QWere you also able to call on the Wehrmacht units for manpower to assist in the Jewish raids, or any partisan warfare or executions?
AOf course, not by order, but by agreement,
QYes, you were able to call on other units besides your own for assistance when you needed it?
AIf they were voluntarily asked to do it. I could not order a unit to do so.
QLet me ask it this way. Your survey of a tactical situation showed you that you did not have enough manpower to solve this problem, even with the assistance of what Police Units you already had, would you then be at liberty to go to the nearest Army, to the nearest battalion commander of the Wehrmacht, or regimental commander of the Wehrmacht, and explain your situation to him and ask for some help
AThe Army as such had forbidden the participation in liquidation. It was a question of voluntary agreement between the leader of the Einsatzkommando, and the leader of the military unit to get assistance, despite the prohibition of participation in the executions, and this happened repeatedly. It was not a question of an order on our part, but of agreeing voluntarily with the other military commanders.
QDid the individual man, say the Wehrmacht private or the non-commissioned officer have the power to volunteer or to agree to go to your assistance in these execution matters?
AYes, as certain individuals, yes, as far as he took it upon himself to disobey.
QLet's go back just a little bit. The Einsatzkommando Fuehrer has agreed with his neighboring Army commander, whether a unit is decided, or a battalion, or regiment, it makes no difference, he has agreed that he needs thirty or fifty men to come to his assistance.
The Army unit commander is agreed that he does need this many men. Does this Army unit commander then call on a junior officer and say, pick out twenty men, or thirty men, and take them over to where the Ensatzkommando requests them, and commit them to action, or, does that junior officer assemble his company and ask for volunteers from the Wehrmacht to go?
AMy answer is, of course, only a theoretical one.
QYes.
AI cannot give you any concrete case, as I assume it I would have to assume the latter, that he would ask the people to volunteer.
QThe same was true of officers in the Wehrmacht as it was for the men, is that right, on a voluntary basis?
AYes, that is what I mean,
QNow, General, let's turn to Document Book II-B, page 7 in the English, page 5 of the German, which is document NO-2337, and is Prosecutions Exhibit No. 58, this is report dated 29 August 194-7.
A '41.
Q '41, yes, I am sorry, on page 11 of that report, in the English document book, it relates the number of Jews that were driven out in the Rumanian territory, and in this connection you discussed the participation yesterday of the defendant Felix Ruehl, of which he has also told in his affidavit. Now are these two instances the, same, the one in the document and the one which is related by the defendant Ruehl?
AI don't remember the affidavit of Ruehl.
QAll right. I show you in Document Book III-D, page 76 of the English, page 121 of the German, Document No-4149, which is Prosecution's Exhibit No, 169.
Now in paragraph 3 of that document -
AYes, I got it.
QMy question is, is the instance related by Ruehl in his affidavit the same incident as the one given in the report of Document 2837, the first document which was called to your attention?
AYes.
QDid Ruehl ever report to you what disposition he made of this transport, after he carried them to some place. Did he ever report back to you that this problem was settled, that he had disposed of the Jews?
A can not remember that.
QIf he had reported to you that 1265 of the younger Jews were liquidated, would you have remembered it now? know that is a difficult question.
AI remember the incident very exactly. But to answer your question, I didn't have the impression that Ruehl was a leader of the transport. Ruehl, sofar as I remember was the very one who passed on my directives to MogilowPedolsk to let the Jews go back to Rumania, who then reported to me that Rumania would not let the Jews return across the river, and then he was referred to Kommando XII, which was then to try to arrange the transporting back of the Jews by way of another bridge. That happened as the result of a directive given by me to Noske. Ruehl, therefore, had nothing else to do but to give the directive to Mogilov, and to report back to me that the Rumanians would make difficulties. And, then from a part of Kommando XII together with a part detachment of X-B in Mogilov, which was not under the direction of Ruehl, but under a different leader.
This transport of Jews was effected from Mogilov over the bridge to Jampel, into the Roumanian territory. From my own knowledge I consider it completely out of the question that a) younger Jews were picked and b) that 1265 were shot. Because the order was clear, and Noske reported later the carrying out of this order, and there was no cause to assume that such a selection was made, or that such killings were perpetrated.
QThen Nosske reported to you on this incident?
AYes, that is right.
QDo you recall what Nosske reported?
AT have already said yesterday that by arrangement with the German bridge officer, he had just barely made it possible that this transport be brought back.
QGeneral, in the event of liquidations which would have been preferred by the Rumanians, could the Einsatzgruppe have prevented or order the Rumanians troops to cease and to desist and not execute these men?
ANo, we had no power of command towards the Rumanians. We only had the possibility of intervening once and awhile because the Rumanians were making difficulties by lootings, and by rapings, and, thus, we permitted ourselves to interfere personally.
QOnly on special occasions then you could interfere with the Rumanians troops affairs?
ANot in a military matter, but against individual persons.
QAll right. Now, General, one more document. Let's turn to Document Book II-D, on page 49 of the English, and on page 54 of the German. This is document NO-2841, which is Prosecution's Exhibit No. 94. Were any of these 94 Jews guilty of spying, as the report says, on the population?
AI can only interprete the text, Mr. Prosecutor, that according to that, it looked as if the Jews had sabotaged against the harvest, and were identical with persons who had denounced other people, and caused them to be sent off, that is what the document shows.
QYes, a sabotage would cover the creating of dissatisfaction with the agricultural workers, or in any way preventing them from doing their normal agriculture, labor, would it not, that would be agriculture sabotage?
AYes.
QAnd also -
AIt would be agitation, too.
QYes. And also it was about or prior to the entry of German forces in this area, these people had sent Russians, there own fellow nationals, by their denouncing, off to Siberia. Now, General, it is not clear to me why for a crime against another Russian before the Germans occupied the area the German forces would want to punish these men?
AMr. Prosecutor, may I remind you of the law which had just been decreed in Germany, I believe they were the Same, only goes somewhat further, insofar as the officials are accused that as the result of the laws of their State they officially persecuted people, and in the case of Goerdler, the young girl who recognized Goerdler, who even was involved in the assault against the life of the Chief of State, received twelve years in the penitentiary, and that these twelve years in the penitentiary, according to the Berlin publicity were not even sufficient.
QGeneral, I have no desire to got into a debate, That was yesterday, we were trying to pin it down to facts as to the document before us.
Now who determined that the number of Jews should be 94 to be executed as a reprisal, or retaliation. Was this the Kommando-Fuehrer there?
AIt must be typically a fact which I had said before; a detailed investigation was undertaken, and the result of this investigation had effected 49 people. Namely, they had participated in sabotage, or in agitation. That is not a general measure, but certainly these were individual investigations.
QBut it was a reprisal measure?
AWell, the text seems to show the contrary, It was a measure because of the security being in danger, The text which was probably summarized one can not quite make it out.
QLet me ask you this. As a general policy were the populations of any area warned beforehand that they would be subject to reprisals if they did not obey the directives and the orders of each of the police units?
AYes, there were very clear orders. There were directives of the Army, or of the Army corps, which were posted, and made known everywhere in which, for example such crimes were listed with a threat that whoever violated such directives would be publicly hanged.
QAnd were these people who violated these directives always given a trial, or was it an emergency measure to have the arresting officer decide whether he had violated a directive and pass sentence?
AI don't know about such matters. I believe that these taking of hostages and reprisal measures took place later on.
QNow again, can I direct your attention, please, to Document Bock II-C, page 16 in the English, page 18 in the German, which is document NO-2952, and is Prosecution's Exhibit No. 71. General, in this document please turn to the fourth paragraph under the heading "Partisan Warfare."?
AYes
QPage 16 of the English, and 18 of the German. Now under paragraph four I direct your attention to the sentence where twenty hostages were dealt with by a summary Court. General, are you familiar with the proceedings in a Summary Court?
ANo, I don't know anything about it.
QYou don't know then whether these twenty hostages would have a right to counsel to represent them?
AI don't know this, but I could give you exact information about it. The decree which I had mentioned before, the. Decree of the Fuehrer, signed by Keitel of May 1941, excludes such procedure. This is a directive about the procedure-to be applied before a court martial, and this directive determined that in all these cases a court martial is not competent, but that an officer has to decide those cases by himself.
QThen you have answered my next question, but I would like it to be stated in another way.
THE PRESIDENT.Mr. Walton, may I interrupt, please.
MR. WALTON:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:Does the offer also decide the ratie?
ADecide about life and death, whether it is a suspicious suspect, or not?
QDoes he decide the ratio of hostages, as to the number of German deaths, if any?
AI had just understood the Prosecution's question differently. I don't he meant the taking of hostages, but the question of whether somebody if he was suspected was in a position to have a defense counsel present him in the trial.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Walton, is referring to a particular document where reference is made first to ten hostages, and then twenty hostages. Does this officer who investigates the matter decide just how many hostages shall be killed because of whatever jeopardation was committed upon a German element?
THE WITNESS:The Einsatzgruppe itself did not take any hostages, it did not treat the question of hostages, therefore, I can not give you this information, with my knowledge of the Einsatzgruppe, but in this case just this execution of hostages was the cause that Colonel von Schobert - I mean, General von Schober complained to Seibert that for these cases which happened in Belzy, not enough hostages had been shot, and he, therefore, would give directive that harsher measures be taken, that is to more hostages should no shot then were shot in this case.
I don't know whether ratio numbers were already determined, as this happened in the Southeast later on. I would assume that this was determined by the competent local officers of the units, probably, according to these directives of the Army, but I am only giving you my interpretation.
QYou had referred to the Keitel Order, and I recall that in the first trial, the IMT Trial, that Keitel had been quoted as ordering so many hostages to one German soldier killed, and I was wondering if that applied in this case?
AYes.
QSome more information, General. I think you have answered this, but I would like to get it dtraight in my own mind. Did the hostages under sentence of death have the right to appeal deaht sentences to a higher military or SS authority?
AOf course not. Thas was just what I said before as to the content of Keitel's Order.
QYes, now, didn't the main duty of this Summary Court consist of selecting the number of persons to be executed, the main duty?
AI can not tell, you that.
QIn your direct testimony didn't you state as a fact that the arrest of hostages was carried out, and I quote your words, "By order of the Supreme Commander of my Army," and then you relate that the Army complained that you executed a few hostages. This has been referred to several times, is that correct?
AI only know this from the document, and from the statement of Seibert, who had this experience with Schober. I don't know of these hostages measures from my own knowledge.
QThen according to your best recollection the Army did make complaint about too few hostages being executed?
AYes, and Seibert immediately reported this to me.
AAbout what time was this, General, about what month of the year?
AIn July 1941.
QAnd the Army Commander at this time was General von Schober is it not so?
AYes, General von Schober.
QNow did you increase your execution of hostages after this complaint? Not you personally, but generally as to your unit?
AMy unit also did not participate in any shooting of hostages.
The question of hostages was a matter for the Army, and I would like to add from my recollection that at my time in the East the Army also arrested very few hostages, because at that time the partisan warfare had not yet turned into a warfare of the population, a general warfare.
QLater under General von Manstein, were you ever called on to execute hostages?
AI can not remember any such incident.
QDo you remember any town or villages in Russia where it was brought to your knowledge that hostages were executed by some one?
AI only know from the Prosecution's documents about the shooting of Kischimen. I don't remember anything myself.
QNow let's consider this same document a little father. In paragraph-
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Walton, suppose we recess at this time.
MR. WALTON:Yes, Your honor.
THE PRESIDENT:We will be in recess until 1:45.
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal will be in recess until 1345 hours.
(Whereupon a recess was taken until 1345, 15 October 1947.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The Tribunal reconvened at 1345 hours, 15 October 1947).
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE-PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
OTTO OHLENDORF - Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. WALTON:
QGeneral, just-prior to the lunch hour, I would like to redirect your attention to the document which we were discussing at that time, and it is contained in Document Book II-C, Page 16 of the English, Page 18 of the German, and it is Document NO-2952, Prosecution's Exhibit 71. I should like to call your particular attention to Paragraph 5 headed "Jews". In your comments last Thursday you stated that these forty-five Jews were executed as a counter-measure. By this do you mean that they were executed - I am sorry.
AI beg your pardon. I only stated my argument following the document.
QLet me ask you, do you have before you Paragraph 5 headed as a subject "Jews"?
AYes.
QBy your comments do you mean that they were executed in retaliation for attacks on German military personnel?
AIt can be seen from the document, yes.
QNow, was some of the Security Police directives, disobedience to which could bring death, failure to register as a Jew?
AI should think that in this connection it might mean one had not stayed at home in the evening. They are precaution-measures in order to avoid attacks by the military, which is a presumption which cannot be taken from the document.
QDid a summary court or other court act on the cases of these forty-five Jews in that document? Would you state as a matter of general knowledge that they would?
AI cannot imagine at all.
QIs it a matter of general policy that no court of any kind acted on cases where Jews were to be shot in reprisal?
AI think here you have to follow the argument as I started it, that on principle there was an order that regular courts were to he excluded.
QNow, let us consider next Document Book II-D, Page 41 in the English and the German Page 43, Document NO-4135, being Prosecution's Exhibit 91, and in this same document book, Page 45 of the English, Page 48 of the German, which is Document NOKW-587 and is Prosecution's Exhibit 92.
MR. WALTON:May it please the Tribunal, Document NO-4135 shows at the top of Page 41 the date 10 July 1941. The photostat copy of the original shows this date to be 14th of July, 1941, and the German document books so give it. I now ask your Honors to make correction of this typographical error.
THE PRESIDENT:It will be corrected. BY MR. WALTON:
QNow, General, in your direct examination you stated that these two documents offer strong contradiction. I invite your close attention once more to these two documents. In NOKW-587 it was reported to the I-C of Army Group South that Einsatzkommando 10-B shot 500 Jews, among whom was the Jewish leadership. Now, when we consider Page 41 of the English, Page 43 of this same document book, where you found Document NO-4135, it shows the situation which prevailed about the same time in Czernowitz as the report to I-C of the Army Group South shows, does it not?
AIt seems to cover the same period of report.
QYes. At one-point in your testimony you stated that the SD had no prisons as you were immediately behind the fighting front, did you not?
AI beg your pardon; because?
QAt one point in your testimony you stated that the SD had no prisons as you were immediately behind the fighting front, did you not?
ANo, not for that reason. That must be said in another connection. In Czernowitz not the SD but the Einsatzkomnando there did not have any prisons but the Rumanians had them because the Rumanians were in charge of that city.
QAnd did Einsatzgruppe D ever take any prisoners?
AOf course, but only temporarily.
QYes.
AThat is not prisons.
QDid your gruppe ever interrogate prisoners of war and civilian prisoners?
AI do not want to deny that, although I cannot remember any individual case, but surely there would have been P.W.'s as well as certainly civilian prisoners because if they were suspected of a crime they had to be examined.
QNow, how were these persons incarcerated while the series of interrogations were in progress?
AFor example, in Czernowitz there was a house which was a prison.
QWas it ever possible to keep those prisoners that you had not finished interrogating in Army prisoner-of-war cages or Rumanian prisoner-of-war cages or prisons, take them out for interrogation and put them back?
AIn one document and only one document I read of a similar occurrence from Feodosia. These occurrences were new to me, that civilian prisoners were sent to POW camps. When I read it I could only explain it to myself that it concerned persons of military age who were sent to the POW camp for that reason.
QNow, did the Einsatzkommando ever decide that a person should not be killed but should be punished by a prison term?
ANo, but I want to explain this because else you might get the wrong impression. I believe that the Proportion of released prisoners to these condemned was ninety to ten, or even a ratio of ninety-five percent to five percent, and a number of documents, which the Prosecution has submitted here itself reveal that fact, that a number of persons were arrested who were suspected of being partisans and the rest were released.
QNov in the second topic under the heading, "Einsatzkommando 10-B" in Document NO-4135 before you, which is Page 42 of the English, it states that a great number of Jews of the poorer class are in the Rumania, prisons and nearly no intelligentsia. Doesn't this document confirm the fact that executions had nearly wiped out the leadership or the intelligentsia class in this area, as reported in NOKW-587to the Army Group South?
AI read the contrary from it, and perhaps I understood the contrary because I actually knew the condition, because in Czernowitz there were two scandals. One was the very rotten way in which Jews were killed by the Rumanian Army, and the second was the dirty business the Rumanians did with the rich Jews, and from my knowledge I can comment on this sentence, that the rich Jews actually were not arrested.
THE PRESIDENT:What methods did the Rumanians employ in liquidating Jews that you disapproved of in the language which you have just used?
THE WITNESS:With the kommando leader from Czernowitz I wanted to leave Czernowitz, and I found some of the Jews as they had been shot by the Rumanians, or they had been shot at, and they had been lying there shot although not dead, although the kommando leader had asked the Rumanian Army to stop this. One group of Jews had been sent there and they had shot at them and left the victims lying just as they were. Some were not dead, and only forceful, interference by Pesterer finally stopped it or put it in order end that was when he was responsible for excesses against Rumanians. BY MR. MALTON:
QGeneral, can we assume that most of the time there was close cooperation between the Rumanian troops and the Einsatzgruppen insofar as the solution of the Jewish problem was concerned in your respective areas?
AUnfortunately I must contradict you immediately, Mr. Prosecutor. This cooperation was not possible and for that reason did not exist.
QAnd, General, if you would be so kind, please return to Document Book II-D, Page 41 in the German, 43 in the English, the same document, NO-4135, Prosecution's Exhibit 91. We agree, do we not, that this Operational Situation Report No. 22 is one of the reports that was consolidated in Berlin?
AYes.
QDid not the RSHA have to get this information contained in this report from the four Einsatzgruppen, A, B, C and D?
AThe RSHA got reports from A, B, C and D.
QNow, did not the information under the heading, "Results of the Conference between General von Schobert and Ohlendorf," come from your headquarters before Berlin could consolidate it in its report?
AOf course.
QNow, I have a Question of Document Book I, one Question which is on Page 72 of the English, Page 97 of the German, and is Document NO-3422, and it is Prosecution's Exhibit 19. This document contains directives for the commanders of the chief of the Security Police and the SD which were to be assigned to the prisoner of war camps and the transient camps and the date of this document is 29 October 1941. Were you on the date shown on this document the commanding officer of Einsatzgruppe D?
AYes.
QCan you turn, please, to Document Book III-D, Page 14 of the English, German Page 16, to Document NOKW 641, which is Prosecution Exhibit 151, and this document is, as you will recognize, your signed report to Army headquarters, under date of 12 February, 1942, You gave the Tribunal your comments on this last week, but I would like to ask you what is meant by the phrase under, and I quote, Paragraph I, "Watches confiscated".
AI beg your pardon, may I have this page number again?
QIt is Page 16 of the German. Do you find paragraph headed "I. Watches confiscated"?
APage 16?
QThe document begins on Page 16.
AYes.
QNow, I should like you to explain to the Court what is meant by the term, and I quote, "Anti-Jewish actions" which appears in the first sentence of that paragraph?
A "The watches confiscated during the anti-Jewish actions", do you mean this?
QNo, just what the torn "anti-Jewish action" means.
AThat is not written here, "anti-Jewish action".
QDoesn't the sane phrase in Paragraph II under "Confiscated rubles" appear?
AI believe, unfortunately, I must quote the translation because in the German text it says "Jewish actions," and not "anti-Jewish actions."
QDoes that phrase then mean an action against the Jews?
A Yes.
QAnd the same phrase as it appears in Paragraph II under "Confiscated rubles" also means the same thing?
AYes.
QNow, isn't it true that this property was confiscated simply because it was Jewish property and because Jews were enemies of the Reich and they had no right to property whatever?
AThe text clearly reveals that it says that the property which came, which we got after the Jews were killed was confiscate by the Reich.
QWas this a war-emergency Measure or self-defense Measure, this action?
AI don't think it has ever been maintained. There was an instruction to confiscate.
QNow, I think, General, we will leave the document books. I want to ask you some questions on other information. In your direct examination you stated that between March and July 1942 you were frequently absent from your post as commander of Einsatzgruppe D, did you not?
AYes,
QWho was the acting commander of your group while you were away?
AMy co-defendant, Seibert was acting commander.
QNow, Seiberg, did he occupy this post because of his rank or because of your confidence in him?
AI beg your pardon; because
QDid he occupy this post of acting commander of Einsatzgruppe D because of his rank or because of your confidence in him?
ABecause he was in my staff, that is in the staff of the group, and he was the senior officer there.
QThen because of his rank as senior officer?
ABecause of his rank in the staff, yes.
QIsn't it true that you had confidence in Seibert, that he would be a man that would see that all orders and directives both from Berlin and from the Army would be carried out with the same degree of care that you would have used if present and in actual command?
AUnfortunately I cannot confirm that to you. He did not have the qualification to do that. I trusted Seibert but that independently from what you say, I think we discussed it this morning.
QGeneral, don't misunderstand me. This is not merely confined to executions by the actual daily activities. Didn't you have confidence that Seibert would see that they were carried out just as completely and just as militarily as you would have had you been there?
AUnfortunately he could not do that because I did not have the authority to do so. He could not act for me as authority towards kommando leaders who were senior in rank to him like Standartenfuehrer Seezen, for example, the kommando leader of 10-A; Standartenfuehrer Mueller of Kommando 12. Zapp also held the same rank as he did at least, if not a higher rank. These factors alone show that he had no power to command these kommandos. As you hill remember from the direct examination, as an acting chief it was, Standartenfuehrer Seezen who had been assigned to no by the RSHA. That has never been clanged, only that I did not use him. In this connection Seibert never acted, for me, but he acted for no in the staff, and saw to it that the affairs were running out properly.
QDid you yourself ever leave specific orders with Seibert about the activities of the group to be transmitted to the different Kommandos?
ANo. Although I don't like saying it, in this connection I must say again that such orders were never given by me at all, and Seibert neither had the possibility nor the opportunity to give such orders.
QOn your return from your first absence and subsequent absences in which Seibert was left there, did you have any cause for complaint against his actions that he had performed while you were gone?
AUnfortunately he could not prevent altogether that within the groups differences arose. However, I could not blame him for this because in that connection he did not have the moral authority to prevent this.
QDid he make any attempt to settle these differences?
AI am afraid I don't know that any more.
QGeneral, do you recall any conversations with Seibert concerning the solution of the Jewish problem in the areas occupied by Einsatzgruppe D?
ANo definite discussions, no, but surely such discussions took place, of course,
QDid Seibert over object to the liquidation of Jews, gypsies, Communists, etc?
AMr. Prosecutor, such an immediate possibility he did not have and he had no reason for it because he was not immediately connected, with it. Such discussions usually Were conducted, in a comradely manner because he knewmy position just as well, that is my situation with regard to Himmler and Heydrich. He knew the situation of Himmler and Heydrich regards the Fuehrer. In other words, he knew all the circumstances, and he could not anticipate that nowadays it would, be useful, apart from useless conversations a bout these matters, to have made formal objections.
Q:Did he over ask to be relieved of duty permanently with you?
A:No.
Q:Did he ever ask to be relieved of the duty of inspector of executions?
A:I do not know whether Seibert over inspected any executions. For that reason he could not have asked me to be relieved of that duty. The military inspections in the companies, he certainly very much enjoyed, because that was what he liked to do.
Q:He accompanied you on inspection trips you have stated?
A:Yes.
Q:And on these inspection trips you have at least three times inspected executions. Was Seibert with you then?
A:During these inspection trips no executions were inspected at all, but I merely remember one trip we had together when by chance at the Kommando 10-A we happened to come across the shooting of several plunderers.
Q:He did not ask to be relieved from viewing this incident, did he?
A:It was on the street. He could not have been relieved, because he was approaching this place.
Q:When you sent Seibert on an inspection trip, did he, as your representative have the power to see that the execution squads carried out your orders for humane executions?
A:I have just said that I do not remember that he was sent by me to inspect any executions. If I sent him on any inspection trips, for example, to inspect the Tartar companies, of course he had the special authority to stop bad conditions there. That was the purpose of the trip.