"As long as I was there, I had the impression that the defendant von Papen acted in accordance with these basic principles. That means the bringing about of connections in a peaceful manner rather then with force."
This last statement is contrary to the first half of his answer. Apart from that, this latter sentence -
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or contradictory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction in the second half. "Rather than by force" is contrary to the first half of his reply, since he said that he acted according to these principles.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is: "As long as I was there, I had the impression that the defendant von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing relations through peaceful means rather than force."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says "rather than with force." In the English version the objection is to the word "rather".
THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful means. "Not by force" he means.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In my text it says "rather than by force".
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same thing.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might cause the assumption that the defendant von Papen did not even consider or contemplate peaceful means. We want to prive, in accordance with the foregoing sentence, that he rejected other means than peaceful ones. uttered by the Court, then I have no further objections and I do not wish to press this point.
THE PRESIDENT: It couldn't mean anything else in English. I don't know what it could mean in German.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it would mean: "I would prefer peaceful means, but in the last analysis, if need be, other than peaceful means would have to be considered."
That would be the interpretation of the German version. We want to establish and confirm that none other than peaceful methods were ever considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the Tribunal that the prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which Your Lordship has just put it. We shouldn't suggest for a moment that Prince Erbach would make any other answer that in the sense the Tribunal has accepted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you would agree to read the words in the sense "and not by force."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree, and I should like to have the decision of the Tribunal as to whether Graf Feil will be transported here so that he can depose an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Feil, who write this letter, which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David. to draw our attention to in the Prince's interrogatory?
Has the letter of Count Feil been translated?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Not yet, My Lord, but it is a rather simple letter. However, we can not prove the identity of the letter, and that is why we wanted the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the prosecution were prepared to admit the letter?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, My Lord. It would quite suffice; the contents are sufficient. Even if we had an affidavit, we could not prove anything other than what is actually contained in the letter already.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David. we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl von Feil will be admitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention one point that arose on Tuesday. been permitted by the prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at an early stage, in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to general evidence of shackling because I said that the prosecution had not led evidence as to shackling by the Germans as part of their case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued.
I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later stages, adopted the same line. order that was part of the preparations for the commando order, and I said so at the time. the learned professors who are conducting the defendant Jodl's case, or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain that it was a misunderstanding and that neither of us feel that we have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with reference to the admission or introduction of ths?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to it, and the defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to make a full explanation as to it. I only wanted it understood how the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in so doing.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): I should like to put one question to the witness. BY MR. NELTE:
Q Witness, the accusation has been raised against the defendant. Field Marshal Keitel, that "rather than to protect his subordinate officers, he threatened them with turning them over to the Gestapo". was not the case? to the officers of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab, of the Operational Staff of the Wehrmacht; and as far as Colonel Minst was concerned, who was closely connected with him as the Chief of his division, there was almost a fatherly relationship between them. I can also say that I myself, with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, one of the workers of my staff, in the year 1945, on the basis of factual dissent with the staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, was accused in a letter to Field Marshal Keitel that I had disturbed the cooperation and that I had sabotaged the conduct of the war; and in the reply, Field Marshal Keitel requested us and said that he would take the complete responsibility for everything which his subordinate officers were doing.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Cross examination.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross examine. That, of course, will not be taken that the prosecution is accepting the truth of this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated the 20th of May, 1946.
Mr Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit, in which case if should he given a number, or whether it should go to the Commission.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary for it to be given an exhibit number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. That enables Dr.Laternser to refer to it hereafter.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the prosecution should get copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course.
MR. ROBERTS: We, of course, have not received any.
Mr Lord, Mr. Dodd is printing out that we have not seen this affidavit. We do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy, and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.
THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be supplied to the prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, and so be able to cross examine if they wish to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the prosecution, and they may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.
Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.
THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nurnberg?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit over the week-end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, will you examine the next witness?
DR. JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Yes, if it is the wish of the High Tribunal. With the permission of the High Tribunal, I wish to call Major Buechs as my next witness.
as follows. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: the pure truth and will withheld nothing and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Witness, what position did you have in the last years of the war? of the Luftwaffe, with the chief of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab, the Wehrmacht Operational Staff. And in that capacity, I was an adjutant with Colonel General Jodl.
Q And were you in this position until the end of the war? 23 rd of May, 1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, would you consider the lights? When that yellow light goes on, it means that you are going too fast; and if you would try to make a pause after the question comes through to you, that would be much better.
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Witness, during this time in which you were in the Fuehrer's headquarters, did you see that the headquarters was in different areas?
A Yes. In East Prussia, I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in the year 1944, in Berchtesgaden.
Q It has been mentioned that at the Fuehrer's headquarters, there was a party clique allegedly. Do you know anything about that? would choose to call Fegelein, Bormann and Burgdorf.
Q You would say that that was a clique? official contact, and to the outside world created this impression of being a clique. with others? I also observed that these three gentlemen had a very strong influence on Adolf Hitler himself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three again? They did not come to us quite clearly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. BY DR. JAHRREISS: three gentlemen you just mentioned?
A Fegelein: He was the liaison officer, with Himmler, to Adolf Hitler. Then Bormann, who was the head of the party chancellory and the deputy of the party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as chief of the army personnel office and at the same time as chief adjutant of the Wehrmacht with the Fuehrer. of these three gentlemen?
A I should start with Fegelein. Fegelein as liaison officer of Himmler was, as far as the Fuehrer was concerned, that man to whom he turned in all questions of material, equipment, and personnel of the Waffen SS divisions. When these questions were discussed and the use of these divisions in the course of the military situation came up, and in this connection when the situation reports came up, there were many common points within the sphere of work of Fegelein. But, on the other hand, the general official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was very, very slight.
Q And how about Bormann?
Jodl always strongly delineated his sphere of influence. If there were unjustified accusations against the Wehrmacht or if there was any interference, he always rejected this interference or these accusations. It witnessed this especially while the war was being carried on on German soil. There were frequently frictions with those Gauleiters who had been designated to be Reichs Commissars, and on this occasion it witnessed that Colonel General Jodl, when he received complaints from Bormann or letters from Bormann, dealt with these letters in a rather abrupt marginal note and returned these letters, and in that way he showed his attitude. If he was not successful in dealing with the matter in that way, he was not slow in telling the Fuehrer just how he felt, and then he brought about a decision on the Fuehrer's part in writing.
Q And the third of these gentlemen mentioned, Burgdorf? General Jodl had very little official contact with him, although Burgdorf had to handle the personnel, the filling of positions, and he discussed these matters with the Fuehrer. In this case, I saw that General Burgdorf first of all discussed these matters with the Fuehrer alone, so that Colonel General Jodl had very, ver* little influence in that direction. was between Colonel General Jodl and each of these three gentlemen?
A Jodl rejected Fegelein; he was averse to him and I believe Jodl, even at that time, fully realized his character defects. I was there when he called Fegelein to account and put him in his place. As far as Bormann is concerned, I should say Colonel General Jodl had no relationship with him at all. I believe there was no association outside the official one, no personal relationship at all. And the same things that I said about Fegelein I believe also applies to the relationship with General Burgdorf, whom Colonel General Jodl did not like personally.
Q Now I shall turn to a different point. Witness, do you know anything about this matter, that in the last phase of the war there were considerations that certain hostile aviators, which were in hand, would be turned over to the popular rage? Did you hear about that?
A Yes. I recall in the spring of '44, at Berchtesgaden, the Fuehrer, in a rather heated way, demanded that Allied flyers who made Emergency landings in Germany not be protected by the Wehrmacht against the enraged populace.
This demand had been based on reports according to which a Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Luftwaffe had protected an Allied aviator. At that time the Fuehrer made this demand in a very sharp and a very heated manner. He demanded that the Wehrmacht issue corresponding orders so that a stop would be put to this once and for all.
Q Did Colonel General Jodl have the demand put to him also by Hitler? General Jodl did not have any direct connection with the treatment of this question for this was not a purely military matter with which Jodl would be concerned.
Q Did the Colonel General make any statement at all in this report? and, on his part, did everything possible in order to attempt to dissuade the Fuehrer from this demand, and immediately he tried, by taking a critical attitude, to establish the action which would be taken so as not to infringe on International Law in dealing with aviators. in this matter, but tell me, was it possible, if, as you have described, Hitler was enraged and stormed and demanded a decree, was it possible to pursue a delaying action? something like that, it was impossible for these gentlemen to whom this demand was put to do anything at that moment, to contradict or perhaps to refuse the carrying through of this order.
There was nothing left for them to do, and this suggestion was put by Jodl frequently, that one would have to try, by the supplying of arguments, of data and facts and counter arguments, and through the presentation of attitudes of agencies and officers who were concerned with this -- that that material should be gathered end, in a quiet and favorable hour, approach the Fuehrer on this matter once more and try to dissuade him from his extravagant and exorbitant demand. At the outset, this resulted in a rather lengthy exchange of letters, and the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, everything with the idea of delaying the matter as much as possible and, if possible, shelving the matter completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror flyers was concerned, was this, that in this case we succeeded absolutely, even though the Fuehrer again and again had his attention called to this question through reports and wanted the decree to be carried through.
Q Did not a decree like that come through ? decree like that actually was never issued ? August of 1944, when, after an air attack on Munich, Fegelein, in a rather drastic manner, described low level attacks to him and reported to him that in the flack resistance two Allied aviators had parachuted and had been captured by one of the flack people. And Fegelein said that he had called this man to account and asked him why he had not shot the flyers, and this man said he had not done so because he hadn't had an order to that effeckt. At that moment I interpolated on my own account that there actually was no such order; and then the Fuehrer accused me in the strongest manner that the leading officers of the Wehrmacht had not issued a decree like that, and then he again demanded the issuing and execution of that order.
Q Did it actually take place then ? of the campaign in the West where burning questions were in the foreground, and these questions avershadowed the problem of the treatment of terror flyers; this problem was shelved in favor of the burning question of the West.
1940, which allegedly took place in the Reichschancellery, where the Fuehrer again bemoaned the fackt that despite his demand this decree had not been issued? lem, in a very heated manner, to General Koller, who was the then Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe. I was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Fuehrer say approximately the following: that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Wehrmacht and espaecially the attitude taken by the Luftwaffe, it had not beenpossible for him to counteract the terror of the allied flyers over Germany through a counter terror.
Q Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, we have a document which we want to submit. It is an interrogatory to be found in the document book, Volume 2, Page 173, which is the testimony of General Koller, Chief of the Luftwaffe. This testimony, under Figure 4, which is on Page 130 of the document book, shows all the details of interest, and it shows this discussion in Berlin, which is of tremendous importance. This conversation took place in the main room and the other part took plane in the ante-rooms; and there was also a conversation with Goering telephonically. I should like to have the permission of the High Tribunal, in order to save time, to present this matter in toto, even through the witness on the stand wan present for only a part of this conversation, as the last sentence shows Jodl is deeplyconcerned in this whole document. And I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may deal with this matter in toto now and present it now.
which is to be found on page 179. Here the witness was asked:
"How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe?"
The answer is on the next page and is:
"From 1 September 1943 until 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the air Force Operational Staff, from 23 November 194 chief of the General Staff of the Air Force."
Question 5, and that is the question which concerns us, is on page 179:
"Do you recall that about March 1945 in the bunker of the Reich Chanceller the Fuehrer reproached you and the Luftwaffe because such an order was not given?
Answer, page 180?
"Yes, I remember quite exactly that about the beginning to the middle of March 1945, during the situation report a notice taken from the Allied Press Reporter Survey was laid before the Fuehrer by Bormann. It read somewhat to this effect:
"Am American combat aviation crew shot down over Germany a short time previously was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were mis handled by indignant persons of the population, had been threatened with death and probably would have been killed, if German soldiers had not delivered then and taken them under their protection.
"Bormann further pointed out to the Fuehrer in a few words that this confirmed that, soldiers in such cases step in against the population.
"Hitler, rather angry, turned to me and said excitedly:
"I have already once ordered that bailing-out bomber crews are not to be protected against the population. Those people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect these murderers against their own population which is acting from justified hate. Why were my orders not carried out?'
"Surprised by this attack I replied somewhat like this:
"'I know of no such order, moreover it would be a practical impossibility "Hitler, turning toward me expressed himself, very loudly and sharply, "'The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Luftwaffe, because the gentlemen of the Luftwaffe are cowards and are afraid that something might also happen to them.
The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly agreement between the Luftwaffe and the British and American fliers.'
"Hitler turned then also to Kaltenbrunner who happened to be present in the background, and speaking to him while partly looking at me continued:
"'I hereby order that all bomber crews bailed-out in the last few months and also all bomber crews bailing-out in future are to be turned over by the Luftwaffe to the SD and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone who does not carry out my orders or who takes action against the population will be punish with death and is himself to be shot.'" "Hitler then further expressed in a general way his indignation and his conception.
The assembled officers made a general impression of surprise and disapproval.
"After the Fuehrer's entourage had passed on, I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passage way. Essential points:
"Keller: It is impossible to carry out these orders. The Luftwaffe wil have no more to do with it. I, under no circumstances, and I can say as muc for the Reich Marshal. It Is entirely out of the question that the Luftwaffe outs its hand to it in anyway.
"Kaltenbrunner: The Fuehrer has completely wrong ideas. Also, the duti of the SD are continually misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover no German soldier would do what the Fuehrer demands. That is not in the German soldier's line. He does not kill prisoners; if individual fanatical party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier interferes. The Fuehrer has a completely false picture of the attitude of o* soldiers. Moreover, I will also do nothing in the matter myself. It would not occur to me at all. We must only see how we can get out of it, otherwi* he will have a few of us transferred among the first. We must gain time. It one way or the other, I am going to leave Berlin immediately for a fairly long time.
"Keller: Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is propitious. But we must have another way out as far as the Fuehrer is concerned, for it is possible that he may come back to his order tomorrow.
Later on, if it gets worse and worse, we will have to see how to prevent the business, or what is going to happen to us.
"It was decided at my suggestion that no order alone the lines commanded by the Fuehrer will be given to the Luftwaffe and the SD. None was given to the SD. In case the Fuehrer should revert to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind:
"All previously captured prisoners belonging to flying crews must not be handed over to the Luftwaffe, but scattered everywhere around under the contr of the Replacement Away Commander (BdE); time of capture not to be centrally known. Therefore, the establishment of a number of air personnel captured during the last months would be very difficult and time-consuming. Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crows go automatically to interrogation center. Those are in a state of moving, owing to operations. Liaison is bad.
"Therefore, detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. of the Luftwaffe (Ic des OKL) should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner, who, however, would first have to be appointed.
"After the Fuehrer's entourage, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel in the entrance of the air raid shelter and said:
"'The Fuehrer's order is insane (Keitel remarked in between: "One can certainly call it that"). The Luftwaffe shall keep her escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convnced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order and moreover with such a thr* of punishment, only verbally. To an order of this kind he has to sign his own name. Whether or not it will then be carried out is an open question, in any case not by the Luftwaffe. Nor by the SD, either, I have spoken with Kaltenbrunrer.
"Field Marshal Keitel: He will not sign such orders then, and the OKW always has to endorse everything. But I will be damned if I issue such an order."
"Koller: The Luftwaffe cannot join in this under any circumstances. We will never assume such a responsibility."
"Field Marshal Keitel: You are right. I neither. I must think over what I can do about it and how.
"The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Fuehrer's order.
"After refreshments in a corner of the air raid shelter I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to go to the cloakroom and the way out. H itler by chance came out of the room, gave an order to an orderl and called me as I was passing by. The door to the conference room was open, "Hitler said to me;"'I came back to my order once more.
All of you must help me, it cannot go on like this any longer. The Luftwaffe, or at least the Reich defense has failed.
What am I to do against the frightful bombing terrorism which is only murdering German women and children" "KOLLER: The Air defense and our crows do what they can and what is humanly possible. The neglect of air armament by us, the momentary technical and numerical superiority of the enemy, cannot be eliminated or altered overnight When the searchlight-units finally become stronger, the air situation over Germany will improve for us." "HITLER: I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible before the German pepple for the continuation of this air situation. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think it over before flying here." "KOLLER: It certainly will not improve the air situation, but on the contr make it worse." "HITLER: No, what the Japanese have done is the right thing. In contrast to his behaviour at the gathering, Hitler was quiet again. He displayed an affable manner. From experience, one could talk with him better alone, then in presence of other people. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and declared:
"'If I am permitted to express my point of view, it is that this will not do. Such measures are in such brutal opposition to the education, feelings and thinking of ail soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot fill soldiers with the articles of war and docent conduct and then order actions which go against everybody's grain. You must not forge' my fuehrer, that the enemy fliers also carry out orders and do their duty just as ours. If they are shot down or make crash landings, they are just defenseless and unarmed prisoners. How would we stand before the world? And the first measures of the enemy would be to treat our flying crews the same way. That is something we cannot answer for to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline would colla at one blew.'" "Up to that point the Fuehrer had not interrupted me.
After he had a first looked at me, he turned his look away, and seemed to be lost in his thoughts. But he had been listening and interrupted me here, and said quietly and in an earnest manner:
"And so the Luftwaffe is still afraid. That is indeed quite all right, but I am responsible for the protection of the German people, and have no other means except this" "Hitler turned around and went book into the conference room.
"After my arrival at the Luftwaffe Headquarters (Kurfuerst) I informed Colonel von Brauchitsch of the events and ordered him to report to the Reich Marshal about it as soon as possible. I myself could not reach the Field Marshal at that moment. During our conversation Brauchitsch also expressed a disapproving attitude towards the Fuehrer's order.
"Some one or two hours later the Field Marshal called me and began his conversation with the following words:
"'Tell me, has he finally gone completely mad?'" "It was very clear who was meant.
I personally reported once more to theReich Marshal about the principle happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner and added:
"'I will not carry out this order or any activity connected with it. I will take pains to handle the situation so as to gain time first of all, in any case, and do everything possible to prevent any of us from falling under the wheels. Perhaps after the last conference the Fuehrer will not come back to his order any more. If he does, however, it will be very hard, and you will have to go to the Fuehrer youself. What the Fuehrer ha ordered must not be allowed to happen in any case."
The Reich Marshal expressed himself as very much opposed to Hitler's attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as had been suggested, to inform him immediately at the proper time, and ended his conversation with these words:
" This is all insane and cannot he carried out."
"h) Measures against Allied fliers on the basis of the above-mentioned Fuehrer's order have been adopted neither by the Luftwaffe nor by the SD. This order has not been made known in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (B d E), or their offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Fuehrer's meeting and the order has not been passed on by the Army High Command (OKW).
"Hitler did nit refer back to his order later, either with the Reich Marshal, or with myself or my representative; nor, I think, with Kaltenbrunner either. To be sure, I have never sp to the Latter again about this matter.
" Whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop, or wheth he forgot about it under the pressure of events, I was unable t judge.
"i) Perhaps two or three weeks later there came to my knowledge a directive of the OKW -- I think a teletype -- in which, as I recall, mention was made of the eye-witness report that had given occasion to it. In it was disclosed that the Fuehrer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had acted against their people. " He mention was made of the main point of Hitler's order. If I remember correctly, the order was signed by Keitel and is to be regarded as anything else than an attempt to cover himself as far as the Fuehrer was concerned. In my opinion, General Jod had nothing to do with the entire-affair." was that picture presented by General Roller correct?
A I remember the following matters: In the Luftwaffe the * is based on a mutual assurance, and that was the sentence which I remember strongly. DR JAHRREISS: Thak you very much. I need not ask you any fur question on this point. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjour now.
( A recess was taken.)
Q Mr. Witness, I assume that you can still recollect the equipment, the furnishings in the offices of the fuehrer's headquarters.
A Yes, I can still remember them. Q In these offices of the Fuehrer and the Field Marshal, the Colonel General, and your own, were there maps on the wall? A Yes, both in East Prussia, particularly the Headquarters, the Fuehrer had a physiographic map of Germany and then a poli* map of Europe, and in the various other rooms there were similar maps. Q Were maps hung up also of Germany? A Yes. Q And the bordering territory, on which concentration camps a penal institutions were indicated, say, for instance, with a blue ring? A No, neither in the Fuehrer's Headquarters in East Prussia in the Reichschancellery in Berlin nor at the Berghof in Berch gaden have I seen such a map at any time. Q On the 11th of May, 1946, the Munich radio -- at 12:30 midday broadcast a letter from a painter who had alleged that I had seen maps in the Fuehrer's Headquarter which could not be anything else but maps showing the location of concentration camps. Is that possible? A That is quite out of the question. Q Was there any detailed statement about that? THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of broadcast from Munich. DR JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I didn't ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to tell him how the public has come to that knowledge, that there were such maps. But I have a further questions? THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that i ought not to be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you a* that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.