and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to Mauthausen did not occur again.
Synagogues were burned. Apparently someone was thinking of the 8th of November 1938. I immediately took steps so the cases did not increase. Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General Secretary van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it. the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. In the execution, this basis was certainly abandoned. It was nothing but the execution of measures against the Jews, such as had occurred in the Reich. Perhaps, in one case or another, even more was done, for I know that for example in the Netherlands there was a drive to force the Jews to be sterilized. Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg camp and in the Vught camp. We had also prepared to create the corresponding work opportunities. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to make available from the Dutch budget means which the Jewish population should have according to the proportion. districts and two camps, various difficulties occurred, various hardships which were perhaps unavoidable. Perhaps they might be considered excesses. Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be distinguished in order that they could be controlled, and in order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other restrictions.
In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a Dutchman who, out of protest, were such a star himself.
In 1942, Heydrich again made demands that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, and that then one could not allow such a hostile population to remain in the theater of war. He pointed out that he was responsible for the security of the Reich in the this evacuation and attempted to find other ways out.
At the end, Heydrich carry out all measures in the occupied territories as well.
I inquired of Take 23-GES Ahuna I was told that the Jews were sent to Auschwitz.
I had people sent from the Netherlands to Auschwitz.
They came back with the report that that was a camp for 80,000 people.
The people were comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100 men.
A witness here confirmed that this
THE PRESIDENTL How long do you think you are likely to be?
DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished at least by noon tomorrow, but perhaps it will take only an hour.
I have questions on plundering of economic measures, and destruction.
Then I will be finished.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946, at 1000 hours) MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday with respect to the notes of the conference between this Defendant and Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts, apparently, Colonel Williams of our Staff, who interrogated this Defendant late in October, was handed these notes by the Defendant, and somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced. So the Defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but I think in error in saying that he turned 1?hem over to me.DR. SEYSS-INQUART -- Resumed BY DR. STEINBAUER: indictment, the question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the Netherlands? to the camp Auschwitz, which was indicated to me, in order to ascertain whether and what the possibilities of shelter there were, I reported the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police or Heydrich whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to remain in contact, by mail with the Netherlands. This concession was made to me. For about three quarters of a year or a year, such contact by mail was maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I don't know how the camp administration did this. The letters were identified as authentic by the addressees. When the number of letters dropped off later -- it never stopped completely - the Security Police told me that the Jews in Auschwitz had only few acquaintances in the Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in Auschwitz.
Q Witness, did you not turn to Bormann, too?
A Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich's order. I turned to Bormann to inquire of the Fuehrer whether Heydrich actually had such powers. Bormann confirmed this. I admit frankly that I had misgivings against the evacuation.
Q Did you do anything to do away with these misgivings? course of the war - they were to the effect that the severity of the war would be an especial "burden on the Jews. If there was too little food in the Reich, the Jewish camps would receive little, and probably they would be strictly treated and comparatively slight occasions would be taken advantage of to impose severe penalties. Of course I also thought of the unavoidable tearing apart of families, at least in part, in the case of labor commitment. That was the reason why we resisted for three or four months. The decisive argument was the statement of the competent authorities, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the Jews should not be in the immediate theater of war.
always that the German people were in a life and death struggle. Today things appear different in their actual effects. At that time, we might have said, "The Jews will be kept together in some camp, even if under severe conditions, and after the end of the war they will find a settlement somewhere.' But these considerations had to be put aside, for their presence in the battle area could weaken the German power of resistance. In the course of 1943 I spoke to Hitler. I called his attention to this problem in the Netherlands, In his own convincing way, he assured me at that time, but at the same time he admitted that he was thinking of a permanent evacuation of the Jews if possible, from all of Europe with which Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to see to it that the Jews would be settled en the eastern border of the German sphere of interest in so far as they could not emigrate to other parts of the earth. At the beginning of 1944, I spoke to Himmler, I met him occasionally in Southern Bavaria. I asked him about the Jews in the Netherlands. The fact that our eastern front was being with drawn meant that the camps would fall into the battle area in the course of time, or at least into the rear areas. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews would be even more serious then. Himmler said, approximately, "Don't worry; they are my best workers." I could not imagine that on the one hand the Jews capable of working were working, and on the other hand their relatives were destroyed. I believe that in such a case one could only expect that a Jew would spring at a German and strangle him. Reich Commissioner for the administration. Did you cooperate in them? myself with it to the extent that this was possible as Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, powers to carry out the evacuation, to take steps if excesses occurred beyond unavoidable difficulties, or to report to no. Dr. Boehmke had a constant struggle with the so-called Central Office for Jewish Emigration. He had to intervene again and again, but I am convinced that we did not avoid all hardships.
The Jews were gathered in the Westerborg camp. When the first transport left, I received a report that the trains were over-crowded. I remonstrated to the Commander of the Security Police and I asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly manner.
The Netherlands Report states that in the beginning the transports were made under bearable conditions; later, conditions generally became worse. But such overcrowding of trains as occurred, as indicated in the report, did not come to my knowledge. execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of a few Netherlands general secretaries, especially General Secretaries van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions. The basic measure could not be changed. I believe that the number of exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands report, at least according to my reports.
These Jews were, at the last, in the Westerborg Camp. When the invasion began, Himmler wanted to remove them. When I objected, this was not done. After the battle of Arnhem, they were removed to Theresienstadt as he said, and I hope that they remained alive there.
Q Did you release property on this occasion?
DR. STEINBAUER: To close this chapter, I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish problem in the Netherlands, and on page 6 it gives all the agencies which dealt with the Jewish problem.
Under No.3 you will find the General Commissar for Security, the Higher SS and police Leader H. Rauter, General of Police.
Under No.4 is the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Leeder aus der Funte, under General Commissar. The report said, "Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality, an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate them, or to deport them."
not the defendant.
THE WITNESS: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as Higher SS and Police Chief in this case, and not as General Commissar for Security. The measures were carried out by the German police, and not by the Netherlands police.
DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech spoke about the Jewish problem at one time. The prosecution has submitted a part of this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you are putting this document 1726 PS to the witness, which contains an historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the historical statement is accurate?
Do you, defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?
THE WITNESS: May I see the document?
(A document was handed to the witness)
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the document or whether he challenges it.
THE WITNESS: The presentation of facts is correct, with the addition which I made in connection with the General Commissar for Security.
THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your attention ought to be drawn to: February, 1941, forinstance. You have the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading, February, 1941? Do you see that?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I asked the witness, and he said that the facts are accurate. BY DR. STEINBAUER: I have the English here, saying that Jews were arrested and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
A I discussed the case yesterday. That was a measure on the direct order of Himmler, which I learned of after it had been carried out, and against which I protested. To my knowledge, the mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur after that.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that document is accurate, with the exception of the two passages to which you referred under the numbers 3 and 4, on the last page. Is that right?
THE WITNESS: In my testimony yesterday, I confirmed the orders contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual events. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is correct? prevention of the destroying of synagogues in the Hague and Amsterdam.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Steinbauer. Go on.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I should like to refer to document 79, Page 203, U.S.A. 708. That is a speech which Seyss-Inquart made on the Jewish question The prosecution submitted this document; but I must add to that by reading the last sentence: "The only thing we may talk about is the creating of a tolerable transitory condition by maintaining our stand that the Jews are enemies and thus applying every precaution customarily observed against enemies. As regards the time when Germany will not be here as an occupational force to maintain order in public life, the Dutch people will have to decide for themselves whether they want to endanger the comradely union with the German people for the sake of the Jews ..." BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Witness, I should like to ask you about this speech. Were you thinking of the complete elimination and destruction of the Jews?
A I never thought of that. In this speech I was not even thinking of evacuation. At that time, I held the point of view that the Jews should be confined in the Netherlands, was done to enemy aliens. For the reasons which are given in the preceding part of this speech, which the American prosecution submitted, that was still the point of view, of treating them as enemy aliens. Englishmen, for example, were also transported to the Reich.
Jews which were customary in the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the speech?
THE WITNESS: This speech is March, 1941. and made the somewhat imaginative suggestion that all belligerent powers should pool one per cent of their funds to solve the economic problem of the Jews. I was of the opinion that the Jews still existed; I never called the Jews inferior. BY DR. STEINBAUER: violations of international, the chapter on plundering.
Who confiscated raw materials and machinery in the Netherlands? agencies. The execution was in part under my agencies and part with the Wehrmacht, the armament inspectorate, also with the police and the Waffen SS; and from the beginning of 1944 it was transferred eseentially to the agency of the armament minister, which was also my agency, and tothe field economic commands of the high command of the army. At that time, control was extremely difficult.
Q What was your attitude toward this problem? fare were obsolete and could not be applied to a modern war because the labor potentiality of the civilian population is at least as important as the war potentiality of the soldiers at the front. The limitation seemed, to me, to be according to circumstancesof the state of our own population. This was doubtless, quite different in the various countries. I therefore endeavored to obtain a statement from Reichsmarshal Goering that the Dutch must live under the same conditions as the German people, and this promise was not completely kept, however.
Q How was the confiscation carried out? By what authority?
A Until 1943, the Dutch agencies carried out our assignments. The technical work was done by many experts. I did not understand anything about such matters. I took steps when complaints reached me. For example, I prevented the removal of the factory in Dortrecht, and a new electrical works in Leuvarden. machines could be taken back to the Reich from factories which delivered more than one-half of total production to the Reich, for example Phillips in Einhoven. What do you have to say about this?
A We were against the black market from the beginning. It was always a so-called "grey market" with us. I had prohibited food from current production being bought on the black market. Every case was investigated by the competent authorities, agreement with the Dutch authorities. It was a business which had been forbidden by me. The good were confiscated and turned over to the Dutch authorities. This measure was 100% for the benefit of the Dutch. What the German Reich wanted officially it got anyhow. the lowest. The figures are deceptive since prices on the black market were several times higher than these on the normal market. The actual amount of goods is much lower.
instruments over to the SS.
A That is true. Please judge that in connection with my general statements. The SS needed microscopes for its hospitals in general, which had been destroyed by bombings. In the laboratories of the University at Utrecht, there were such microscopes which were not being used. I had the case investigated by my agency, and what seemed dispensable I confiscated. for the Dutch. The Reich wanted to close the Institute at Leyden, which is one of the most famous research institutes in the world. I believe the Soviets and Americans have one especially for atomic experiments. I prevented closing this organization whihc would have meant an irreparable less for the Netherlands. Experiments were carried out by Professor Eisenberg in Leyden. Lymmuiden removed.
A This firm was built up by a German firm after May 1941. The electrical installations of this organization were repeatedly destroyed by the English, not without the aid of the intelligence service of the Dutch resistance movement. In my opinion, there was justification in the Reichmarshall's order that they be moved to the Reich. This was done. Why damages were not paid, I don't understand. I had issued an order that all such demands had to be fully paid, but perhaps the German concern gave back its share. ation means to the Reich. That was the affair of the transport command of the Wehrmacht. Once I took part in confiscating 50,000 bicycles, but there were 4,000,000 bicycles in the Netherlands. This was for the mobilization of troops in the Netherlands proper. collections. in the public museums of Amsterdam, Mortizhaus and so forth were especially protected, but it is possible that loans to these museums belonged to Jewish people who were taken to the Reich within the general frame of confiscating Jewish property.
There was one case. A Krueller foundation existed in the Netherlands which was given to the Netherland States by will. With my aid, three pictures were taken to the Reich from this foundation, for which I later concluded a contract for sale with the authorities in charge of the foundation. I endeavored to replace these pieces for the museum. I procured a Van Gogh and a Corre, and the head of the museum once told me that the new pictures suited the museum better than the old ones. Coast. When the Coast was declared a fortification area, I induced the Dutch authorities to have a new cellar built as Mastrich. The pictures were taken there, always under Dutch administration. No German had anything to do with it. In the fall of 1944, Dr. Goebbels demanded that the pictures be taken to the Reich. I refused this and had reliable guards placed in the cellar by a person from the Dutch Ministry with the necessary powers in order that they would not be turned over to the enemy troops. I was convinced that the Dutch Government in England would see to it that these pictures would remain in the Netherlands.
Q Did you yourself acquire any pictures? two or three small pictures by contemporary artists. As Reichscommissar, I bought pictures by contemporary artists at exhibitions when I liked them and when they seemed worth the price and were offered for sale. Reich, especially to the Hunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna and the Reich Governor's office in Vienna. They were all pictures on the open market, as far as I am informed. Included was a picture ascribed to Vermeer but contested. On the other hand, I acquired an authentic Vermeer for the Dutch State by preventing the sale to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, there is no specific charge against this defendant of having bought pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: It was mentioned in the Trial Brief. May I continue We will conclude this question.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want details about it. It is sufficient if he told us that he paid for the pictures. He need not give us details about the pictures.
DR. STEINBAUER: I will go on to the next question. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q I submit to you document RF 136. It describes the confiscation of the property of the Queen of the Netherlands. Pictures and art objects from Jewish fortunes or from enemy fortunes, when ther was reason, were liquidated and sold in the Reich. A very lively free trade developed with the participation of the Dutch art dealers, doubtless supported by the free transfer of currency. RF 136. what do you know about the order for the liquidation of this property
A I myself ordered this liquidation. In the Netherlands, of course, there was an order to confiscate enemy property as in all occupied territories. When we came to the Netherlands, the royal property was only placed under administration, without any steps being taken against it.
After the outbreak of the campaign in the East, in the very first days, the Queen of the Motherland spoke personally on the radio, not only with a very antagonistic attitude but with the definite appeal for active resistance and with serious personal accusations against the Fuehrer. In this state of affairs, the property of any Dutch citizen would have been confiscated. I therefore decided to proceed in this case in the same way in order to prevent further developments, but also in the conviction that I could not make an exception. I myself signed the ord
Q What instructions did you give in the course of the liquidation? I ordered the estates to be turned over to the Motherlands State, I believe with the exception of one house. Also the shares, the archives, everything of historical or artistic value should be selected by a Dutch commission so that the Netherlands State could take it over. The commission included almost everything in its list that was at all possible. I realized that and did not strike out one piece. In particular, I had the historical installations at Joesdisch and Huistenborch turned over in full, although Berlin wanted them placed elsewhere.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that the defendant need make this quite so detailed, Dr. Steinbauer. He has made the point that some of the things were turned over to the Netherlands State.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I ask one brief question? BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Do you know to what extent the property was actually liquidated?
A I had a survey given to me. It was reported to me that three, or at most five, percent of the property was actually liquidated.
and raw materials. Who undertook this confiscation?
A I may refer to my previous statement. In the late summer of 1944 on, this was done primarily by the Feldwirtschaftkommandos, the Field Economic Command. There are individual documents available with notations referring them to me. There were many unauthorized confiscations. People came from the Reich with trucks and began to take away machinery. Together with the Wehrmacht commander and the Higher SS and Police Chief, I ordered that strict measures should be taken against these methods.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to refer to two documents which I submitted but which I shall not read in order to save time. These are documents number 80 and 81, page 205 and 208. The first sentence is interesting. It concerns Wehrmacht matters carried out by the occupation forces. BY DR. STEINBAUER: removal of furniture was clothing from Arnhem was carried out.
A The charge is correct. The situation was as follows: The front was directly south of Arnhem. There were three or four resistance lines built in Arnhem proper. The city had been completely evacuated. It was being shelled. The goods in Arnhem were gradually being ruined in the course of the winter. The Fuehrer ordered at that time through Bormann that textiles, particularly for German families who had suffered bomb damage, should be brought from the Netherlands. probably have been that these things would either have been plundered or would have been rained by the weather or in a battle for Arnhem they might have been burned. Although it was not in my territory but at the front and the executive power lay with the Wehrmacht, I gave my approval that in the circumstances should warrant, consumer articles and textiles should be brought to the Ruhr. I ordered at the same time that the items should be taken for the replacement of damage. I believe that Dr. Wimmer can confirm this.
A I opposed this strongly. When such a case was reported to me, I, through my General Prosecutor, had the order for arrest issued.
Q Now I go on to the next question. How about the blowing up of ports, docks, locks and mines in the Netherlands?
A Such things were blown up at the time when the Netherlands became a theatre of war.
As for port and dock installations or shipyards, the following was decisive: The port of Antwerp fell almost undamaged into the hands of the enemy. I believe that it was of decisive importance for the further development of the offensive. Thereupon the competent military authorities in the Netherlands began a precautionary blowing up of such installations. I know only the fact, not the details. I refused to watch the explosions, but my deputies intervened with the Wehrmacht agencies, and I believe that in Rotterdam half of the installations were not blown up. This is shown by the Netherlands report. I had nothing whatever to do with the matter, aside from what I have just said. up mines as war-important installations. I inquired of Reich Minister Speer, and he issued an order not to blow them up but only to cripple them; that is, to interrupt operations for three or four months. The orders were issued to this effect. I hope that they were not violated.
Q Here in this trial we have heard of an order for "scorched earth". Was it in effect in the Netherlands also?
A I received the "scorched earth" order from Bormann. Without military necessity, all technical installations were to be blown up. That meant, in effect, the destruction of Holland, that is, the Western Netherlands. If explosions were carried out in 14 or 16 places in Hollandm the country would disappear under the water in a few weeks. I did not carry out the order at first. I established contact with Reich Minister Speer. I had a personal meeting with him on 1 April in Oldenburg. Speer told me that the same order had been given in the Reich, but that he was frustrating it, that he now had full authority in this matter, and that he agreed that the order should not be carried out in the Netherlands. It was not carried out.
Q Now, to another chapter. Floods did occur. Did you have anything to do with them? something to do with it.
There were prepared floodings by the Wehrmacht for defense purposes, and battle floodings, whichsuddenly became necessary in the course of battle.
The prepared ones were carried out in close contact with my agency and the Dutch agencies. At their intervention, about half of the area was spared and saved. The flooding was mostly with fresh water so that less damage would be done, and the outer dikes were spared. Commander in Chief of Holland. Veeringer Seepolder was especially mentioned. At that time there was great danger of an air landing, at the demand of the Dutch defense front. I was not actually informed of the battle measures taken; the commander had decided on it overnight.
When, on the 30th of April, I talked to General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, he told us: "What has been flooded so far can be justified in a military sense; if youflood any more now, it is no longer justifiable." without reading it. It shows that these floodings were of a purely military character. of the food supply for the Netherlands population. What measures did you take to maintain the food supply for the Dutch people? difficult question of the whole administration, and I believe, from the special aspects of the case, it was the most difficult in all the occupied territories. there are more than 600, to be fed. The food economy is highly cultivated, dependent upon the import of hundreds of thousands of tons of fodder. Since the occupation and the blockade, that was all gone. The whole food economy had to be changed over to the production of food for immediate human consumption. It was certainly a great achievement of Dutch agriculture that this was successful. However, I may say that my experts aided very effectively, and we got a great deal of support from the Reich.
than in any other occupied territory. The most important thing for me was to maintain this food supply, although the leader, General Director Lauers, and his entire apparatus, were hostile to the Germans. Against the will of the Reich Central Office I received it, because otherwise I would not have been able to hear the responsibility for the nourishment of the people.
Q Did you also deliver food to the Reich? supplied from the Reich, and vegetables were demanded in exchange. The Reich demanded more vegetables and also the delivery of cattle, canned meat, legumes, and a few other things. Vegetables and meat would not have made so much difference, but the legumes were a little difficult. I am convinced that the Dutch food system did as much as it could.
Q What was the situation in the fall of 1944? of 3,000, and then of 2500 calories. In 1944 we had 1800 calories. Experience today shows what that meant. At about the time that the first British airborne divisions were landed at Arnhem, on order of the Dutch Government in England a general strike of Dutch railroads began and it was carried out almost completely. At the same time, these ships in internal waters disappeared. It was not a strike, but it amounted to the same thing. Wehrmacht were greatly endangered. Ther German Wehrmacht began to confiscate ships and, in effect, interrupted all traffic. I established contact with it, and it said that if the railroad strike should stop it would not have to proceed rigorously. I reported this to General Secretary Hirschfeld and General Director Lauers. They achieved no results, and I had to consider how I could restore shipping. I discussed it with the Wehrmacht, and I suggested that I give them two or three weeks' time in which they could secure their necessary shipping space. Of about two million tons available, they needed 450,000 tons. Also, during this time I would forbid all ship traffic, because the Wehrmacht was confiscating all ships anyhow. I permitted traffic of small ships in Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How is all this relevant to the charges made against the defendant?
DR. STEINBAUER: The Netherlands report, which the prosecution mentioned, states in great detail that the defendant, as Reich Commissar, is responsible for the famine which began in September of 1944, until the spring of 1945, and for the great mortality, especially of children, because, on the occasion of the shipping and railroad strike, he prohibited the import of food. That is one of the most serious charges made against him. I have asked for witnesses on this subject, and perhaps I might cut it short now so that the witnesses may speak about it.
THE WITNESS: I must ask to be allowed to comment on this matter. This is the charge which seems the most serious to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Perhaps we can have a brief recess now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. In the Government Report it is asserted that at that time 50,000 Dutch people died of starvation and, therefore, I should like to ask you what reason did you have for establishing this traffic embargo at that time?
A. I believe I have already set up and stated my reasons. The traffic situation was such that the Wehrmacht had to assure its shipping space, and as long as it did that there was no ship traffic possible. I wanted to limit the SState to as short a period of time as possible, so that afterward, assured ship traffic would be made possible and the food supply of Holland could be assured in a regular and orderly manner. In practice, traffic was not interrupted through my embargo, but rather -I believe witnesses will confirm me in this -- that the fact of the confiscation of ships was the cause. Of course, naturally, I asked myself whether the Dutch food supply would be endangered, and I said to myself that the Dutch people themselves were responsible for being in this state of emergency, that they had brought it about themselves, and of course that the military interests of the Reich were equally important. I told myself, further, if in the next half of October I can reinstate an orderly ship traffic then, in my opinion, I shall have two months' time in which to take care of the food supply for the Dutch people. Then I can bring over one hundred fifty to two hundred, thousand tons of food supplies and that will be sufficient to establish rations of 1400 to 1800 callories. I believe I can recollect that between the 15th and 20th of October, I gave the order to reinstate ship traffic.
Q. And what did you do in this direction?
A. Ship traffic was not reinstated because the Dutch traffic authorities, for the most part, had disappeared, perhaps because they were afraid that they would be made responsible for the general railway strike. For weeks on end we tried unsuccessfully, and at the end I talked with General Secretary Hirschfeld and gave him complete authority.