I join in that objection and refer to the statement which he has made.
BY THE TRIBUNAL (Justice Biddle ): yesterday, about the number of SS divisions at the end of the war. Do you remember that ?
Q I think you said there were 35 at the end of the war: Is that right, 35 about ?
Q Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is this. You were referring only to Waffen SS divisions, were you not ? Only the Waffen SS ? the command of the army ? army commanders, but not as far as discipline was concerned. Their superior was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting. He was also considered as such by their supreme commander in practice. As far as the strenghth of the divisions, the equipment, and the losses, that was something which was his very own; in fact, it was exclusively reported to the Fuehrer by Himmler himself.
Q When had they been coordinated into the army ? When ? What year ? the war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began. if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right ? blackmail on the strength of this troop concentration or an attack.
Q Just a minute. I asked you if you did not fear an attack by Russia.
You did at one time, did you not ?
Q All right. When was that ? When ?
Q ( Interposing) when did you first hear of that attack ? 1940, because of the first conference I had with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on the 29 th of July. it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not ?
AAfter the political clarifying-work . Up to then, it had been a guess, nothing but a guess. work if you were afraid of an immediate attack ? to begin with, until the spring of 1941. Until then, only defensive measures were instituted. Only in February of 1941 did we begin with the troop concentration for an attack.
Q Now, then, just one other question. I am not at all clear on this. During that attack, did you then advise that Germany attac first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack ? What was your advise ? You saw this danger; what did you do about it ? of a written statement of mine made to the Fuehrer in which I drew his attention ti the tremendous consequences of such a decision, of which one knew, of course, how the campaign was begun, but of which no human being could imagine how it would end.
Q We have heard all that. I did not want to go into that. What I wanted to get at is this : You were afraid that Russia was going to attack. If that was true, why didn't you advise Germany to attack at once ? You were afraid Russia would attack, and jet you say you advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.
A That is not the case. I did not advise not to march into Russia; I merely said that if no other possibility exists, and if really there is not political way of doing away with that danger, then I, too, can only see the preventive attach as a possibility.
THE TRIBUNAL ( Justice Biddle ) : That is all. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT : The defendant can return to the dock.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Exner.
DR. EXNER : I have four witnesses whom I wish to bring before this Tribunal. But I went to start by making a request. With reference to lame leg which I am suffering from, may I leave it to my lolleague Jahrreiss to question the witnesses, please ?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.
Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only one counsel may appear in the court, and at the presentation of the case on behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.
DR. JAHRREISS : In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call the first witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar Brandenfels.
stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your name, please?
Q Will you repeat the oath after me: truth, and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. HERMAN JAHRREISS (Counsel for defendant Jodl).
Q Mr. Witness, were you in the Army Command Staff during the war?
Q During what period?
A From the 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944. I was a member of the Armed Forces Command Staff.
Q What was your position there in the Staff? capacity as department chief of the operational department of the Army.
Q I am going to have document shown to you No. PS-823, Exhibit RF 3! it is in your document book, second volume, page 158. Please, will you be good enough to have a look at it.
A Do you want me to read the whole document?
Q I want you to have a general picture of it. Who is the author o* the document? ministry Group.
Q How far does that document connect with the defendant Jodl? first page, there is an initial or line that reads as a "J"?
A That might be a mistake. If you will just refer to the initial appears at the end of that document, that is the initial of the Chief of Quartermaster Department, Oberst Polleck.
the bottom?
A The first is carried out by the official of the document. I can recognize for certain it is Administrative Counsel Niehmenst's signature.
Q Do you mean the initial. I mean the top one?
A The-top one? The bottom initial is the signature of Oberst Polle After the document was submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I initialed it again at the top, and then my mark was sent to the quartermasters Department, that is the "Q" underlined at the top, and then it was again issued by the quartermaster chief, and then there is the date of 9th September, and he in turn marked it "Administrative Group." The actual author then signed or initialed the document again. I want to draw your attention to the fact this pertains to the war matter, and that this document in the corner shows Jodl was not really concerned with it. He had advised only the organization and the quartermaster department so far as that was concerned. There were several commitments that had to be made.
Q Just a minute, Mr. Witness, just a minute. I do not mind if you to lecture, but I want to also go ahead. There are marks in the margin of document, do you see them:
Q Is any one of them written by Jodl?
A No, they are both initialed with a "K" for Field marshal von Keit lates to prisoner of war affairs, and if I understand you correctly, you want to say that the letter "J" is not possible? It is not probable, for the reason that the jurisdiction of Jodl could have had nothing to do with this matter at all.
Q But is it correct, Mr. Witness, that the Quartermaster Department under Jodl's command?
the Organization Department, had certain parts which the Attorney General had not dealt with, and which were dealt with by the head of the Department "Q", and dealt with by the department chief, but was working; along with the OKW. said applies to that Department "Q". The Department "Q" had in its main department that part whore it supplies, and it also supervises the supplies, but to all appearances it came directly under OKW. The second department naturally appears as administrative -- military administration, and, the third department dealt with general questions, that is, such as quartermaster affairs and the laws, and questions of fact.
Q Then I have one more question on this organization. Did that depart meat, the Armed Forces Command Staff, have anything to do with the Fuehrer's "HQ"? the Fuehrer's HQ, but in that neighborhood in Berlin. Department "Q" was conducted by Jodl, partly, with the Chief of OKW?
Q But this question was partly so, is that correct?
Q Mr. Witness, what position did you have at the beginning of the war? the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army.
THE INTERPRETER: Would you speak a little more slowly. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q And what department did you have? in the higher command, and the higher command level.
Q Did that apply to the general staff officer of the OKW?
staff 1 October 1939,and who had been nominated then to be the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff after that date? Sodenstern which had been proposed. October -- on the 5th or 6th, that Jodl would not have been chief of the Army Staff at all? said to be given, but that was dealing with the State.
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issues in this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers that are submitted has any relevancy at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't quite understand what the relevancy of the evidence is at the moment.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the prosecution is right when they say that the defendant Jodl belongs to a group of conspirators for accomplishing the war, and if that group of conspirators had used the State as a means for their aims, I think the prosecution believes there must be some other peculiar order of the State when conspirators will exchange uncertainty with arranged date, and that is why it is important for the Tribunal to be presented with this.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given who date of this exchange, without going in on cross examination. He went to Vienna on a certain date, and came back at another date, and there has been no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The defendant Jodl has said that this mobilization had appeared before 1st October as from the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff. Now the witness says that this allegedly only applies up to the day of mobilization here.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. You say as a matter of surmise that would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is on the assumption that he is stating merely the person in this important posi tion was disposed of in accordance with the routine so far as the State work was concerned, if that had been a pro-arranged schedule.
May I present something further, please.
THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the Tribunal rules you may not go into that. BY DR. JAHRREISS:
Q Mr. Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field activity which you just mentioned, I believe it was because I assumed that you had particular expert knowledge of it, is that true, in that you just had official contact with combating the bandits? and practically, thinkable, and additional information were taken from my department from that dale.
Q Are you familiar with the pamphlet on bandit fighting, of May 1942?
Q Was it the third ruling of that department that winter? combatting the guerrillas or bandits. At that time we had comparatively little experience, and since the guerrilla fighting had not been expected during peace time, it was natural that the new experience would have to be given some effect. the southeast? definite conception on their part. Is it quite often true that one can speak about a bandit war as it is fought with bandit equipment? fighting, it must be limited to its own location. That is a correct question. conception of guerrilla warfare, which it might have had?
A So far as the State is concerned, yes. The method, no.
Q What do you mean by extent, or degree?
by banditry fighting. from a human point of view, as well? point of view concerning it was most unusual.
A. What I mean by extent is the territorial extent of the zones affected by bandit fighting.
Q. Was it something unusual, territorially speaking, or do you mean from the human point of view as well?
A. Guerrilla fighting, both in its territorial extent as well as the question referring to the human beings concerned with it, was most unusual.
Q. Do you know, Mr. Witness, whether these bandits or guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast contained many Jews?
A. I can't remember that, amongst the hundreds of reports which I have had about guerrilla fighting, there was the mention of Jews at all. If there were Jews in these units, then it can only have been the case to a very limited extent.
Q. Well the, the testimony related in this court room that this guerrill fight had been conducted for the extermination of Jews, isthat true?
A. I have never heard anything about that.
Q. Or perhaps the extermination of Slava?
A. Here again, I have never heard as much as a hint of such a situation. That interpretation would have been quite contrary to the intentions of the military leaders.
Q. Why?
A. The Military Command had a very definite interest in seeing a peaceful country behind every front and a productive population; and every aim and every measure which had that target was always appreciated by the Military Command. Every soldier whom we had to use in bandit fighting was urgently needed by us at the front.
Q. Was the policy in the East carried out in the manner in which the Armed Forces leaders wanted it for their purposes?
A. No doubt that was not the case, because the Armed Forces particularly in the interest of their volunteer units, would have liked ot see a different policy in the East. We ourselves tried to carry on a bloodless pacification even amongst the guerrillas by using our own system and methods. There considerable propaganda campaigns were put into practice which were meant to cause the guerrillas to stop fighting.
In certain cases there were special negotiations with individual guerrilla units and, though limited to certain occasions and periods, they were most successful.
Q. Do you know General von Pannewitz?
A. Yes. General von Pannewitz was the Commander of the 1st Kosack Division.
Q. When, please?
A. It must have been during 1943.
Q. Is it correct that this General, as the Commander of that 1st Voluntary Kosack Division, had one complaint to the OKW about difficulties he was having in his division?
A. Yes. General von Pannewitz is an old regimental comrade of mine and he visited me at the headquarters, and on that occasion, during the summer of '43 or maybe during the autumn, he told me in detail about the state of affair the position and the difficulties which he was experiencing, particularly because of the Eastern policy of the government regarding the morale of his unit At that time he was complaining particularly about the fact that the government policy had no national aims for his Division, and he had certain further complaints about difficulties which the dependents had who were partly in trek or were to be settled.
Q. Did Jodl concern himself with that episode?
A. Yes. At the time, after I had the visit, I reported the conversation to the Colonel General and I asked him, in the interests of our voluntary units to exercise his influence.
Q. Influence on whom do you mean?
A. Influence on the Fuehrer.
Q. But you told me that this wasn't any of Jodl's tasks -
THE PRESIDENT: What is the relevancy of this, about some General who commanded a Kosack Division and that he had difficulties with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, these are a few preparatory questions and the actual question now comes. It is a question of jurisdiction, responsibility I was just about to ask the witness the decisive question.
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions go to the decisive question? How can a visit of this General have anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give you the reason for that, then I will have to tell the witness what I went him to tell me. Then my question is a suggestive and leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but then I didn't wait to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on. The Tribunal hopes that you won't take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I didn't understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the OKW. Mr. President, I can abbreviate the questions I want to put to the witness a great deal because in this case -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I think, My Lord, Dr. Jahrreiss said he had no further questions, that he was finished.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there was a misunderstanding. The witness has, in fart, just answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to underline it a bit more but then you did not want me to.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to the witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination a great deal because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on the 20th of May, 1946. If this is my turn, or when my turn comes, I propose to submit that affidavit to the Tribunal so that I can't then be excused of not having ascertained the facts when the witness was available in the Court room. I now propose to ask the witness at once whether the contents of that affidavit of the 20th of May, 1946 are correct.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Mr. Witness, are the contents of the affidavit you have given me, dated the 20th of May, 1946, correct?
Q Thank you. Mr. Witness, do you know General Hausinger? submitted Affidavit No. 20, U.S.A. Exhibit No. 564, and on Page 2, Figure 4, this General is making the following statement; I quote: "It has always been my personal view that the treatment of civilians in operational areas and the methods of the bandit fighting in the operational zone was a useful opportunity to the political and military leaders to carry out their aims; that is to say, to bring about the systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews, I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Hausinger could have arrived at that view? talked to him about the question of the guerrilla fighting. As far as I am concerned, he has never said anything to me which might express this view and I can not explain this statement of his because it is opposed to the principles of the military leaders regarding the conducting of the guerrilla war.
Q Thank you. Why was the jurisdiction over the bandit fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy during 1943 and '44, transferred to Himmler by order of the Fuehrer? predominantly a task for the police and that police forces should be more suitable to carry it through then the sometimes somewhat aged security unit of the Army, such as we could place at the disposal of that task.
Just how far Himmler was keen to create a new position of power in that connection, that I don't know, how far he might have hypnotized the Fuehrer about that. regarding the Fuehrer order? far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. Operational areas, until the end, and as far as guerrilla warfare was concerned, too, can under the orders of the Army Commanders. In the remaining territory the Army Forces Command Staff were not altogether in agreement with this new arrangement because we were hoping that the Reichsfuehrer SS would be in a position to draw on his reserves, unknown as they were to us, and use them in these zones so that we would get a few men out. he should be excepted from this transfer of jurisdiction from him to Himmler? I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time. Southwest? war, the Central Department of the Army General Staff, and I know there, too, the higher positions were being dealt with. Now I want to ask you what the principles were on the strength of which Army commanders were appointed? seniority whereas peace time appointments formed the skeleton of the war time organization. military principles? considerations and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were placed in responsible positions for the event of a mobilization.
I want to give you an example: General von Leeb, General von Krestenstein, General von Kleist, Colonel General von Hammerstein. retired before the outbreak of war but were they planned for higher positions in the event of the outbreak of war? it ever know that military leaders had formed a group which had for its aim the carrying out of aggressive wars and of disregarding International Law in such event? can state in this connection that during the years of '37 to '39 quite a number of General Staff officers visited myself and the other officials in the same department and talked to us. The majority of these officers were senior officers of the unit staff and they were, therefore, the confidential advisors of the Commanders. These officers, just like their senior officers had fought in World War I, and the only opinion they ever gave to us was that the German nation should be saved a second war. In spite of all positive points of view about the Fuehrer's successes, there was acertain concern about the policy and particularly the rapid rearmament of the Armed Forces, which of course made careful work difficult. After the negotiations at Nurnberg, the confidence increased a great deal and it was generally the opinion of these officers that the Fuehrer would continue to be successful in preventing a war, keeping the peace.
Q What was the attitude of the high officers after the Munich Agreement? conversations with General Staff officers, that there was a general conviction that the Fuehrer, with his policies, would continue to preserve the peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August, I saw the Fuehrer at H.Q. Zossen, where I had a conversation with several officers, who were of the opinion at that time that a war would not occur and that it was only necessary to make the Fuehrer's political intentions possible by having the troops firmly under control so that there would not be a political misfortune if the guns went off. the preparations for that offensive begun?
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about five years of war?
DR. LATERNSER Mr. President, I want to put to the witness who of the supreme commanders, and beginning when, had knowledge of that offensive, and that is important. It is important to ascertain how the cooperation amongst that group worked. Please, will you allow me that question?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q When were the preparations for the Ardennes offensive begun? the beginning of the offensive who were not participants?
A The last question I can answer with No. The first question, as far as the date is concerned, I cannot give an answer to, but I do know that there had been troop movements in the proposed zone for that offensive, which had been ordered by the highest commanding officers before the commander in the West, who was responsible,was informed, and that he, therefore, was making frequent inquiries at my department asking an explanation of these movements. had to direct the offensive, was not informed about troop movements and movements of divisions for that purpose that took place in his very territory?
A Yes, that is the situation. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thankyou. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal willadjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946, 1000 hours).
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and documents that were made the other day in court, I will take that to the order in which they were dealt with in Court, and the three witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbache Kandruth, and Strupp. General Donovan is rejected. are granted, and the application of the defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted yesterday. nesses, Stuckhardt and Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may be called upon the subject concerned, Hess, the Tribunal orders as follows: 17th of May 1946 is rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal has twice ruled to this effect.
Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the proposal to call, as a witness, Gaus, who would only support evidence as to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. Tribunal's formed decision, and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a witness, are accordingly denied. poses to deal, and it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution has asked the Tribunal to decla to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross examine any witnesses other than the defendants in this court. If they wish to examine or to cross examine these witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are now sitting for the taking of evidence on the questions with which the organizations are concerned.
DR. KUBOSCHOK (Counsel for defendant von Papen): I should like to voice one request for the case of von Papen.
On the 6th of June I submitted a written request. This was discussed with the prosecution, and the General Secretary has advised me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.
Prince Erbach-Schoenberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, however, are partially incorrect and sometimes misleading, and therefore a supplement is necessary. I am suggesting that Prince Erbach-- who is in the American occupied zone in Gmunden, Austria -- be transported to Nurnberg and that he be interrogated, outside of this Court but in the presence of the prosecution, to supplement this interrogatory. also in the American occupied zone of Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach -- in which he has testified and made statements in detail about the contacts which the defendant von Papen had with the circle of the assaasins of July 20th. feels that it is forced, even though otherwise we would not stress this fact, to discuss thismatter in the course of evidence. Most likely this matter will be covered through an affidavit. Erbach, be transported to Nurnberg so that, in the presence of the prosecution he can depose an affidavit. The transporting here of both of these witnesses is absolutely essential, because the case of von Papen is imminent and it is almost impossible to take care of these matters by correspondence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the particular points in which you say that the interrogaroty of Prince ErbachSchoenberg is incomplete or misleading?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preveding questions of this interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that it had been the wish of the defendant von Papen to have the solution of his task brought about through a peaceful development rather than through force. Then, in connection with a question which follows, as to whether the defendant von Papen acted in accordance with these basic political principles, the witness answered as follows: