The army led, but Hitler was in steady and close collaboration with the Supreme chief of the Army and with was Chief of the General Staff, until December 1941 when, after having taken over the supreme command of the Army he also took over the direct leadership.
This personal union of a German High Commander of the Armed Forces and Commander in Chief of the Army evidently led to many mistakes which resulted in the severe charges against the German High Command, as Staff of the General High Command and its Chief of Staff General Keitel.
Keitel himself feels heavily enough the guilt of the whole complex of the war against Russia which he has frakly stated in the witness box. It is therefore not only understandable but also the duty of the defense to clarify Keitel's responsibility for all these facts of the most terrible atrocities and incredible degeneration.
For the purpose of an easier understanding of these matters, which are often most complicated, I handed the affidavit of defendant Keitel to the Tribunal. It is Exhibit No. K 10. I refer to it without reading its contents.
It seems to me of importance to emphasize that from the very beginning the war against the Soviet-Union hasbeen subject to three factors for its execution:
First, military operations and orders: Commander in Chief of the Army, OKH.
Second, economically, the Four Year Plan.
Third, ideologically, the SS organizations.
The German High Command had no competent influence upon these three factors and no authoritative power. Neither can it be contested that in the course of his aforementioned truly anarchistic methods of work, Hitler, when all is said and done, held all the strings in his hands and sometimes used the German High Command for the forwarding of his, Hitler's orders nor it qualified to change the principal responsibility.
Considering the wide extent of the material produced by the Soviet Prosecution, I can refer, within the compass of my statement, only to a comparatively small number of the documents. The documents on pages 126 up to 136, which have been dealt with in detail, will be summarized by me as follows, briefly.
To begin with, I will discuss the documents USSR 90, 386, 364, 366, 106 and 407, and I shall try to prove in detail that the accusations against the OKW and Keitel as the guilty parties have no value as evidence as far as these documents are concerned.
Then, on page 130, I come to a category of documents to which I have referred earlier in Part 2 of my presentation, in which I dealt with official documents. If I refer to official reports of the Investigation Commission in this connection, it is not done because of their actual contents but because they have been produced as support for the indictment of Keitel. They, on the strength of their own statements, furnish the proof that Keitel's indictment and that of the OKW and the State are not based on facts as far as these serious things are concerned.
From the large number of documents in this connection I have dealt with USSR 9, 35 and 38. In these official reports, which implicate the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, any concrete facts are lacking which might refer to the staff of the OKW--that is, Keitel--as the perpetrator or initiator of these atrocities.
As to the actual contents or statements of the documents, I am merely pointing out that Keitel, in his position, had neither the authority nor the possibility to give orders which led to the crimes asserted.
Then, on page 134, paragraph1:
In the documents previously quoted, either Keitel or the OKW are named as the responsibility party. However, there are many such official reports which have been quoted during the presentation of the prosecution as evidence for Keitel's guilt, in which neither the name of the defendant nor the OKW is even mentioned.
In this connection, I draw your attention to documents USSR 39, 8, 29, 45, 46 and 63.
I only ask the Tribunal to examine the remaining documents equally carefully to that effect and to ascertain whether, if they are submitted in connection with Keitel and the OKW, they allow any final conclusion regarding Keitel's guilt or whether that is not the case in the documents which have been presented.
In this connection I should like to add that the remarks at the bottom of page 134 will not be read by me, and that I am not referring to them either.
I should now like to come to the statements regarding the economic exploitation of the occupied territories, and I should like to submit them--they begin at page 137--without reading them. Since the defense counsel of Reichsmarshal Goering has already dealt with this problem and has made clear the authority and responsibility, it would merely be repetition, which I shall certainly avoid. However, I shall refer to the contents of this part of my presentation and beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
I now come to pages 143 and following, where I refer to the assertion made by the French prosecution regarding the participation of the OKW and Keitel in the cases of Oradour and Tulle.
The French prosecution have charged the defendant Keitel personally with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The accusation concerns putting to death French civilians without judicial decision.
In this connection the cases of Oradour and Tulle were particularly emphasized.
They are recorded in a report by the French Governmentdocument F-236. The French prosecution declared--and I quote: "Keitel's guilt in all these things is undoubted."
In this connection, it is not my task to discuss the frightful happenings of Oradour and Tulle. As defense counsel for defendant Keitel, I have to examine whether the assertion of the prosecution that defendant Keitel bears any guilt or responsibility in these atrocious occurrences is founded.
You will understand that the defendant Keitel is particularly intent on producing evidence to the effect that he is not responsible for these terrible occurences, and furthermore, that when such things came to his knowledge he was anxious to have them cleared up in order that the actual offenders might be brought to account.
It is incontestable that Keitel had no direct participation in these crimes. Any responsibility and guilt of the defendant can therefore be derived only from his official position. No orders of any kind bearing Keitel's signature have been submitted by the prosecution, so that whoever is guilty, Keitel does not, at any rate, belong to the circle of those directly responsible.
The horrible wrongs suffered by a large number of French villages are recorded in the notes of General Berard dated 6 July and 3 August, 1944. I have already pointed out, when this document was submitted, that by the submission of those notes of complaint alone--that is, without simultaneous production of the replies, which are also in the possession of the prosecution--no objective picture can be presented of the facts as they are for a pronouncement on the guilt of the defendant Keitel. As the defendant Keitel, owing to his lack of authority to issue orders in the matter, cannot possibly be taken into consideration as the author of the orders which led to the complaint, any responsibility and guilt of Keitel's can therefore be proved only by the fact that he did not cause the necessary stops to be taken after being informed by the German Armistice Commission. Whatever Keitel did or failed to do can be gathered only from the reply notes and from the stipulations of the OKW to the German Armistice Commission.
I shall skip the following sentence.
Counter-evidence would indeed be impossible for the defendant Keitel even in this case, had not the French prosecution themselves submitted a document which was to serve as proof of Keitel's individual guilt. This document is worded as follows, and was read by the French prosecution at the session of 31 January 1946.
I pass on to page 147, and there I say:
This document signed by Keitel, shows:
1. Upon receipt of the French memorandum of complaint of 26 September, 1944, the OKW issued orders to the German Armistice Commission to investigate and handle this matter.
2. Thereupon the German Armistice Commission instructed Commander-in-Chief West to investigate the incidents.
3. Upon receipt of a letter from Army Group B, the OKW expressed itself as follows:
"It was in the German interest to answer these charges at the earliest possible moment.
"The manner in which this case was handled indicates that perhaps there still exists a great deal of ignorance as to the importance to be attached to all reproaches against the German Wehrmacht, to counteract any enemy propaganda, and to refute immediately any purported German acts of atrocity. The German Armistice Commission is hereby instructed to continue giving this matter attention with all possible emphasis. It is requested to render any assistance possible and especially to take all steps for expeditious handling of the matter as far as it regards your own sphere of action. The fact that PZ, AOK 6 no longer forms part of the forces of Colonel West is no reason to prevent continuation of the needed investigation so as to bring light into and refute the French charges."
It may therefore be safe to say that it has been proved that the defendant Keitel, upon receipt of information, undertook with due energy such steps as were within the scope of his authority and ability as the chief of the OKW.
This eliminates the prosecution's contention in so far as it has assumed the guilt of the defendant Keitel. At the sane time, however, the handling of this case by the defendant Keitel points to the conclusion that he acted in a similar manner in other cases.
Mr. President, before coming to the problem of hostages, which I thought I would leave for a later time, possibly, I was going to come to the serious evidence concerning Nacht und Nebel, which is at page 154.
It may be said that there is hardly any order in which, during the proceedings of this Tribunal made a deeper impression on people's minds than the order "Nacht und Nobel". By this is meant an order which originated during the fight waged against acts of sabotage and the Resistance Movement in France.
Asaa result of the departure of the troops in connection with the march against the Soviet Union, plots against the security of the German troops remaining in France, especially acts of sabotage against all means of communication increased from day to day. From this resulted the need for increased activity of couter-espionage offices, which led to proceedings and verdicts of military courts against members of the Resistance Movement and its accomplices. Those sentences were very severe. In addition to capital punishment, imprisonment also. During meetings for discussion of the situation, reports which arrived daily caused violent disputes with Hitler, who, as always, was trying to find someone on whom to fix the blame, and who, according to Hitler was in this instance to be found in the far too cumbersome handling of military justice. True to his spontaneously explosive temperament, he ordered, the working out of directives to create a quick effective and lasting spirit of intimidation. He declared that confinment could, not be considered an effective means of intimidation. When Keitel objected that not everyone could possibly be sentenced to death, and that Military Courts would, furthermore, refuse to comply, he replied that he didn't mind about that. Cases where the offense has been established to be so serious as to impose capital punishment without lengthy Court proceedings, should continue to be dealt with as heretofore; that in other cases, however, where this was not the case, he ordered the suspected persons to be brought secretly to Germany while withholding all news as to what had happened to them, it being a fact that promulgation of sentences for penal servitude in occupied territory failed to have an intimidating effect in view of the amnesty at the end of the war.
Thereupon the defendant Keitel proceeded to consult with the chief of the Judge advocate's Office of the Wehrmacht and with the chief of the foreign Counter-Intelligence Office (Canaris), from when also came the letter of 2 February 1942 (document UK 35), deliberations as to what should be done. When repeated remonstrances with Hitler to refrain from this system, or at least to relax the demand for complete secrecy failed to have any effect, a draft was finally submitted which became the Decree of 7 December 1941 (UK 35), which we have before us here.
The staff of experts and the defendant Keitel had succeeded in establishing the competency of the Reich Administration of Justice for the persons removed to Germany (see last paragraph of directives of 7 December 1941). Keitel had guaranteed this stipulation by means of the first Enactment-Decree governing the directives, in that he made the clarifying statement (last sentence in paragraph 1, of IV) that unless otherwise oredered by OKW, the case would be referred to civilian judicial authorities according to section 3, paragraph 2, second sentence. The defendant believed that in such manner he had at least ensured that the person involved would have the benefit of regular court proceedings and that according to German provisions for accomodating and treating prisoners upon trial and prisoners serving a sentence, there could be no danger to life and limb. Keitel and his staff of exports believed that they could find comfort in the fact that however cruel the suffering, and the uncertainty endured, by those concerned might be, neverthelss, the life of the deported persons had at least been saved.
In this connection, allusion is also made to the version of the cover letter of 12 December 1941. As already stated by the co-defendant General Jodl during his examination, there had been adopted a certain wordking when the signatory wished to express his dissent with the order submitted. The cover letter begins with the words:
"It is the well considered desire of the Fuehrer...."
The closing sentence runs:
"The attached directives....comply with the Fuehrer's interpretation".Persons who received such letters knew from that wording that once again this was an order of the Fuehrer which could not be evaded, and they concluded the refrom that this order should he applied as mildly as possible.
The letter of 2 February 1942, comes from foreign CounterEspionage Office III (Amt Ausland/Abwehr), the original of which must have been signed by Canris. At that time the defendant was not in Berlin where, after promulgation of the decree of 7 December 1941, the matter was dealt with further. Keitel, at the Fuehrer Headquarters, was not informed of the contents of the letter. In the light of the above remarks, the wording of the letter justified the assumption that a milder carrying out would be made possible through the provision that Counter-Espionage Offices were directed "to see to it that before an arrest is made, evidence will be at hand fully sufficient to warrant the transfer of the perpetrator". It was also provided that before the arrest took place the competent military court must be approached in order to establish whether the evidence were adequate.
In Germany the transfer was to be made to the Reich Administration of Justice. Sufficient prrof for the correctness of the assumption of the defendant Keitel is found in the fact that in view of the attitude of this Admiral which is sufficiently known to the Tribunal, Canaris would never have ordered the transfer to the Gestapo.
As already stated, the defendant Keitel did not know of the letter of 2 February 1942.
Although the defendant Keitel believed that he had achieved everything possible to safeguard those involved, the "Nacht und Nobel" decree - as it came to be termed later - caused him great mental anguish.
Keitel does not deny that this decree is not compatible with International Law, and this was known to him.
That Keitel denies, however, is that he know, or that prior to the Nunrberg trial he know, that after arrival in the Reich the persons involved were imprisoned by the police and then transferred to concentration camps. This was contrary to the meaning and purpose of that decree. The defendant Keitel could not learn anything about it because after the persons involved were turned over by the competent Law,Lords of the Military Courts to the competent judicial authority for transfer to Germany - to be turned over to the Administration of Justice - the competency of the Wehrmacht ceased, unless the case involved proceedings by a Military Court. The defendant Keitel is unable to explain from personal information how it happened that such a great number of persons were brought into concentration carps to experience a treatment described as "NN' such as was described by witnesses who appeared here. Results obtained through evidence presented to this Tribunal load to the assumption that without so informing military authorities, police authorities indicated as "NN" prisoners all politically suspicious persons who on the basis of political measures were removed from occupied territories to Germany, to be placed in concentration camps. According to evidence, persons held in "NN" camps were primarily people who had not been sentenced, after formal proceedings by Military Courts in occupied territories, to be brought to Germany.
It therefore becomes evident that the police authorities in occupied territories made use of this decree as a general and unrestricted charter for deportation, exceeding every imaginable measure and regardless of the preorgatives of the Military Authorities alone, and the rules of procedure imposed upon them.
The fact that such a situation was at all possible in occupied territories without the knowledge of the Wehrmacht authorities can only be explained by the fact that as a result of the appointment of Senior SS and police chiefs, the carrying out of police duties was withdrawn from the military authorities, and that these higher SS and police chiefs received their orders from the Reich leader SS.
At no time were the Reich leader SS and Senior SS and police chiefs given the right by OKW to make use of the decree, inteded to be used as a police executive measure by the Wehrmacht alone. The decree was valid only for the offices of the Wehrmacht in whom judicial authority had been vested, and its wording was explicit and restricted along that line.
The letter of the German Armistice Commission of 10 August 1944 (document 843 PS) proves that OKW had indeed no knowledge of this improper application of the decree of 7 December 1941. It says therein:
"...that the basis for arrests seems to have undergone a chance in that, in the beginning, individual incidents and violations of law or attacks on the Occupation Power were involved; in other words it meant the apprehension of elements who had been definitely active in certain cases (and who were liable to punishment according to the Hague Convention (Hague LKO) while, at present, there are also numerous persons being deported to Germany who, because of their anti-German sentiments, are being removed from France as a precautionary measure".
Under Figure 4, that letter reads as follows:
"A prerequisite for application of the above-mentioned decree is that the persons arrested will be made the subject of judicial proceedings. There seems to be reason for assuming that because of the number of cases, especially within the compass of precautionary measures - such proceedings are now frequently being dispensed with, and the prisoners are no longer held confined in investigation or penal institutions of the German legal authorities, but in concentration camps. Also in that respect, an essential change has taken place as compared with the original provisions of the decree".
In the reply of OKW dated 2 September 1944 - signed by Dr. Lehmann, (chief of the OKW Judicial Department), explicit ref erence is made to the directives for the Fuehrer decree of 7 December 1941, the so-called BE decree.
In it nothing is said that the original presuppositions for deportation to Germany were changed.
This reply, however, was sent from Berlin, without the knowledge of the defendant Keitel; the letter also of the Armistice Commission was evidently sent to Berlin. The legal department of the armed forces was in Berlin. Keitel himself was at the Fuehrer Headquarters, and learnt nothing of the exchange of correspondence.
It should be pointed out that it was a grave sin of ommission not to have immediately replied to the letter of the German Armistice Commission of 10 August 1944, and to explain that this was a case of improper application of the decree of 7 December 1941, and the directives issued relative thereto. An investigation should have been initiated at once, so as to take to task those reponsible for this abuse.
In so far as the Tribunal regards Hitler's military staff as guilty, the defendant Keitel takes the responsibility withing the extent of his responsibility as chief of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT:Perhaps this will be a convenient time to take a recess.
(A recess was taken).
Mr. President, The defendant KEITEL is accused by the prosecut-
ion of having participated in the deportations for the purpose of labor commitment. In this connection, KEITEL declares, that in conformity with his jurisdiction he did not have anything to do with the procurement, recruitin and conscription of people in the occupied territories, nor with the assignment of the labor forces thus procured, for the armament industry. Co-defendant SAUCKEL gave the following testimony as a witness on 29 May 1946 (Page 10484 of Ger man Transcript):
Mr. President, thefollowing statements I should like to have official notice taken of without reading them. My colleague, Dr. Servatius, according to our agreement, will explain the connection between the Wehrmacht replacement and economy of manpower. However, I have to refer to some documents which the French Prosecution has submitted against the OKW and Keitel concerning active participation in deportation.
Page 166.
Now the French prosecution during the cross-examination of SAUCKEL, has submitted four documents tending to prove the active participation of the OKW and of the defendant KEITEL in the deportations. These are documents 1292 PS, 3819 PS, 814 PS and 821 PS.
The first document is a report of the chief of the Reich Chancellery Dr. LAMMERS regarding a conference with HITLER, during which the question of procurement of labor for 1944 was discussed. The defendant KEITEL took part in this discussion. Annexed to this report a letter from the defendant SAUCKEL of 5 January 1944.is reproduced in which the latter summed up the results of the conference of January 4th and proposed a decree of the Fuehrer. I quote the following parts therefrom. ........................ 5. The Fuehrer pointed out that it was necessary to persuade all the German offices in the occupied territories and in the allied countries of the necessity of taking in foreign labor, in order to be able to support unanimously the General Plenipotentiary for labor commitment in carrying out the required organization, propaganda and police measures.
................ 2. The penaltimate paragraph:
The following offices should in my opinion receive the decree in the first place.
................. 3. The Chief of the OKW, General Field Marshal KEITEL for instructions to the military commanders in France and Belgium, to the military commander South-East, the plenipotentiary General accredited to the Fascist Re publican Government of Italy, the chiefs of the Army Groups East.
........ .......... The document therefore proves: a) that Field Marshal KEITEL took part in a conference, without however stating his point of view on the problem of labor procurement, b) that the Fuehrer decree was to be brought to the knowledge of Field Marshal KEITEL for the purpose of instructing the military commanders. And that part confirms what is concerned in that part I have not read. What defendant KEITEL admitted as to his points of contact with this question is thereby confirmed. The 2nd and 3rd documents refer to a conference in the Reich Chancellery on July 11th, 1944, in which Field Marshal KEITEL took no part. Now the French Prosecutor has made the statement that the teletype is an order of Field Marshal KEITEL to the military commanders to carry out the decisions of the conference of July 11th. Mr. HERZOG has said in this connection that KEITEL's order was dated July 15th, 1944. A brief examination of the document - a photostat - shows that the document concerned is a teletype of July 9th containing an invitation from the chief of the Reich C hancellery Dr. LAMMERS to a conference on July 11th, which KEITEL transmits to the military commanders. Therefore that is an error. The conclusions of the Prosecution, based on this document, are therefore also invalid, but the document is also interesting from another point of view. It states therein verbatim: "The following directives are for the instruction of the military commanders or their representatives:
I refer to my directives for the collaboration of the Wehrmacht in the procurement of labor from France- signed teletype "Keitel" The defendant KEITEL requested me to call the attention of the Court to this method of expression for the following reasons. Numerous documents bearing the signature "Keitel" have been submitted here. According to KEITEL's attitude, already explained, which excluded any show of authority, he never used the "I" form in his communications or transmission of orders. The Prosecution only submitted one other teletype of the defendant, apart from this document, in which the "I" form occurs. Considering the many documents which confirm this admission of KEITEL, this statement that here the trans-mission of an order of the Fuehrer was in question must be believed, also that the style of wording which I quoted corresponds to on order from the Fuehrer.
General WARLIMONT (Doc.3819 PS) refers, during the conference of 11 July, expressly to a "recently issued Fuehrer order", the contents of which he reproduces exactly as contained in the teleype directive with the signature "KEITEL".
Important as confirming this evidence of the defendant KEITEL is likewise the newly submitted document 824-PS - RF 1515.
This is a letter of the menatime had become the Chief of the military commanders in France and Belgium. It is said therein that:
"by order of the Fuehrer the demands of the G.B.A. and of SPEER are to be fulfilled". further that in theevent of evacuation of the battle area, measures must be taken toward securing fugitives, etc. for labor; finally that reports must be sent to the OKW regarding themeasures taken. The reference to the Fuehrer's order shortly after July 11, 1911, shows as well as WARLIMONT's statement, that there existed no directives from Keitel or the OKW.
It can be therefore considered as proved that neither KEITEL himself nor the OKW had any part in measures to levy or recruit labor. The OKW was the office in charge of transmitting the orders which HITLER, as the superior of SAUCKEL wished to forward to the military commanders; it had no competence and no legal responsibility.
It is not the same in this complex as in the spheres that are within the administrative competence of the OKW, as there existed in this sphere at least a specialized function which included the possibility of voicing doubts.
In the sphere of labor procurement and labor commitment, the points of contact with SAUCKEL's activities are the following:
a KEITEL was co-signatory of the Fuehrer's decree of March 21, 1912, concerning the appointment of the G.B.A.
b. He transmitted HITLER's orders to support theactivities of the G.B.A. on the basisof special instructions to the local military authorities of the occupied territories. Now, at the session of 2 February 1916 the French Prosecution has, in the matter of the deportation of the Jews within the scope of defendant KEITEL's responsibility, stated the following;
"I shall subsequently speak about the order for the deportation of the Jews and I shall prove that this order came from a joint action of the military government, the diplomatic authorities, and the security police in the case of France.
It results from this that
1) The Commander-in-Chief and
2) the Reich Foreign Minister and
3) the Chief of the Security Police and Reich Security Head Office (RSHA).these three persons , were bound to be informed of and bound to have agreed to this action, for it is clear that by their function they must have known that similar measures, which concerned important affairs were taken and also that the decisions were taken jointly every time by the staffs of three different administrations.
These three persons are therefore responsibile and guilty ...." If you examine the very thorough individual handling of this item indictment you will establish that the OKW is not mentioned and that no document is produced which originates either from the OKW or from the defendant KEITEL. It fell as from the KEITEL affidavit, Document Book 2, that the military commander for France, who is mentioned several times, was not placed under theOKW.
Now, the prosecution has, in the handling of this question, attempt ed to prove the cooperation of the "Army", as Mr. JAURE says, with the Foreign Office and the Police.
They believe they can put this cooperation to the account of the highest authorities, that is, the OKW, in the case of the Amy, and therefore KEITEL. This production of evidence is erroneous. In order to make that clear, I must point out that there was a military commander in France. This military commander was invested with civil and military power; he represented a non-existant state power and therefore had police and political functions besides military tasks. The military commanders were appointed by the OKW and received their orders from the latter. As it follows from this, there existed no direct relations with the OKW on this question. Since defendant KEITEL, as chief of the OKW was not placed above the OKW, there exist likewise no indirect relations of either subordination or authority. What Mr. FAURE has said at this point is unfortunately true:
"In France, a plurality of jurisdictions manifested themselves with mutually divergent and even contradictory tendencies which overlapped each other or went counter to their own authority."
Actually, the OKW and defendant KEITEL had nothing to do with the Jewish question in France, with the deportation to Auschwitz and other camps; they had neither commanding nor controlling authority and therefore no responsibility. The fact that the letter K in the telegram, dated 13 May 1942 was completed to mean KEITEL is indicative of the contention adopted by all prosecuting parties, concerning the presumptive implication of the defendant KEITEL. That was Document 1215 F. Fortunately, the French prosecutor has corrected this and cleared up the error.
The prisoner of War Question.
The fate of prisoners of war has always stirred the feelings of men.
It has been the endeavour of all civilized nations to give the soldiers who fell in the hands of the enemy those reliefs which could be made compatible with the interests of warfare.
It has been considered as one of the most important advances of civilization to have achieved an agreement in that case in which the nations were opposed in a mortal clash. The distressing incertitude over the fate of these soldiers seemed to be bridged over, their humane treatment guaranteed, the dignity of the disarmed opponent assured.
Like so many things, our belief in this advance of human society has begun to waver. although this belief is still formally upheld - as it has been once and for all by the solid resistance of the general officers - , we must nevertheless admit that a brutal policy, oblivious to the Nation's own sons and of anything but its own striving for power has in many cases disregarded the sanctity of the Red Cross and the unwritten laws of humanity. The treatment of the responsibility of the defendant Keitel in the general complex of the prisoners of war system comprises the following individual problems:
1) The general adjustment of the treatment of prisoners of war, the German legislation on the prisoners of war system;
2) The authority over the prisoner of war camps, divided into Oflag, Stalag and Dulag;
3) The supervision and control of the legislation and its administration.
4) The individual cases which have been brought before the court in the course of the indictment.
As the organization of the prisoner of war system has been set forth in the course of presentation of argument, I can restrict myself to setting forth that the OKW (Keitel), within the scope of his tasks as War Minister, in accordance with the decree of 4 February 1938 by order of Hitler, was competent and to that extent responsible:
a) for the ministerial right to issue ordinances within the entire local and professional range, partially restricted by cowork and co-responsibility in the matter of using the prisoners of war as laborers;
b) not authorized to have command over prisoner of war camps and the prisoners of war themselves, competent to allocate on a large scale to the Corps Area Commanders the prisoners of war arriving within Germany proper;
c) for the general supervision of the camps within the range of the OKW (except for those within the range of the zone of operations the rear-army area, the area of the military commanders, the Navy and Luftwaffe prisoner of war camps).
The competent office for this in the Army High Command was the "Chief of the prisoner of war system", who was several times made personally responsible by the prosecution. The defendant Keitel attaches importance to the fact that the Chief of the prisoner of war system was his subordinate over the general Wehrmacht office. This proves the self-evident responsibility of the defendant Keitel in this domain oven in those cases in which he supposedly did not sign orders and decrees personally.
The basic provisions for the treatment of prisoners of war were
1) The service regulations issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command within the scope of the normal mobilization preparation and set down in a number of Army, Navy and Luftwaffe publications.
2) The stipulations of the Geneva Convention special mention of which was made in the service regulations.
3) The general decrees and orders which became currently necessary.
Regardless of the treatment of Soviet-Russian prisoners of war, who were subject to regulations which were different on principle and to which I shall return in particular, the provisions of the service regulations which corresponded to international law, that is the Geneva Convention, were authoritative. The OKW exercised supervision over the strict observance of those Army service regulations through an inspector for the prisoner of war system and after 1943 through a further inspectory board, the inspector-general for the prisoner of war system."