THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, I should like to submit it the way I received it from the General Secretary. That is No.106.
THE WITNESS: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate in the years 1941-1918 is shown at a lower figure that the report which I received in 1945.
QI have two questions regarding Austria. The first question is: The American prosecutor has charged that you had given Muehlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes contained?
AYes. It was the outcome of the discussion which I had had with Dr. Schuschnigg and, above all, the agreement of Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaler and Dr. Fischboeck was also included on how the experts on the Fatherland front were incorporated; on all things that we had agreed on, things which Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not have to put through for us here.
QThen the American prosecutor asked you whether you knew that Austrians, after the Anschluss, starved in concentration camps -- after the Anschluss. You answerered, no, that you did not know. But in Austrian concentration camps people died you know. Here in this room, I believe, in the course of time, you have become familiar with conditions in German concentration camps. Were the two identical?
AIn no way at all, and, apart from that, I said that it might have been possible that I heard that Austrians died in Austrian concentration camps. Those things that we heard about German concentration camps, the Austrian collection camps can in no way be compared with the German concentration camps.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination in chief of the Defendant, and with the permission of the High Tribunal, I should like to call my first witness, General Glaise-Horstenau. BY MR. BIDDLE:
QDefendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of land warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
AYes.
QDid you consider that they were all obsolete?
A No.
QWhich ones did you consider were obsolete?
A was of the opinion that the contractual prerequisites for the protection of the civilian population was obsolete because of technical developments for certain warlike measures of complete blockade. Bomb attacks were interested primarily with the construction of the civilian population and, consequently, they were to justifiable only if the civilian population was considered a war potential, just like the troops at the front; and if that is the case, then the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in such a way.
Q And when you say "considered in such a way", you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; isn't that the conclusion?
A That was my conclusion, yes.
Q When was that conclusion reached?
A I believe with the increase of the bombing attacks.
Q Never mind the increase of the bombing attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
A The end of '41, beginning of '42.
Q All right. Now there are two other short questions. You said that you told the Fuehrer that you would not act as a Trojan horse, is that right?
A Yes. Yes, of course.
Q Well, had he suggested to you that you should act as a Trojan horse?
A No, not that, but I was fully aware of my difficult position. It was completely obvious to me that I could be misused for such purpose; that behind my back, behind my ministerial post, a situation could be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
Q Well, you used that expression after you had been talking to the Fuehrer for some time, did you?
A In the course of the discussion, but the thought itself I had had previously. But I avoided that.
Q You had had this thought for some time?
A Yes.
QEver since you had gotten into this Austrian matter actively you had had the thought I suppose?
AThe possibility of a difference of opinion about this situation, that possibility was quite clear to me.
QThat your actions might be misconstrued?
AFirst of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
QOf course. Well, you represented both sides at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
AYes, that is quite correct.
QWell nos, let's take up this matter of declaring forfeited property of enemies of the state. You made those declarations I presume, did you not, as Commissioner?
AYes.
QAnd was that made under a decree of the Fuehrer giving you authority to do that?
AThat was a basic practice which was current in the Reich and if I did -
QNow wait a minute. I didn't ask you about the practice. It was made up under a decree, was it not? That practice was under a decree?
AYes.
QAnd that decree applied to all occupied countries, did it not?
AI don't think so. This decree I announced in the Netherlands myself; the measures in the Netherlands came about on the basis of my directive.
QI understand that. I don't want to get you confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Fuehrer, was it not, giving you that authority; is that right?
AOn the basis of a directive.
QOf a directive of the Fuehrer, right?
AYes.
QIs that directive in evidence? Has it been put in evidence?
AI don't think so.
Q A right. Now tell us what was in it. What was in that directive?
AIt was a rather general directive that the property of persons who were enemies of the Reich was to be confiscated. Even in Austria I issued a decree similar to this. The first one was issued in the Reich itself That was the model.
QNow, you were the person in the Netherlands who had complete discretion to make the determination of who was an enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the decree?
ANo, that was a matter which the police and the courts had to determine.
QI see.
AI had only influence.
QWell, the police didn't have to go to the courts to get that determination surely, did they?
ANo. Either the police directly made a decision like that or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court sentenced the people on the basis of that, and then on the basis of that judgment the confiscations were made.
QAnd the property of the Free Masons was confiscated under that decree. What other property, of what other groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that directive of the Fuehrer? I don't mean individuals; I mean groups?
AA the moment I can't think of any others, although there were a few other groups.
QBut, in effect, see if I state the practice correctly. The police would decide that an individual or group of individuals, on account of their words or their actions, were enemies of the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
AYes. And the decisive factor was Heydrich.
QThe decisive factor was Heydrich?
AAnd the Netherlands agency carried through his decisions.
QAnd you carried through Heydrich's decisions; right?
AYes, I carried through Heydrich's decisions when it came to to confiscation of furtunes.
and the Bibelforschers, the Bible Students belonged to that group.
QOh, the Bible Students bellnged to the group, too?
AYes.
QAnd the property of the Bible Students was confiscated also, since they were evenies of the Reich?
AThey probably didn't have very much, but what they had was confiscated because of their attitude, that they refused to serve in the war effort.
QThey refused -- let me get this straight. This is interesting. The Bible Students refused to fight or to serve in the German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that right?
ANot quite, not quite. The Bible Students in Germany refused to serve in the German Army. First of all they were prohibited and then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
QWait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
AYes; but this group was not prohibited in the Netherlands because they refused to serve in the German Army but rather, they were prohibited on general principles. We were against this group.
QOh, I see, on general principles. As pacifists, you were against them so you confiscated their property; right?
AYes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you return the defendant to the dock?
EDMUND GLAISE HORSTENAU, A witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name, please.
AEdmund Glaise Horstenau.
QWill you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath). THE PRESIDENT: You may sit dorm.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart):
QWitness, what position did you have in the Austrian Hungarian monarchy?
AI was born in 1882 in Braunau in upper Austria. I came of an officer's family of French descent. In 1918 I was a Major in the Austrian Army, and in the Austrian headquarters I was an expert on politics and the press.
QWhat position did you have then in the Austrian Republic?
AAfter the collapse of 1918 -
THEPRESIDENT (Interposing): Witness, will you kindly pause after the question has been asked you. Don't answer it absolutely immediately. Otherwise, it gives the interpreters no opportunity. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
QWhat position did you have in the Austrian Republic?
AAfter the overthrow of 1918, I was in civilian service, Director of Archives at the University, a historian and author. Among other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old Austria, a book -
Q (Interposing) Witness, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only your public positions. I am interested in knowing about them only.
What public positions did you have?
ADirector of Archives. Then, I was minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, guarantor of the July agreement and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart.
In November 1939, I voluntarily entered the German Army, first as a grave registration inspector, and from 1941 on, became a military diplomat and was on duty at Zagreb. However, I had no command at the front. During September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb because, being an old Austrian, I acted against the official politics and was one of the basic opponents of Ustacha.
Another reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the state who was elected by us, by the name of Ante Pavelic, a"criminal object".
QGeneral, I shall put a few brief questions to you, and it is quite sufficient if you just answer the question. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss, but rather how it came about, and therefore I shall have to ask you briefly as to the July Putsch of 1934. Were you in any way connected with Councillor Schuschnigg?
AYes.
QWhat was the economic situation that obtained then?
AThe economic situation which obtained then may be characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6 million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, with their families more than a million were in the misery of unemployment.
QWhat possibilities were there regarding the expansion of the economic area?
AIn this connection I can say openly and immediately that the possibilities always received no as an answer. When Austria wanted the Anschluss, the answer was no. If Austria wanted to call the Habsburgs back, the answer was no. If Austria wanted to enter a German customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was no. Men like Briand spoke of a Danube Federation. We and our neighbors received only cold shoulders. That is the Austrian tragedy.
QDid a party arrive which considered the Anschluss to be the chief problem, and what were the means of this party?
AIn the year 1918, the spearhead of this Anschluss was the National Democratic Party led by Otto Bauer, who, the year previously, had considered the Anschluss to be the only possible thing for the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to the front, but that was at the end of the '20's, and the party was unified and subordinated itself to the leadership of Hitler.
QWho was the then leader of the NSDAP in Austria?
A. The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler, however, in the person of -- I can't think of his name.
Who was this man? In 1933 it was Dr. Habicht.
Q.And after him, is it correct that it was Captain Leopold?
A.After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of the party.
Q.And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with respect to Hitler?
AThey said they were obligated to obedience and loyalty.
Q.We know about the famous agreement of the 11th of June of 1936. After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about his political objectives?
A.I met Seyss-Inquart shortly before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he told me about his political objectives at that time. In general, it coincided with that which he later set up as his political objective?
Q.And what was that briefly?
A.The party, not as an organization, but only as the bearer of ideas, was to be incorporated into the Dollfuss regime. These men were to act in the government,
Q.Did you yourself deal with the Fuehrer Hitler, or did you talk with him?
A.Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
Q.When did Seyss-Inquart enter the government?
A.Seyss-Inquart entered the government the 12th of February 1938.
Q.Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
A.As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on the 17th of February.
Q.Did he tell you about his visit with Hitler? Did he tell Schuschnigg and the other members of the cabinet what had taken place?
A.Certainly he told Schuschnigg and he told me as well.
Q.Did he collaborate in the planned plebescite which was to take place on the 13th of March 1938?
A. At that time, without knowing about the plebescite, I left on the 6th of the month to be gone for two weeks.
Therefore, I cannot give you a reliable answer to this question.
Q.But do you know whether this plebescite had been decided upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
A.To my knowledge, the plebescite was not a matter which concerned the Ministerial Council.
Q.Were the National Socialists in agreement? Did they agree to the plebescite?
A.As far as I found out on my return from my leave, certainly not.
Q.Now, it was know or became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a plebescite. Where were you and what did you witness or experience at that time?
A.On the 6th of March, as I have already said, I went to Stuttgart on leave, something I had planned for a long time. I gave a lecture, and the subject of my speech was -
Q.We are interested only in the facts.
A.Then I undertook a private visit to Landau so that I could visit friends, my French friends, and there Buerckel, whom I had told nothing about my arrival, visited me. While with Buerckel I heard over the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it was obvious to me that the scheduled plebescite would bring about certain grave counter-measures on the part of Hitler, and I decided to go to Vienna at once, to fly back, in fact.
Buerckel was to have arranged this. However, I called over the phone and talked to the Reichschancellery and Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. To the American interrogator I gave the reasons for complying with his request, and subsequently here I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin. I heard from the words of an absolutely authentic witness that he did not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all solutions by force.
During the night of the 9th to the 10th, I arrived at Hitler's and entered a discussion which lasted for two and a half hours, a speech which assumed no concrete proportions.
He arrived at no concrete decision, and told me that during the course of the day, at 11 in the morning, to be exact, he would have me called in. In fact, he had me called at 8 in the evening in order to give me the draft of a resignation for Seyss-Inquart to offer to Schuschnigg and the notes for a radio speech. He declared that he could not bring these notes to Austria himself, and he wanted it to be taken care of in the regular way by courier.
Later on, from the office of Reichsmarshal Goering, I received a draft.
There was a telegram contained therein, containing a second request to Hitler asking for the marching in of the German troops. And I should like to say, from the beginning, I knew the third draft had no actual significance. These were my expressions on the 11th in Berlin.
Q.Then you flew to Vienna and met Syess-Inquart. What did you discuss with him ? What did you do in the morning of the 11th of March ?
A.Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him personally about what had taken place in Berlin, and I told him about the grave doubts and concern which I had, and made it entirely clear to him. Together, SeyssInquart and I, at 11,00 in the morning, that is briefly after my arrival went to Schuschnigg. Before Schuschnigg -- certain inner-political problems had arrived and I did not know about these things because I had been absent Seyss-Inquart laced these questions and after Schuschnigg had a fit of weepi I told him the news and pointed out to him that there might be a possibility of a world war and implored him to give in and to rescind the request for a plebescite which was scheduled for Sunday.
Q.Did you and Syess-Inquart offer to resign ?
A.I cannot recall whether we did that orally. This discussion was rather brief, but afterwards, about 1,00 o'clock in the afternoon, we offered to resign.
At this time, there was another decree on the part of Hitler that a decree of the National Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary for already, on Thursday evening, I had made my decision in front of Buerckel that in connection with the plebescite, I would go to the minister and ask him to resign so that more tragedies could be prevented.
Q.And how did Schuschnigg act to this offer in order to postpone the plebiscite ?
A.Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about 2,00 in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Zernatto, I do not have to tell you who these gentlemen are, decided to establish a modus prevention with Seyss-Inquart. I remember I left since my mission had been accepted and completed on the 12th of February.
Q. And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon ?
A.Certainly after this discussion, which led to no result, Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that he would indefinitely postpone the plebiscite which had been set for Sunday. I believe that the worst of the crisis had passed.
A short period thereafter, Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, end returned visibly agitated and excited saying, that he had been advised for Berlin that Hitler would not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to succeed in the position of Chancellor. Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg, and I turned this down for certain reasons. Seyss-Inquart went in alone, and returned after a brief period of time and we had a discussion -- a discussion which seemed of importance to me. He was confident of the fact of receiving the Chancellorship, and he said to me, almost with an undertone of regret, "Now we will just have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work together with the Catholics and others who one of similar trends.
We will establish an organization together, over which I shall reign and govern However, I demand of Hitler, that as far as internal politics is concerned I will demand an agreement of 5 years silence."
Q.And of course, Hitler, did not react to that. He marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law and as Vice-Chancellor, you signed this law ?
A.Yes, I was a co-signer of this law. I entered into the Government and I counter-signed this law, for three reasons.
First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the world, and that no one was doing anything or lifting a finger in our behalf, Point 2, and I must say something here which has been said in the Southern German press, I entered under the impression of the unheard of and fantastic street demonstrations that were taking place.
You can call this mass psychology, but this mass psychology was resent and it was an unheard of demonstration between people and, Third, when, on the Ballhaus Platz, where I did not participate in the origination of this rule, on the night that I received this law in hand the German Panzer Division was rolling in.
The occupation of the country by Adolf Hitler was nearing its completion and to him it meant, "Now we shall deserve a break. This is the last job." And if anyone tried to force or prevent it, it would not have been possible.
Of course, today it is very easy to say about my home country that it should have committed suicide, rather than be afraid of death.
DR. STEINBAUER:This is quite sufficient, and Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Von Papen):
Q.The July agreement, did it result through pressure from Germany or on mutual wish and mutual interest ?
A.On the basis of mutual wish it was concluded, and as a result of mutual interest.
Q And then later, did you have complete confidence in Schusnigg and he in you?
AUp intil the winter of 1937-1938, we had a complete relationship of confidence to Schusnigg.
QDon't you know anything about the intention of Mr. Von Papen to the effect of the removing of Chancellor Schusnigg?
ANever did I have the slightest hint as to that effect
QWhat was the so-called Hilfsfond?
AThe Hilfsfond was -- this is not to be a criticism -- but this was a fund which was established for the help of National Socialist who had been arrested.
QDid Schusnigg and the Government have knowledge of this fund?
ABoth of them knew about this and they knew of Langoth as well.
QWhat was the NSDAP and Leopold, and what was their connection to Mr. Von Papen?
A.The NSDAP and Leopold were completely adverse to Von Papen, first of all because he was a Catholic, and they distrusted him for certain reasons and in certain ways.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine?
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DODD:
QDid you know a man named General Muff?
AYes, very well indeed.
QYou were in the habit of telling him everything that went on in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
ANo.
QDo you know Stephen Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to Germany?
ANot him either. We spoke together perhaps, but I did not let myself be used as an informer.
QThen what did you think you were being brought to Berlin for by Buerckel from Stuttgart?
AI cannot quite follow you, I am sorry.
QWhat did you understand was the purpose of your trip, when you were being brought from Stuttgart to Berlin in 1938, when Hitler wanted to see you?
AI did not go from Stuttgart, but rather from the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered this matter and accepted, for at all costs, I wanted to find out what this was all about.
QI wanted to know what you thought was the purpose of your trip when you left, from wherever it was that you left, to go to Berlin. That's all.
AMy intention was to comply with Hitler's invitation adn to see just what was taking place in Berlin.
QYou told the Tribunal that you were interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when you got the false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for Seyss-Inquart, you certainly didn't think you were proceeding in a peaceful manner insofar as Austria was concerned, were you?
AFrom these three things, I had the absolute impression that if Schusnigg were to recall and not hold the plebiscite, then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
QAnd what do you suppose you were going to do with the false telegram which asked Hitler for a warning. You knew that this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you consent to carry this back to Austria?
AI did not carry it along and there was a difference of opinion between myself and Fieldmarshal Goering. I did not take it along. It was given to a courier.
QYou told us, we have your notes here, in which you said you did carry it along.
ANo, never did I say that. It would be against reality and truth. I never put down, in a note, or say that I took any of these three things along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that, and I should like to call your attention to the fact that according to the agreement, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with the Reich agency in the Reich.
QWell, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a falsehood didn't you? Whether you carried it or Globocnik did, it wasn't true, was it?
AI beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever to do with this telegram, and later on, I asked Seyss-Inquart whether this telegram had been sent off and he said no, it had never been sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used here in Austria.
QCertainly, they were not given to you by Hitler to throw into the waste basket, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they were going to be utilized did you?
AThat was the task of Seyss-Inquart because according to the Berchestagen agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of answering something else. BY MR. DODD:
QWell, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to think that you had some other reasons, but I don't want to press it any further.
ANo, I would be very grateful if I could follow. I do not quite follow it and I don't understand the point of your question.
QWell, if you don't understand it, I do not think there's any point in pressing it.
AI should be very grateful if you would.
QWhat I suggested in my question was that you, at least, knew about this false telegram which was drafted either by Hitler or by Goering. You were then a Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria, knowing that this telegram had been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier.
AThe telegram had lost any and all significance through the fact that Schusnigg agreed not to hold the plebiscite, and I told Schusnigg that I was referring it to Seyss-Inquart to say anything that was to be said if Hitler would march in.
Q All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not going on with it.
Do you remember telling us at the time Goering was talking with Seyss-Inquart on the telephone, you found out that the defendant von Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Goering in Berlin?
AI am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse in 1945.
QWhat I want ti know is, how di you find that out?
AI found out from Wiedmann. with whom I just happened to be together.
QAll right. Now, you know defendant Von Papen once wrote a letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany. and that was away back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence in this case, US 67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator with von Papen?
AI was a willing collaborator for the normalization of the conflicts arising out of the situation, but I am not familiar with this document.
MR. DODD:I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT:Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER:No, sir.
THE PRESIDENT:The witness can retire.
THE PRESIDENT:We will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken.)
FRIEDRICHRAINER, a witness, took the stand and tesified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name, please?
ADr. Friedrich Rainer.
QWill you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT:You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STEINBAUER:
QWhat functions did you have and how long did you have them, in the NSDAP?
AI have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until 1934 I carried out no functions.
Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Corinthia called me to the Gauleiter's office.
Beginning in 1936 I worked in the county offices. County Director Leopold in the autumn of 1936 relieved me of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In February 1938 Klausner appointee me his political adviser and collaborator, after I had been called to the County Command Office again. In May 1938 the Fuehrer appointed me Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to Corinthia. Those were my political function.
QYou were Gauleiter of Corinthia in the end, therefore?
AYes.
QAnd through years of work in the NSDAP, you had a chance to get to know it well?
AYes, I know the conditions well since the Anschluss.
QThen when did you come to know Seyss-Inquart?
AThe First time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1933. We had a conversation which lasted only a few minutes. A few days later I was arrested, and for six and a half months I was in the custody of the Austrian police. After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that.
QWas he a member of the Party?
ADuring the time that the Party was prohibited, Seyss-Inquart was not a member of the NSDAP. He was a member of Steirischer Home Protection Organization. That organization was, I think, in 1933, and by agreement between their leaders with Habicht, a part was taken over as part of the Austrian NSDAP. After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich Treasurer, Dr. Schwartz, and the members of the Home Protection Organization, among them I believe Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply for membership again.
QSo your statement in that famous Reiner letter--I shall call it the Reiner letter hence fort --is incorrect, is it?
AAt that time I did not know that the admission in its original form had not been recognized by the Reich Treasurer.
QSo that we can say you knew Seyss-Inquart, you had talked to him quite frequently, and surely he would have told you his ideas regarding the Anschluss.
A Yes.
QWhat were these ideas? Please be very brief.
AThe Anschluss, at that time, was not the subject matter of our discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all Austrian parties; it remained the ideal or the target for all of us. In this case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State should once again steer a course towards Germany and that the interior conditions should be peaceful.
The difficulty in this connection was that the arrangement made by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg excluded conditions of the Constitution, and the State, based thereon, was to be a system of only one party. It was particularly difficult, therefore, on the part of the opposition of the National Wing, to participate in the work and to make that legal.
That task, according to Seyss-Inquart's conception and my own, was to be carried out without further bloodshed and on the basis of a peaceful method. If there was sufficient good will and if the radicals could be gotten over to our side, such a way seemed practical.
QThere was an agreement on the 11th of July, 1936?
AYes.
QThen you, at that time, went to see Adolf Hitler to clarify his attitude towards that party. What did Adolf Hitler have to say at the time?
AA few days after the 11th of July, 1936, I went to Berchtesgaden, where I was called; and on the 16th or 17th of July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT:I think you can go a little faster than you are going, witness.
A (continuing) The Fuehrer made a very serious statement during that conference, and he demanded, in very severe words, that the Austrian National Socialists should respect the agreement of the 11th of July under all circumstances. He criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of such methods would lead to continue us foreign political difficulties.
He demanded that the National Socialists in Austria should use the existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question regarding the Fatherland Front, he said "Yes". He assured us that in the near future the general atmosphere would be relieved and that the relationship between these two German states would thus be improved.
QIn principle, therefore, he approved of Seyss-Inquart's policy; is that right?
AThe Fuehrer's statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
QWas Seyss-Inquart the leader of the Party?
ANo; Seyss-Inquart was never the Party Leader.
QDid he subordinate himself to the leaders of the Austrian NSDAP as you state in your letter?
ASeyss-Inquart was a member of the national opposition group, and in that capacity he recognized the leaders wherever they were.
As to that letter, I want to draw your attention to the fact that he recognized Klausner, because Klausner, after the Berchtesgaden agreement, had replaced Leopold by request of the Fuehrer, since he was steering a quiet, clear, and open course. In the cooperation with him there appeared to be a safeguarding for the Berchtesgaden agreement.
Seyss-Inquart, however, had explicitly stated that in his capacity as trustee for the agreement of Berchtesgaden and Minister in Schuschnigg's government, he considered himself independent from Klausner.
QTell me, Mr. Witness, after the understanding of the 12th of February, 1938, did you, during a railway journey, meet Seyss-Inquart, who was coming back from his visit to the Fuehrer?
AYes.
QWhat did he tell you about his conference with the Fuehrer?
ASeyss-Inquart returned in a sleeper, and we sat together in his compartment. He had a piece of paper -- I think it was an envelope -- and on that there were notes. I remember that he described the formalities which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his capacity as an Austrian Minister and that he wanted to deal with the Constitution, and that he considered himself responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans.