It is not incredible that a man of the church, who, throughout his life was only concerned with finding a true relationship to God, should have been unhappy in such an office. It is not unbelievable that it was not long before he recognized that he lacked all technical qualifications to profit by his office. I concede that one could become somewhat suspicious on hearing that during the year he worked at the Gestapo Office in Opeln he had not bothered to acquaint himself with the duties of his office. However, if one bears in mind that, from the beginning, he was determined to leave the Gestapo Office after the year was over, and if one further bears in mind that according to his whole psychological make up, such activity must have been repugnant and disagreeable to him, one can understand that as a result of this inner resistance he maintained a passive attitude and took no serious interest in his office but left everything to his trusted experienced officials. He committed no illegal acts during his term of office. Neither could the Prosecution prove that he had committed any illegal acts.
He was an outsider in the Reich Main Security Office. You have heard him say that an intrigue was responsible for his assignment to the Gestapo Office in Opeln. He testified further that an even more malicious intrigue was the cause of his transfer to EK 6 in Russia. He had tried to get his release from this Kommando. However, he was told that he must take up his position first and that he could pursue his transfer and his release from the RSHA only from Russia. It is tragic for this man that, against his will and wholly innocently he was forced into an activity for which, according to his character, he was not suited.
It is fully credible that he immediately asked his superior Thomas in Russia for a transfer and release and that he told his superior that, as a former priest, he could not hold an office in which death sentences had to be pronounced and executed. As he has testified, that is why a deputy was assigned to him for tasks concerning the actual execution since his superior realized that a man had been appointed here who was absolutely unsuited for the task.
Finally you have heard him say that he immediately pursued his transfer and release. Nothing speaks against his illustration. The short period during which he was in Russia vouchsafes for the correctness of his statements. This is the position of this man in Russia.
As a witness under oath he testified that he never heard anything of the Fuehrer Decree neither in Germany nor in Russia and that no wholesale executions or any executions at all were ever carried out during his stay with the Kommando, that were based on the Fuehrer Decree. The president of the Court understandably remonstrated that it did not sound credible that he should not have heard of the Fuehrer Decree. Your Honors, I on the other hand am of the opinion, that nothing in the world is more credible.
Who should have told him of the Fuehrer Decree, the existence of which I shall now assume? His superior perhaps, who, because of his request for transfer and because he was a former priest recognized in him a wholly unsuited person and who even agreed to his release since Biberstein made every effort to be released from the Kommando? This superior must have considered him nothing but an outsider. However, outsiders were not taken into confidence on such terrifying orders which instilled horror even in those persons of this circle who were of a more harsh nature. Even the men of his Kommando had no reason to do so. Certainly they too must have recognized in their Chief a man, who was not suited for such terrible tasks. Moreover, it is not even certain that members of EK 6 knew of the Fuehrer Decree. The testimony of defendant Graf speaks against it. It is quite natural that Biberstein had no knowledge of the so-called Fuehrer Decree when one further considers, that according to the testimony of this same defendant Graf, executions in accordance with the Fuehrer Decree were presumably never carried out by EK 6 and that Graf furthermore had heard of only one wholesale execution which had been carried out by Jeckeln's special police formation long before Biberstein's arrival, and when finally it is considered that at the end of 1942, the period of large wholesale executions for all Kommandos had long since passed and that Jews were practically non-existent in the territory surrounding Rostow.
The Prosecution in Document Book 5 0 bearing the title Biberstein, has presented evidence, which at first created the impression as though Jews had been found and executed in the district around Rostow at a time which would have been immediately prior to the transfer and only a few months before the arrival of Biberstein in Russia. However, the Prosecution, upon our objections, expressly limited the probative value of these documents to the extent that they only wished to show that executions of Jews were still carried out somewhere in Russia during May, June and July of 1942. Through the testimony of the witness Hartl as well as that of defendant Graf and Biberstein, the Prosecution itself knows exactly that the defendant did not come to the Einsatzkommando 6 in Rostow until the middle of September 1942. The documents concern, as has already been stated, the period from May 1942 until July 1942. At this time Biberstein had not even been transferred. The towns mentioned in the documents are located in the vicinity of the Rumanian border and are at least 500 kilometers west of Rostow. Therefore they do not prove that executions of Jews were actually still carried out in the Rostow district during the time that Biberstein was there. A Russian proverb once said: "Russia is large and the Czar is far away". This proverb wanted to express that Russia is so large and far flung that somewhere, something may always happen in this area of which the head of the state knows nothing. This applies even more so to the present war in far-flung Russia. One cannot make events seem probable in Rostow because at some far distant place occasional executions of Jews were carried out and at that by the Police or the rural police, or the offices of the civilian administration which had nothing to do with the Einsatzkommandos. One cannot refute the statements of Biberstein, Graf and Hartl with this.
The Prosecution bears the full burden of proving that Biberstein knew of the Fuehrer Decree and that he permitted such executions, that is executions due to racial or political membership, to be carried out. I refer once again to the findings of Tribunal IV concerning the burden of proof by the Prosecution. The Prosecution has furnished no proof. No proof can be furnished by presenting evidence in the manner in which it was attempted in Document Book No. 50. I believe that this manner of presenting evidence would be sharply criticized in their country.
However, I would now like to produce evidence to the contrary, In connection with the question concerning the number of executions, Biberstein has stated before the Court that he had made his deposition concerning the number of executions under certain moral compulsion, that in addition he had been misled by the statements of the interrogator in Eselheide, that a thousand more or less would make no material difference. A man, who would make such a statement in such a foolish manner, a statement which under certain circumstances could incriminate him, would certainly have admitted from the very beginning that he knew of and had acted in accordance with the Fuehrer Decree. In none of the interrogations and in none of the affidavits which he made is there even a hint of this. He has nothing to state or to admit in this point. One must take this into consideration and weigh this when examining the question whether or not he has told the truth. I now come to the affidavit made by him and presented against him.
Biberstein has stated that this affidavit was made under duress. That has actually been proved. Document No. 4997, Prosecution Exhibit 183, which contains the record of Biberstein's interrogation begins as follows:
QWhat is your name?
ABiberstein.
QRaise your right hand and repeat the following oath: "I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the full truth, conceal nothing and add nothing, so help me God.
Amen."
(Biberstein repeats the oath)
QDo you know that omissions in your statements are regarded as equally severe violations of the oath as false statements under oath?
AYes.
Witness Wartenberg testified here under oath that he had not informed the defendant of the fact that he could refuse to make a statement if it would incriminate him. The reason Wartenberg gave for his conduct was that he did not know whether Biberstein would be indicted. However, I definitely know that in Germany as well as in your country the witness has the right to refuse to make statements which would incriminate him. I know positively that the examiner must inform the witness of this right to refuse to testify. This is prescribed by law. Through the fact that Herr Wartenberg immediately placed Biberstein under oath, instructed him that he was not permitted to conceal anything and did not inform him to what extent he could refuse to answer questions, Biberstein was placed under psychic duress. I am therefore of the opinion that the affidavit which was made by him was obtained in an illegal manner and, for this reason, cannot be given any consideration.
Biberstein has assured you in a manner worthy of belief that he really does not know how many executions were carried out during the period of his service with the Einsatzkommando 6. He has explained to you how he came to estimate this number. You must make this the foundation for your verdict and assume that it has not been proven how many executions were carried out during the period of Biberstein's service with Einsatzkommando 6.
Actually, however, this is only a quarrel about trifles as one says proverbially in Germany. However, many executions may have taken place during Biberstein's time I have already explained to you that they were legal, carried out after completion of a detailed police investigation which is customary in Russia, which was prescribed and the carrying out of which can therefore not be considered as showing guilt on the part of Biberstein.
Biberstein has stated that a number of proceedings were pending at that time. He has explained to you that due to the military situation at that time the civilian population everywhere had carried out large scale attacks against the occupation forces. Biberstein has also explained that the executions which were ordered in the police proceedings were not carried out individually but in groups, that is to say after certain time intervals and for a certain number of condemned. This in itself is an understandable procedure and is in no way criminal.
I am therefore of the opinion that Biberstein is neither guilty of a war crime nor of crimes against humanity.
With regard to the last count of the Indictment, i.e. membership in an organization which has been declared criminal, I have the following to say:
Biberstein was Honorary Fuehrer of the SS. As such he never did any service in the SS. Therefore he was never used for criminal acts, nor has it been proven that he knew of the criminal acts which took place after 1 September 1939.
He was never a member of the Gestapo or the SD. He was merely on duty with the Stapo Office in Opeln because he was compelled to, that is to say due to a special war order he was there for one year on a trial basis. Through this, however, he did not become a member of the Gestapo. In this office he neither committed nor heard of crimes. The prosecution was unable to prove either of these. The Index of the Prosecution contains the assertion that Biberstein had admitted this in his affidavit. An examination of the affidavit, however, shows that this assertion on the part of the prosecution is incorrect.
Biberstein was under further compulsion, that is to say on the basis of an order, Fuehrer of an Einsatzkommando, this, however, only from 9 9 Feb.
-M-BK-5-8-Gross (Int. Juelich) the beginning and characteristically only temporarily. In this position he never committed any crimes. Nor did he discover that the Einsatzkommandos were used to commit crimes. He had heard only once of a mass execution of Jews as a singular reprisal measure for severe acts of sabotage by these Jews. He found this out however, and this is especially important, only on his return trip to Germany after he no longer belonged to the Einsatzkommando 6. Whether this report which he received at that time was correct, is immaterial. He at least knew and had heard nothing else. Therefore, at the time during which he belonged to the Einsatzkommando 6, he did not discover that the Einsatzkommandos were used to carry out criminal acts. In this connection it is also important that from the moment of his transfer, he made every effort to leave the Einsatzkommando and that he succeeded in accomplishing this. Thus I may say that no proof has been furnished that Biberstein had any knowledge of criminal acts.
Therefore Biberstein should also be exonerated on the last Count of the Indictment.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Hoffmann, you may proceed.
DR. BERGOLD:Your Honor, I beg your pardon, I have to leave almost immediately. If you remember I told you I had to go to another trial and I would therefore ask that you excuse me.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well, Dr. Bergold.
DR. HOFFMANN (for the defendant Noske):
Members of the Court!
Whenever peaceful people are to lose their lives, it is always a tragedy.
Whoever is guilty of causing this ought to be placed in the dock.
Hitler who gave the order to exterminate the Jewish people in Russia, or to kill people only for their ideas, preferred suicide to the dock. That was the only way out that man could find.
No justification whatsoever would have been possible either before the world, or before the German people.
That man would not even have been able to give a reason for his order.
It has been said that the Jews in Russia would mean endangering the future of the German people, or that the Jewish people was bearing in itself a fundamental readiness for Bolshevism and for partisan activity.
But this is no reason. How could Jewish children endanger the future of the German people or infants became active as Bolsheviks or partisans?
Neither is it a reason that by the order of Hitler - in short the Fuehrer Order - Bolshevism was to be annihilated.
By killing the adherents of an ideology without regard to any individual guilt, an ideology is not being annihilated, but rather strengthened as history has shown beginning from the first persecution of Christians.
The order was senseless and not justifiable at the same time. It was not only a wrong against the Russian and Jewish peoples, but also against the German people, which has today to bear the consequences, while the originator of that order escaped, responsibility by committing suicide.
Thus, I do not see any justification or reason whatsoever for Hitler's order.
I do not condemn the order solely for the only reason that it was directed mainly against the Jewish people; far from it.
I should not condemn it less if it had been directed against another circle of people.
I condemn such an order as a matter of principle.
As the Defense Counsel for the Defendant Nosske I have, thus, only to deal with the problem, how a man is to be treated, who, on his part, received that order and was to carry it out.
In order to do this, the objective facts have to be established first.
Nosske was the leader of the Einsatzkommando 12 of the Einsatzgruppe D. During his own interrogation, he declared t hat he had never been faced with having to carry out the Fuehrer Order. He assumed me of that as early as during our first talk in the prison and has stuck to it until this day.
On the other hand, Nosske does not deny that people were killed by shooting for other reasons by the Einsatzkommando 12. Yet, such executions took place by reason of the laws of war for sabotage and partisan activities. I shall deal later with the question how these executions are to be judged.
At first we have to deal only with the question of the execution of the Fuehrer Order.
The defendant Ohlendorf, the Chief of Einsatzgruppe D, estimated the number of persons killed by the GruppeD in consequence of the Fuehrer Order as many thousands.
In view of this high figure a strong suspicion arises that also the Einsatzkommando 12, as far as it was led by the defendant Nosske, participated in these shootings carried out on the basis of the Fuehrer Order.
Because of that strong suspicion I waived, during my personal inter-rogation of the defendant Nosske, the right to ask him the question how many persons he had shot on the basis of the Fuehrer Order.
Little effect would have been achieved by his answering the question by "none", in view of the strong suspicion resting upon the defendant Nosske.
The remark of the Judge Musmanno about my failure to put the expected qyestion to the defendant Nosske in spite of the duration of my interrogation of the defendant Nosske of 11/2 days plainly hit the mark. But it was my intention to leave judgment of the question whether or not Nosske had told the truth when he stated that he had not executed the Fuehrer Order, to the cross examination.
Nosske was cross-examined for 11/2 days, and, as far as I have learned to evaluate an American cross-examination, the defendant Nosske has not been convicted to have failed to say the truth with regard to the assertion that he had not executed the Fuehrer Order.
But even this fact will still leave some doubts, because it seems almost incredible that any man, considering the whole situation, should have been able to evade the execution of the Fuehrer Order.
On the basis of the personal evolution of the defendant Nosske, I am, however, in a position to state some facts which will make that attitude no longer astonishing.
Nosske did not belong to the group of the fanatics who saw their god in Hitler and executed his orders as though they were tablets of the law. On the contrary, Nosske belonged, when Hitler came to power in 1933, at an age of 31 years, to a generation of men who had, in the period between the first World War and 1933 a democratic education within the Weimar Republic.
Nosske explained on the witness stand how it came about that in 1933, when he was a referendar at the law court, no alternative was left to him by orders of his superiors than either to relinquish his career or to join the party. It may be presumed that he came to the NSDAP without a particular enthusiasm and preserved, inspite of the propaganda and his subsequent close attachment to the National Socialist State, a degree of individuality and power of discernment on account of his activities with the Secret State Police.
That is why Nosske, when he received the Fuehrer Order at Pretsch in 1941, fully realized that that order was utterly unjustifiable. It will, it is true, be objected, why Nosske, realizing that, aid not oppose the order.
As a matter of principle, it will have to be considered that any opposition in the then prevailing situation required great personal courage, extraordinary firmness of character, and, above all, an absolute conviction of the wrongfulness of. National Socialist policy.
I am firmly convinced that today Nosske has realized the infinite worth of prevailing with one's own conceptions, once they were recognized as just, even in the face of a strong propaganda.
But at that time the propaganda was still stronger and though the defendant Nosske saw through the ummorality of that order and sensed it, he was not able to master the strength to express his right feelings, the less so as probably he would not have found understanding or even readiness to listen to him.
Likewise, such an opposition would have led to grave external consequences.
I am not even going to contend that the defendant Nosske would, had he resisted the order, have been shot summarily. But surely he would have suffered considerable personal disadvantages, which, owing to the daily increasing severity of the administration of justice, could not be anticipated beforehand as to their ultimate consequences.
Nosske declared that externally he did not show any resistance but in his heart was resolved not to execute the order. With regard to the result of his resolution, he declares that he had succeeded in evading the Fuehrer Order until, in March 1942, he was relieved.
A "failure to execute the order" will here also be always defined as the mass shooting of people without regard to their personal guilt, only because of their membership in a race or their, activities as Commissars.
Nosske has pointed out that he managed not to execute the Fuehrer Order for various reasons. At the start of the Russian campaign he followed up other Einsatzkommandos into areas which they had occupied previously, remaining in reserve. Later on it was partly a similar thing, partly he had to occupy preponderantly rural areas, where there were no Jews. These were mostly living in the towns. He was also helped by the extraordinarily severe winter of 1941/42, as he was unable to leave his quarters owing to snow and cold for weeks and, above all, to join the 17th Army, where his actual first assignment with a view to the execution of the Fuehrer Order would have taken place. At that assignment Nosske did become active in the area of the 17th Army either because the German advance was stopped and he was relieved in March 1942.
In conclusion it may be said that Nosske has declared that as a result of lucky coincidences he was able to evade the Fuehrer Order, and in particular that he was never placed before the question of an inescapable assignment on the basis of the Fuehrer Order.
Judge Musmanno asked the defendant Nosske what would have happened if he had been restricted in his freedom of decision to the extent as to be placed before the direct alternative of shooting e.g. 500 Jews on the spot or to be shot himself in case of a refusal. To that Nosske answered that in this case he would have shot the 500 Jews.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Hoffmann, the illustration is not put exactly the way I put it. I did not say "confronted with the situation of shooting 500 Jews or being shot yourself, what would you do?" I merely asked him, because he had denied that he at any time ever shot a Jew and that he had ever been placed in that situation. He said that it was his good fortune that in all the time he was in Russia he did not have to confront that dilemma, that he had great regret that any of his co-defendants were placed in the position where they had to answer that problem.
But he, fortunately, never had to answer that situation. So then I put to him, "suppose you were put in that situation that you were confronted with 500 Jews and you had this Fuehrer Order before you, what would you do?" You see there is a great difference there, Dr. Hoffmann We did not ask him to chose between an alternative. We gave him the opportunity to reply freely just what he would do in that situation. And he said, if we recall correctly, that were he in such a situation and would be subjected to the possibility of reprimand by his superior that then he would have to execute the order. However, we will, of course, examine the record very thoroughly in that connection should it become important to do so.
DR. HOFFMANN:Your Honor, if you will look at my trial brief I think my trend of thought is correct except for that point where I explain that in my opinion your question, Your Honor, also concerned the contention that in a certain case he would have been restricted to a certain extent. Actually, I merely want to explain that in my opinion you, Your Honor, put a hypothetical question - what he would have done if he had come into that situation - and that was the answer he gave you. Perhaps the translation does not indicate this quite as clearly. I want to state this again in my final plea that this was merely the answer to your hypothetical question.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, it was a hypothetical question, At no time did we ever in the form of a question or in the shape of observation suggest that someone who is confronted with the proposition of losing his own life is compelled to take some step which would result in immediate loss of his life.
Dr. Hoffmann, since we have now stopped at this point do you think this might be a good time to have the morning recess?
The Tribunal will be in recess for 15 minutes.
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT:You may proceed, Doctor.
DR. HOFFMANN:Your Honor, first of all I would like to continue my presentation, and I requested that my office be giventhe German text of this cross-examination problem of your Honor so that I may refer to it briefly.
THE PRESIDENT :Very well.
DR. HOFFMANN:In my opinion this answer given by Nosske is not to be judged as the expression of callousness or inhumanity. It shows that Nosske does not pretend to be a noble and blameless man, but rather admits to be a human being with all his inherent weaknesses. Though possessing the insight to discern good and evil, his estimate of his own character is, in an assumed case, not high enough as to be able to credit himself with the firmness to prefer to be shot himself rather than to shoot others.
The only think I can say is that it is very hard to say how one would behave in such a situation oneself.
Although the answer given by Nosske seems to me not an ethically sublime one, but an honest answer which, in its honesty speaks in my opinion in favor of Nosske.
The statements made by Nosske on the witness stand are, incidentally, indentical with those made in his affidavit in reply to the Prosecution.
Now I am going to deal with the documents which the Prosecution has submitted against Nosske in the first place. There are only 3 and I shall be able to deal with them in succession.
There is the document NO-2841, Prosecution Exhibit 94, Document Book II D, Page 49, of the English text.
This document contains a report about the harvesting work in the area of Babtschiczy and relates the shooting of 94 Jews.
The defendant Nosske does not deny that members of the Einsatzkommando 12, who had been supervising the harvesting in that area, reported those shootings to him.
But he declares that what had been reported to him was that these shootings had taken place because of sabotage of the harvesting, and not on the basis of the Fuehrer order.
Nosske was not present at these shootings. All he can say is what had been reported to him.
The document itself refutes the assumption that this was a case of the application of the Fuehrer Order. It mentions expressly countermeasures, which presuppose that a particular cause had been present for the shootings. TheFuehrer Order, however, decreed theextermination wit out regard to a cause.
Furthermore, the Prosecution has submitted theDocument NOKW-634, pros. Exh.168. This document deals with the treatment of baled-out Russian parachutists.
There is no doubt that the parachutists concerned were Russian soldiers who would have had to be regarded as prisoners of war. The question is, whether the expression "to take care of" as used in the last paragraph of that document, means the same thing as "to kill", by which it would be proved that the members of the Einsatzkommando did in fact killprisoners of war.
In the first part of the report a parachutist is mentioned who had been killed because he offered resistance, and this procedure is called "taking care of" of the parachutist in question. In this case "to take care of" is the equivalent of to kill.
However, the document does not clearly show that the expression "settle", which was also used in the last paragraph of this report, is to be considered tantamount to killin the other parachutists who are then mentioned later on.
According to colloquial usage it is also possible that the ex pression "erledigen" in the last paragraph means to render harmless in the sense of taking the other parachutists prisoner.
In any case, the defendant Nosske cannot state anything about this from his own knowledge.
He was not present during this occurrence. He did not prepare the report himself. He did not sign the report. During this time he was even sick in the hospital and another officer was in charge of the Kommando.
No killing could have been carried out by vir tue of the Fuehrer order.
Document NOKW-3147, Exh. 96, Document Book II D, page 52 of the English text, is a report on the activity of Einsatzgruppe D from 19 August to 15 September 1941.
Einsatzkommando 12 is not mentioned in this report.
The Prosecution has also submitted this report as evidence against Nosske because Einsatzkommando 12 likewise belonged to Einsatz gruppe D. Even if the report contains reports on shootings which were forwarded to the Group by Einsatzkommando 12 nevertheless this report does not provide any reason for believing that shootings reported in this way were carried out by virtue of the Fuehrer Order.
Nosske has declared that he also reported all shootings to the Group which were carried out by any agency, within his territory, whether by the Wehrmacht or by the police.
However, no shootings took place by virtue of the Fuehrer Order.
In conclusion, Einsatzkommando 12 was at that time about 100 200 kilometers away from the post headquarters of the Group and could not have carried out any shootings which may possibly have been carried out at the post headquarters, of the Group and in the territory named in this report.
Finally I come to the last document which the Prosecution had first submitted against Nosske. It is Document 2837, Pros. Exh. 38, Doc. Book II B, page 7 of the English text.
This document discusses the passage of about 10,000 Jews across the Djester River near Jampol Shootings of Jews are also mentioned in that document.
During the examination of the defendant Nosske, the latter was closely questioned about the document by Judge Musmanno. The Prosecution devoted about three-fourths its cross-examination to this document. The views of the defendant Nosske unchanged. He declared that he did not carry out any shootings and did not execute the Fuehrer Order.
It was a pleasant confirmation for me when the witness Harsch, who by chance was once Bridge Commander at Jampol, repeated the statement of the defendant Nosske simply and clearly without previous questioning.
The interrogation of this witness Harsch by Judge Musmanno has produced unimpeachable proof that no shootings were carried out by Nosske or his men during the passage of the 10,000 Jews. The witness has expressly stated that as Bridge Commander of the Army he himself witnessed from beginning to end the manner in which Nosske effected the passage of the Jews.
Also noteworthy in this testimony is the fact that the Jews returned voluntarily, that they were happy to find themselves in their old surroundings again.
The witness has impressively and credibly described how the Jews in question continued to camp for 2 days on the banks of the river after Nosske had driven off with his men, Not until ten were they conducted back into the interior by the Roumanian police.
In my opinion this testimony is especially valuable because it shows that in a case where the interpretation of the document might be just as doubtful as in the other documents the statement which Nosske gave was in accordance with the truth. Therefore, his statements concern the other documents can also be given preference before any other interpretation.
The statement of the witness Harsch concerning the incident at Jampol, however, also brings up another point which is very important for Nosske. The Prosecutor asked the witness during his cross-examination what the situation of these 10000 Jews had been with regard to food and whether Nosske had done anything for these people.
Hereupon Harsch declared that Nosske requisitioned peas for these 10,000 persons and distributed these peas among them. He said that the ration had even been so generous that even after the departure of the Jews there were still peas left. That shows that these people received enough through this food issue to satisfy their hunger, for hungry people would not have left any peas at all. However, it also shows that Nosske did not keep to the terms of the Fuehrer Order.
If he had wanted to run up a "shooting score" it would have been easy for him to kill thousands of innocent human beings here.
Nosske was in Russia for 8 months. His activity was interrupted by a period of sickness of one month, during which Hausmann was in charge of his kommando.
The Prosecution has brought in an affidavit by Hausmann in rebuttal This is Document NO-4747, Exhibit No. 118. The Prosecution itself says that a few hours after giving the affidavit the affiant committed suicide.
At first I raised an objection against the admissibility of this affidavit because I can no longer cross-examine Hausmann.
Then I withdrew this objection without knowing anything about the document. I believed that thereby I could better servo the discovery of the truth than if I had prevented the submission of this document merely as a matter of form.
After I had a chance to look over this rebuttal document Iwas able to ascertain that it completely confirms Nosske's account of his activity.
According to this affidavit no shootings took place by virtue of the Fuehrer Order.
Hausmann recalls having found only one Jew in the entire territory which Einsatzkommando 12 was occupying.
This man was put to work as a mechanic in Kommando 12 and remained unmolested.
A report on 300 executions which Nosske presumably showed to Hausmann was considered false by the latter, because such executions had not taken place at all.
Whether this affair between Nosske and Hausmann concerning the alleged report of 300 executions is true, and if it is true what intentions Nosske had in mind with such an untrue report, are questions which can no longer be cleared up today after Hausmann's suicide.
In any case, In Hausmann's opinion the 300 executions were a lie.
If Nosske actually reported executions to the Group which had not taken place, then he probably must have had a reason for making such a false report.
Perhaps by doing this he saved the lives of other persons.
In any case Hausmann took the matter so seriously that he denounced Nosske to the defendant Ohlendorf.
An indication that Hausmann was certain that no executions had taken place.
In March 1942 Nosske left Russia and in April 1942 went to the Reich Main Security Office in Berlin and in June 1942 entered Department IV.
Now the Prosecution asserts that he worked there on the so-called Kommando Staff.
It is necessary to determine what this so-called Kommando Staff was.
According to Nosske's statement this was no longer an actual Kommando Staff as it is understood in the ordinary sense and as Heydrich had also once planned it, but after Heydrich's death it had become a sort of editorial staff which had only continued to retain the name of a Kommando staff.
Nosske has stated at the time when he belonged to this staff reports concerning persons who had been shot in Russia by virtue of the Fuehrer Order were already being sent exclusively to Eichmann, the Chief of Group B IV in Department IV of the Reich Security Main Office.
In Nosske Document No. 6, Exhibit No. 5, Dr. Hans Ehlich, the Chief of Section III I in the Reich Main Security Office states:
"After April 1942 the Kommando Staff was the office where the respective specialists from all departments met for the purpose of making editorial summaries of the material contributed to the Reports from the East by the departments handling the respective subject matter. These summarized reports were called "Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories". In contrast to the former "Operational Situation Reports from the USSR" they did not contain, as far as I recall, any figures or reports concerning operations carried out in the East by under the Fuehrer Order.
At any rate, Dr. Hans Ehlich's affidavit shows that the office manager occasionally appointed by Office IV of the RSHA, only had to see to it that the reports were technically correct and were distributed.
The Kommando Staff surely did not issue orders or directives to the Einsatzgruppen, not even before Nosske came there, because of course, the Fuehrer Order was the basis for the work of the Einsatzgruppe.
Nosske was not a member of the Kommando staff for long, but received several other tasks in the RSHA.
Nosske was not a popular member of the RSHA, as can be seen from Exhibit No. 6.
Kurt Geissler, who made out this affidavit, states that Nosske tried, as early as 1942, to effect his release from the Security Police.
He says, verbatim:
"At this time Nosske, in my presence, took advantage of the opportunity to effect his release from the Security Police through the Chief of Office IV.
He pointed out that the Security Police could no longer place a value on his services.