violently to the publication of such a policy against the Jews. consideration for enemy nations. In the years 1942 and 1943 the whole world was already engaged in a bitter war against national socialist Germany. An aggravation of this struggle hardly seemed possible, certainly not by publishing facts which had long since become known abroad.
Aside from this, the consideration of making a still worse impression on the enemy countries could hardly influence men as Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler.
If they would have counted even upon the smallest possible positive result of a publication of the genecide of the Jews, then they certainly would not have omitted such publications. On the contrary, they would have tried by all means to strengthen the faith in victory of the German people therewith. The fact that they have not done this is the best proof that even they did not consider the German people as radically anti-semitic, and it is the best proof too, that one cannot speak of such anti-semitism on the part of the German people. such an end he did not reach such a goal. the Prosecution to the defendant Streicher, that he had educated the German youth in an anti-semitic spirit and that he had sunk the poison of anti-semitism so deeply into the hearts of the youth that this pernicious result would make itself felt a long time after actual life yet. is to be seen in the fact that young people, due to the Streicher education in hatred toward Jews were supposed to have been ready to commit crimes again Jews, which otherwise they would not have committed and that youth thus educated might be expected to perpetrate such crimes in the future too, put out by the publishing house of the "Stuermer" and some announcements addressed to Youth which appeared in this paper.
Far be it from me to extenuate or defend these products. Evaluation of them can and must be left to the Tribunal. In accordance with the basic principle of the defense, the only question to be taken up here will be whether or not the defendant, in one way or another, influenced the education of Youth towards criminal hatred of Jews. be said that for the greater part German Youth did not knew them at all, much less read them. No evidence has been produced to substantiate the contrary which is assumed by the Prosecution.
The healthy common sense of German Youth refused such stuff. German boys and girls preferred other reading material.
It may well be emphasized here, that neither the contents of nor the illustrations in these books could prove in any way attractive to youth. They were, of necessity much more likely to be avoided. Of special importance in regard to this point is the fact that defendant Baldur von Schirach, the man responsible for the education of the whole body of German youth, as a witness declared under oath, that the mentioned juvenile books of the publishing company were neither circulated by the Hitler Youth leaders nor found a circle of readers among the Hitler Youth.
The witnessmade the same assertions for the "Stuermer". One of his closet co-workers, witness Lauterbacher, declared on this subject that the "Stuermer" was actually forbidden for the Hitler Youth by defendant von Schirach. not suited to attract the interest of young person or even to offer them ethical support. The measure taken by the Reich Youth leaders is therefore quite understandable.
If some of the "Stuermer" articles submitted by the Prosecution seem to indicate that the "Stuermer" was read in youth circles and there produced a certain effect, then it should be said on this point that typical works, that is, works ordered for propaganda purposes were concerned. No proof whatsoever has been furnished for the assertion of the Prosecution that Germa youth harbored criminal hate toward Jews.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken).
Accordingly, neither the German antion, nor its youth can be termed criminally from the charge made against the defendant Striecher that he educated the youth and the nation on these lines.
Now, one might be tempted to assume that the "Stuermer" exercised an especially great influence upon the organizations of the party, the SA and SS, but this was not the case either. in the same way as the mass of the people did. Its publications were "The SA-Leader" and "The SA". From these, the mass of the SA drew the foundation of their ideology. These publications do nut contain even one article, written by the pen of the defendant Striecher. If the latter had really been the man the Prosecution thinks him, the authoritative and most influential propaganeist of anti-semitism, he would necessarily have been called in for collaboration in these publications, which were issued to instruct the SA on the Jewish question.
A publication aiming at ideological education would never have been able to dispense with the collaboration of such a man. in these papers, demonstrates again that the picture drawn of him by the prosecution does not correspond in any way with the actual facts. Through his own publication, the defendant Streicher could not gain any influence ever the SA, and the columns of "The SA-Leader" and "The SA" were closed to him. Even the highest SA-Leaders declined to advocate his ideas. With regard to this the SA deputy chief of staff SA-Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, made the following statement when he was heard as witness before the commission on 21 May 1946 :
"At a leader conference, the former SA chief of staff, Lutze, expressed his wish that there should be no propaganda for the "Stuermer" in the SA. In certain groups the "Stuermer" was even prohibited. The contents of the "Stuermer" disgusted and repelled most of the SA men. The policy of the SA with reward to the Jewish question was in no way directed at the extermination of the Jews; the fight aimed only at preventing a large scale immigration of Jews from the East."
Thus the ideology of the "Stuermer" was rejected on principle by the individual SA man as well as by the SA leaders, and it is, therefore, out of the question to speak of any influence of Streicher upon the SA. publications, but his articles did not appear in any other newspapers and publications. Neither in the "Veolkischer Beobachter" nor in other leading organs of the German press, was he allowed to say a word, although accordinq to the will of the Propaganda Ministry, enlightment on the Jewish question was supposed to belong to the noblest tasks of the German press. from the state leadership or the Propaganda Ministry, to impress his ideas upon a wider circle. The defendant Fritzsche, the man who had also the right of decision in the propaganda ministry, declared as a witness that Streicher never exerted any influence upon propaganda and that he was completely disregarded. Thus, in particular, he was not entrusted with broadcasting speeches, although just an address ever the radio would have had an entirely different mass effect then an article in the Stuermer which necessarily affected only a limited circle. The fact that even the official pro paganda of the Third Reich did not utilize the defendant Striecher, makes apparent that his activity would net have premised any effect, that in fact he did not exert any influence at all. The official German state government recognized Streicher as what he actually was, the unimportant publisher of a really unimportant weekly. said with all clarity, was as little radically antisemitic as that of the German Youth and also that of the party organizations. Any success in instigating and inciting to criminal antisemitism is therefore not proven.
I now come to the last and decisive part of the accusation, i.e., to the examination of the question : who were the persons mainly responsible for the orders given for the mass-extermination of Jewsy; how was it possible that men were found who were ready to execut these orders, and whether, without the influence of defendant Streicher, such orders would not have been given or executed.