Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. RIEDIGER (Attorney for the Defendant Haensch): Mr. President, I ask that the Defendant Haensch be excused from the sessions on Thursday and Friday, since the time is approaching for the preparation of his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Haensch will be excused from attendance in court on Thursday and Friday in accordance with the request made by his counsel.
Yes, Mr. Walton.
MR. WALTON: General, there are about three or four questions which I overlooked concerning executions. I desire, at this time, to ask them and then I expect to leave this subject for good and all. BY MR. WALTON: called for the future execution of women and children by this means. Do you know why this change was made from the usual method of shooting? lieve the moral strain on these men who were actually detailed to execute women and children. Now you have stated that their mechanical performance was not of the best and this gave you the opportunity to use a van as little as possible, is that not right.
A No, that is a mistaken interpretation. These two things differ. If the gas wagon was mechanically faulty it certainly was not used. It was not used even if it was in order, because for the men the moral strain was greater in killing people by gas vans than by shooting. vans, the usual method of shooting was employed? page 3 of the English, page 5 of the German, and this is Document NO-2661, Court No. II-A, Case No. 9.being Prosecution Exhibit 149.
Under the paragraph headed, and I quote, "Jews", which is found on pages 9 and 10 of the English, I am not familiar with the page in the German, this is stated, and I quote, "The solution of the Jewish problem which can be considered as almost solved and settled in the Ostland, continues," -- which is underscored, -- "in the remaining occupied territories of the East." -- "Of the East" is underscored -- Still quoting: "The concentration of Jews in Ghettos has generally been carried out." -- That sentence is underscored -- Still quoting: "Again and again the Jews who do not obey the official orders are seized and shot. In order" -
15 Oct 1947_M_MSD_9_1_Biolsi (Lea)
MR. WALTON: Shall I continue, your Honors? Have you found it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may continue.
MR. WALTON: Still quoting: "In order to avoid the spreading of the danger of epidemics, shootings of Jews became necessary at different occasions" End of quotation.
General, are to presume that the term "Ostland" refers to the Baltic countries? other territories occupied by Einsatzgruppen? gruppe at all, but in March 1942 -- this is a report of March 1942, in this case from the occupied civil areas --for example, the Eastland was not an area of Einsatzgruppe in this time. territories of the East?
A Certainly not in some of these areas. Einsatzgruppe D, during this time - from the 1st to the 28th of February - which is the time of the report, was in the crimea, and in Melitopol and in Taganrog. continuing the solution of the Jewish problem in the Eastern territory which it occupied?
A Yes, but from the terminology "herding into ghettos", this does mean that an area of the Einsatzgruppe D cannot be for, at that time, there were certainly no ghettos in the area of Einsatzgruppe D. classes of the Russian population which threatened the security of the German forces, beginning with the class you considered most dangerous to security?
A I don't think I over undertook to make such qualification. If you had asked me at that time whom I considered most dangerous I 15 Oct 1947_M_MSD_9_2-Biolsi (Lea) Would certainly have mentioned the political commissars or the political functionaries -- independently from the racial group of-to which they belonged.
Q And who was the next most dangerous class, in your opinion?
A I don't want to make any more classification. killing of the insane was handed you. an execution of insane persons -- naming the time and place, approximately.
A Noo not even approximately. I only remember one locality, one building, but I cannot give you the village, or the town, or the time. After such an order I inspected these matters myself in order to be able to give respective reports to the army and then I refused to do it.
Q You don't recall the approximate number of people who were liquidated at this time?
A No, I don't.
Q Now, let's turn our attention to Document Book II_A, page 124 in the English, page 138 in the German, which is Document No_3233, and is Prosecution Exhibit 54. On pages 126 and 127 of the English Document Book this quotation is found:
"The removal of asocial elements led to the fact that 800 gypsies and insane people were rendered harmless."
And on page 127 this quotation appears:
"During the period covered by the report, 2,010 people were shot, among these there were 678 Jews, 359 Communist officials, 153 partisans, and 810 asocial people, gypsies, insane people, and saboteurs."
Do you follow?
15 Oct 1947_M_MSD_9_3_Biolsi (Lea) Karasubasar. In the last paragraph of this excerpt it says that among the 810 asocial people, gypsies, insane people and saboteurs were liquidated. Does this not mean that only 10 of this number met death as saboteurs, because they offered any threat to the military security of the German forces? the expression, "saboteurs" means whether this number contains a number of people who endangered the security of the German forces by sabotage. And were shot for that reason.
A No; in the first paragraph I have quoted it says that 800 of a certain class of people were executed. Then, in the second quotation it says 810 -- that is different from 800--asocial, gypsies, insane people and saboteurs -- being a difference of 10 people between the first figure and the second figure. Now, can we assume that within this larger number only 10 people were saboteurs?
A I have already commented on this document. Such an assumption would be impossible. I believe that the reports were mixed up here. I just said that south of Karasubasar such a possibility did not even exist, In reality it could not exist.
Q Now, let us turn to Document Book III_D, again on page 11 of the English, page 12 of the German, Document NOKW_604, which is Prosecution Exhibit 150. Do you recognize this report, General?
Q Do you consider this an authentic report? Romanenko-- I am soory, I mis-stated the question. This is a report prepared by Commando 11_a on the case of Wladimir Romanenko, suspected of sabotage that interfered with Russian workers employed by the German authorities. It goes on to state that the information to Romanenko's 15 Oct 1947_M_MSD_9_4_Biolsi (Lea) sabotage activities proved, on investigation by Commando 11-a, to be erroneous.
Now, General, what was the disposition finally made of Romanenko? I cannot remember the incident at all. It can be gathered from the first two lines, what we have already discussed this morning - that on the 7th of September the Special Commando 11-a, through Sturmbannfuehrer Gemeiner, - he was at the time the liaison officer of the army, etc., the Supreme Commander had ordered the surrender to the Commando and had informed them that he wanted a punishment to be meted out, if possible, by public hanging. As the prosecutor has just stated, the Commando has thoroughly examined this incident and it did not find the charges of the Supreme Commander confirmed in all its details. Therefore, it seriously warned two witnesses who testified against Romanenko. Nevertheless, Romanenko was executed as an insane person. This report is evidently a report of this Special Commando 11-a, again via the liaison officer, direct to the Army headquarters. Unfortunately, I don't known what led the Special Commando 11-a to act as it did.
Q Just from the report, isn't it true that Romanenko offered no threat to military, security, -- did he? order from the army to punish Romanenko by hanging him publicly. what army gave that order?
A That must have been on the 10th of September; and it must have been the Supreme Commander, - either Manstein or still Schobertbut I would assume that at that time probably Manstein was there already; but I cannot be sure.
Q. Now, let us turn to Document Book II-C, page 42 of the English, and 49 of the German, being Document NO-3137, which is Prosecution Exhibit 76. Now, there is a paragraph which reads as follows, and I quote:
"The Commandos continued the liberation of the area from Jews and Communist elements. In the period covered by the report the towns of Nikolajev and Cherson in particular were freed of Jews and remaining officials there were appropriately treated. From 16 until 30 September, 22,467 Jews and Communists were executed. Total number, 35,782. Investigations again showed that, everywhere, the high Communist officials had be-taken themselves to safety. It was, foremostly, leading partisans or leaders of sabotage detachments who were seized."
General, did you follow the quotation?
A. Yes.
Q. Was not the headquarters of your Einsatzgruppe D in Nikolajev at the date of that report?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. From memory, can you tell how far Cherson was from Nikolajev?
A. About 80 kilometers.
Q. Your headquarters were in Nikolajev some months, were they not?
A. That is right.
Q. Can you give an estimate as to how many Jews lived in these two cities?
A. I have already commented on this in my direct examination. According to my estimate there were about 5,000 Jews in each of these cities.
Q. Now, what did you mean when you reported to Berlin that a city or an area was freed of Jews?
A. That there were no more Jews in those areas.
Q. Where were the former Jewish inhabitants of these places?
A. The Jewish inhabitants had been killed.
Q. When a report stated, and I quote: ".. and the remaining officials were appropriately treated." --what, exactly, is meant by the term "appropriately treated"?
A. Mr. Prosecutor, I may call your attention to the fact that you may not assume that this is my text. This is a text from Berlin, and the interpretation such as you would like to have I cannot give you to this text. For if we think back to this time the first sentence already is incorrect, that the territory was freed of Jews, for this was at the time when the area was completely untouched as far as ridding it of Jews is concerned, and only later did Himmler arrive and ordered the executions of these craftsmen. The first sentence, therefore, would be incorrect, and therefore, I ask you not to have me interpret this word for word because this would be an incorrect interpretation. I have already said in direct examination that this figure especially cannot be correct under any circumstances. Neither the 22,000 nor the total number of 35,000.
Q. From the general language of these reports from Berlin -- which I agree with you is not your language -can we assume that "appropriately treated" is a synonym, or another word for liquidation?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. General, last Wednesday you commented on Book II-D, page 51 of the English, page 57 of the German, which is Document No-3148, and is Prosecution Exhibit 95; and also the next document which is in the same book, page 52 of the English, and page 58 of the German. This latter COURT II-A CASE IX document is NO-3147. Now, by comparison of the two Communists executed, and both of them give the same total of 13,315.
Does not that appear on both documents?
A. No, in the first document the number 17,350 appears as the total number. And in the second, 13,315. But even if I say that the "7" is a typographical error and that it should be "13" then this is the best proof that here in two separate operational reports, one on the 20th and one on the 26 of September, the same report was given.
Q. Now, let me reach what I am trying to get at. Can it be possible that this report of the 26th of September, if the numbers agree, as they do in my book but don't in yours -- if the numbers agreed, would not the report of the 26th of September be a confirmation of the report already sent forward on the 20th of September?
A. That is absolutely possible.
Q. Now, in the event, we will say, if Berlin received any additional reports of executions during the week 20 to 26 September, was it customary for the RSHA to merely repeat the facts contained in the report preceding to show that the tactical situation with regard to Einsatzgruppe D had not changed?
A. well, usually if nothing happened it was not customary to copy the same report over again, but you would just say that there is no report. Therefore, this is completely incomprehensible to me.
Q. General, as a matter of fact the execution of Jews and Communists happened more frequently during the first part of the campaign than later, in 1942, did it not?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. And this was because Einsatzgruppe D encountered COURT II-A CASE IX more of these classes of people in August and September 1941 than it did in February and March 1942, isn't that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, one report states that an Einsatzgruppe C -not your Einsatzgruppe -- executed 35,000 people in two days. Is it not true that all units of an Einsatzgruppe, with the active assistance of police units attached to them and Wehrmacht units upon which they should call for assistance, could have executed such a large number of people in such a short time.
A. No, I consider it completely out of the question.
Q. Let me go into that a little further. Police Battalion No. 9 was a police battalion on which you could call, is that correct?
A. No, no.
Q. What was the police battalion-
A. If the police battalion which had been attached to the Einsatzgruppe in the East had the number "9, then this was the original battalion which, by order of Himmler, was distributed among the various Einsatzgruppen, without battalion staff, that is, there was no more battalion, but there were four companies, and these four companies were distributed among the four Einsatzgruppen. Each company to each Einsatzgruppen. In my Einsatzgruppe the company was completely dissolved. That is to say, the various Einsatzkommandos got one or two plattons, or a half platoon, from this unit. For it was attempted to use these police units for guard purposes for the Einsatzgruppen. It may be that another Einsatzgruppe handled this differently. For example, kept the company together. But a company was put at my disposal which was no longer a company because it was distributed among the entire area of 400 kilometers.
for manpower to assist in the Jewish raids, or any partisan warfare or executions? your own for assistance when you needed it?
A If they were voluntarily asked to do it. I could not order a unit to do so.
Q Let me ask it this way. Your survey of a tactical situation showed you that you did not have enough manpower to solve this problem, even with the assistance of what Police Units you already had, would you then be at liberty to go to the nearest Army, to the nearest battalion commander of the Wehrmacht, or regimental commander of the Wehrmacht, and explain your situation to him and ask for some help in liquidation. It was a question of voluntary agreement between the leader of the Einsatzkommando, and the leader of the military unit to get assistance, despite the prohibition of participation in the executions, and this happened repeatedly. It was not a question of an order on our part, but of agreeing voluntarily with the other military commanders. or the non-commissioned officer have the power to volunteer or to agree to go to your assistance in these execution matters? it upon himself to disobey.
Q Let's go back just a little bit. The Einsatzkommando Fuehrer has agreed with his neighboring Army commander, whether a unit is decided, or a battalion, or regiment, it makes no difference, he has agreed that he needs thirty or fifty men to come to his assistance.
The Army unit commander is agreed that he does need this many men. Does this Army unit commander then call on a junior officer and say, pick out twenty men, or thirty men, and take them over to where the Ensatzkommando requests them, and commit them to action, or, does that junior officer assemble his company and ask for volunteers from the Wehrmacht to go? it I would have to assume the latter, that he would ask the people to volunteer. it was for the men, is that right, on a voluntary basis?
Q Now, General, let's turn to Document Book II-B, page 7 in the English, page 5 of the German, which is document NO-2337, and is Prosecutions Exhibit No. 58, this is report dated 29 August 194-7.
A '41.
Q '41, yes, I am sorry, on page 11 of that report, in the English document book, it relates the number of Jews that were driven out in the Rumanian territory, and in this connection you discussed the participation yesterday of the defendant Felix Ruehl, of which he has also told in his affidavit. Now are these two instances the, same, the one in the document and the one which is related by the defendant Ruehl?
A I don't remember the affidavit of Ruehl.
Q All right. I show you in Document Book III-D, page 76 of the English, page 121 of the German, Document No-4149, which is Prosecution's Exhibit No, 169.
Now in paragraph 3 of that document -in his affidavit the same incident as the one given in the report of Document 2837, the first document which was called to your attention? made of this transport, after he carried them to some place. Did he ever report back to you that this problem was settled, that he had disposed of the Jews? Jews were liquidated, would you have remembered it now? know that is a difficult question.
A I remember the incident very exactly. But to answer your question, I didn't have the impression that Ruehl was a leader of the transport. Ruehl, sofar as I remember was the very one who passed on my directives to MogilowPedolsk to let the Jews go back to Rumania, who then reported to me that Rumania would not let the Jews return across the river, and then he was referred to Kommando XII, which was then to try to arrange the transporting back of the Jews by way of another bridge. That happened as the result of a directive given by me to Noske. Ruehl, therefore, had nothing else to do but to give the directive to Mogilov, and to report back to me that the Rumanians would make difficulties. And, then from a part of Kommando XII together with a part detachment of X-B in Mogilov, which was not under the direction of Ruehl, but under a different leader.
This transport of Jews was effected from Mogilov over the bridge to Jampel, into the Roumanian territory. From my own knowledge I consider it completely out of the question that a) younger Jews were picked and b) that 1265 were shot. Because the order was clear, and Noske reported later the carrying out of this order, and there was no cause to assume that such a selection was made, or that such killings were perpetrated.
Q Then Nosske reported to you on this incident?
Q Do you recall what Nosske reported? with the German bridge officer, he had just barely made it possible that this transport be brought back. have been preferred by the Rumanians, could the Einsatzgruppe have prevented or order the Rumanians troops to cease and to desist and not execute these men? We only had the possibility of intervening once and awhile because the Rumanians were making difficulties by lootings, and by rapings, and, thus, we permitted ourselves to interfere personally. with the Rumanians troops affairs? persons.
Q All right. Now, General, one more document. Let's turn to Document Book II-D, on page 49 of the English, and on page 54 of the German. This is document NO-2841, which is Prosecution's Exhibit No. 94. Were any of these 94 Jews guilty of spying, as the report says, on the population?
A I can only interprete the text, Mr. Prosecutor, that according to that, it looked as if the Jews had sabotaged against the harvest, and were identical with persons who had denounced other people, and caused them to be sent off, that is what the document shows. dissatisfaction with the agricultural workers, or in any way preventing them from doing their normal agriculture, labor, would it not, that would be agriculture sabotage?
Q Yes. And also it was about or prior to the entry of German forces in this area, these people had sent Russians, there own fellow nationals, by their denouncing, off to Siberia. Now, General, it is not clear to me why for a crime against another Russian before the Germans occupied the area the German forces would want to punish these men?
A Mr. Prosecutor, may I remind you of the law which had just been decreed in Germany, I believe they were the Same, only goes somewhat further, insofar as the officials are accused that as the result of the laws of their State they officially persecuted people, and in the case of Goerdler, the young girl who recognized Goerdler, who even was involved in the assault against the life of the Chief of State, received twelve years in the penitentiary, and that these twelve years in the penitentiary, according to the Berlin publicity were not even sufficient. That was yesterday, we were trying to pin it down to facts as to the document before us.
Now who determined that the number of Jews should be 94 to be executed as a reprisal, or retaliation. Was this the Kommando-Fuehrer there?
A It must be typically a fact which I had said before; a detailed investigation was undertaken, and the result of this investigation had effected 49 people. Namely, they had participated in sabotage, or in agitation. That is not a general measure, but certainly these were individual investigations.
Q But it was a reprisal measure? was a measure because of the security being in danger, The text which was probably summarized one can not quite make it out.
Q Let me ask you this. As a general policy were the populations of any area warned beforehand that they would be subject to reprisals if they did not obey the directives and the orders of each of the police units?
A Yes, there were very clear orders. There were directives of the Army, or of the Army corps, which were posted, and made known everywhere in which, for example such crimes were listed with a threat that whoever violated such directives would be publicly hanged.
given a trial, or was it an emergency measure to have the arresting officer decide whether he had violated a directive and pass sentence?
A I don't know about such matters. I believe that these taking of hostages and reprisal measures took place later on. Bock II-C, page 16 in the English, page 18 in the German, which is document NO-2952, and is Prosecution's Exhibit No. 71. General, in this document please turn to the fourth paragraph under the heading "Partisan Warfare."?
Q Page 16 of the English, and 18 of the German. Now under paragraph four I direct your attention to the sentence where twenty hostages were dealt with by a summary Court. General, are you familiar with the proceedings in a Summary Court?
A No, I don't know anything about it.
Q You don't know then whether these twenty hostages would have a right to counsel to represent them?
A I don't know this, but I could give you exact information about it. The decree which I had mentioned before, the. Decree of the Fuehrer, signed by Keitel of May 1941, excludes such procedure. This is a directive about the procedure-to be applied before a court martial, and this directive determined that in all these cases a court martial is not competent, but that an officer has to decide those cases by himself. it to be stated in another way.
THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Walton, may I interrupt, please.
MR. WALTON: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the offer also decide the ratie?
suspect, or not? German deaths, if any?
A I had just understood the Prosecution's question differently. I don't he meant the taking of hostages, but the question of whether somebody if he was suspected was in a position to have a defense counsel present him in the trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Walton, is referring to a particular document where reference is made first to ten hostages, and then twenty hostages. Does this officer who investigates the matter decide just how many hostages shall be killed because of whatever jeopardation was committed upon a German element?
THE WITNESS: The Einsatzgruppe itself did not take any hostages, give you this information, with my knowledge of the Einsatzgruppe, but Colonel von Schobert - I mean, General von Schober complained to Seibert that for these cases which happened in Belzy, not enough hostages had been shot, and he, therefore, would give directive that harsher measures be taken, that is to more hostages should no shot then were shot in this case.
I don't know whether ratio numbers were already determined, as this happened in the Southeast later on. I would assume that this was determined by the competent local officers of the units, probably, according to these directives of the Army, but I am only giving you my interpretation. the first trial, the IMT Trial, that Keitel had been quoted as ordering so many hostages to one German soldier killed, and I was wondering if that applied in this case?
Q Some more information, General. I think you have answered this, but I would like to get it dtraight in my own mind. Did the hostages under sentence of death have the right to appeal deaht sentences to a higher military or SS authority?
A Of course not. Thas was just what I said before as to the content of Keitel's Order.
Q Yes, now, didn't the main duty of this Summary Court consist of selecting the number of persons to be executed, the main duty?
Q In your direct testimony didn't you state as a fact that the arrest of hostages was carried out, and I quote your words, "By order of the Supreme Commander of my Army," and then you relate that the Army complained that you executed a few hostages. This has been referred to several times, is that correct? of Seibert, who had this experience with Schober. I don't know of these hostages measures from my own knowledge. complaint about too few hostages being executed? year? is it not so? complaint? Not you personally, but generally as to your unit? hostages.
like to add from my recollection that at my time in the East the Army also arrested very few hostages, because at that time the partisan warfare had not yet turned into a warfare of the population, a general warfare. execute hostages? was brought to your knowledge that hostages were executed by some one?
A I only know from the Prosecution's documents about the shooting of Kischimen. I don't remember anything myself.
Q Now let's consider this same document a little father. In paragraph-
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Walton, suppose we recess at this time.
MR. WALTON: Yes, Your honor.
THE PRESIDENT: We will be in recess until 1:45.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1345 hours.
(Whereupon a recess was taken until 1345, 15 October 1947.)