Did you know of these things?
A. At that time, no, I did not know that. In my position in the General Staff that matter did not concern me.
Q. I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is there an entry in your diary -- it is a passage in I-172, the basis for the draft of your speech -- that after the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? That is page 290 of Book 7. Do you know that passage?
A. In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it said exactly what strategic improvements through the various actions of the Fuehrer had taken place, in that respect. But only these strategic -
Q. Again I don't want to stop you, but did you say something to this effect -- and I will give you the document if you like -that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim?
A. In the first draft I set down that through the Anschluss of Austria the strategic situation of Czechoslovakia had become so utterly hopeless that at any time it could fall a victim to a pincers attack. That is the strategic retrospect about facts, indisputable facts.
Q. How I go very shortly to the case of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of documents. I want to deal with It on 17, which will be found on page 29 of Book 7. And I have flagged that for you, Witness. Item 17.
A. Yes.
Q. You are familiar with that?
A. Yes, I know that.
Q. I don't propose to read it again, because it was read very recently; but you said yesterday that the problem was this:
First of all you must have a surprise attack; if you were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.
A. Yes, on the basis of the stipulations put by the Fuehrer.
would take four days to get into their battle position. which is going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the incident is going to take place.
A Yes, I said that. You would either have to predetermine the time; otherwise the situation could not be net.
A I testified to that at length yesterday. Something had to be utilized and exploited that would help the situation along, but those are meditations in the General Staff and whether we captured these natters from the French they were considered irrelevant and insignificant. that either the Wehrmacht or the Counter-intelligence Section would be charged with the manufacture of the incident.
A Yes, I said that in case the Abwehr (Counter-Intelligence) is charged, but these were all theoretical meditations of the General Staff as to applying that to a situation which I depicted at great length yesterday, and incidents like that occurred every day. been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go to war? fied as to that. I believe the true reason would have been told the world, and the actual reason, which was made known through the press, that three and a half million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people, and that was the question at issue. the earthly good of manufacturing an incident? what I said then at length: I knew the world history and the his tory of war too well not to know that in every war things like that happen -- the question about the first shot, as to who fired the first shot.
And the Czechoslovak State at that time had fired thousands of shots on German territory. are not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you want to manufacture an incident? If you can't answer it, say so.
A It isn't at all confirmed that, but I wanted to bring about or create an incident. I said, "in case." We never prepared an incident and that, to me, seems the decisive factor.
Q I won't argue any further with you. I have put my point and will leave it. last paragraph on page 29, the sane document:
"Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack."
And then:
"... deaths of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers." tion of war or any warning to the civilian population, doesn't it?
A That meant that I called the attention of the Fuehrer, through this document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result would come about.
A Would you call that a terror attack? plade. These are all theoretical words for our General Staff, just theories. Just how and if thought was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with justice or not. tice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were recalled to the OKW on the 23rd of August, 1939, from your artillery employment. We know that, don't we? of you, wasn't it? do not know whetherhe knew about it at all. I rather doubt it.
Q Very good. On a very smallpoint, Witness, you told the Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with the Fuehrer, I think, until September 1939, but your Diary, on the 10th of August, 1938 -- it is Page 136 of Bock 7 -- your Diary said you attended a conference at the Berghof with the Army Chiefs and the Air Force groups. Didn't you meet the Fuehrer then? What I said was, word for word, verbatim, on the 3rd of September I was introduced to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke the first word I ever addressed to him. That is what I testified to word for word yesterday. I had seen the Fuehrer a dozen times before then and I had listened to him when he had delivered his speeches
Q Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong. Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you aright when you said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?
A That applies to the beleaguring of the city of Warsaw at that time.
The terror attack which was to hit the entire city through artillery, that took place after a forewarning which had come through twice. with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of September, 1939, before any declaration of war? Isn't that a matter of history? Kesselring, who is very well informed, on this problem, testified to that in detail. He said that on this date the militarily important bases and objectives of Poland were attacked but not the population of Warsaw.
MR. ROBERTS: If the Tribunal want the reference, Kesselring gave evidence as to the bombing of Warsaw, the English transcript, page 5731. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q Now, I suppose the result of the polish campaign was *aturally a source of satisfaction to all of you? military view, was quite satisfactory to us. Of course things happen in life that would give were satisfaction than a military action.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, this is a new exhibit, D, for Donald 885, and it is GB-484. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q That letter is in your handwriting, is it not? Is it in your writing?
Q Very good. Now, it is written to Police President, Dr. Karl Schwabe, Brunn (Moravia), Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939. "My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of September 22, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought about for us an unusually favorable point of departure politically as well as militarily.
The most difficult part for the people as well as the Army is naturally still ahead." I propose to read it without comments and comment afterward. "But the Fuehrer and his associates are full of the greatest confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. This time to will show that we have the better nerves and the greater unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not letting then perk up, of this I am convinced." Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the troops. "Tahnking you once more heartily for your words of appreciation which exceed by far my modest contribution in the shadow of the powerful personality of our Fuehrer. I am with Heil Hitler." Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties and don't have concentration camps and don't persecute Jews? Is that why you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don't break treaties?
A No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political situation generally was such that I was of that opinion.
Q Thank you. Now, you say: "Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of." Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the Gestapo?
Q The Gauleiters? Sauckel, for instance, in a largo area like Thuringia, he couldn't do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or Gestapo, wouldn't he?
A We are not concerned with that here. The fact was that these Gauleiters were concerned with the organization of the State and they carried their offices through in a noteworthy way. Despite these catastrophes the people were much better taken care of them in other years, that is in 1938, and that is to the credit of these people.
Q The people were better taken care of? his regular rations. It was a model of organization.
government or the Party was allowed, was it?
A Yes. It made it easier on one hand and on the other hand brought about terrible and tremendous catastrophes about which I have just learned here.
Q Your letter speaks for itself, and I will go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence: "That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not letting them per up --", what did you mean by that? that quiet and order were maintained and not to tolerate a Czech uprising while we were at war. That is a matter of course and taken for granted. I did not say that he was to murder or Germanize the Czechs at all, but he had to keep order.
Q Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect the integrity of Norway and Denmark, d id you not?
A Yes, I believe I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure. reassure all these Western centrals, and there was another assurance on the 6th of October, and you say that in November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?
A Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.
Q I know you did. please don't always say that. I have got to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see. "In the meantime", as your speech said --and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book 7, page 11 of your notes.
MR. ROBERTS: It is in the middle, my Lord, under Paragraph 8.
Q "In the meantime, we were confronted by the problem of the occupation of Norway and Denmark. In the first place, there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the North would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime necessities -- 'Notwendigkeiten'" -- that is the word, isn't it -'Notwendigkeiten' -
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that ought to be "necessary" and not "imperative. "Erforderten" is the German word. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q "-- which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval export points." You wanted air bases and naval bases, didn't you?
A. Militarily they were tremendously important to us. There is no doubt about that, but the stipulation to take them, those were the reports which we had.
Q. What I suggest to you, you see, is this: That in this, like the case of the other three low countries, in this case, you simply made an excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not done it for months, and you breached Norway's neutrality at your own chosen time. Is that right?
A. In order to answer that question Yes or No, one would have to undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both our own and the enemy side. Before that has been done, only a subjective opinion is here. I have mine, and you have another.
Q. Yes. I point out to you that it was Germany on every occasion who violated the neutrality. The Allies did not.
A. In the case of Norway, the English did that for the first time in the case of the "Altmark" by the shooting of German ships in Norwegian territorial waters, and that has been determined and proved indisputably. There is no doubt about that at all.
Q. The "Altmark", as you very well know, Witness, was not an occupation at all: it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine that your navy would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of talking about the "Altmark". It was not an occupation at all.
A. But it was a violation of international law, as far as Norwegian sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do the same thing, but you personally had no business to carry through a combative action in those Norwegian waters.
Q. Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred prisoners? That is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for it.
A. You are just quoting one small example, but there are hundreds of them
Q. It is the example you quoted, witness, not I. I did not quote it.
A. I can only say that we were under the certain subjective impression and that in the last second we curried through an enterprise, to which British troops were already committed, and if you can prove to me that that is not true, I shall be very grateful to you.
Q. I am going to call your attention to the only outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read rather hurriedly yesterday
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is in Jodl's document book Two, and it is page 178. Well, My Lord, it begins at page 174. My Lord, that is on the left hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was an expert specialist, that he evaluated the files from the British landing brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and on the bottom of page 175:
"The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short time before our invasion of Norway the British invasion troops had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of embarkation. They were then re-embarked after the German invasion of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops before our landings could not be determined from the documents and from the statements furnished by prisoners. Whether they intended to occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the special equipment of those British troops. Insofar as I could evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners they dod not contain proof of the English plans with regard to Norway."
And this is the next question:
"Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway we arrived only just ahead of the English?
"Answer: Yes, the information in the documents and the statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted to mean that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English.
However, whether this was considered unmistakable evidence escapes my knowledge."
Then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train. The witness does not know anything about them. BY MR ROBERTS:
Q That is pretty porr evidence, isn't it, on which Norway was to be invaded, contrary to all the treaties and all the assurances?
A I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct, but that is only found in this reason--that Soltmann was not an expert in this field. He was not even an officer of the General Staff. We have further and much more persuasive pieces of evidence which were before me on my desk; namely, all the directives carried by the English landing brigade, and our assumptions were absolutely confirmed by fact through these records as follows-al law, how keen you were to see that International liar was observed. You knew that was against international law didn't you? plied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war or not, was not found in any regulation of the Geneva Convention or the Hague Landwarfare Regulations. Those were the things that we went by.
Q If an hinorable German gives his word, he keeps it, does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going to depart from it, does he, an honorable German? when human beings work together. but not in the sphere of politics. Germany to break her word over and over again? Or would you rather not answer that question? for the formulation of German politics.
Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg you pardon, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. in the West, it was always Hitler's intention to violate the neutrality of those three small countries? intention to go through Belgium, but he had reservations with regard to Holland for a long time. I believe these reservations were rescinded in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions Were not determined. Regarding Belgium his intentions were known comparatively early. That is, about the middle or the early part of October. ensive war and an offensive war in somebody else's country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn't it?
Q You couldn't attack in the West unless you attacked through Belgium, could you? and was questionable. I have already said that.
Q Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line, so that you couldn't attack her frontally. air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That is what you hoped, wasn't it? improved through our having the coast, that is true.
Q Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the Tribunal knew already. I don't intend to read them, but the first document in order of date is 375-PS, Us-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is during the time of Fall Gruen. In the last paragraph of the document, page 9, I think, it says:
"Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great Britain."
That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn't it? ridiculous piece; it was just the work of a very small lieutenant. what happened afterwards. you heard about it from Keitel -- was the Chancellery meeting the 23rd of May 1939. That is L-79, Book No. 7, page 275. Do you remember there that the Fuehrer said:
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases are to be occupied. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. Considerations of right and wrong or treaties do not matter. The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and the Air Force. If Belgium and The Netherlands are successfully occupied and held, if France is also defeated, fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured. Daily attacks by the German Air Force will cut her life line."
There wasn't any doubt as to the policy of the Fuehrer in Hay 1939, was there? and the things which purportedly were discussed at that time, and I am not able to judge whether it is correct for I did not hear it. I didn't hear about it later; I didn't hear about it from Keitel.
Q Very good. Did you hear about the speech made by the Fuehrer on the 22nd of August 1939?
MR. ROBERTS: I don't know if the Court have got this. It is not in your document book. It is No. 798-PS, in Document Book No. 4. There are some loose copies, my Lord. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q "Holland, Belgium, and Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate their neutrality.
You always thought Hitler was a good prophet, didn't you? You thought Hitler was a good judge, whereas Germany would break hers.
Now, then, that was August. I want to -
A (Interposing) I don't know that either.
Q Very good. Now, I want to come to the document which you put in yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, wait a/minute. Defendant, what do you mean by saying you don't know that? Do you mean that you didn't know the document? You said, "I don't know that."
THE WITNESS: I do not know what the Fuehrer actually said in his conference on the 22nd of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken place, for I was in Vienna at the time. I only know what supposedly is set down in documents which have been submitted.
BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q Now I want to put the whole document L-52. Dr. Exner , quite properly of course, read some extracts, but I went to read some more.
Now, L-52 was Hitler's memorandum on the 9th of October 1939. May I point out that the 9th of October 1939 was three days after his renewed assurances to the Western neutrals.
I want to refer to certainpassages. You have read some; I want to refer to others.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, what I am now reading from, starting withthe outside page is the 5th page. It is page 27 of the original, which appears in the bottom righthand corner. BY MR. ROBERTS: "Germany's military means of waging a lengthier war are, as far as our main enemy is concerned, theAir Force and the U-boat arm.
"The U-boat can, even today, if ruthlessly employed, be an extraordinary throat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat warfare lie in the great distances to the scenes of action, in the extraordinary danger attached to these journeys and in the continuous threat to their homo bases. That England has not, for the moment, laid the great minefield, as in WorldWar I, between Norway and the Shetland Isles, is possibly connected - - provided the will to wage war exists at all -- with a shortage of necessary barrage materials. But, if the war lasts long, an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and outward routes. The creation of U-boat strongpoints outside these constricted home bases would lead to on enormous increase in the striking power of this arm." access to the Atlantic?
A I do not believe so. I believe it is a rather general and correct naval strategic consideration and can apply to a base at Murmansk which we already had at that time, or it might refer to the base at Iran or Spain, but it is not a special reference to Norway, for under oath I have declared that the Fuehrer did not consider Norway, not with the slightest thought.
Q. Very good.
A. Not until we had the notice and report from Quisling.
Q. I have heard your answer. Now, may I go on reading:
"The German Air Force, the GAP, cannot succeed in efficient operations against the industrial center of England and her south and southwest ports until it is no longer compelled to operate offensively from our present small North Sea coast by extremely devious routes involving long flights. If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces would be able to strike at the industrial heart of Germany and would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really important targets. If we were In possession of Holland, Belgium, or even the Straits of Dover as jumping off bases for German aircraft, then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.
"Such a shortening of air routes would be all the more important to Germany because of our difficulties in fuel supply. Every 1000 kilograms of fuel saved is not only an asset to our national economy, but means that 1000 kilograms more of explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is, 1000 kilograms of fuel would became 1000 kilograms of bombs. This also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear and tear, and above all, in valuable airmen's lives".
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is two pages on, and your Lordship will see "41" nearly at the top of the page, with an asterisk, and the heading "The German Attack". Has your Lordship go it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY MR. ROBERTS:
Q. "The German Attack. The German attack is to be mounted with the object of destroying the French army, but in any case it must create a favorable initial situation which is a pro requisite for a successful continuation of the war.
In these circumstances, the only possible area of attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and Nijmegan in the north, exclusing Liege.
The object is to attempt to penetrate Luxembourg Belgium, and Holland in the shortest possible time, and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English forces".
I suppose I can't ask you to say what your opinion is of the honesty of giving those western neutrals a guarantee on the 6th of October and saying that is the only possible means of attack in that memorandum of the 9th. I suppose that is a question of politics, is it?
A. It is a political question, but the stipulations were made only on the condition of the strictest neutrality. But the neutrality was not kept, for British fliers daily and by night patroled and flew over this area.
Q. Why should the wretched people of the Netherlands and Belgium be destroyed and mutilated because British airmen fly over their territory -- destroyed and mutilated by the German Army? What is the logic of your remark at all?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there is one more passage from that document I should like to read. If your Lordship is thinking of adjourning, perhaps I mith read it, and then I will have finished with the document. My Lord, it is the next page, and it is toward the end of the page. It is against the number "P-52". It is just above "Time of Attack". BY DR. ROBERTS:
Q. It is on your page 52, Witness, at the very beginning, or just at the end of page 51: keep firmaly fixed in their minds the fact that the destruction of the Anglo-French forces is the main objective, the attainment of which will enable suitable conditions to obtain for later and successful employment of the German Air Force. The brutal employment of the German Air Force against the heart of of the British will to resist can and will follow at the given moment".Did that mean terror attacks against the civilian population?
A. You are asking me continuously about a document which from the first to the last word was written by the fuehrer, as I have already told you. You are citing a rather interesting picture of the Fuehrer as a strategist and as a military leader, and it is of interest to the world, but I cannot see how this concerns no.
Q. But may I point out, Witness, that your own counsel produced it and you relied on certain parts of it. That is how it concerns you; you relied on it.
A. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours).
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 6 June 1946) BY DR. ROBERTS: against the Low Countries. Will you look at your diary 1809 P.S. for the 8* May 1940. It is page 141 in document book 7 and it is page 115 in the German bock. The actual quotation is page 143 in the document book 7 at the top on the page:
"May 8. Alarming news from Holland and cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road blocks part of mobilization Measures." themselves against your invasion? Was it alarming because you thought the Dutch aught have suspected you were going to break your treaties and assurances?
A I don't understand the question.
Q I will go on. "According to the reports of the Intelligence Service the British have asked for permit to march in but Dutch refused. According to reports measures of the Dutch partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture who the the Dutch don't work hand in head with the English or whether they really wanted to defend their neutrality against the first attacker."
It is clear from that, isn't it, that you had no information at all that Dutch neutrality was going to be broken?
A That is not clear from the entry. The whole thing is only a bri* argument on reports which ire received on this day or on the previous day fr* Canaris. If that were to be followed up completely these latest reports w* have to be at hand. This entry refers to latest reports. Many thousand previous ones are not included. countries, small countries, were invaded with all of the armed night of Germany, were they not?