AYes. I have already explained the reasons of practical politics, which were of a foreign political and economic nature.
QIn this and in later negotiations, did internal political reasons, particularly the settlement of the Party question, have a part in deciding this?
AOf course, it was the task of the government to solve inner political tension. The Chancellor had to try to find a way out of the difficulty, which he had inherited from Dollfuss, bu cutting down the inner political front.
QDo you believe that Mr. von Papen concluded the July 1936 treaty with treacherous intent?
AI have no reason to believe that he did not consider this agreement a serious attampt to create a modus vivendi between Austria and the Reich. That is not changed by the fact that it resulted in a modus mali vivendi.
QDid the Germans complain that after the agreement of the 11th of July, 1936, there was no essential change in the inner political course of the Austrian Government?
ASuch objections occurred repeatedly, and thus we come to the last and the real cause of the conflict with the Reich, the battle of National Socialism within the country. In the interest of maintaining the independence of the country and cooperation--on the basis of the treaty of the 11th of July--with the German Reich, the leaders of which were National Socialists, there were two fields or two demands which, in the long run, the Austrian Government found to be irreconcilable.
Those were the difficulties of the task of all persons entrusted with carrying out this treaty in Vienna, including the German Minister.
Q. On the basis of these conditions, particularly the July agreement, were questions of internal policy, such as technical and personnel questions of the so-called national opposition, the subject of discussions between the chancellor and Mr. von Papen?
A.The situation as just descrived shows that such discussions were unavoidable, and that between the chancellor and the German minister, as well as with the Italian minister, talks on the internal political situation took place. This is, from a general point of view, quite customary. I know of no diplomatic records which do not contain such entries. The chancellor could not have permitted any intervention, in any case.
In personnel questions, Schuschnigg was especially reluctant, because he was afrain of "Trojan horses", I might say. That more or less represents the situation in wuch talks between the chancellor and the Germans on the other side.
Q.Was the opposition of Mr. von Papen to the methods of the illegal party clear?
A.Yes. According to the information received by the government, the heads of the illegal party -- that is, Leopold, in particular -- were rejected by von Papen. This was doubtless due to differing political ideas and differing political methods which von Papen on the one hand and the heads of the illegal party on the other hand were determined to pursue.
Q.Did Mr. von Papen, referring to the July agreement, ever take an aggressive attitude in Austrian foreign policy?
A.There existed between Austria and the Reich, not only in cultural and internal political fields, but also in the foreign politicalfield, unbridgeable differences of opinion. I will mention briefly the demands of the Reich. Austria was to leave the League of Nations, which we, referring to the geographical and historical continental position of Austria, rejected. A second point was the Austrians' attitude -
THEPRESIDENT: (Interposing). Is this at all answering the question that you have put to him?
DR. KUBUSCHOK:He is introducing the answer to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Try and get on with the answer to it, will you? Get the witness on to the answer, rather than the introduction.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q.I should like to know whether Mr. von Papen had an opportunity for an agressive intervention in Austrian foreign politics, and in the individual cases mentioned by you, whether he took advantage of this opportunity.
A.I want to say that in spite of the deep, basic differences, this did not occur, and that a minister with a more radical point of view would certainly have had on opportunity and occasion for sharper attitude towards Austria. Not in a single case did we reach an agreement with the German Reich on a joint foreign political action. Von Papen did remind us of that, but that was all. As for aggression, or aggressive activities, I cannot speak in this field.
Q.Did Mr. von Papen in part act as an especially active mediator? I would like to remind you of the case of Pinkafeld.
A.The Pinkafeld incident is an example of the mediating activity which von Papen carried out. On the surface, it was a minor incident, but it led to threats of invasion by Hitler. Von Papen was called to Berlin, and had a great deal of difficulty in persuading Hitler -
THEPRESIDENT: (Interposing). Witness, if it is convenient to you, it would be more convenient to the Tribunal if you spoke a little faster. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q.Then the case was cleared up by von Papen without any difficulty?
A.Yes.
Q.Did Mr. von Papen speak to you about the reasons for his being called away on the 4th of February, 1938?
AIn a visit early on the 5th, he expressed his astonishment, and his anger, I might say, at his being called away, which in his opinion and also in our opinion had been determined by the events of the 4th of February, 1938, the recall of Fritsche and other generals, and the recall of von Neurath. In his opinion, it would not remain without effect for Austria, either, especially in view of the person of his successor, who was given. At that time, Buerckel or Counsul General Kriebel was proposed.
That was approximately what von Papen said to me on the 5th, and I believe also the chancellor before he left.
QThen he believed and feared that his successor would carry on a more severe policy against Austria?
AFrom the two persons who had been mentioned, that conclusion was inevitable.
QDid von Papen take part in the pressure exerted on you and Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden talks?
ANo, he did not.
QDid he rather, as far as he had any opportunity to take part in the negotiations, attempt to weaken Hitler's demands?
AIn view of the atmosphere of violence which prevailed and the program of demands which was presented, this was not difficult. I believe that he, like many others, endeavored to keep order so as to assure sensible progress of the negotiations.
QIn the course of the negotiations, a number of concessions was made. Do you believe that the attitude and the participation of von Papen as a whole in these negotiations had a restraining effect and led to this practical success for you?
AHis attitude as a whole was no doubt mediatory. One cannot speak of success at Berchtesgaden as far as the result is concerned; but that is not von Papen's fault.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Kubuschok, do you think you will be able to finish in a few moments?
DR. KUBUSCHOK:Yes.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
QI believe it would be better to answer my question, if you did not consider the final result of Berchtesgaden, but rather the fact that Hitler had a great program of demanding beyond the final results, whether you consider that some very important points were changed in the course of the negotiations.
AAs far as there was any aid on the other side, it came from von Papen.
QDo you recall that the Hitler-Schuschnigg negotiations were especially violent because Hitler determined Schuschnigg in his German attitude and that von Papen care to Schuschnigg's aid, and that that improved the original situation for Schuschnigg?
AI was not present for the first hour or two or the talk. I cannot answer the question.
QMy last question is this. Did Mr. von Papen, after the 26th of February, the day on which he took leave of the Federal President, have any official activity in Vienna?
ANo; the Vienna location was administered by the charge d'affaires, von Stein, who considered the two protests against the demand plebiscites on the afternoon of the 9th or the morning of the 10th. Von Stein, General Muff, and State Secretary Keppler sent in the ultimatum for getting the resignation of chancellor Schuschnigg to the Austrian President. This shows that Ambassador von Papen was no longer acting.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well. We shall recess until a quarter past two.
(A recess was taken until 1420 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1415 hours, 13 June 1946)
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday.
DR. KUBUSCHOK:May I have permission to put one more question to Witness Schmidt, a question which I had overlooked putting before the recess ?
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
GUIDO SCHMIDT -- Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION -- Continued BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q.Mr. Witness, in November, 1937, in the course of measures introduced against the illegal movements, certain materials were confiscated which were given the name "Tafs papers". Is the presence of Herr von Papen referred to in these "Tafs papers" ?
A.As far as I can recollect, with this material which we called the "Tafs plan" a number of documents were discovered one after the other. I think I can remember that in one of these documents Papen was mentioned. An attempt on the life of the German Ambassador to Vienna was to be the cause for interior uprisings in Asutria, which were to be followed by reprisal measures by the government; and then later it was to lead to measures introduced by the German Reich. I can not remember the details of that plan any more.
DR. KUBUSCHOK:Thank you.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:Dr. von Luedinghausen, counsel for the defendant von Neurath, With permission of the Tribunal, I should now like to put a few questions to this witness. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q.Dr. Schmidt, when and on what occasion have you met Herr von Neurath ?
A.I met von Neurath in November, 1937, in Berlin where I paid a visit to him.
Q.Can you tell us what attitude von Neurath, as German Foreign Minister had with regard to the relations of the German Reich to Austria ? In particular, can you tell us his views regarding the agreement of the 25th of July 1936 ? I should like to draw your attention to the fact, in this connection, that the prosecution have alleged that von Neurath had made this agreement wilfully deceiving.
A.During the few meetings which I had with von Neurath he has always expressed the view that he was in favor of an independent Asutria. He mentioned that there should be the closest possible cooperation in the foreign politicalm economical and military sectors. Our conversations always stood on the basis created by the 11th of July agreement, and differences of opinion only arose through the various interpretations of the agreement. Neurath, on behalf of the German government, was interested in the best possible activation of the agreement, which, for defensive reasons, we preferred a different interpretation. At any rate, Neurath refused forcible methods and he followed approximately the line of an independent Austria but working closely with Germany.
Q.What was Neurath's opinion regarding the extreme circles of the party in the Reich which, in fact, favored a policy of intervention in Austrian affairs ?
A.As I have already said, methods of force were disliked by Neurath which includes the methods of intervention and the methods of the illegal party in Austria. I believe that, from conversations which I have had with him, I can state that as a certain fact. His complete refusal of the activities and the appearance of Keppler and Weselmeier speak in favor of the same point of view, they having been the preparers of the new development in Austria. The expression which he has used in that connection allow no doubt regarding his point of view.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. SEIDL:Dr. Seidl, counsel for Frank and Hess. Mr. President, may I have permission to represent my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, who is absent and put a few questions on behalf of Defendant Goering to the witness ?
THE PRESIDENT:Yes. BY DR. SEIDL:
Q.Mr. Witness, you have just stated that in November, 1937, you paid an official visit to Berlin ?
A.Yes.
Q.Did you, on that occasion, talk to the then Field Marshal Goering ?
A.Yes.
Q. Is it correct that even at that time Field Marshal Goering had already told you that the Austrian problem could only be solved by complete union between the two brother peoples ? That is to say, Austria's Anschluss to the Reich.
And that he, in turn, would do everything he could to achieve that end ?
A.It wasn't told me in those words. The Reich Marshal did refer to a close cooperation with Austria, but a demand for an Anschluss was not mentioned as far as I can remember. I could add, to illustrate that, that at that time the events of the 25th of July, 1934 were being discussed. I expressed the view that the agreement of July, '36, would put a final line under that development, and Reich Marshal Goering stated that he, mentioning Habicht, would make the originating of this affair -- make them responsible and that he would ban them into some other part of Germany. That remark alone shows that the Anschluss was not mentioned. The Reich Marshal appreciated the development caused by the 11th of July, 1936. That is to say that a full stop had been put at the end of the developments, ending then what one had to describe as a state of war. That was the state of affairs existing to the 11th of July, 1936.
Q.Is it correct that on the morning of the Anschluss, that is to say the morning of the 12th of March, 1938, Goering called you to Berlin, telling you to use an airplane ?
A.No. That was either Monday or Tuesday; that is the 15th or 16th.
Q.When you were in Berlin, did he put the question to you whether you yourself or Schuschnigg had asked for help from foreign powers, military help ?
A.I can not remember having heard that question.
Q.You stated this morning that with the Anschluss National Socialism in Austria had become reality. I now ask you, before the Anschluss, wasn't National Socialism a political reality in Austria ?
A.Yes, certainly a political reality, but I am talking of a political reality in the sense of the final force.
THE PRESIDENT:I am afraid you are going a little bit too fast -- well I don't know what it was. Anyhow, you had better repeat it because the interpreters don't seem to have got it.
BY DR. SEIDL:
QThe question was whether, even before the Anschluss, National Socialism in Austria had been a reality, and I put this question with reference to the fact that the witness had said this morning that only with the arrival of German troops had Austria found National Socialism a reality.
ABy "Political reality" I meant that now National Socialism had got hold of the authority of the state, because until then it had been a prohibited party, which of course, after the agreement of February 12, was allowed within the Fatherland Front and had been asked to cooperate in the political life.
In other words, I wanted to say that was the principal change, due to the arrival of German troops, which came to the National Socialists.
QNow, one last questions: After the Anschluss, did you not repeatedly tell the Reichsmarshall that the Fatherland Front, on the occasion of the Anschluss, had collapsed like a house of cards?
AWell, of course I cannot remember individual statements, but the collapse of the Fatherland Front did, of course, happen when the Chancellor resigned. The Fatherland Front was the collecting point for resistance, and with the 11th of March, resistance had collapsed.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution want to cross examine?
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DODD:
QDr. Schmidt, when, for the first time -- if you know-- did the defendant von Papen suggest to Chancellor Schuschnigg that he, Schusnigg, have a meeting with Hitler?
ALate in autumn 1937, possibly November; it may have been December, von Papen made the suggestion for such a meeting. These meetings did not, however, have any concrete results. The official in vitation was brought by von Papen on or abort the 6th or 7th of February, after he had returned from his visit to Hitler. On that day I heard of that invitation.
QNow, will you tell us also, if you know, whether or not von Papen assured Schusnigg that this meeting would be restricted to very well defined lines, and that it would concern itself only with matters that were agreed between Schusnigg and von Papen before the conference took place.
A The Chancellor himself demanded exact wording for the agenda of the conference, that is, "11th July, Final Removal of Existing Differences" and so on and so forth.
That had been agreed between von Papen and Schusnigg.
QAnd did von Papen assure Schusnigg that the meeting would be entirely favorable for Austria?
AAssure him? No. But a declaration was given by von Papen to the effect that the situation at the time was favorable. In this connection, von Papen referred to the conditions such as had been created on February 4.
QWell -
AHe believed then that Hitler would lead a foreign political success, following these events, and that for a very cheap price, therefore, a certain success could be scored by the Chancellor.
QOf course, what I am trying to clear up her--and you can answer briefly, which, I think, will help us--is this: You and Schusnigg had the impression that advantage would accrue to you and to Austria if you attended this meeting, isn't that so?
AI said earlier that the Chancellor was not optimistic. An improvement on the situation, therefore, was hardly expected, but removal of the existing differences.
QNow, the night before you left for Berchtesgaden, you had a conversation with a man by the name of Hornbastel, is that so? The ambassador.
AYes.
QAnd had you already had a conversation with Seyss-Inquart that same evening, you and Schusnigg?
AIt is ppssible. During those days, repeated discussions took place.
QWell, maybe I can help you a little bit. Don't you recall that Zernatto and SEyss-Inquart were drawing up a memorandum of some sort about domestic questions while you and Hornbastel, I believe, or someone else, were preparing a paper or papers on international matters or matters of foreign policy? Does that help you any?
AI'm afraid I haven't understood you.
QWell, I am referring to the time when you and some of your associates were preparing a memorandum of some sort about the foreign questions, and Sernatto and Seyss-Inquart were preparing papers about domestic affairs.
You remember that, don't you?
AYes.
QNow, you were alarmed that night about Seyss-Inquart, weren't you?
AYes.
QAnd why were alarmed? What was the cause of your alarm? What did you fear at the hands of Seyss-Inquart?
AThe drafts which we saw before the departure, which had been used by Zernatto and Seyss-Inquart as the basis for some of the political discussions, appeared to me to be politically useless It was my impression that two men were working here who had the wil to talk but who didn't do justice to the seriousness of the situation. There were descriptions used, such as the Austrian National Socialist conception opposed to National Socialism, but there is no difference. An Austrian National Socialist conception can only be National Socialist. I criticized these matters during our conference.
QWill you agree that he was in some kind of combination with Hitler and that bad things would result from it for Austria?
By "him" I mean Seyss-Inquart.
ANo, at that time I had no fear that there was a secret agreement between Hitler and Seyss-Inquart.
QNow, when you got to Berchtesgaden the next day, you found that much of the material that had been discussed between Zernatto and yourself and Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg was the basis for Hitler's demands on Schuschnigg, isn't that so?
AYes.
QAnd weren't you convinced, at least that day, that Seyss-Inquart had been in communication with Hitler some time before you got to Berchtesgaden and had communicated to him these basic demands?
AWe merely had the impression that the basis for this conference was a draft which had been prepared by men who knew the conditions, so that a considerable part of Seyss-Inquart's agree ment was based on this program of demands.
The entire program of demands had not been made known to us previously.
QYou and Schuschnigg represented Austria that day at Berchtesgaden?
AYes.
QHitler, von Papen, von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau were there for Germany, isn't that so?
AYes.
QYou and von Papen and Schuschnigg rode from the border together in the same railroad coach to Berchtesgaden, did you?
AYes.
QAnd in the course of that -
A (Interposing): Whether Papen was in the same coach, that I am not sure of, but he was in the same carriage on the way back.
QWell, he was on the train, wasn't he, whether he was in the same coach or not? Didn't he get on the train at the border an ride on with you end Schuschnigg?
AThat I no longer know.
QDidn't he meet you at the border?
AHe was waiting for us at the border, yes.
QPerhaps I am confused, but what I am getting at is a particular conversation that you and Schuschnigg had with von Papen, either right at the time you met him at the border, or in the course of your trip up to Berchtesgaden, when he told you, "Oh, by the way, there are going to be a few generals up here. I hope you won't mind." Do you remember von Papen saying that?
AWell, generals were mentioned, yes. Whether the name Keitel was mentioned, that I can no longer remember, but it was said that he would be there.
QWell, it was rather casually said, and you didn't have any opportunity to object at all, did you? And up to that time you hadn't known there were to be military men there.
ANo, at that time we didn't know.
Q Now, you got to Berchtesgaden at what time of day?
Early in the morning or mid-morning?
AIn the course of the morning.
Q Yes, and I wish you would tell the Tribunal, as well as you can, just what happened there that day.
We have heard much testimony about this meeting, and you are the first person on the stand who was there. I guess that's not so -- Keitel was there also. But at any rate, you participated in the discussion. How did the discussion start?
ATo begin with, the discussion started with a conversation between Hitler and Schuschnigg. That conversation took place alone, so that neither I or the other gentlemen were present. Later, the individual gentlemen were consulted, and then there were conferences between Hitler and the then Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, during which the program, points which had been pointed out before were discussed. In the course of the conversation, individual demands were ...
QWhile Hitler and Schuschnigg were talking, who were you talking with if you were talking with anybody, or whatwere you doing?
AI was together with the other gentlemen whom you have already mentioned, partly in the large hall and partly we sat in the ante-room right outside of the conference room.
QDid you talk to von Ribbentrop, for example, while Schuschnigg was talking to Hitler? What was going on there? What were you discussing with Ribbentrop, if you were talking to him?
AIn the afternoon we discussed, with Ribbentrop the program of demands. I did that partly on my own, and I succeeded in having certain points eliminated
QFor the moment I wish you would limit yourself to time here so that we will know the exact sequence of events as they happened. While Hitler and Schuschnigg were in conference, were you just sitting around in an informal conversation or were you in an actual conference with Ribbentrop or with anyone else?
ANot in the morning, no, because I, at least, had not yet seen the program. The political discussion could only take place on the strength of the individual demands which were to be put.
QThere were recesses, so to speak, between the conferences, and during those recesses, didn't you have the chance to talk to Schuschnigg? During those few intervals?
AYes, after about an hour Schuschnigg came out and told me about the situation.
Q Tell us what he told you, right there.
AHe first of all described the violence of the language used, and then of the ultimatum which was presented.
QTry to tell us what he said if you remember. What did he say about the violence of the language used? That's what we want to know.
AFirst of all, he started with the greeting he had received, then by describing the meeting, and then that the Fuehrer had accused him of not being a German, and had accusedhim of not having followed the German policy which existed even during the time of Hapsburg, and that he was letting the Catholics do too much. Then therewere very serious arguments between Hitler and Schuschnigg personally, during which the Chancellor felt that he personally was being attacked badly. The details of this conference I cannot new remember, but the violence, according to Schuschnigg's description, was very hard.
QYou had luncheon there, I assume, at mid-day or shortly after?
AAfter the conference, on or about 12:00 or 12:30, there was a joint luncheon. There was a perfectly normal tone of conversation because in the meantime the waves had been calmed down.
QWas Schuschnigg quite a heavy smoker?
AYou mean then, or when?
QI mean at that time, of course.
AYes, he was a heavy smoker.
QNow, we have heard that during that day of the conference, he was not permitted to smoke, and that, you pleaded with Ribbentrop to let him have one cigarette. Now, what about that? Is that so, or is that a story?
AWe were told that in the presence of Hitler, there was to be no smoking. That's true. Whether I tried to find a possibility for the Chancellor to be allowed to smoke or whether I actually asked Ribbentrop for permission for the Chancellor to smoke I don't remember, because that detail was not of any importance.
QWell, alright. Anyhow, at this conference did Schuschnigg tell you that Hitler had told him that Seyss-Inquart would be made Minister of Security of the Government?
AI am afraid I could not understand you. There seems to be some interference.
Q Did Hitler demand that Seyss-Inquart be made Minister of Security?
AThat was one of the demands on their program.
QMade by Hitler?
AYes.
QDid he also demand that Glaise Horstenau be named the Minister for the Army?
AThat was the second portion with reference to which those demands were made.
QDid he also demand that all the expelled students from Austria be reinstated?
AYes, students who had been renounced were to be reprieved and admitted to the Universities.
QAnd certain discharged officials were to be reinstated to duty also?
AYes.
QSecond, certain officials of the police in Austria were to be reinstated to duty as well?
AThat came under the chapter "reprieve action".
QWere there also demands made with regard to currency exchange and customs?
AThere were demands of an economic nature of every kind.
QNow, didn't it occur to you as soon as Schuschnigg heard these demands made on you, that this conference had exceeded the limits that had been placed upon it by Von Papen and Schuschnigg? You knew that right away, didn't you?
AYes, the program was more far reaching than we expected, that's quite true, but I don't know whether Von Papen knew the questions previously.
AMy question was, did you not go to Von Papen and tell him, "This is net what we came here to do" or something like that? Didn't you have any conversation with him during one of these recesses?
AOf course, statements of that type were more far reaching than we expected.
QWhat did Von Papen say?
AWe had the impression that he found it awkward at that time.
Q Didn't he suggest, however, that you agree to Hitlers demands?
AThe final condition, that is to say, after some of the concessions had been achieved, certainly was recommended by von Papen because in his opinion, an agreement should be reached. The Chancellor too gave his personal word, because he did not want to leave without a result being reached. Also, the situation was not to be endangered.
QAlso, Hitler agreed that he would dissolve the new National Socialist Party in Austria, didn't he? Didn't he assure you that he would do that?
AYes.
QThat he would recall Dr. Tafs and Leopold, the leaders of the Nazi party in Austria?
AYes.
QAnd also, you agreed to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Minister for Security?
AThe Chancellor agreed with that decision.
QAnd you agreed to take in men by the names of, or men like Fischboek and Wolf into the Austrian Press service?
AThey were to be admitted. Fischboek was to be in the Ministry Economy, and Wolf in the Press section.
QAnd you agreed also, to try to absorb some of the National Socialists int the "Fatherland Front", to absorb them into your own program?
AThe description of trying to absorbe some of the Nazis into the Fatherland Front does not meet with the situation.
QHitler told you that you had until December 15 to accept his terms, didn't he? I mean, February 15.
AYes.
QAnd he told you that if you didn't do so, he would use force?
AThe ultimatum as Hitler had stated it was that he intended, as early as February, to march into Austria, and for the last time, he was prepared to postpone it.
QWhat about those Generals, were they walking in and out while the conference was going on? Men like the defendant Keitel?
ASeveral times the Generals were called in.
QWere you and Schuschnigg frightened? Did you think at one time that you were to be taken into custody or that you were to be shot?
A That possibly we might be taken into custody, yes, but to be shot, no, We thought we may not be allowed to leave.
QDon't you recall that you and Schuschnigg . . . Didn't Schuschnigg tell you that when Hitler called Keitel in, Schuschnigg thought it would be the end? You remember Schuschnigg telling you that, and you said that you agreed because you were frightened too?
AI am afraid I don't understand you.
QDo you remember Schuschnigg telling you, when you were on your way back to Vienna, that he was frightened when Keitel was called in, and that he was afraid that he was going to be shot, and you told Schuschnigg that you were frightened too or words to that effect?
ANo, I don't remember that conversation. Shooting was never mentioned because, as I said, we were only afraid that if things didn't go well we might not be allowed to leave.
Q Very well. What was von Papen doing while the generals were moving in and out ? Did he see that as well as you ?
AWell, of course during such a heated discussion it is quite difficult to say, after eight years what each individual was doing
QThere were not too many of you there -- six or eight. Were you pretty generally in a group ?
AThere were continuous changes. We were not always together. There were various combinations going on all the time.
QLet me put it to you this way: There wasn't any possibility of von Papen failing to see the generals there that day, was there
AOn that day he must have seen them when we were there.
QVon Ribbentrop told yon that Hitler was in a very angry frame of mind, didn't he ?
AYes, we were agreed on that.
QAnd he also urged that you, of course, accept the terms as the best thing for you and for Schuschnigg, didn't he ?
AAt any rate, Ribbentrop at the time did not participate in that pressure. He represented the German demands as well, yes, but not in an unpleasant or violent way. Even at that time I mentioned that to the Chancellor.
QThis was the situation, wasn't it: Von Ribbentrop was playing the role of the nice man, while Hitler inside was playing the role of the horrid man, and you and Schuschnigg were being passed back and forth from one to another ?
AIt was my impression, rather, that Ribbentrop was not acquainted with the subject very well and that for that reason alone he was keeping back.
QThat is interesting, and it is not altogether news in this case, but in any event, isn't it a fact that you were being played off, so to speak, between the nice man, Ribbentrop, and the bad man, Hitler ?
AYou can not describe it like that because it really was not the position. We had to discuss the details with Ribbentrop, and Hitler stated that we would now discuss the details amongst us.
Q Could it be that you do not realize it yet ? Are you sure that that was not the situation, or is it only that you have not realized it to this day ?
AAbout what ?
QThat situation that I suggested -- that you were being maneuvered between the good man and the bad man.
Well, if you don't understand, I don't think we need to go on with it.
Now, how late did you stay there that day, and what time did you leave Berchtesgaden ?
AThe late hours of the evening. I think it was between nine and ten, as far as I remember.
QAnd when you got back to Vienna, did you tell Seyss-Inquart, during which Zernatto had been informed both by the Chancellor and myself. Later on I joined that conversation, but I had the impression that the greater part of the report had already been completed. Only details were talked about later.
QYou told the Tribunal this morning that Seyss-Inquart told you that he wanted to retain some independence for Austria-some semblance of independence, anyway. Now, you did not believe that, did you, when he told you ?
AWell, of course, I can not say Yes or No to that. I turned him down, and therefore I did not think a great deal about his political coneptions because I did not propose to enter the government, but the demand was such that it had to be regarded as being serious.
QWell, you used some particular language when you turned him down, didn't you ? What did you say about wanting to be truthful and decent ?
AI stated at that time that I belonged to Chancellor Schuschnigg, that the laws of decency still applied to me, and that therefore I would resign with him.
QDidn't you use the language, " I still believe in the rules of truth end decency" ?
ANo, the laws regarding faith and decency were still applicable to me. I went all the way with Chancellor Schuschnigg and I would resign together with him . You would have to know my relations to the Chancellor, and anyone who knew it would know that I could not have acted any differently.