I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation:
"Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts except those in China there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore, the attack on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if the necessary forces would not be ready for that."
Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about three weeks later on 13 April 1943. The top secret notes of this conference are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 159.
I shall quote only one sentence:
"The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment."
I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in uniform all over the world.
The Nazi preparations and collaborations with the Japanese against the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic, and the other of fomenting of war in the Pacific.
In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortation to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States.
These documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their overall plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their overall plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by the Defendant Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were carrying their plan against Czechoslovakia.
This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the inclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering's adjutant to General Udet who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document Number R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 160.
I invite the Tribunal's attention to the statement in the covering memorandum that the inclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech, in which Goering called for increased aircraft production and pleaded the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote just two sentences, which appear on page 33 of the German text and page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence from the end of the paragraph:
"I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there."
THE PRESIDENT:Which page is this on?
MR. ALDERMAN:Page all of the English translation. Goering's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators' schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several days.
During the period of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States at war at that time in war. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force files.
It is document 376-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit Number USA 161.
This document is a memorandum marked "Chefsache", the German designation for top secret, from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe General.
Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a "brief resume on the military questions current here", is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I shall quote to you Numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of the first page of the English translation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet document.
"The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date.
Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:
"(a) No other operational commitment "(b) Portuguese neutrality "(c) Support of France and Spain.
"a brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF." -- or the German Air Force.
The Nazi's military interest in the United States is further indicated by Paragraph 7, which I read:
"General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10 to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits."
Again in July 1941 in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the USSR, the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This Top Secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is our Document No. c-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 162. I read from the first paragraph of that text, just preceding the paragraph numbered (1):
"By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies "(1) In General:
"The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.
"Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America.
"The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force, which must be greatly increased in strength."
From these documents, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The Nazis plan with regard to the United States was, however, a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far East, they again considered war against the United States.
I now refer again to basic order number 24, regarding collaboration with Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was state in subparagraph (3)(a) as "forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war."
Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States' entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on possessions of the United States practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities of the involvement of the United States were also discussed. This, basic order number 24 stated -- and I am referring to subparagraph (3)(c), on the top of page two of the document, C-75:
"The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany."
The order continues in an unnumbered paragraph immediately below subparagraph (3)(d):
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power --
extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia)."
In those passages, there is a clear envisagement of United States involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also envisioned by the defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler and the defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes are contained in our Document C-152, which has already been put in as Exhibit No. GB 122. I wish now to repeat the four sentences of Item 11 of the minutes of that conference, contained on page 1 of the English translation. I am quoting the defendant Raeder:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (the whole English fleet contained, unpreparedness of the United States of America for war against Japan, inferiority, of the United States vis-a-vis the Japanese.) Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, the Phillipines, Borneo, and Dutch East Indies). Japan, wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the USA. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible."
The defendant Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of United States involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of 23 February, 1941 with the Japanese ambassador, Oshima, the notes of which are contained in our 1834 PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit No. USA 129.
The Tribunal will recall that in a passage I have already read, subparagraph (2), near the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation, Ribbentrop assured Matsuoko that a surprise by Japan was bound to keep the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Phillipines as the result of a declaration of war.
Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be involved.
I quote here from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation:
"The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway.
Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Throe Power Pact.
The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's en try into the war.
If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance fot the countries of the Three Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end.
He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job.
Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that unfortunate ly he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of this fleet in Japanese waters."
In the paragraphs that follow, some of which have already been read into the record, Ribbentrop again stresses the mutual inter-dependence of the Tripartite Pact Powers and suggested coordinated action.
I want to quote now only the last paragraph on Page 5, a difficult bit of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar.
"The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A. to break off diplomatic relations.
Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this;
after signing of the Three-Power Pact, we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter.
Such a lessen should open the eyes of the people in the United States to the situation, and under certain conditions bring about a swing towards isolation in public opinion.
Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong.
The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda.
The question, however, was in no way acute at the time."
Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoko, discussed the possible involve ment of the United States.
Notes of this conference are contained in our document 1877-PS, which I have already intorduced as Exhibit "USA-152", an I have read it into the record.
The relevant statements appear in the bottom two paragraphs of page 1, and the first full paragraph on page 2 of the English translation.
I shall not take the Tribunal's time to read them again.
I should like to refer to one more document, to show that the Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese to undertake, both threatened the vital interests of the United States, and could lead to United States' involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict.
This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in Berlin on 4 April 1941.
I've already offered, in my opening statement to the Tribunal two weeks ago, document 1881-PS as Exhibit Number "USA-33", and I read at that time a considerable portion of it into the record.
Unless the Court prefers that I not do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to re-read a few brief passages.
THE PRESIDENT:I think we might treat it as being in evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN:I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages which I read two weeks ago, and which I had expected to re-read at this point, show not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United States.
Furthermore, we have a document that shows the Nazis know at least a part of what those war plans were.
I now refer again to document number 1538-PS, which has been offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-154, the secret telegram from the German Military Attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May, 1941. He talks about the conferences he has had regarding Japan's entry in the war, in the event Germany should become invoked in war with the United States.
In the paragraph numbered "1", this sentence also appears - I quote the last sentence in the paragraph number "1":
"Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand."
May I at this point review the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this time, the Spring of 1941. In view of their press of committments elsewhere, and their aggressive plans against the USSR set for discussion in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in the war at that time. Nevertheless, they had been considering their one preliminary plan against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic Island document which I offered.
They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth, just as they would urge them to attack the USSR soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the implication of the move against Singapore. They also knew that the Japanese Army and Navy were preparting operation plans against the United States. They knew at least part of those plans.
The Nazi conspirators not only knew all those things; they accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese, and pushed their Eastern allies still further along that course.
In April, 1941, Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan would have become involved in the war with the United States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike without delay.
I refer to our document 1881-PS, the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April, 1941, which has already been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-33, I refer particularly to the first four paragraphs on page 2 of the English translation. I think that has been read to you at least twice, and I perhaps need not repeat it.
Then, skipping two paragraphs, we see Hitler then encouraging Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the United States, and I invite your attention to the fourth paragraph on page 2, which you have heard several times and which I shall not re-read.
Here in those passages were assurances, encouragement, abetment by the head of the German state, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April, 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end there.
I now offer our document 2898-PS as Exhibit Number USA-163. This is another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, regarding his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister. It is dated the 30th of November, 1941, exactly one week before Pearl Harbor. I will read from the first four paragraphs on page 2 of the German text, which is the first paragraph of the English translation, and this passage, I am sure, has not been read to the Tribunal. No part of this document has been read.
"The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is very great. The Japanese government, since it sent Ambassador Kurusu, has taken a firm stand as he told me.
He is convinced that this position is in our favor, and makes the United States think that her entry into the European war would be risky business.
The new American proposal of 25 November showed great divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These differences of opinion concern, for example, the further treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest" -- and then the German text has the legend '1 group missing', indicating that one group of the secret code was garbled on transmission. It would appear from the text that the missing words are 'difference of opinion'. "The biggest (1 group missing) however resulted from the U.S. attempt to make the Three-Power agreement ineffective. U.S. suggested to Japan to conclude treaties of non-aggression with the U.S., the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other countries in order to prevent Japan's entry into the war on the side of the Axis powers. Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty obligations, and for this reason American demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions promised by the U.S. and merely mentioned that grave decision were at stake.
"The U.S. is seriously preparing for war and is about to operate a considerable part of its fleet from Southern Pacific bases. The Japanese Government is busy working out an answer in order to clarify its viewpoint. But he has no particulars at that moment. He thinks the American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable.
"Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations, and she hopes that in that case Germany and Italy, according to the ThreePower agreement, would stand at her side. I answered that there could be no doubt about Germany's future position. Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood from my words that Germany in such a case would consider her relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I answered, according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation.
"Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible that be would come back to this point soon.
The conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression that the U.S. Note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory even for the compromise-seeking politicians here. For these circles America's position, especially in the China question, is very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three-Power Pact as being the main obstacle between successful JapaneseU.S. negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese Government is becoming aware of the necessity of close cooperation with the axis powers."
The time is now fast approaching for that day of infamy. I offer our document 2987-PS as Exhibit USA-166.
This document consists of extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano during the period 3rd December to 8th December, 1941.
It consists of notes he jotted down in the course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy.
The Italian has been translated into both English and German, and copies of both the English and the German are in the document books.
I now quote from the beginning of the entry of 3rd December, Wednesday.
"Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end.
Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace.
The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf.
The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply.
The Duce was pleased with the communication and said:
We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September, 1939.
' What does this new event mean? In any case it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his manoeuvre.
Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan.
Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy--much too easy--to predict a long war.
Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered.
Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive."
And then, December 4th, Thursday - that is three days before Pearl Harbor.
"Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious.
Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less.
Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it."
And December 5th, Friday.
"A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness.
After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese, and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace.
He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't."It appears from the last entry I have read, that of 5th December, that some sort of an agreement was reached.
On Sunday, 7th December, 1941, Japan, without previous warning or declaration of war, commenced an attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the South West Pacific.
On the morning of 11th December, four days after the Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on the United States, committing the last act of aggression which was to seal its doom.
This declaration of war is contained in Volume IX of the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which I now ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice as Exhibit USA-164.
An English translation is contained in our document book, and for the convenience of the Tribunal is No. 2507-PS.
The same day, December 11, the fourth anniversary of which is tomorrow the Congress of the United States resolved that a state of war between the United States and Government of Germany, which has thus been thrust upon the United States, is her by formally declared.
This declaration is contained as Document 272 in the official publications "Peace and War", of which the Tribunal has already taken judicial notice, as Exhibit USA 122 The declaration itself has been reproduced for the document books as our Document 2945-PS.
It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators, in thei collaboration with Japan, incited and kept in motion a force reason ably calculated to result in an attack on the United States.
While main taining thei preference that the United States not be involved in war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw a distinct possibility, even proba bility, of such involvement as a result of the action they were encouraging They were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the United States, and they accepted the consequences by insuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict result.
In dealing with captured documents of the enemy, the completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured, but those documents which have been dis covered and offered in evidence before this Tribunal show that the Japanese attack was the "proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy, and that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely let to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned I should like to rend the Ciano diary entry for 8 December, the day after Pearl Harbor:
"A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America.
He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened.
One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her potential force.
This morning I told this to the King, who had been pleased about the event.
He ended by admitting that in the long run I may be right.
Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of relations between America and the Axis."
The final document consists of the Top Secret notes of a conference between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop It is our Document 2932-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit No. USA 165.
The immediate subject matter is the Pearl Harbor attack, but the expressions therein typify Nazi technique.
I quote from the second paragraph of the English translation, which has not been previously read:
"First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold.
With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.
"General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and em phasizes how glad he is that htis brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan.
"The Fuehrer continues: 'You gave the right declaration of war.'
This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible, But if one sees that the other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard as possible, indeed, and not waste time declaring war.
It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese.
He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia.
When he then realized that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formality.
He would continue to go this way in the future."
If the Tribunal please, that ends my presentation of the various phases of aggressive warfare charged as crimes against peace in Court I of the Indictment.
As I conclude this phase, I hope the Tribunal will allow me to express my deep sense of obligation to Commander Sidney
J.Kaplan, Section Chief, and to the members of his staff who did the yeoman work necessary to assemble and prepare these materials that I have presented.
Those members in the staff, in the order in which the materials were presented, are Major Joseph Dainow, Lt. Commander Harold Leventhal, Lt. John M. Woolsey, Lt. James A. Gorrell, Lt. Roy H. Steyer.
Commander Kaplan and his staff have fully measured up to the famous motto of his branch of the armed services, the United States Coast Guard, "Semper Paratus", always prepared.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1000 hours, 11 December 1945.)
Official transcript of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal in the matter of:
The United States of America, the French Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Def endants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 11 December 1945, 1000-1030, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
COL. STOREY :If the Tribunal please, the United States next offers in evidence some captured moving pictures through Commander Donovan, who had charge of taking them.
COMMANDER DONOVAN:May it place the Tribunal, the United States now offers in evidence Document No. 3054-PS, United States Exhibit No. 167, the motion picture entitled "The Nazi Plan." This document contains several affidavits with exhibits, copies of which have been furnished to Defense Counsel. I ask the Tribunal whether it believes it to be necessary for us formally to read the affidavits at this time. Since the motion pictures themselves will be presented to the Tribunal, and therefore will be a permanent record, I respectfully submit that the reading be waived.
In the past three weeks the Prosecution has presented to this Tribunal a vast amount of evidence concerning the nature of the Nazi conspiracy and what we contend to be its deliberate planning, launching, and waging of wars of aggression. That evidence has consisted of documentary and some oral proof, but the Nazi conspirators did more than leave behind such normal kinds of evidence. German proficiency in photography has been traditional. Its use as a propaganda instrument was especially well known to these defendants, and as a result the United States in 1945 captured an almost complete chronicle of the rise and fall of National Socialism as documented in films made by the Nazis themselves. It is from excerpts of this chronicle that we have compiled the motion picture now to be presented, entitled "The Nazi Plan," which, in broad outline, sums up the case thus far presented under Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment.
The motion picture has been divided into four parts. This morning we first offer to the Tribunal Parts 1 and 2, which are especially entitled "Rise of the NSDAP, 1921 to 1933," and "Acquiring Totalitarian Control of Germany, 1933 to 1935."