Q Who then carried out the executions? responsible for carrying out the details. He had at his disposal the people furnished by the Army, the newly arrived police company who was to relieve the company so far in operation and who had not yet been distributed among the subkommandos. Furthermore, I think I recall that the 11-A kommando, or the 10-B, or even both, furnished forces by order of Ohlendorf. Finally there were the forces of the subkommando and my guard personnel.
Q Who carried out the execution itself? furnished mostly by the police company, but here I cannot give any specific details, who was used for the transport, who was used to block off the area, and who was used to do the shooting. I believe that people rotated.
Q Witness, did you supervise the execution?
A Yes, I did. It took place under my responsibility. Once I was at the place of execution with Mr. Ohlendorf and there we convinced ourselves that the execution took place according to the directives laid down by Ohlendorf at the beginning of the assignment. I personally was there several times more, and I supervised. As I heard, the adjutant of Ohlendorf was there once, and saw that everything was carried out according to the instructions. Furthermore, my subkomman do leader, Sturmbannfuehrer Schulz, was always present, the company commander of the police company, and, I think, another captain.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the adjutant, please?
THE WITNESS: That is the co-defendant Schubert, your Honor.
Q (By Dr. Mayer) Witness, did your supervision extend to blocking off the area and the transporting of the victims?
Q In these executions were Krimtschaks shot also?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, just on a point of Krimtschaks?
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, I was just going to come to
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Q (By Dr. Mayer) Dr. Braune, please tell the Tribunal Krimtschaks.
They were of Jewish race and of Jewish faith, Jews.
Therefore, they came under the Fuehrer Order.
a Jew, particularly also who was a Krimtschak and who was not? was the only Jewish execution which I saw personally. Even Council of Elders and carried out the registration.
According to what I heart this took place in the following. manner: The Jewish council of Elders was installed, a number of locally well-known and respected people,and this council of Elders itself called the Jews up for the registration. Whether in its own name or on the orders of the Subkammando or Kommando, I don't know, but they proclaimed that the Jews would have to register. That is two say, the Jews registered themselves as Jews. They identified themselves. Furthermore, the Council of Elders established it. That was two-fold control,and that is also how it was done with the Krimtschaks as far as I recall.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't understand what do you meant by two-fold control. You mean the subkommando and the council?
THE WITNESS: Once that way, namely that the persons concerned reported themselves and said, "We are Jews".
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see.
THE WITNESS: Furthermore the Council of Elders which was locally known.
THE PRESIDENT: Usually how many were on the council?
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I cannot give you an exact number, but it could have been eight, ten or fifteen. I don't know exactly.
THE PRESIDENT: When you used the phrase that they were usually well-known and respected people, I understand that you mean that they were Jews well-known and respected in the community.
THE WITNESS: Yes, your honor. Among the Jews were well-known and respected people, who were locally known.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you. Q (By Dr. Mayer) Witness, what happened with the Tartars?
before the Bolshevik revolution. They were Mongols, an Asiatic tribe, and they were of Mohammedan faith. From the first day on these were in favor of the German occupation and their liberators. The Tartars had to suffer very much under Bolshevism. Of about 450,000 at the time of the Bolshevist revolution, only 220,000 were left. All the rest had been deported or liquidated. They were oppressed in every respect, and we restored to them their opportunity to worship and we gave them the opportunity to speak their own language, to continue in their customs and usages, so that I can claim that particularly Einsatzgruppe D under Ohlendorf had a very positive relationship to the Tartars. I think the most moving proof of the favorable attitude of the Tartars is that after the capitulation I read in the papers in Norway that the rest of these Tartars were also deported by the Bolshevists because of their friendly attitude toward the Germans. Not only did nothing happen to the Tartars from our side, but they collaborated closely with us. I recall that when the military situation had become hopeless in the Crimea that the Tartars put themselves at our disposal spontaneously in order to fight Bolshevism, that they came on their own accord and asked to be allowed to fight with us, and I was personally in small villages and I saw it, and I recall a very old Tartar who could not grasp that we refused him because he was too old. Within a few weeks more than 10,000 Tartars reported for battle, and in the shortest time the Einsatzgruppe had set up 18 Tartar companies which were armed and supplied and equipped by the Army, and whom we sent to the most endangered villages on the edge of the Jaila Mountains, and in the Jaila Mountains themselves, those villages which had to suffer the most from the partisans.
I think that this is the best repudiation of the contention of the prosecution that we had exterminated Asiatics. Here we had more than 200,000 Asiatics in the Crimea, and I can only assure you that neither did I ever get an order to exterminate Asiatics nor did my kommando exterminate any Asiatics.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, dod you know that in some of the reports a reference is made to liquidation of Asiatics, are you familiar with that?
THE WITNESS: I read it, your Honor. I cannot explain the statement. I don't know who made it or whether actually something like that happened. I only know that we didn't have such an order or that anything.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, I think this would be a proper occasion to have a recess. I come to a new subject.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I might announce that we will recess shortly after three and then not reconvene today, that when we recess this afternoon, which will be between three and three-thirty, we will recess for the entire day and then reconvene next Monday. moment until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 26 November 1947).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, the prosecution new wants to offer Document NO-4997 as Prosecution Exhibit 183.
DR. FIGHT (FOR THE DEFENDANT BIBERSTEIN): Your Honor, in view of my statement yesterday, may I say the following now Having been able to study this document, I withdraw my objection of yesterday against the submission of this is evidence without recognizing the correctness of the statements by Herr Biberstein which are contained in there; may I only point out the following dates: are 29 June 1947, 10:00 to 11:15, taken by a reporter, Margarete Fritsche. On the last page here it says in the text.
"Question: You are the same Biberstein whom I have interrogated under oath before? May I point out to you that you are still under oath.
"Answer: Yes. was made from former interrogations. The date contained is the same date, 29 June 1947, at ten oclock. If the basis of the affidavit was taken between ten and eleven, considering the facts contained, cannot have been made at the same time.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, it seems apparent from the document that this document contains two different interrogations, one interrogation during which information was obtained from the defendant which was the basis of the affidavit, so, if I am not mistaken, I haven't got my document book with me -- the affidavit was sworn to and signed on the 2d of July and it is the contention of the prosecution that this second interrogation which is the last page of the document was carried out on this day. The correct date of the second interrogation appears certainly on the affidavit which is in Document Book I, as far as I remember.
THE PRESIDENT: All the Tribunal has before it now the offer by the prosecution of Document NO-4997, Prosecution Exhibit 183. Yesterday the defense objected to the introduction of this document. Today it withdraws its objection. In view of the fact, therefore, that both sides are agreed that the document is to be accepted as an exhibit, it will be accepted. Both sides, of course, have the right to comment on this document or to attack it in any way that they feel is in order.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: Very well, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. ERICH MAYER (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BRAUNE): Your Honor, I ask to be able to continue with the direct examination of the Defendant B raune.
DR. ERICH MAYER: I now come to a new set of questions, namely those questions to the witness which refer to the case in chief and to the document which are submitted. BY DR. ERICH MAYER ( ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BRAUNE):
Q. Dr. Braune, in the Report of Events No. 156 of the 16th of January, 1942 it was reported that in Aluschta on 21 November 32 Jews and 32 Communists were shot. This report of events was not submitted against you, but still please make some statements about this, because you were in charge of a sub-kommando in Aluschta.
DR. ERICH MAYER: Your Honor, I want to mention that this report of events was only submitted by the prosecution in in excerpt. It is in Document II-A as Document No. 3405, Exhibit 42, page 72 of the German and page 57 of the English text.
Q. (Continued) Witness, would you please comment on that report of events, referring to the photostatic copy?
A. I have the photostatic copy of this document before me, the complete photostatic copy, and I quote from page 54. Only the first paragraph is contained in the prosecution documents. It says - this first paragraph shows that on the 23rd of November, '41, partisans northwest of Aluschta, attacked a column with hand grenades and the German Army suffered three deaths, and 6 wounded; apart from that, three trucks were badly damaged. It then says as retaliation, and now it says on the photostatic copy, in the German copy, 21 November; perhpas I may correct this here, because this never could have happened on the 21st and no retaliation could have been carried out then for an action which only occurred on the 23rd of November by the partisans. The photostatic copy here shows me that the figure is printed so badly that could read it as "21" but doubtlessly it is meant to be 24. I think one could read this with a magnifying glass. reprisals concerning the investigations on my arrival in the Crimea, I have already explained that on the 23rd of November, no sub-kommando of mine was in Aluschta yet, but a sub-kommando of 10B was in Aluschta. The second paragraph confirms this beyond doubt which is not contained in the prosecution documents. There it says that on the 26th of November, that is, three days later, that a tank fighting battalion, which was in Aluschta, supported by anti-aircraft and part of a Rumanian Mountain Brigade, carried out an action against those partisans and that the Kommando 10B had prepared this action. The second paragraph of the document itself shows that this was a sub-kommando of 10B and not my men.
DR. ERICH MAYER: Your Honor, may I mention that this report of events, insofar as it concerns this part, which is the report of events for this part, I shall introduce in my Document Book No. 11.
On this occasion, I would like to make supplement. It is a supplement to a reply of the witness to a question by the President before the recess. The President asked the witness how the Krimchacks differed from the others and the witness only answered that the Krimchacks are of the Jewish origin, but of Mosaic creed.
This alone does not make them different from other Jews in the Crimea. The fact which makes them different from the other is that for reasons that are not known here they speak a language similar to the Turkish language and therefore they were different from the rest of the Jewish population. I merely would like to say this in order to explain this to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We are glad that you have offered that further explanation Dr. Mayer.
DR. ERICH MAYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q. (By Dr. Mayer) Witness, did it happen repeatedly that in the reports of events measures were reported which were carried out by the Wehrmacht?
A. I presume that the reprisal measure, which was just mentioned was carried out by the Wehrmacht, because I do not remember that such retaliation measures were ever carried out by us in such a form, but in order to reply to your question, of course, constantly events were contained in our reports which concerned the Army. It does not say here, "Report of Events of a Kommando" or an Einsatzgruppe, but they are reports of events of the entire territory and may I just point out that there are numerous reports about partisan combatting contained in these reports of events and that these were events in 95% of the cases which were handled by the Army.
Q. The prosecution also maintains in their prosecution statement that according to Document 2828 Exhibit 86, contained in Document Book II-D, page 25 of the German and page 20 of the English text, the executions of 2,910 Jews and 19 Communists in the area of Simferopol, that is, in the territory of your kommando, were carried out there. Witness, will you please look at this document and comment on it?
A. I have this document in front of me and may I ask you to look at page 1 of your excerpt. It is page 11 of the original, and it says, "Einsatzgruppe D, Garrison Simferopol," and too in three paragraphs it is reported about shootings of Communists and Jews. All three paragraphs obviously and evidently refer to the entire territory Of the Einsatzgruppe under the heading over to the left, under "Shootings" it says "2,910 more Jews and 9 Communist officials were shot after summary proceedings.
Thus the sum total of executions has risen to 54,696." This total figure alone shows that this is a summary report of the Einsatzgruppe and not of my kommando. I cannot say either why the prosecution deduces that these 2,929 persons were shot by my kommando, because it all comes under Einsatzgruppe D, Garrison, Simferopol. Kommando 11B is not mentioned at all, but may I also say that the report of events dates from the 12th of December 1941, The events which are mentioned here must therefore have at least occurred few days before this date. This morning I explained when my kommando went to the Crimea and when the sub-kommandos started to move. It will be understandable that a sub-kommando did not carry out executions the first or second day. From a more time point of view I consider it impossible that among these figures executions for my sub-kommando are contained. I know at least concerning Simferopol that from the day of my arrival, no executions were carried out, which was mentioned here this mornings. I therefore considered it impossible that these figures, all of which I am charged with, concern my kommando at all from a mere time point of view. On this occasion, may I point out how questionable these reports are and how incorrect. That is shown by the fact that it says on the top of t Report of Events 145, under "Garrison and Signal Communications" it says, I quote, "The Garrison and Signal Communications reported in Operational Situation Report No. 156 of 16 January, 1942, have remained unchanged." I believe it is evident that a Situation Report of 12 December cannot refer to a Report of Events of the middle of January. That is one month later.
Q. The prosecution charges you in their case in chief with the fact that you had sub-kommandos in Kersch and Feodosia and therefore you are responsible for the shootings which occurred there. Witness, this morning you already touched upon this question and answered it in the negative, but on the basis of the prosecution documents, please comment on this question.
These are the documents in Document Book II-A, page 30 of the German text, Document No. 2834. Exhibit 87, and in Document Book II-B, page 34 of the German and 35 of the English text. Here it is Document No. NO-2824, Exhibit 62.
A. At first I refer to Document Book II_D, page 30 of the German text, that is NO-2834, Exhibit 87. On page 4 of the Exhibit it says, under "Location Sonderkommando 10-b" -- Kertch and Feodosia are not mentioned any more -- but it says Sudak and radio communications while on route. For my Kommando 11-b it is mentioned, "Garrisen Simferopol, with parts in Aluschta, Karasubassa and Eupatoria." Those Garrisens are correct. May I explain why Kertch and Feodosia are not mentioned under 10-b. The Kommando 10-b, after their arrival in the Crimes, had their location in Feodosia, Kertch and Sudak. At the end of December, that is shortly before this situation report, the Russians carried out a surprise landing in Feodosia and Kertch, recaptured Feodosia and Kertch and the whole peninsula, and, as mentioned repeatedly, a very difficult military situation arose. During these events the Kommando 10-b had to withdraw from Feodosia..... And may I remind you, that my co-defendant Seibert explained how he was looking for this Kommando which had to escape from Feodosia....I now refer to Document Book II-b, page 34 of the German text, it is NO-2824--
DR. MAYER: Page 33 of the English text, your Honor.
A(Continuing) It is a report of events of 19 December, that is two weeks before the previous one, when the landing had not yet occurred. And here, on page 4 of the excerpt, under Sonderkommando 10-b, it is shown under "Garrison Feodosia, with divisions in Kertch and Sudak".....it is shown that, before the landing 10-b was in Feodosia and Kertsch; and may I show you that after the recapture, 10-b was active in these two locations again, and neither my Kommando nor any of my sub-kommandos were over stationed in Feodosia or Kertsch, or ever operated there.
Q. Witness, perhaps you would be good enough to show the position of Sudak on the map.
A. This morning I showed approximately where approximately Feodosia is -- it must be about here.... the Russians landed here ..... and at the same time they landed here, in Kertsch, and practically recaptured this whole part here.... and then they advanced in this region, and tried to block off the Crimea up here. This was a very dangerous situation. Apart from that, they advanced to Simferopol from here.
Later on I shall explain that a few days later they landed on the other coast as well; the obvious aim was to connect those two coasts and, therefore, the entire army in the East, near Sevastopol, should be cut off, and destroyed. Sudak is also on the south coast, not far from Feodosia, southwest about here. Sudak is here... Feodosia about here .....Kertsch about there .... while my territory, here, is Simferopol; east of it, Karasubassa; south of it, Aluschta; and to the west of it, Eupatoria.
Q. Witness, the Prosecution also maintains in their case in chief that the affidavit of the co-defendant, Schubert, of 24 February 1947, proves that in December 1941 the Kommando 11-b shot seven to eight thousand people in the area of Simferopol.
During this morning's session you already touched upon this question, too; but I would like you now to explain this question, based on these documents. I refer to Document Book I, page 141 of the German, page 108 of the English text. It is Document No. NO-3055, Exhibit 28.
A. I have the document book in front of me. And may I just quote from it: "In December 1941, I do not remember the exact date, I was assigned my Ohlendorf or Seibert to supervise and inspect the shooting of about 700 to 800 people." The document shows quite clearly that Schubert did not mention seven to eight thousand, but only seven to eight hundred. Already this morning I mentioned that in my opinion there must be a mistake. Hey I point out that this morning it was translated by "mistake". I would like to attach importance to it that I do not want to show some error which was done on purpose, but I think it is an error rather than a mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well... I would like to have a little conference here with the interpreter. The interpreter has just said that the witness has said it was an error, and not a mistake. I would like to have some linguist give us the hair-breadth distinction between an error and a mistake.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, in our language the meaning "mistake" may be more serious, as if one tried to explain that something was done on purposel while an error would exclude any such possibility.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we would term the former situation as a deception, and not a mistake. If someone purposely endeavors to mislead, it drops out of the category of a mistake; but if it is something done on purpose, therefore, it would be deceit, or deception.
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor, I agree to this.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. I am glad it wasn't the fault of the interpreter. BY DR. MAYER:
Q. Dr. Braune, does this concern the execution carried out by order of the Army before Christmas 1941, which you have already mentioned?
A. Yes, that is what was meant.
Q. The Prosecution also charges you that the shootings of 1154 partisans in Eupatoria on 7 January 1942, was ordered by you, and as evidence for this they submit a letter from G-2, Major Riesen. It is in Document Book III-D, pages 104, 105 of the German text, and page 62 of the English text, Document NOKW-584, Exhibit 165. Would you like to comment about this?
A. I have this document in front of me as well, and may I comment on it. I just said that after the landings in Feodosia and Kertsch the Russians landed again in the first days of January 1942. It might have been the 5th or 6th. They landed here, in Eupatoria. This landing also succeeded. The city was conquered by Bolshevists, and the German troops had to withdraw from the city. The situation became even more hopeless from a military point of view because of this. During this recapture of the city, the civilian population of Eupatoria, to the greatest extent, had assisted the Bolshevists and had acted as guerillas and snipers. These civilians also had captured two trucks with heavily wounded German soldiers who were not able to escape from the city any longer, and cut them off from the rest, and all these wounded German soldiers had their throats cut by them. This fact was revealed to the commandant of Eupatoria, one of the most brilliant German officers who already had a high distinction Chief of the Army because the Russians were very pleased about having killed these wounded German soldiers.
The Commander-in-Chief of the 11th Army, General Field Marshal von Mannstein, felt that the male population who were rproven to be able to carry arms, who lived in Eupatoria, were to be executed as snipers and guerillas and partisans. On the basis of this Order the G-2 AO, Major Riesen, went to Einsatzgruppen Chief Ohlendorf, and requested the Einsatzgruppe, in this case my Kommando of the sub-Kommando there, should carry out this execution. I myself was present during that conversation as well, and I remember distcintly how we were in our sitting room, and Major Riesen came in the evening. Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf rejected this, and explained that this was a matter to be dealt with by the Army. At further urgent request he finally agreed that I be sent along to support Major Riesen, and apart from that Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf wanted to being about that among those arrested snipers and partisans, through my sub-kommando in Eupatoria, those were to be combed out, who were known to kommando the sub-kommando, and their units. Some of them had even worked for our units very conscientiously for some time; some of them were even employed by our kommando, and we know them to be reliable; and he wanted that those men should not be shot as well. The following day, 7 January, which Major Riesen mentions here, may be right. According to the order given to me, I also travelled to Eupatoria. For order's sake, I must correct here that not three SS leaders, as it says here, travelled alone to Eupatoria, but only me. Major Riesen must have made an error here. He only wrote this down about a year after the events. When we arrived in Eupatoria Major Riesen reported to the combat commandant, and informed him of the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Colonel at the time said, almost verbally, "the Commander in Chief would not have had to send me for this. I would have done this on my own authority because in this case these are only snipers and bandits who have forfeited their lives."
I then brought in my sub-kommando, and this sub-kommando, with our local and indigenous aids, who assisted us sorted out from the 1500 people who had been arrested about 300, who were known to be reliable, for it must be right that about 1184 people remained. It is not that from 1500 people 1184 were chosen, and it was said they should to be shot, the original order had been that all men of military age were to be shot. And out of these, 300 were selected who were exempt from shooting. During this selection Major Riesen, who says himself in his statement on page one, that he had to carry out the order of the Commander-in-Chief, ordered an Air Force communications battalion to carry out these shootings on the order of the Army. Those persons were taken in a line through the city, where fighting still took place. It is right that snipers still shot at us from houses, and that these snipers threw hand grenades, and we shot at then with automatic rifles to stop them. These persons were then shot by the Air Force unit, according to order in the outskirts of the city in a tank ditch.
Q. Is it right.......that of these 1184 people from the city many tried to escape when you arrived at the ouskirts?
A. Yes. En route, as far as I remember, about 80 to 90 people tried to escape, and not only 20 to 30 of these snipers. They were shot down with automatic rifles by this Air Force unit. This caused a very dangerous and critical situation. I presume that Major Riesen, who says on the following page, "SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Braune gave instructions on the place of execution to carry out the shootings." He means by that, that after this attempt to escape I was very excited, and therefore told him that he should not hesitate any longer and have this longstretched column with so few guards, go in a closer formation. Furthermore at the collection point - about 200 to 300 meters from the place of execution - I pointed out to him that he should not put guards on either side of those to be executed. This was on the railway platform which was on a lower level than the rest of them. "If they tried to escape again your soldiers will shoot each other." If he means that, by instructions, then he is right. Apart from that, he gave the order; he could only give orders to this Air Force unit, and I could not, and these measures were carried out under his orders. order to fire. I cannot see from the document in how far I gave an order to fire. But I can only assure you that I did not give such an order. But I stated that I was merely at the place where those snipers were collected, and that was two to three hundred meters away from the ditch, where the shootings were carried out by this Air Force unit. Apart from that, I would like to add that in my position, and with my rank, it would not have been my task to give an order to fire, to nine of ten men who shot; but such orders to fire were given by an NCO, at the most by a lieutenant, and not by a man with the rank of a major.
Q. Witness, I have one more question. I noticed that you said you shot the people who tried to escape with machine. Is this nor an error?
A. No, this Air Force unit also had two or three automatic rifles and they fired with these.
Q. I only noticed it because I considered this impossible, to set this up so quickly.
A. No, they were light automatic rifles, which were put into position.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, may I concerning the statement of Colonel Mueller, referring to Major Riesen and the witness here, submit a statement with the request that the witness read this short excerpt out of thisl this will make the order clear, and will show that in cases like in the one here, through the Fuehrer order, this was made legal, and it was entirely up to the commander or the officer to deal with this task. The Fuehrer order of 13 May 1941, Document C 50; I shall also introduce it in my Document Book II.
A. (by the witness) I have the order in its photostatic copy in front of me. Its heading is: "Fuehrer headquarters, 13 May 1941. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Army." Then under Roman I it says: "Treatment of crimes by enemy civilians." Figure 1. "Crimes committed by Enemy civilians are not to be dealt with by court-martial, or military courts until further notice." Figure 2. "Snipers are to be shot by the unit while fighting or while escapingwithout consideration." Figure 3. "All other attacks of enemy nationals against the Wehrmacht and its members are to be shot by the units, on the spot, and have not or can temporarily not be carried out -- suspects will be taken to an officer immediately and he shall decide whether they are to be shot."
"In localities in which the Army is attacked from ambush, immediately by order of an officer, whose rank must at least be a battalion commander, collective measures are to be carried out immediately if the circumstances do not make it possible to find out the actual criminals." And finally the last sentence. "It is expressly prohibited that suspicous persons be kept in prison." I must assumes that the commander thought of this Fuehrer order when he said: The Commander in Chief would not have had to send you. I would have done this on my own anyhow. to carry out a surprise raid and refers to Document Book III-D for "Dog", page 58 of the English text, page 98 of the German text, Document NOKW1863, Exhibit 164. Please comment on this as well.
A I have this document in front of me as well. It is on page 98 of the German Volume. The first page of this document, consisting of six pages, unambiguously shows that this is a measure, I quote: "Which was carried out at the order of the AOK 11 -O-Qu-" on 12 January 1942. exactly that this order was given because of the situation. In Simferopol the rear Army units and the reserves units, a mixed crowd set up barricades in a hurry. The city was divided into defense sectors and everything was prepared for battle against the Russians approaching from Feodosia. At that moment the Army ordered that the city be combed out in order to be saved from surprises from the city, and that is how this order came about. That this was a purely military measure and that the Army took a very active part is shown also from the distribution list on the last page. This shows that this order was given to the AOK, to the Einsatzgruppe, to the Town Area Commander, the local commandant, counterintelligence, etc. Now it says again on the first page, "On 12 January 1942, a surprise action will be carried out to apprehend unreliable elements (partisans, saboteurs, possibly enemy troops, parachutists in civilian clothes, Jews, leading Communists, etc.)" May I draw your attention to the Jews here noted to show that from the Army as well the Jews were listed under the term of unreliable elements and were considered a danger in the rear Army territory.
The actual carrying out is shown clearly from the order. There were almost two-and-a-half thousand members of all Wehrmacht units who took part in this, 55 members of the Military Police, and 20 men of the Secret Field Police, also, if one adds it, exactly 48 men of the Einsatzgruppe, because I remember that at that time a few men from the group staff also took a part because I did not have 48 men at my disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you explain what was meant by the phrase, "possibly enemy troops?" Do they mean by that that they weren't certain there were enemy troops there or not and therefore said "possibly enemy troops?"
THE WITNESS: I explain it in this way, your Honor, after six years; that owing to the prolonged fighting for the entrace into the Crimea some of the former regular troops took off their uniforms already before they were captured and carried out sabotage and set up part of the units, etc., and therefore were to stay in the Crimea to do this, and I believe that these kind of people are meant by this. I may assure you these were not military units who were in uniform and openly carried their arms who had come into the city, but former soldiers who had not been left behind with special tasks. and all these six districts during that action were under the charge of an Army officer. That is, what actually happened in these districts during the action was done under the command of an Army officer, and finally, on page 5, it can be seen how it was in effect carried out and instructions were given that these districts were to be blocked and be combed out street by street and as far as was possible that the houses be searched as well. But I remember that they could not do that with the forces at their disposal. It was also determined that male persons who were on the street and any suspected female persons were to be checked up in these areas and all suspicious individuals were to be brought to assembly points. There There they were rechecked again with the assistance of persons familiar to the police and the inhabitants, and then finally they were checked for a third time.