These are the documents in Document Book II-A, page 30 of the German text, Document No. 2834. Exhibit 87, and in Document Book II-B, page 34 of the German and 35 of the English text. Here it is Document No. NO-2824, Exhibit 62.
A. At first I refer to Document Book II_D, page 30 of the German text, that is NO-2834, Exhibit 87. On page 4 of the Exhibit it says, under "Location Sonderkommando 10-b" -- Kertch and Feodosia are not mentioned any more -- but it says Sudak and radio communications while on route. For my Kommando 11-b it is mentioned, "Garrisen Simferopol, with parts in Aluschta, Karasubassa and Eupatoria." Those Garrisens are correct. May I explain why Kertch and Feodosia are not mentioned under 10-b. The Kommando 10-b, after their arrival in the Crimes, had their location in Feodosia, Kertch and Sudak. At the end of December, that is shortly before this situation report, the Russians carried out a surprise landing in Feodosia and Kertch, recaptured Feodosia and Kertch and the whole peninsula, and, as mentioned repeatedly, a very difficult military situation arose. During these events the Kommando 10-b had to withdraw from Feodosia..... And may I remind you, that my co-defendant Seibert explained how he was looking for this Kommando which had to escape from Feodosia....I now refer to Document Book II-b, page 34 of the German text, it is NO-2824--
DR. MAYER: Page 33 of the English text, your Honor.
A(Continuing) It is a report of events of 19 December, that is two weeks before the previous one, when the landing had not yet occurred. And here, on page 4 of the excerpt, under Sonderkommando 10-b, it is shown under "Garrison Feodosia, with divisions in Kertch and Sudak".....it is shown that, before the landing 10-b was in Feodosia and Kertsch; and may I show you that after the recapture, 10-b was active in these two locations again, and neither my Kommando nor any of my sub-kommandos were over stationed in Feodosia or Kertsch, or ever operated there.
Q. Witness, perhaps you would be good enough to show the position of Sudak on the map.
A. This morning I showed approximately where approximately Feodosia is -- it must be about here.... the Russians landed here ..... and at the same time they landed here, in Kertsch, and practically recaptured this whole part here.... and then they advanced in this region, and tried to block off the Crimea up here. This was a very dangerous situation. Apart from that, they advanced to Simferopol from here.
Later on I shall explain that a few days later they landed on the other coast as well; the obvious aim was to connect those two coasts and, therefore, the entire army in the East, near Sevastopol, should be cut off, and destroyed. Sudak is also on the south coast, not far from Feodosia, southwest about here. Sudak is here... Feodosia about here .....Kertsch about there .... while my territory, here, is Simferopol; east of it, Karasubassa; south of it, Aluschta; and to the west of it, Eupatoria.
Q. Witness, the Prosecution also maintains in their case in chief that the affidavit of the co-defendant, Schubert, of 24 February 1947, proves that in December 1941 the Kommando 11-b shot seven to eight thousand people in the area of Simferopol.
During this morning's session you already touched upon this question, too; but I would like you now to explain this question, based on these documents. I refer to Document Book I, page 141 of the German, page 108 of the English text. It is Document No. NO-3055, Exhibit 28.
A. I have the document book in front of me. And may I just quote from it: "In December 1941, I do not remember the exact date, I was assigned my Ohlendorf or Seibert to supervise and inspect the shooting of about 700 to 800 people." The document shows quite clearly that Schubert did not mention seven to eight thousand, but only seven to eight hundred. Already this morning I mentioned that in my opinion there must be a mistake. Hey I point out that this morning it was translated by "mistake". I would like to attach importance to it that I do not want to show some error which was done on purpose, but I think it is an error rather than a mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well... I would like to have a little conference here with the interpreter. The interpreter has just said that the witness has said it was an error, and not a mistake. I would like to have some linguist give us the hair-breadth distinction between an error and a mistake.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, in our language the meaning "mistake" may be more serious, as if one tried to explain that something was done on purposel while an error would exclude any such possibility.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we would term the former situation as a deception, and not a mistake. If someone purposely endeavors to mislead, it drops out of the category of a mistake; but if it is something done on purpose, therefore, it would be deceit, or deception.
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor, I agree to this.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. I am glad it wasn't the fault of the interpreter. BY DR. MAYER:
Q. Dr. Braune, does this concern the execution carried out by order of the Army before Christmas 1941, which you have already mentioned?
A. Yes, that is what was meant.
Q. The Prosecution also charges you that the shootings of 1154 partisans in Eupatoria on 7 January 1942, was ordered by you, and as evidence for this they submit a letter from G-2, Major Riesen. It is in Document Book III-D, pages 104, 105 of the German text, and page 62 of the English text, Document NOKW-584, Exhibit 165. Would you like to comment about this?
A. I have this document in front of me as well, and may I comment on it. I just said that after the landings in Feodosia and Kertsch the Russians landed again in the first days of January 1942. It might have been the 5th or 6th. They landed here, in Eupatoria. This landing also succeeded. The city was conquered by Bolshevists, and the German troops had to withdraw from the city. The situation became even more hopeless from a military point of view because of this. During this recapture of the city, the civilian population of Eupatoria, to the greatest extent, had assisted the Bolshevists and had acted as guerillas and snipers. These civilians also had captured two trucks with heavily wounded German soldiers who were not able to escape from the city any longer, and cut them off from the rest, and all these wounded German soldiers had their throats cut by them. This fact was revealed to the commandant of Eupatoria, one of the most brilliant German officers who already had a high distinction Chief of the Army because the Russians were very pleased about having killed these wounded German soldiers.
The Commander-in-Chief of the 11th Army, General Field Marshal von Mannstein, felt that the male population who were rproven to be able to carry arms, who lived in Eupatoria, were to be executed as snipers and guerillas and partisans. On the basis of this Order the G-2 AO, Major Riesen, went to Einsatzgruppen Chief Ohlendorf, and requested the Einsatzgruppe, in this case my Kommando of the sub-Kommando there, should carry out this execution. I myself was present during that conversation as well, and I remember distcintly how we were in our sitting room, and Major Riesen came in the evening. Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf rejected this, and explained that this was a matter to be dealt with by the Army. At further urgent request he finally agreed that I be sent along to support Major Riesen, and apart from that Oberfuehrer Ohlendorf wanted to being about that among those arrested snipers and partisans, through my sub-kommando in Eupatoria, those were to be combed out, who were known to kommando the sub-kommando, and their units. Some of them had even worked for our units very conscientiously for some time; some of them were even employed by our kommando, and we know them to be reliable; and he wanted that those men should not be shot as well. The following day, 7 January, which Major Riesen mentions here, may be right. According to the order given to me, I also travelled to Eupatoria. For order's sake, I must correct here that not three SS leaders, as it says here, travelled alone to Eupatoria, but only me. Major Riesen must have made an error here. He only wrote this down about a year after the events. When we arrived in Eupatoria Major Riesen reported to the combat commandant, and informed him of the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Colonel at the time said, almost verbally, "the Commander in Chief would not have had to send me for this. I would have done this on my own authority because in this case these are only snipers and bandits who have forfeited their lives."
I then brought in my sub-kommando, and this sub-kommando, with our local and indigenous aids, who assisted us sorted out from the 1500 people who had been arrested about 300, who were known to be reliable, for it must be right that about 1184 people remained. It is not that from 1500 people 1184 were chosen, and it was said they should to be shot, the original order had been that all men of military age were to be shot. And out of these, 300 were selected who were exempt from shooting. During this selection Major Riesen, who says himself in his statement on page one, that he had to carry out the order of the Commander-in-Chief, ordered an Air Force communications battalion to carry out these shootings on the order of the Army. Those persons were taken in a line through the city, where fighting still took place. It is right that snipers still shot at us from houses, and that these snipers threw hand grenades, and we shot at then with automatic rifles to stop them. These persons were then shot by the Air Force unit, according to order in the outskirts of the city in a tank ditch.
Q. Is it right.......that of these 1184 people from the city many tried to escape when you arrived at the ouskirts?
A. Yes. En route, as far as I remember, about 80 to 90 people tried to escape, and not only 20 to 30 of these snipers. They were shot down with automatic rifles by this Air Force unit. This caused a very dangerous and critical situation. I presume that Major Riesen, who says on the following page, "SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Braune gave instructions on the place of execution to carry out the shootings." He means by that, that after this attempt to escape I was very excited, and therefore told him that he should not hesitate any longer and have this longstretched column with so few guards, go in a closer formation. Furthermore at the collection point - about 200 to 300 meters from the place of execution - I pointed out to him that he should not put guards on either side of those to be executed. This was on the railway platform which was on a lower level than the rest of them. "If they tried to escape again your soldiers will shoot each other." If he means that, by instructions, then he is right. Apart from that, he gave the order; he could only give orders to this Air Force unit, and I could not, and these measures were carried out under his orders. order to fire. I cannot see from the document in how far I gave an order to fire. But I can only assure you that I did not give such an order. But I stated that I was merely at the place where those snipers were collected, and that was two to three hundred meters away from the ditch, where the shootings were carried out by this Air Force unit. Apart from that, I would like to add that in my position, and with my rank, it would not have been my task to give an order to fire, to nine of ten men who shot; but such orders to fire were given by an NCO, at the most by a lieutenant, and not by a man with the rank of a major.
Q. Witness, I have one more question. I noticed that you said you shot the people who tried to escape with machine. Is this nor an error?
A. No, this Air Force unit also had two or three automatic rifles and they fired with these.
Q. I only noticed it because I considered this impossible, to set this up so quickly.
A. No, they were light automatic rifles, which were put into position.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, may I concerning the statement of Colonel Mueller, referring to Major Riesen and the witness here, submit a statement with the request that the witness read this short excerpt out of thisl this will make the order clear, and will show that in cases like in the one here, through the Fuehrer order, this was made legal, and it was entirely up to the commander or the officer to deal with this task. The Fuehrer order of 13 May 1941, Document C 50; I shall also introduce it in my Document Book II.
A. (by the witness) I have the order in its photostatic copy in front of me. Its heading is: "Fuehrer headquarters, 13 May 1941. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Army." Then under Roman I it says: "Treatment of crimes by enemy civilians." Figure 1. "Crimes committed by Enemy civilians are not to be dealt with by court-martial, or military courts until further notice." Figure 2. "Snipers are to be shot by the unit while fighting or while escapingwithout consideration." Figure 3. "All other attacks of enemy nationals against the Wehrmacht and its members are to be shot by the units, on the spot, and have not or can temporarily not be carried out -- suspects will be taken to an officer immediately and he shall decide whether they are to be shot."
"In localities in which the Army is attacked from ambush, immediately by order of an officer, whose rank must at least be a battalion commander, collective measures are to be carried out immediately if the circumstances do not make it possible to find out the actual criminals." And finally the last sentence. "It is expressly prohibited that suspicous persons be kept in prison." I must assumes that the commander thought of this Fuehrer order when he said: The Commander in Chief would not have had to send you. I would have done this on my own anyhow. to carry out a surprise raid and refers to Document Book III-D for "Dog", page 58 of the English text, page 98 of the German text, Document NOKW1863, Exhibit 164. Please comment on this as well.
A I have this document in front of me as well. It is on page 98 of the German Volume. The first page of this document, consisting of six pages, unambiguously shows that this is a measure, I quote: "Which was carried out at the order of the AOK 11 -O-Qu-" on 12 January 1942. exactly that this order was given because of the situation. In Simferopol the rear Army units and the reserves units, a mixed crowd set up barricades in a hurry. The city was divided into defense sectors and everything was prepared for battle against the Russians approaching from Feodosia. At that moment the Army ordered that the city be combed out in order to be saved from surprises from the city, and that is how this order came about. That this was a purely military measure and that the Army took a very active part is shown also from the distribution list on the last page. This shows that this order was given to the AOK, to the Einsatzgruppe, to the Town Area Commander, the local commandant, counterintelligence, etc. Now it says again on the first page, "On 12 January 1942, a surprise action will be carried out to apprehend unreliable elements (partisans, saboteurs, possibly enemy troops, parachutists in civilian clothes, Jews, leading Communists, etc.)" May I draw your attention to the Jews here noted to show that from the Army as well the Jews were listed under the term of unreliable elements and were considered a danger in the rear Army territory.
The actual carrying out is shown clearly from the order. There were almost two-and-a-half thousand members of all Wehrmacht units who took part in this, 55 members of the Military Police, and 20 men of the Secret Field Police, also, if one adds it, exactly 48 men of the Einsatzgruppe, because I remember that at that time a few men from the group staff also took a part because I did not have 48 men at my disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you explain what was meant by the phrase, "possibly enemy troops?" Do they mean by that that they weren't certain there were enemy troops there or not and therefore said "possibly enemy troops?"
THE WITNESS: I explain it in this way, your Honor, after six years; that owing to the prolonged fighting for the entrace into the Crimea some of the former regular troops took off their uniforms already before they were captured and carried out sabotage and set up part of the units, etc., and therefore were to stay in the Crimea to do this, and I believe that these kind of people are meant by this. I may assure you these were not military units who were in uniform and openly carried their arms who had come into the city, but former soldiers who had not been left behind with special tasks. and all these six districts during that action were under the charge of an Army officer. That is, what actually happened in these districts during the action was done under the command of an Army officer, and finally, on page 5, it can be seen how it was in effect carried out and instructions were given that these districts were to be blocked and be combed out street by street and as far as was possible that the houses be searched as well. But I remember that they could not do that with the forces at their disposal. It was also determined that male persons who were on the street and any suspected female persons were to be checked up in these areas and all suspicious individuals were to be brought to assembly points. There There they were rechecked again with the assistance of persons familiar to the police and the inhabitants, and then finally they were checked for a third time.
tical circumstances as we had then at the time in the Crimea must be allowed to take such precautions for their own security. I think that such actions and similar once are being carried out in Germany as well after the capitulation repeatedly.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, in view of the advanced time I would only like to tell the Tribunal that I have just finished a section here. I will now start on a new complex of questions, so that if the Tribunal wishes to close down here, this seems to be a good point.
THE PRESIDENT: There is merit to your suggestion, not only for what 3 you have said but also the fact that there will be quite an interval before we reconvene, an interval of time, and therefore we would have to sort of refresh our memories anyway. The Tribunal will be in recess now until Monday morning at nine-thirty o'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until l December 1947, at 0930 hours.)
of America, against Otto Ohlendorf, et al., l December 1947, 0930-1630.
Justice Musmanno,
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
DR. MAYER: Dr. Eric M. Mayer for the defendant Werner Braune. Your Honor, as to the witness Braune we concluded on Wednesday of last week with questioning, and I would like to continue now.
THE PRESIDENT: Continue Dr. Mayer.
DR. MAYER: On Wednesday we were discussing the charge of the Prosecution in the document which the Prosecution had submitted against my client. I shall now come to a different section. BY DR. MAYER:
Q.- Dr. Braune, during your assignment in the East, did you go on a leave?
A.- Yes, after having taken part in the anti-Partisan action, which lasted for three days, in the first half of March 1942, together with Herr Ohlendorf, I went on leave, and, exactly on 26 April 1942, I travelled by plane together with him back to Simferopol.
Q.- When did the gas-vans arrive in Simferopol?
A.- Sofar as I remember that must have been at the end of February 1942.
Q.- How many vans were there when you arrived in Simferopol?
A.- There were two vans.
Q.- Do you remember how they were distributed?
A.- Sofar as I remember one of these two vans was given to Commando X-B, or XI-A. The other van was in Simferopol, but I am not quite certain of this. I know that Herr Ohlendorf testified that two vans were standing in Simferopol, and were always requested by the other commandos, but that is quite possible too, I think.
Q.- Were they used immediately after they arrived?
A.- Immediately after their arrival they certainly were not used, because after the long journey from Berlin to the Crimea, which is more than two-thousand kilometers, their condition on account of the weather was such that they had to be repaired.
Q.- The van which was moved to Simferopol, was it used by you?
A.- I already testified to the Prosecution that I didn't use the van but the van must have been used by my commando in Simferopol once, because I remember exactly that Sturmbannfuehrer Schulz came to me and told me he didn't want to use the van again, because he considered the unloading and the burying of the bodies to great a strain for his men. The men objected to the use of the van as well. But at what time exactly Sturmbannfuehrer Schulz said this to me, I do not remember any more. It is possible that it happened on the day when I returned from the antiPartisan operation, but it is also possible that he only said this to me after I returned from my leave.
Q.- During your leave was the van still used?
A.- I am not quite certain of this, but I don't think so. According to what Sturmbannfuehrer Schulz said to me.
Q.- The Prosecution said in the opening speech that defenseless civilians were often shot as Partisans. Did this occur in your Commando?
A.- In my commando it didn't occur. I can only assure you that these Partisans with whom we dealt were anything but defenseless civilians.
Q.- Can you tell us anything about theanti-partisan fighting, and the Partisan situation in the Crimea in general?
A.- In the Crimea the Paritsan problem was particularly difficult for three different reasons. One reason was there had been weeks of fighting for the Crimea. The Bolshevists had sufficient time to prepare their Partisan warfare in detail. Apart from that the Haila Mountains in the farther part of the Crimea was particularly suitable for Partisan fighting, and also the fact that the Crimea is practically an island which is only connected with the Continent by the small isthmus near Pericope, and because of that the Partisans were an especially great danger.
Q.- Witness, how did the Partisans make themselves felt?
A.- This can be seen from the reports of events, which were submitted here. From the very first day they attacked small army columns, single rear posts; they attacked from ambush; they killed German soldiers; they took their papers from them, their uniforms, and their weapons.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, in Document Book II I shall include excerpts from the Reports of events 136 and 143, and shall submit them to the Tribunal to show how extensively the Partisan movement was in Crimea, and how great was the danger for the small numbers of German troops stationed in the Crimea.
Q.- Did the Partisans wear uniforms, or any recognizable insignia or did they carry their weapons openly?
A.- I never saw such an instance nor did I over hear of it, but it occurred repeatedly that the Partisans wore the German uniform, which they had captured in order to look like the German soldiers, in order to carry out their attacks better and more unobserved.
Q.- Were the Partisans recognized as combattants by the Army?
A.- No, the Army never recognized them as combattants, but considered them and treated them as what they were - Franc-tireurs, namely, people who attacked from ambush.
Q.- How were the Partisans supplied?
A.- First of all, before the Crimea was captured, the Partisans had a great amount of food, cattle, weapons and so forth, which they kept in the mountains.
The two reports to which my counsel referred show these particulars clearly. Apart from that they currently attacked villages on the edge of the mountains, as well as in the mountains themselves, they plundered and looted, and took anything they needed. They also forced men of military age, and even women to join them. Also those, who opposed them or who defended themselves were killed, and very often their farms were burned down.
Q.- Witness, please describe briefly what attacks were carried out against the Partisans, attacks which are constantly mentioned in the report of events?
A.- The operations by the Army were limited, to the time when the mountains were more or less passable that is before the severest winter started, and after the snow had melted. Of course, several small operations were carried out in spite of the snow and the cold, but in the decisive winter months the most effective protection were the Tartars Home Guard Companies which were sent into the individual villages, in small detail detachments, which thus protected these villages, and, to a certain extent, also the communications. During that time serious fighting took place between the Partisans on the one, and the Tartars Home Guard Companies on the other side, since the Partisans still tried to attack the villages. After the snow had melted in the spring and of course also before we constantly sent patrols on reconnaissance; the results of these reconnaissance operations were passed on to the Einsatzgruppen, some of them even directly to the Partisan combatting department, where then the individual operations were planned and carried out under Military Leadership by Army forces.
Q.- When carrying out such Anti-Partisan operations, were men of your Commando also assigned to this task?
A.- Yes, my men also were assigned to this task by the Army. I myself took part in a few operations, but the Army was completely in charge of it, Q.- How strong were the detachments which were assigned to fight the Partisans?
A.- That depended on the individual case. We had operations with two divisions took part.
Accordingly, the operation took sometimes one Q.- What experiences did you have in the Crimea concerning sabotage and terror group of Bolshevists?
Already before the Crimea was captured, destruction and demolition battalions had been set up; that is, battalions which destroyed everything which they considered important, in particular the gas, electricity and water works, railroad stations, very important public buildings, the Party buildings were practically destroyed, and in Simferopol, as I have heard, the MKVD Building was blown up after the German troops had occupied it. These destruction and demolition battalions consisted mostly of Communist functionaries, and active Communists. After the capture, then they were left behind on purpose and they again formed a certain nucleus which strengthened the Partisan group, and as Partisans they now attacked in the rear the German Army troops.
Q Did women and young people take part? eleven years of age took part. Bolshevism now knew no limitation here. They called on the entire population to take part in the fighting in the rear of the enemy army, and this appeal was followed. I remember quite well that they acted in the most cunning manner. They would put in dynamite which could blow up after a while. These explosives were set up in large buildings, and also in buildings where they were expecting the German troops would make searches; they were fixed to doors, and cupboards, so that when the door was opened the explosive exploded; even short waive explosives were used. I remember in Krasnodar, after the German occupation, on one day, I believe, six or eight large public buildings were blown up in that way. after the Ethnic Germans. Please tell us something about the situation and the fate of the Ethnic Germans?
in the Crimea. Before the war there lived about 50,000 German people in the Crimea. For generations they had retained their language, their culture, and their customs. Under Bolshevism they had suffered greatly. When we occupied the Crimca, Of these 50,000 Germans who used to live there only six to seven hundred remained. All the rest had been deported or Killed. According to detailed information, we obtained at first, the mass of Ethnic Germans were taken, if I may point out on the map (Witness stands in front of map on wall) via this point here, Kerch, to the Kaukasus Mountains, over this channel, this narrow channel here (indicating on the map). They then had been deported to the Siberia, or were supposed to have been sent there, (Returns to the witness stand). Those who were not fit to work or to be moved by train, so far as we heard at the time, were shot according to our information. I received confirmation of the fate of the Ethnic Germans when at the end of July, or the beginning of August, I moved with the First German. Armored Army from Rostock into the Kaukasus Mountain area. We entered Armaria with the first Army unit. We had moved in with the First German troops which invaded that country, and late one evening three Ethnic German women reported to me. They were in a terrible condition, beyond description. Their report showed us that they had been in a train which was to go farther East, but during a German airplane attack the railroad track had been destroyed, and the whole train load of Ethnic Germans, about 2,000, was left burning alive in locked ears by the Russians. One car had been damaged, and thus these three women had managed to escape at the last minute. We also heard there that these approximately 50,000 German people, that is those who had as yet not been killed were sent to Siberia from the Kuban area.
There again it was said that they who were not fit for work, or were not fit for transportation, were shot.
Q Dr. Braune, from reports in the daily newspapers, did you hear about the interview of the wellknown author of a recent book on Stalingrad, Theodor Plivier, which he had with the Dutch reporter Scheffler? It reveals that the Wolga German Republic where many Germans lived suffered the same fate as the Ethnic Germans in the Crimea.
MR. WALTON: Your Honor, I feel that I must protest, or object to this line of questioning. There has been no basic foundation which has been laid for the introduction of the work of this author, whether he is an expert, and no connection has been shown between this book, or this author and the defendant, on the grounds of immateriality, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, may I mention here that Theodor Plivier gave this interview during this summer, after he himself had returned from the East, and he confirms from his own experience what he found there during many years of stay. So far Theodor Plivier has expert knowledge in this matter, and, therefore, it is of great importance what he says.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Mayer, it is entirely agreeable that you present this book with such parts of it as you believe are material and relevant, and that can be done in your document book. This witness did not write the book, so, therefore, he can not tell us about the book.
If we permit witness to tell us about books, then they can just start in the libraries of the world. I had assumed that you had intended that he only refer to the book, and with a sentence or two indicate the nature of its contents, which he has now already done, and, I would think that would be sufficient. You can supplement that in your document book, of course.
DR. MAYER: Your Honor, I have finished with this question anyhow, and I shall give a small excerpt in the document book.