QAnd now, I shall turn over to the following war crimes against peace. First of all we have to make clear which offices and ranks you held during this critical period. Perhaps you can deal with 1933.
A From '32 to '35 I was in the division which later was called the Operational Division of the Army.
From the middle of '35 until October '38 I was Chief of the Division of the Office for Defense and in the Wehrmacht office which was later called OKW.
QThen the Wehrmacht AMT was later christened OKW?
AYes. From October '38 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and in Bruenn, in Moravia; and beginning with the 27th October 1939.
QJust a moment please. 27th of September?
ANo -- August, rather. 27th of August 1939 I took over the management and task of the Chief of the Operational section.
QNow, we shall begin at this time in the years 1932 to '35 when you were in the so-called Operational Office. Did you concern yourself with war plans?
AAt that time in the Operational Division there were no preparations, only a directive for the improvised border protection in the east. This was a rather sudden organization and there were preparations for evacuation measures along the whole German border in case of hostile occupation; that is, in the case of so-called sanctions. There was nothing else beyond that.
QWere you connected with the announcement of the general conscription?
ANo, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about this the day before.
QWhat was your sphere of missions as chief of the branch of the national defense from June '35 to Octber '38?
AIn this position I had to set down the operational strategic directive according to the instruction of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to concern myself with these matters and I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht, to set down studies and maneuvers. There was an extensive Wehrmacht maneuver in '37. I had to take care of the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws which were connected with the general conscription order; and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people; and the so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defence Committee belonged to me and my office.
QCan you tell us, what were you at that time? What was your military rank?
AI came into this as "Obertslieutenant" I believe; in the year '36 I was promoted to "Oberst", which was Colonel.
QDid you participate in the "Reichsverteidigungsgesetz," Reich defense law?
ANo, this law originated before I entered the Wehrmacht AMT.
QBut the Prosecution is accusing you of participation on the basis of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261, USA 24. That is the document to be found in volume I, page 9. In this document it says "in the enclosures I will send you a copy of the Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Signed by Blomberg."
This is dated the 24th of June. Then there is a supplement paragraph 3d of September '35 to the Defense economic group 1-A, copy transmitted and signed Jodl. Want can you tell us about that?
AIt is indisputable that whenever a Reich law was issued I had to transmit the copy to the other offices, and I do not have to say any more than that.
QBut the drawing up of the law itself you yourself did not participate in?
ANo.
QWere you a member of the Defense Council Executive?
ANo.
QMember of the Defense Council?
AI was that automatically at the moment when I took over the leadership, the direction of the experts council, and in the tenth session of this meeting of exports on the 26th of June 1935 General von Reichenau designated me and introduced me as his deputy.
QAnd what was the purpose of this committee? We have already discussed this matter, therefore be as brief as possible.
AJust to use a few words, in this committee a unified mobilization, the mobilization of state and people, in agreement with the military mobilization, was prepared, and this mobilization was laid down in the mobilization books.
Q.What were these various graduated steps which were set down?
A.We had learned these matters from France and we had copied them. The French followed the procedure that mobilization was carried through in five degrees.
THE PRESIDENT:Do we need the detail about this?
DR. EXNER:Very well. BY DR. EXNER:
Q.Perhaps you can tell us what this sense was, why these lines were taken over. What was the reason?
A.Thepurpose was so that they would have a means, as was customary all over Europe at this time, so that an intensified readiness for war could be set up before the public order for mobilization was issued.
Q.Did the Reich Defense committee concern itself with armament?
A.No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.
Q.Did the Reich Defense committee concern itself with political plans or intentions?
A.Political problems were in no manner the concern of this body but in event of a war only was the case of mobilization. But no certain war, but all mobilization for any and all war which was possible.
Q.In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization books. Is that correct?
A.Yes. I believe I already said that.
Q.How about these books?
A.In these books the details of all the chief Reich offices were set down and with figures so they could be recognized.
Q.What do you mean by that?
A.I mean the various ministries.
Q.You mean the civilian authorities?
A.Yes, the civilian authorities.
Q.And the preparation taken by them had to coincide with the preparations by the military; and what were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?
A.The preparations in the demilitarized zones concerned themselves solely and alone with the evacuation, that is, the surrendering, of the areas West of the Rhine in case of a French occupation.
Q.I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in this connection I should like to refer to 405 E.C., GB-460, page 11 of my document book, where in the first volume the 10th session of the Executive Council is mentioned. You are accused that you had decreed the topmost secrecy concerning all of these preparations, which according to your picture just now were of a purely defense nature. Why was this decree of secrecy?
A.The keeping secret of measures of that kind is taken for granted in the entire world, but with us in Germany it was especially important, for the civilian authorities for years were not customary to concern themselves with things military, and it seemed to me especially important that in foreign countries there would not arise a misinterpretation or, say, the capture of an order like this so a misunderstanding -- misunderstanding which have been shown characteristically in this proceeding when we talked about the "Freimachung," the clearing of the Rhine.
Q.And why did you decree secrecy so that foreign countries would not be stirred up?
A.At that time we were in a position of much greater weakness than at the time when we had an army of 100,000 men only. This army of 100,000 men had been dispersed into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very, very greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be very, very careful in order to avoid any and all tension abroad with foreign countries.
Q What were the military plans of those days?
A I have already said that they were the preparations to protect the borders. And at that time, I also worked on instructions for the commanders in the east, because, in case of a sudden attack by Poland, it would be cut off from the Reich.
Q Did you know of any intentions of attack -- that is, German intentions of attack -- at that time?
A There was no thought and no talk about that at all.
Q From the 12th session of the Reich Defense Council, I should like to quote one sentence, Page 14 of Volume 1 Of my document book, EC-407, GB-247. At that meeting was Oberstleutnant Wagner of the OKH. Who was that?
A He was the later quartermaster general.
Q Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said:
"The outcome of the war" -- that is, of the last war -- "has left a completely changed military, political situation in the event of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one's own country."
He said that on the 14th of May, 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?
A Of course, one can perhaps say -
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness can interpret to us.
DR. EXNER: Very well. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Now, can you tell us, in the Truppenamt and later in the division for the defense of the country,did you concern yourself with armament?
A I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht, the army, the navy, the Luftwaffe; and it was dealt with and handled by their organizational staff. The commanders-in-chief discussed these matters with the Fuehrer directly. But there is the fact that my General Staff work contributed to the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht. That I know, and do not wish to dispute.
Q Your diary, 1780 PS, does not contain a word about armament, and it seams obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with those problems.
What were your thougths and ideas on this problem of armament? Was yours an attitude that was positive?
AAt that time I was of the opinion, as were my superiors -- and it was characteristic -- that on the day before the declaration, 36 divisions would be set up. Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to the Fuehrer to set up only 24 divisions. They were afraid that there would be a dilution of the entire army, and perhaps they were afraid of rather stormy foreign politics, and politics which would be based on strength and forces which were set down only on paper.
QPlease tell us, what deadline did you concern yourself with as far as armament was concerned, in the year 1935? What deadline did you set?
AVarious graduations were set. The first deadline set was 194243, and the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The construction of the Navy concerned itself with the year 1944-45.
QAt that time -- that is, the opinion that you held at that time -what was the objective of armament?
ASince a disarmament had not come about, the objective was to establish military parity between Germany and her neighboring countries.
QAt this point, in this connection. I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted, the report of General George Marshall, a two-year report. This has already been submitted as Raeder No.19. I have a part here before me, a part which I wanted to use as AJ-3. I submitted it under AJ-3, Page 168. This deals with the problem of rearmament, tending to be some sentences which in reality to me seem to hit the nail righton the head.
In the second paragraph on Page 5, or rather the last sentence there, we see:
"The world does not seriously regard the desire of the weak. Weakness presents too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the bully who schemes for wealth and power."
Then on the next page there is another sentence:
"We must start, I think, with a correction of the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy".Can you tell us, please, at that time, what was our military ratio as compared with the foreign countries, our military strength ratio?
AIn the year 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 peace divisions, and 190 divisions in war. We had almost no heavy artillery, and the armored weapons were in the most primitive stage of their beginning.
The concept of defensive and offensive armament has been discussed on various occasions. However, it would lead us too far afiels to enter into this discussion. But I should like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her geographical position, this concept did not apply, this disarmament concept. The disarmament concept, after months of discussion, failed because of the difference in the conception of this idea.
I should like to quote from an excerpt in this report of George Marshall, Page 168 of my document book, the document out of which I have just quoted, and again just one more sentence in the first paragraph:
"The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack".
Now, however, the prosecution asserts that you should have known that such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only for an agressive. Will you comment on this please?
AI believe this can be explained only on the basis of military non-knowledge. Up until the year 1939, we were, of course, in a position to destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1937 or 1938, actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these states together. And if we did not already collapse in the year 1939, that was traceable only to the fact that roughly 110 French and British divisions in the west during the Polish campaign, as against 23 German divisions, were completely inactive.
Q Can you tell us, when did this strong rearmament actually come about?
A The actual armament was carried through only after the beginning of the war. We entered into this world war with perhaps 75 divisions. 600/0 of our total population had not been trained. The peace time army amounted to perhaps400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in the year 1914. The witness Milch has already testified on supplies, stores, amunition, and bombs.
These supplies ware ridiculously low.
QThen, I should like to refer to and read a war diary entry of yours, Page 16 of Volume 1 of my document book, which is 1780 PS.U.S.A.72. There, on the 13th December you said:
"The General Field Marshall after having described the situation reports on the status of the war potential of the Wehrmacht, whose greatest difficulty lies in the insufficient supply of amunition of the army -- 10-25 days of combat -- 6 weeks' supply."
That was the period of time for which we had munitions.
Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the Rhineland.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now.
(A recess was taken)
Q Colonel General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the Rhine-
land?
AOn the 1st or 2nd of March, 1936; that is to say about six days before the actual occupation. I could not have heard earlier because before that the Fuehrer had not yet made the decision himself.
QDid you, as a General, have military objections against that occupation?
AI have to confess that we were about as frightened as a gambler who was putting his entire fortune on.
QDid you have legal objections?
ANo; I was neither an International Law expert nor a politician and, politically speaking, that agreement between Czechoslovakia, Russia and France seemed to have made the Locarno Pact entirely superfluous; and that was something which I accepted as a fact at the time.
QHow strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the occupation?
AWe occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory West of the Rhine; one battalion were to Aachen, one to Frier, and one to Saarbruecken.
QThree battalions. That is really a symbolic occupation, isn't it?
AYes, and they only acted symbolically.
QDid you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of that occupation
AThere were serious reports which reached our military attaches in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by them. We suggested to Field Marshal von Blomberg at that time that perhaps he ought to discuss the withdrawing of these three battalions west of the Rhine if the French would with draw for to five times as many men from their part of the Rhine.
QWas that suggestion ever made?
AYes, it was made to the Fuehrer but he turned it down. What he refused quite definitely was General Beck's suggestion that we should declare that we would not fortify the territory west of the Rhine. This suggestion came from General Beck and the Fuehrer refused it.
QDid you think at the time that that action contained any agressive intention
ANo, there couldn't be any mention of aggressive intentions because the French Army alone could have blown us off the earth, considering the situation we were in.
Q Do you now think that the leading men had aggressive intentions then?
ANo, nobody had aggressive intentions, but it is of course possible that in the brain of the Fuehrer there was a connection between that occupation and the thought that this was a prerequisite for actions later to be taken in the East. That is possible but I don't know because I didn't see in the Fuehrer's brain.
QBut you did not, presumably, see any outward signs of it?
ANo, I didn't.
QDid you know of the so-called "testament" of Hitler's dated 5 November, 1937, which has been read out in this court room?
AThe first time I heard of it was from Keitel.
QWhat did you know at that time about it?
AField Marshal von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me that the had been a discussion with the Fuehrer, When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken; but I drew my own conclusions as the diary show What I was told wasn't in any way sensational and hardly different in any way from information which had been contained in general directives for the preparation of the war. I can only assume that Field Marshal von Blomberg at that time kept these letters to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
QWas there a march plan against Austria?
AThere was no plan for the march into Austria. That I must emphatically stat in this connection.
QNow we come to document C 175, a directive which has the number USA 68. It is in volume I, Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation for war of the armed forces of the year 1936, and the prosecuto has only quoted the operation order from the instructions, which seemed to creat the impression that this was a plan for the campaign against Austria. How does the importance of this directive really find its explanation?
AIt was one of those typical preparations for war, unified preparations as they were for any thinkable case. Such directives come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and compulsory military service. This theortical military work before us made a difference between two cases, namely, such cases of war which, because of their nature, were politically probable, or might be probable, and such cases which were improbable, As far as the first were concerned, a campaign was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force, while where the later is concerned, there were only to be the appropriate considerations.
If the Tribunal would turn to page 21 of the document, there appears, at the end of the page under Part 3, a sentence: "The following special cases are to be considered inside the High Command generally without participation by outside authorities", and the operation "Otto" appears a mong such cases on Page 22.
QThis document, on Page 18, is that an order which is valid from the 1st of July '37, until, presumably, the 30th of September, 1938? That is just over a year and that, in turn, replaces another similar instruction which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been in force and worked on for similar problems previously.
Did you participate in discussions regarding the Austrian case?
ANo, I have not participated in any conferences.
QIt is said in the Trial Brief that on the 12th of February, 1938, you had been to Obersalzberg, and Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under the 12th of March, '38,is, therefore, based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?
AYes. It is merely the outcome, the reflection of a brief account given me by General Keitel about that day. Probably it is somewhat colorful.
QBut then it says, on February the 11th: "General von Keitel and General von Reichenau at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt have been subjected to political and military pressure." In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are "again" subjected to the most serious political and military pressure. This word "again" does not appear in my German original. Then you suggested maneuvers of deception again: Austria, and that is being held against you.
AI didn't suggest any maneuvers of deception. The Fuehrer ordered them, and I do believe that they are not illegal, because I believe that in the history of the world, both in peace and in war, false cards have always been used; but the Fuehrer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied Military information to Canaris, where our garrisons were situated, and Canaris dealt with it and took it to Munich.
QWhat did you think was the purpose?
AI had been told that the purpose was that there might be a certain amount of emphasis so that Schuschnigg would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg; but he returned home.
QHow long previously did you know of the intentions to march in? How long before the actual march in did you know of such intentions?
AOn the 10th of march, in the morning just before 11:00, I heard of it for the first time.
QAnd the marching was when?
AOn the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who was then temporarily the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, were ordered to the Reichschancellery.
That is whom I heard of the intention for the first time.
QThen did you have on expose'made or what?
AThen the Fuehrer surprised them by telling them that this was the problem of Austria that had come up; and then they learned that there was a General Staff expose' memorandum called "Otto". They sent for me, together with these instructions, and heard from me that such an instruction was in existence, but in practice nothing at all had been prepared. Since it had only been thought about, and since it was only there for the case of an Austrian restoration and since such a restoration was not pending, the Supreme Commander of the Army had done nothing in practice.
Q How do you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
AIt appeared to me to be a family row and I thought that that would solve itself inside Austria in the shortest possible time.
QAnd how did you arrive at that view?
AThat view of mine was due to my great personal knowledge of Austria, with which -- through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club, to which I belonged as a commoisseur of Austrian mountains -- I had been in close contact. I was more interested in the Austrian mountains than the German mountains. I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time and that the uprising on Styria was a characteristic example.
QBut now the march into Austria was the carrying out of the suggestion. C-175, wasn't it?
ANo, the march was improvised completely and done within a few hours, and the result was accordingly. Seventy per cent of all the armored vehicles and cars remained on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken out of their recruit training and given this task. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QDefendant, you said just now, didn't you, that the Fuehrer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn't you?
AI said that the Fuehrer had informed General Keitel and General Viehbahn on the 10th of March, in the morning; that he informed him at that time. He didn't talk to me, because on that day I hadn't talked to the Fuehrer at all.
QI only wanted to know the date. You said it was the 10th of March.
AYes, on the 10th of March, in the morning. BY DR. EXNER:
QIs it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the frontier districts, into the Austrian territory?
AYes; in fact only peacetime units were used, which were meant to take part in the parade in Vienna. All units which might have been necessary for an military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
Q What about Munich's columns?
ANo, they all remained behind.
QWas there any hesitation amongst political leaders at the last moment on that occasion?
AOn the 11th of March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reichschancellery that the armed forces were not to move in, but that the police should pass through the armed forces and were to move in on their own. In the evening, however, on the 11th of March -- at 8:30 P.M. -- the final decision reached me, which was that the armed forces were to move in after all. The reason for that hesitation I never heard.
QSo that altogether there wasn't a forcible march in?
ANo, it was a purely peaceful march. It was characterized by the fact that the chief of the operations staff of the Army had it suggested to him by me that he should have the bend marching at the head of the column and that all drivers should definitely wear spectacles -- otherwise the flowers would hurt their eyes.
QWhat was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march? It has been put before you under the number, C-182, USA-77. You can remember it, can't you?
AYes, I can remember. That is nothing other than the note for the fi of something which had previously been orally ordered and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late
QAnd what is the significance of Document C-103, USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
AThat was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army, for there must be -- even for the most unlikely eventuality -- information as to how to behave, how the troops were to behave. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Fuehrer, and I then clarified -- put his decision down in writing -- by his order.
QAnd how did action actually progress?
AHe had progressed exactly as expected. There was a triumphant para* a triumphant march, such as could hardly have happened in history today -- even if today one doesn't like to remember it.
The population met us as early as during the night.
The customs barriers fell, or were taken down, and then the entire German forces experienced that march only under the hail of flowers.
QWe now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia: Did you participate during the conferences on the 21st of April, 1938, and the 28th of May, 1938, which the Prosecution have described as"Conspirators' Conferences"?
AI did not participate in any of these conferences.
QWhat type of General Staff work were you carrying out for the Case Green -- which is, of course, the Operation Czechoslovakia?
AIn that case I have to come back to Document C-175, which is on page 17 of the first volume of my Document Book.
In that general directive for the unified preparation for war, the two important cases were being dealt with, or were to be dealt with, a defensive action, against a France which might start the war. That is Operation Red. And an offensive action -- that is Case Green -- against Czechoslovakia. That would have been dealt with in just the same way, even if there hadn't been an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two fronts -- which was the problem we always faced -- could never be conducted in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be dealt with anew at the very moment that Austria automatically became new or operational territory. Thus, on the 20th of May, 1938, a new draft was created for Operation Green. It was done by me and it began with the customary words, "I do not intend with a reasonable time to proceed against Czechoslovakia."
QThat quotation is PS-288, USA-26. It is the document dated the 20th of May, 1938. "I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia within a reasonable time." Now, what were you going to say?
AThat, as I was going to say, was the 20th of May. On the 21st, the day after, an incredible incident occurred, however. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even took up positions along our borders. The Czechoslovak chie of the General Staff explained this by saying that twelve German divisions had been stationed in Saxony. I can only state -- and my diary entries prove it -that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing -- absolutely nothing had happened.
DR. EXNER:In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire, an interrogatory -- AJ-9. It is an interrogatory submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attache in Prague. And he confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, at 199. On page 201 of the document there is a question, "What was the reason for the Czechoslovak mobilization in May, 1938?" And he answered it, "It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovak government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of the General Staff, informed me, as reason for the mobilization, that he had exact information that ten to twelve German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking any counter-measures."
And then there should be a diary note from Jodl, volume 1, page 26: "The Fuehrer's question, not to touch on the Czech problem yet, is altered by the Czech deployment on the 21st of May which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Among its consequences, owing to the silence of Germany, this leads to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, which he is not now willing to accept. Hence the issue on May 5th of the new directive for the Case Green."
That is from Jodl's diary, page 26, first volume.
THE WITNESS: Well, then, that was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the former Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on on the Fuehrer.
The result was that he personally changed my draft on 20 May and put th e words at the beginning, "It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be smashed within a short period of time. To decide upon the opportunity and the time is a matter for the political leaders."
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the document PS-388, which I have already referred to, which is USA 26, and I refer to the order of 30 May 1939. BY DR. EXNER:
QPlease tell me briefly that the contents of these directives were.
AIn that order of 30 May three cases had been quoted by the Fuehrer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise. That is to say, politically and after a lengthy period of tension. Most undesirable, because there would be a lack of military supplies. The best solution would be if it happened after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, which would justify us morally and before the world if we decided to intervene.
Furthermore, there was the demand that on the first day the army should break through the forticications, thus making it possible for the armored divisions to go through and operate freely, and then, after four days, a situation should be created which would make the military position of Csechoslovakia untenable.
Q why was the entire directive redrafted in June?
AThe entire directive, instruction, C-175 was re-created in June. This was done, gowever, because on 1 October a new draft year began, the new calling-up period, and because the instructions C-175 were in any case only planned until 30 May 1938. So the old directive, which of course was still in force until 1 October, did nevertheless become invalid on 1 October through that directive which on 24 June, or 18 June, had been drafted by me. In that directive the Case Gruen was once more mentioned in the sense of the Fuehrer's intention--namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that beginning with 1 October 1938--hot on but beginning with 1 October 1938--any favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the Czechoslovakian problem, but only if France would not interfere or march.
I state that no different date existed for this and no order for the starting of a war against Czecheslovakia, but that with the directive of 30 May, the date was left open altogether, but the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June only stated that beginning with 1 October and on the first favorable occasion.
DR. EXNER: That is on page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: "I have decided, beginning on 1 October--" and so on and so forth.
AMay I perhaps conclude this question by saying, in order to explain events quite precisely, that, in fact, before 14 September and as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing at all was done.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl's diary. It is an extract from PS 1780, USA 72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938:
"At noon it is announced abroad that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia...This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up with short term induction orders. Since the Sudeten-Germans are crossing the border en masse, we are requesting at around 1730 at the suggestion of the High Command of the Army, 2nd Department, the calling up of the Frontier Guard Service-- the G.A.D.--along the Czech border in the service commands VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Fuehrer gives his authorization from Munich."
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from page 32 of my document book, volume I, page 32, first volume, and it is an excertpt from Jodl's diary of 14 September, which is in that critical period. BY DR. EXNER:
QJust what were these military measures which were being introduced?
AOn 13 or 14 September, the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. Please notice that we used the increased border protection squads so that the many escaping Sudeten-Germans could be taken care of.
On 17 September the Fuehrer formed the Free Corps Henlein, against the previous agreement, again without telling us beforehand.