QI am not suggesting that. I am merely trying to show that you yourself used language in refusing Seyss-Inquart that indecated that you did not think he was truthful or faithful or decent. Isn't that so ?
AI am merely saying that I myself refused to recognize the demand. There was a difference which arose from the fact that I was a friend of the Chancellor.
QWell, you know we have your testimony down there in Vienna where you testified under oath before the Court, and you remember telling the judge down there that Seyss-Inquart participated in the violent removal of Schuschnigg.
AYes. Yes, I stated that I would not belong to a government run by Seyss-Inquart since that was, after all, partly responsible for the removal of Schuschnigg's government and since I was a friend of Schuschnigg I could not participate in such a government.
QWell, the point of it all is that, knowing Seyss-Inquart and as he had been in the closest association with the Nazis, and having had your experience at Berchtesgaden, are you serious wehen you tell the Tribunal that you really thought -- you really believed Seyss-Inquart when he said he wanted to maintain some independence for Austria ?
AI doubted it at the time. I doubted Seyss-Inquart. What went on in his head, I can not tell you.
QI am not asking you for that. I am asking you what went on in your head.
Now, you had a conversation with the defendant von Papen about Seyss-Inquart not too many years ago ?
AYes.
QNow, tell the Tribunal when and where that conversation took place.
A I met him, I think, late in 1940, and our conversation turned to the events of 11 March 1938.
Papen at the time used very serious, critical words on the procedure of those days with reference to Seyss-Inquart because he had done nothing for the independence of Austria and he said that he had not served German interests either. He wanted to state his criticism, and I had the impression that he was against the forced solution against the solution by means of force, which had always happened
QWell, I want you particularly to tell the Tribunal just what it was that von Papen said about Seyss-Inquart -- and this was 1943, wasn't it, not 1940 ? It was when you were in Turkey and so was von Papen ? A: Yes.
Q: Now, maybe I can help you a little if you have forgotten. Didn't von Papen say that he would not shake hands with Seyss-Inquart ? A: Yes, he said that. He said that some time after the Anschluss he had refused to shake hands with him, and he referred to his behavior in 1938. Q: And he said his behavior was utterly impossible? Isn't that the language that von Papen used about Seyss-Inquart or some of the language? A: He did speak like that. Q: What were the other things that he said ? You have told down there in Vienna that von Papen used the harshest language imaginable in describing Seyss-Inquart and his conduct in March 1938. I think that is of some interst to the Tribunal, and I wish you would tell us exactly what it was. It is only three years ago that you and von Papen had this conversation, and you have not told us very much about it. A: He spoke in very violent terms. He passed a judgment in which he wanted to express that Seyss-Inquart had not protected the Austrians and that he had done nothing to protect the faith of Austria or safeguard the character and interests of Austria. That was Papen's basic thought, and his second thought was that the German interests had not been served by this either, and what he meant was that justified interests of the German Reich had been made to look wrong in the eyes of the World and that the foreign political interests of the Reich had been damaged. That was the principal thought in that conversation, and I think he made similar remarks during other conversations with other people. Q: All right. I am afraid I have passed on from Berchtesgaden and have omitted something that is probably of some importance. Do you remember some time-- I guess not long before you broke up your session there -- Hitler turning to von Papen and saying,"von Papen, you made it possible for me to be Chancellor, and I shall never forget it ."
Did you hear Hitler say that to von Papen that day at Berchtesgaden ?
A: Yes, some such remark in some such form was made. Q: What did von Papen say ? A: That I can no longer tell you, I can not remember. Q: He said, "Yes, my Fuehrer," or something like that, didn't he ? A: Yes, I assume so, because upon being addressed like that he had to answer. Q: He certainly did not deny it, did he ? A: I don't assume he did,but I can not remember the answer. I can only remember the question. Q: The night in Vienna when the SS and the SA people were climbing in the windows and doors of the Chancellory, did Seyss -Inquart do anything to have then excluded A: Not to my knowledge. I don't know; I was on the other side. Q: Yes. It was a very tense situation, as we know. As a matter of fact, you were fearful that some harm would be done to Schuschnigg, weren't you ? A: The situation was tense. Q: How did you and Schuschnigg go home that night from the Chancellory ? A: We left in three cars -- the Chancellor in one, the President in the other, and I was in the third.The departure was organized or escorted by SS men who were present. Q: Schuschnigg was not taken home in Seyss-Inquart's private automobile by Seyss-Inquart; he was taken home by the SS; is that so ? A: No, they departed in a car together. I heard myself how Seyss-Inquart told the Chancellor he would take him home. Whether it was the Chancellor's car or Seyss-Inquart's car, I don't know, but at any rate they travelled in the same car. Q: Escorted by the SS ?
A No, not as far as I can tell you. I don't know whether there were SS in the Chancellor's car, but the SS only escorted the actual departure from the house, and there was nobody on the car or my car, of the President's car after that, after we had left the house, I mean.
QThat is not what you told the Court in Vienna. Down there you said, "Dr. Schuschnigg and I were driven home, escorted by the SS."
ANo, I said the SS escorted or conducted the departure from the Ballhaus Platz. There were about 40 SS men present who conducted the departure from there. Whether some one remained in the car after that, I don't know.
QAll right. You probably can help us clean up one other question. When Seyss-Inquart made his radio speech, he was not actually a member of the Government, was he, or was he?
AWell, there has been a lot of debate about that question. The Chancellor had resigned in the hours of the afternoon, and the President had first of all not accepted the resignation, so, therefore, he was still Chancellor and Seyss was still a Minister. Whether later on the resignation was accepted that I don't know. Some say that the President had asked the Chancellor to continue in charge. Seyss-Inquart and others think that that was not the case. Only the head of the state himself can answer that question for you.
QAs a former member of the government, I want you to look at one document, and perhaps you can tell us whether or not you have seen it before.
MR. DODD:It is 4015-PS. It becomes USA 891. BY MR. DODD:
QThat states that President Miklas had relieved not only Schuschnigg as the Federal Chancellor, but all other members of the federal government, as well as all Secretaries of State, of their respective offices, and that is March 11.
AYes.
when he made this radio speech? That is our understanding of it.
Q That shows, does it not, that Seyss-Inquart was hot in office Is that so?
AWell, I believe that I have had a lot of experience in that question because I worked with the Federal President for a long time.
QJust tell us exactly -- is that true or not? Is our understanding correct?
AIt need not necessarily be that. In practice such documents sometimes go out days later because red tape slows then up. One would have to investigate therefore, when this was actually, in practice, carried out. I assume that it was not prepared until long after the 11th of March.
QWas Seyss-Inquart frequently using the term "Trojan Horse" in the days preceding events of March 12? Was that a common expression of his?
AHe has stated a few times that he was not a Trojan Horse leader, and by that he wanted we testify to his loyalty, and he wanted to explain that it was not his task to open the back door to National Socialism.
QDo you think he protested too much?
AAgainst what?
QAbout not being a Trojan Horse.
AI did not hear that expression more than once or twice or three times from Zernatto.
MR. DODD:That is all.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STEINBAUER:
QI only have one brief question in connection with these last events, Mr. ness. Didn't Seyss-Inquart also post guards ?
AYes, guards had been posted.
QAt What time did that happen ? I mean, the actual resignation of Schuschnigg
AWell, it is difficult to say whether the nomination or the appointment of the new government was the time. I assume that it took place between nine and ten o'clock, since the President was having serious negotiations about the choice of a new Chancellor, and I think the former Chancellor, Dr. Ender, had been include in the debate.
DR. STEINBAUER:Mr. President, I have no further questions for this witness.
THE PRESIDENT:The witness may retire.
---------
DR. STEINBAUER:With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now call the wit ---------ness Police President Dr. Skubl.
MICHAELSKUBL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name, please ?
AMichael Skubl.
"Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT:You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STEINBAUER:
QMr. Witness, which functions have you carried out in the Austrian Republic
AAt the end I was the President of the Police at Vienna, and Secretary of State for Matters of Public Security. Apart from that, I was the Inspector General of the Austrian Executive.
Q Were you called to these offices at the suggestion of Dr. Dollfuss, which instructions he gave before he died ?
ADr. Dollfuss -- the day before he was murdered, on the 24th of July -- had appointed me as Inspector General of the Police. I had enjoyed his full confidence
QCan one, therefore, describe you as having had Dr. Schuschnigg's confidence as well ?
AYes.
QWhen Seyss-Inquart became Minister, were you attached to him in your capacity as Secretary of State and Inspector General ?
AYes. When Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior and of Security, I joined him as Secretary of State. Consequently, I came under him initially, whereas until that time I had been subordinated directly to the Chancellor as Chief of Security.
QDid the police and the gendarmerie remain in your hands or in the hands of Seyss-Inquart, practically speaking ?
AIn practice they had been in my hands.
QDid you particularly have the task of suppressing and fighting against illegal movements ?
AAs President of the Police and Secretary of State for Matters of Public Security, it was, of course, one of my leading tasks to fight against illegal movements, and particularly to fight against National Socialist aggression.
QDid you have any connection, or did you know of any connection between SeyssInquart and the July 1934 matter ? I mean, when Dollfuss was murdered.
ANo.
QWhat was his attitude towards National Socialism ?
ADr. Seyss-Inquart confessed that he was a National Socialist. However, as far as I know, the so-called 120 or 150 percent National Socialists -- that is to say, the leaders of the illegal movement -- did not consider him to be a 100 per cent National Socialist. He was, however, considered to be an very suitable person to be used on the chess board of the National Socialist movement as a chessman, a very suitable chessman.
QIf I understand you correctly, then, he was more a person who was led than a person who was leading ?
AIt was my impression that he was more led than leading.
Q How did you work with Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as Minister of the In-
terior ?
AThere were no disturbances; it was a perfectly harmonious, agreeable way of working.
QDid he exercise any influence upon the police ? Did he, for instance, call National Socialists into the corps of the police ?
ANo; that happened in no case.
QDid you have an opportunity to by-pass the Minister, reproting directly to Chancellor Schuschnigg ?
AChancellor Schuschnigg was the Chief of the Government, and in that capacity he was, of course, my supreme superior. It was a matter of course, therefore, the I would regularly, and upon being called specially, report to the Chancellor and take instructions from him.
QSoon after Seyss-Inquart was appointed as Minister he went to visit Adolf Hitler. Question: Was that an official journey, or was it kept secret ?
AIt was official.
QHow did you come to that conclusion ?
AIt had been announced. I knew about the journey; and Chancellor Schuschnigg so far as I knew, knew about the journey. It was pretty obvious that in his capacity as liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Reich he would have to have an opportunity to speak to Hitler.
QWell then, when Seyss-Inquart came back, did he report the contents of his discussions with the Fuehrer ?
AYes. Upon his return I met Seyss-Inquart at the station, and I asked him he the conferences with Hitler had proceeded. Seyss-Inquart, still being fresh under the Impression of the meeting and discussions, informed me of what he had stated to the Fuehrer. I still remember the inividual points exactly. Seyss-Inquart told the Reich Chancellor as follows:
"High Riech Chancellor: I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I am bound and I have sworn an oath of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have sworn an oath, therefore, to Austria's independence and unity. Secondly, I am an active catholic, and therefore I could not join or follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle. Thirdly, I come from a country where totalitarian regimes are out of the question."
Q Did the Reich, in spite of these views, appoint new county command offices of the illegal NSDAP ?
AYes. As far as is known to me, on the 21st of February Klausner was appointed Couty Leader.
QWhen Dr. Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite did he order any special measures of security ?
AOf course, the order for the plebiscite had the effect of a bomb on the National Socialists, not only on the National Socialists in Austria, bur also the National Socialists in the Reich. There was feverish activity, therefore, and considerable safeguarding measures had to be introduced.
This special activities can be explained, by the fact that the National Socialists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite the would suffer a terrible defeat. The slogans for the plebiscite would have been accepted predominantly by the Austrian population.
It is most interesting, in this connection, to draw your attention to an article which appeared on the 11th of March in the German-Austrian daily paper, and which indicates the fear that this plebiscite would open the way for a democratization of Austria, the creation of a people's front, and consequently, later, a Bolshevist tendency.
This will show that the Austrian National Socialists were conscious of the fact that they were a minority.
QNow we come to the memorable 11th of March, 1938. When did you, as the Chief of the Executive, learn that German troops had marched into Austria?
AThe 11th of March was, of course, an exceptionally exciting and eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during those hours. I only know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to me showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which could not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact that upsetting troop movements were taking place near the Austrian border.
QDid not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg's resignation, say on the radio -- in order to avoid chaos -- that he was asking the population to remain quiet, since he was still Minister of the Interior and Security?
AYes, Seyss-Inquart did make that statement on the radio.
QDid you make any observations to the effect that before Schuschnigg resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, had given instructions, sent telegrams and put through telephone calls, or given any other news regarding the seizure of power?
AWhat I observed was the attitude adopted by Seyss-Inquart until the critical moment, which was a very placid one. As I have already said earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was led rather than a man who was leading. There were clear indications that he felt awkward.
QDidn't you yourself, in the afternoon or evening, have an offer from President Miklas to become Federal Chancellor?
AChancellor Dr. Schuschnigg called me in the early afternoon, and he stated to me that there had been an ultimatum from Germany -- that is to say, Hitler -- and that the ultimatum would no longer be satisfied with a postponement of the plebiscite, but was demanding Schuschnigg's resignation. Then Schuschnigg said that he personally was ready to resign, but that he could not expect from his officials that Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor.
He had a question to put to me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the Chancellor's office. He said that was in agreement with the President, who, a few moments later, made the same offer to me.
I refused, considering that my appointment as Chancellor would, in Hitler's eyes, mean nothing other than a declaration of war. As Secretary of State for Matters of Public Security I was at the head of the group fighting the National Socialist aggression, and therefore I was a personal opponent of Hitler's. Therefore, Had I accepted the Chancellorship, Hitler would have found it a welcome cause to give the order to the troops to march. My acceptance of the Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the fight against the invasion, and such a fight was hopeless, in the face of the tremendous superiority of the German armed forces, compared with the Austria armed forces and Austrian Executive.
QThen Seyss-Inquart formed his cabinet, and you were taken over as Secretary of State. Why did you join that Ministry?
ASeyss-Inquart suggested that I should remain as Secretary for Matters of Public Security under his government. I accepted the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember the conditions which he had made to the Fuehrer. In other words, that there would be a Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that, I was wishing and hoping that the Executive would remain in my hands, and that, in the event Seyss-Inquart had difficulties in representing the Austrian point of view, there would be some assistance for him through me. In other words, there should be an Austrian enclave around him in the cabinet of the Austrian Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
QDid Seyss-Inquart still, at that time, speak in favor of Austrian independence?
AHe didn't speak about it in detail. Actually, that was understood to be a matter of course during that conference we had.
Q. When did you leave that cabinet, and why?
A.During the night of the 11th and 12th of March, I took over the task of receiving the Reichsfuehrer SS. Himmler, who had been announced from Berlin at the airdrome, on that occasion did not arrive on his own, but came with an entire entourage. I cannot remember the names of the individual people who introduced themselves to me; that is to say, I could not understand very many of them. But there was one name which I did understand very well, and that was the name of Meissner. Meissner was an Austrian police officer who, on the 25th of July, had joined the National Socialist uprisings, and who had then after his collapse fled to the Reich. Now he came back under Himmler's protection.
That to me was such an impossibility that I was certain at the end that I could no longer cooperate here. When, therefore, on the 12th, in the morning, I went into the chancellor's building and was received by Glaise Horstenat with the information that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I answered, "He can have that cheaply, because I have already decided on that in the early hours of the morning".
Subsequently I informed Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart that I had had knowledge of the fact that Hitler was demanding my resignation, and that, of course, I had decided to resign. I asked him, therefore, to take official notice of my resignation.
Seyss-Inquart replied, "It is right that Himmler has demanded your resignation but I am not going to have anything dictated to me from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it perhaps that you disappear for a few weeks. But then you must come back, because I attach importance to your cooperation."
I had maintained, however, that that would not happen. And the following day, in writing, I handed in my resignation as president of the police and secretary of state, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually handed the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been attached to me as a so-called political leader of the executive.
Q. And then you were confined, and you still have not returned to Vienna; is that not right?
A.I beg your pardon?
Q.I said, you were then confined and you still have not gone back to Vienna?
A.First of all, I remained as a prisoner in my official apartment. I was under SS and police guard. Then on the 24th of May, two criminal policemen of the Cassel Gestapo deported me to Cassel, where I was forcibly maintained until the liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER:I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT:Do any other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT:The prosecution?
MR. DODD:No questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT:The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I now call the next witness, Dr. Friedrich Wimmer.
DR. FRIEDRICHWIMMER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name, please?
ADr. Friedrich Wimmer.
QWill you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT:You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER:Mr. President, with the witness Skubl I have finished the questions concerning Austria and I shall not proceed to deal with the Netherlands.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
QWitness, were you, from July, 1940 until May, 1945, general commissioner for the internal administration and justice in the Netherlands?
AYes.
QIn that position did you have to deal with internal administration, justice, education, health, archives, museums and the legislature?
AYes.
QWere you not also, at the same time, the deputy of the Reich Commissar?
AIn exceptional cases, cases of emergency; not otherwise.
QDid you also participate in the weekly conferences of the general session with the Reich Commissar?
AYes.
QTherefore, you are informed about the events in the occupied Netherlands rather completely, are you not?
AGenerally, yes.
QNow I ask you, was the German police a part of the offices of the Reich Commissar or wasn't it independently subordinate to the Berlin office?
AThe German police was an organization which was separate from the Reich Commissar's office, and as far as decrees and organization was concerned, they were subordinate to the respective offices in the Reich.
QThat is to say then, immediately subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler?
AImmediately subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS.
QDid the German police, apart from the task of order police and security police, did they have special tasks in the Netherlands?
AThey had quite a number of special tasks in the Netherlands.
QCould you ennumerate these tasks?
AI could not give it completely, but, for instance exclusively in their field was the fight against the resistance movement in the Netherlands; also belonging to their tasks was the establishment, and supervision of concentration camps. Furthermore, removal of Jews from the whole body of the Dutch nation was exclusively their task.
QNow, we come to internal administration. At the head of the foreign ministries there was one general secretary in each; that is to say, a Dutchman. When they resigned, were they persecuted?
ANo. The Reich Commissar had declared to the Dutch general session that if they should feel that decrees or demands of the occupation powers would make it difficult for them, then, without having any fears, they could approach him and explain to him their difficulties, and in that case, if they wanted to, he would let them resign from their office in such a manner that they would 'have to fear no difficulties and no troubles of any kind; and that, also, as far as financial matters were concerned, they could feel sure that they would get their pensions.
QDid the Reich Commissar also dismiss provincial, commissars?
AHe did dismiss provincial commissars, but these exchanges - - and I recall two cases - - these exchanges took place only because the provincial commissars died.
QHow was it about the Mayor?
AAs far as the appointment of mayors is concerned, in principle, the same could be said as for all other officials in the Netherlands.
The mayors in the Netherlands, as in most of the nations, were, not elected to office. They were employed Officials, civil servants, in that sense of the word. They had been appointed by the Queen, even the mayors of the small communities. Since the head of the state was not present in the Netherlands, the Reich Commissar was confronted with the necessity of regulating the appointment and dismissal of mayors and keep up the regulations in that manner. Insofar as the most important positions of the state were concerned, he reserved the right to make appointments, where as in the case of large numbers of appointments of lesser importance, he put that into the hands of the general secretary.
QSo if you look back today and examine she question of how conditions were between '40 and'45 concerning the civil servants in the Netherlands, what can you state in that respect ?
AI believe I may say that at the end of the period of German occupation the majority of the civil servants were in office who had been in office when the German occupation force came into the Netherlands.
QSeyss-Inquart has been accused of dissolving the political parties. When and why did that take place ?
AThe dissolution of political parties was necessitated by the fact that some political parties displayed an attitude which, in critical times, was not bearable for the occupying power Apoart from that, in an occupied territory it is generally impossible to deal with political parties at all. It came about that we received report from our foreign services about conspiracy of various natures, and the Reich Commissar saw the necessity to dissolve the, parties. But as far as the political institutions were concerned, he did not remove the parties as such. The institution of parties still existed.
QIt was suggested by the Reich to reorganize the administration to divine the Netherlands into five administrative districts instead of the traditional provinces.
Did Seyss-Inquart do that ?
AThe Reich Commissar, whenever such suggestions or demands were made, always refused then. He could do that with reason, because the Dutch administration had been conducted at a very high level and the Reich Commissar counted on it. He could do so in the beginning on the basis of many promises; he said the Dutch administration would be loyal to the occupying power.
QNow we were confronted there also with a party which was very close to the National Socialists, the NSB. Did that party gain a leading influence in the administration ?
A :The NSB, as a party, had no influence and gained no influence at all in the administration. Of course the occupying power approached the NSB and consulted the NSB in individual case because each occupying power in history, I believe, as well as in our day, ist not going to approach those parties or groups which have hostile attitudes to the occupying power.
QDidn't the leader of the NSB, Mussert, try to create a similar situation as it existed in Norway under Quisling; that is to say, that he would become Prime Minister of the Netherlands.
AThat tendency Mussert definitely had had, and again and again he expressed it; and I can say that by doing so, he brought the Reich Commissar into a very disagreeable situation. The Reich Commissar always rejected it.
QAnother question, Did Seyss-Inquart in any way exert pressure in religious matters on the population of the occupied territory ?
ANo.
QDid he, in the field of education, issue decrees which would have reduced the rights of the Netherlanders ?
ANo.
QDidn't he sponsor and favor the Dutch Red Cross, although there were cells of the resistance movement in it ?
A He not only permitted the Red Cross to carry out its functions without difficulty, but, as you say, he even favored and sponsored it.
As far as the political attitude was concerned, he would have had plenty of reasons to interfere because in the Red Cross illegal radio stations had been found.
QThey were centers of restistance?
AYes.
QFurthermore, he has been accused of interfering in the legislation in the question of citizenship and also in the question of martial law. You were in charge of the Justice Department. What can you say about that, quite briefly?
AInterferences of that kind have been made, but that occurred because, from the point of view of warfare and the armed forces especially, they become necessary, for those Dutchmen, from the point of citizenship, who had entered the German Army, wanted to have the assurance of also getting their German citizenship. The Reich Commissar, however, was of the opinion that by acquiring German citizenship they would not have any difficulties in Holland itself, as decreed and that can be found in the respective decrees, that these Dutchmen who acquired German Citizenship should be permitted to keep their Dutch citizenship, so that by doing so they would not lose their own nationality.
So far as martial law is concerned, the necessity arose that if soldiers wanted to marry Dutch girls, the approval of parents, and not for political reasons, may have been refused. That approval was of some importance in that connection because the parents, contrary to many other nations, retained this right of approval until the thirtieth year of a daughter.
Q Now I come to another chapter. That is the question of the so-called Standgerichte, military courts.
Will you tell us how these military courts were organized and set up and how long and when they were in session.
AThe creation of military courts was seen as a necessity after a general strike had broken out in Amsterdam and to create a legal basis in the event of similar occurrences in the future, or at least to stop them immediately after they had broken out, and stopthem effectively on the basis of the respective law.
How these military courts were organized and when they had to function can be seen in the decree by the Reich Commissar. It is stated therein. However in order to answer your specific question about the composition of these military courts, I can only say from memory that the president of these courts was a judge, that is to say, a judge who had all the requirements which a judge in the German Reich had to have.
QThat is the essential point, and if I understand you correctly, although these courts were called police courts there was a judge who was the president of the court.
AYes, that is correct.
QIs it known to you whether Seyss-Inquart had established so-called collective fines over cities and communities?
AThe Reich Commissar actually established just fines, collective fines. The largest one, I believe, was the one against Amsterdam on the occasion of the general strike which I have already mentioned. The fines were decreed on the basis of existing decrees, and they were proclaimed by an official memorandum and that by the police.
QIf I understand you correctly, therefore, these collective fines -you mentioned the words "General strike" -- were used when actions of a larger group, a community, had occurred, and not actions of individuals.
AYes, the collective fines were imposed in cases of violations which were committed by a large part of the citizens of the community in question.
QI believe we can conclude that chapter. However, you didn't tell me how long the so-called military courts were in session.
AThey were in session as long as that decree provided. It was two weeks, 14 days, and that was the only time that martial law had been imposed in Holland by the Reich Commissar, that is, if you do not consider the state of emergency after the invasion as such.