3). This means increased efforts in all fields with the total exploitation of all possibilities and all sources of assistance offered gy the country. The concept "Improvisation" hereby stands at the beginning of every thought and action. Everything, serving to increase the fighting strength and seeming suitable to accomplish the assigned tasks, is right. Bureaucratic concepts are to be opposed with a very loose interpretation of the directives.
"An order concerning the establishing of combat echelons and emergency units, as well as further individual directives necessary, follows.
Signed (Loehr) And in the distribution, it is to be noted that there was an advance message by teletype to Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, to the Commander of the German Armed Forces in Croatia and to the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia.
Page 81 in the German and 73 in the English, Document NOKW-1251is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 234 in evidence.
JUDGE CARTER: 233.
Mr. DENNEY: 233; thank you, Your Honor.
This is dated 15 December 1942, bears the heading Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and is a report on experiences in connection with the dynamiting of the Gorgopotamos Bridge:
1.) Course of events:
On 25 November 1942 about 20:00 hours an attack was executed by a band of about 200-300 men on the Gorgopotamos Bridge South of Lamia. (This bridge is) about 211 meters long and crosses a rugged valley. The approach was made in three columns from the mountain side. Without being noticed the two flank columns occupied the heights rising above the railroad and bridge on both sides. From here, a concentric surprise fire attack on the Italian bridge heads took place which immediately caused losses in the shelters which are not bullet proof. In addition both flank groups immediately blocked the road to the left and to the right of the bridge by mines or rather detonations making impossible the bringing up of reinforcements by railroad.
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The blasting material was of English origin and had been prepared carefully. The method of execution shows the hand of an expert blasting specialist; the auxiliary personnel had been instructed well but as yet it worked without experience. The demolition charges were fastened ready for use into pieces of wood which were inserted with prepared rope or by the use of a magnet holding it in place.
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f) Employment of the population for the security and patrolling of railroad tracks for short periods of time. In case of a mine explosion, loosening of rails, etc., to call to account the civilian who was patrolling there previously, if necessary to shoot him. In case of a surprise attack, to punish the villages situated near the locality of the attack ! To seize hostages! To arrest non-residents!
g) Employment of the civilian population extensively and ruthlessly for the construction of fortification!
For the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast (12th Army) The Chief of the General Staff (Signed) Foertsch And, there were 70 copies of this order signed by the Chief of Staff, defendant Foertsch, which went out and I would like to pass the original to Your Honor so you may see his signature and then perhaps counsel for the defendant Foertsch would like to see the document.
Turning then to page 83 of the German and 76 of the English, Document NOKW-950, is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 234. This is a situation report of the Commander of German Troops in Croatia to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for the period 7 to 16 December. The first date is 22 December 1942, situation report to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the note for the enclosure, and then an estimate of the situation from 7.12 to 16.12:
"Enemy situation: The enemy situation in the sector reported on here has become aggravated. The assault power of the partisans in the area between Livno and Karlovac has strengthened. The forces are mainly organized in 5 Partisan Divisions (3 to 400 men) consisting of 3 to 4 brigades each. The Divisions are equipped with heavy weapons including some artillery. Supply and rear services have been organized militarily.
Though, considering the difficulties involved in organizing an illegal army, these efforts should not be overestimated, the combat power of these units seems to have improved so much that they have been able to make a general advance between the Bosna and Una in a North-East direction.
A Corps Staff is situated in Benakovac (West of Sanski Most). Seemingly advancing are:
The 4th Partisan Division (?) some units toward Bosni and Novi and some units towards Prijedor.
The 5th Partisan Division toward Prijedor.
Parts of the 1st Partisan Division are assumed to be still in the area around Vacar Vakuf, units might possibly have advanced into the area Banjaluka-Prnjavor via Kotor Varos.
The 3rd Partisan Division has advanced toward the Bosna Valley between Zenica and Zepce via Jagce and North of it.
The 2nd Partisan Division is alleged to be near Livno.
If it is true, it has a mission to secure the partisan state against DM Chetniks in the Southeast and probably to invade the Makarsak-Zone evacuated by the Italians - in order to include this area in the Partisan State.
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3. Acts of sabotage:
As compared with the period covered by the last report acts of sabotage on the main railroad line have increased. The following acts of sabotage and attacks took place and then it lists the various kinds of sabotage, for instance:
Railroad sabotage:
a) On the main line ......................... 15
b) On the unsecured branch lines ............ 18 Road sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sabotage on telephone lines . . . . . . . 11 Attacks on members of the German Wehrmacht 1 Other attacks.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cases of looting . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.) Own tactical situation and intention:
The tactical situation is conditioned by the advance of the partisans against the ared of Bosna and Una as stated in paragraph two. This advance was stopped in the Western Part between Bosni Novi and Sanski Most but due to the frequent failures of Croatian units has not been entirely taken care of. In the Eastern part the East wing of the partisan group near Jajce suffered a considerable set back. Enemy losses during this operation: 431 counted dead, 60 wounded, prisoners and shot to death, 4. Losses of our own: Two officers and 58 men dead; wounded, two officers and 93 men; missing 8 men.
. . . . . . . . . .
Then on page 85 of the German, 79 of the English, NOKW-956. This is a situation report of the Commander of the German troops in Croatia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. 30 December recites the enclosure of the situation report for the 17 December to the 26 of December, the report just following the one that was submitted before as Exhibit 234:
"The large Communist Group on the other side of the line of demarkation threatens now as before the area secured by German troops. By the occupation of Livno and Tomislavgrad the "Reich" of the Supreme Communist leader Tito has achieved its largest expansion to date. His present day territory is 250 kilometers long and approximately 80 to 100 kilometers wide, and the court's attention is respectfully directed to those figures which set up an area approximately 135 miles which a minimum of about 50 to 54 miles.
According to orders which were found there are allegedly 63,000 armed men in this partisan state who have at their disposal heavy weapons, several guns, motorized and horse-drawn vehicles and a sufficient train of beasts of burden. The heavy offensive activities of these Communist units have abated since the period covered by this report. However numerous enemy reports disclose renewed assembly and preparations for attacks on Jaice, and possibly on Banja Luka too.
Because of the clever evasion on the part of partisan units, our own troops despite uninterrupted offensives were unable to fight with any noticeable effect the partisan brigades near Sanski Most. Sanski Most itself is again threatened from three sides. A similar situation exists near Jajce which is threatened for the fourth time by strong Communist units. Obviously, the enemy is attempting to bring about a decisive success (interrupting the main railroad line?) in connection with the Russian offensive (Before spring). Another reason that one may not count on a decrease in attacks is that the partisans constantly gain new confidence from the failures of the Croatians.
. . . . . . . . .
3 Acts of Sabotage:
During the period covered by this report railroad sabotage has increased. The following cases of sabotage and of surprise attacks have taken place:
1. Railroad sabotage:
a) On the main lines. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 cases
b) On the unsecured branch lines road sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 cases 2. Sabotage telephone lines . . . . . . . . . 1 case 3. Attacks on Members of the German Wehrmacht ----4. Attacks on farms, town halls and the like . 1 case 5. Pillaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---. . . . . . . . . . . .Operation Tusla II:
Was concluded on 21 December. The intention to annihilate the partisans in the area Northeast of Tusla is fully realized. Due to the failure of Ustascha Battalion remaining partisans were able to break through to the south but they were scattered near Sekovici by Pravoslav volunteers. A pacification of the area Northeast of Tusla may be expected shortly. Result 250 enemy dead, 160 delivered for compulsory labor, the Grossgespan of Brod for weeks in captivity of the Chetniks was freed and 80 Chetniks disarmed.
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Signed in draft Lueters Turning to page 83 of the English and 88 of the German, NOKW-979, it is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 236.
These are reports of the 718th Division with reference to the operation against Jajce, and they contain a detailed description of partisan units. Dated 30 September 1942 and carry through to the 20th of December, the same year.
"1. General matters:
"The insurgents in the area Jajce belong to a large well-organized group of partisans. The leader of this large group is the already wellknow 'Tito'. His headquarters is at Glamoc (50 kilometers southwest of Jajce).
"This group of insurgents is divided into several brigades which are again divided into three battalions each of which consists of three companies. The strength of one company is from 60 to 100 men.
"From enemy papers and statements of prisoners it is deducted that the 2nd Serbian Proletaria Brigade is situated west of Vrabas and the 5th Montenegrinian and the 1st Herzegovinian Brigade south of Jajce. The latter two brigades are meant for the interruption of the road and the railway line Travnik-Jajce.
"From the south further brigades some with Italian tanks are supposed to be approaching for support.
"From interrogations and enemy papers it is evident:
"1. In every unit a special confidential agent of the political staff is commissioned with the supervision not only of the partisans but also of the Commissar and the Commandant.
"2. The intelligence service of the partisans is excellent. As scouts they mostly make use of: beggars, youths, and Dalmatian peddlers.
"3. In every partisan battalion there is a signals officer whose task it is to organize an intelligence service of the civilian population.
"4. During an attack they first throw in shock troops equipped with hand grenades and bottles of gasoline. Then follow lines of riflemen. In the meantime in the terrain still further back, groups specifi cally provided for the purpose, commence firing in order to direct attention to themselves.
"5. The partisans have penal battalions. Members of these units must work hard; they must remove mines, must construct road blockades and tank traps and must serve as a carrier service. Furthermore they are employed in especially dangerous operations.
"6. The brigades have at their disposal anti-tank groups. The members carry beer bottles filled with gasoline which have a fuse 20 to 25 centimeters long. The fuse is lighted with a match or a lighter and from a safe cover they are thrown against the tanks.
"7. Furthermore they have at their disposal nine detachments eleven men strong. The members are former foremen of blasting gangs or workers from artillery workshops. Their task is the manufacturing of mines from bombs or artillery duds.
"8. By preference the attacks are made by night. Moonlit nights are avoided; rainy nights preferred.
"9. Before the attack the adversary is put under the effect of alcohol.
"10. Premiums are paid for the capturing of prisoners.
"11. The losses of the partisans are kept strictly secret even from their own people.
"12. The food supply of a part of the partisan units is unsufficient. Once in a while only there is bean soup or a small piece of meat. The bread consists of a mixture of barley, oaths and bran - every second or third day a small piece.
"13. Examples of enemy ground signal:
red: enemy in that direction.
white: enemy encountered, green:
we advance, green-red:
we retreat, green-white:
attack, twice green:
we request aid.
"14. The partisans fix signs of recognition several days in advance; they are different during the daytime than at night. For example, during daytime: moving the body to the left and right or holding the left hand against the mouth.
at night: copying the noises of goats or the cuckoo.
Issuing of various passwords consisting of challenge and password. For instance, Sari...Suhaca, or Faschists...is withdrawn.
I don't think I need to read the insignia rank. We just had them. They are similar to those we had before. However, I would like to point out for Your Honors' notice, "Political Commissar" we have here, and on the prior page, and with reference to the hammer and sickel embroidered in gold on the star, and the reference back to the Commissar of June 1941, which is in Document I.
Turning to page 91 of the German, page 86 of the English, details about the enemy;
"II. Details about the enemy.
"After having taken Mrkonjic Grad on 24 August 1942 the partisans advanced with small units up to the near neighborhood of the town Jajce. After small weak attacks a stronger attack was made on the towns Prudi and Carevo Polje for the first time on 21 September 1942. At the same time Bukovic and the electricity works in Jajce were attacked. The partisans received reinforcements from Mrkonjic (2000 to 3000 men) on 24 September 1942. Thereupon on 25 September the concentric attack on Jajce and places south of it took place. The electric train line between Duganovci and Jajce was cut and destroyed in several places. Jajce was taken on 25 September at 1700 hours.
"According to our own land reconnaissance and Croatian reports the advanced posts and fortifications along the line Bunar - Bistrica Doribaba and various instances of distance and direction. Near Vericki Kam and Duganovci the partisans are in possession of machine gun positions which dominate the approach roads to Jajce.
"One of the leaders is supposed to be a certain Yugoslav Major Djokic who is now in the area of Podmilacje and Divicani with about 500 men.
"According to statements of prisoners the equipment of these groups of partisans is said to be excellent. They are said to have at their disposal mountain guns, heavy trench mortars, heavy machine guns, and light machine guns. In addition they captured two mountain guns in Jajce. One of these is said to be in position near Jezoro and the other one on the road to Banja Luka. Distribution in draft.
"For the Division Headquarters "The Ira."
And the name Geitner is signed here, and again this is not the defendant Geitner. It is the General Staff Officer in this division.
And then continuing with some more matters with reference to the Jajce situation:
"According to statements of prisoners the following participated in the taking of the town Jajce:
I Assault Brigade II Assault Brigade a Serbian and a Montenegrinian Brigade.
"On the march from Jajce in direction to Travnik there are:
I Assault Brigade II Assault Brigade IV Serbian Brigade IV Montenegrinian Brigade."
And then next strength of units:
"I Assault Brigade: Strength: Three battalions consisting of three companies and one escort company. In all: 600 to 700 men. Strength of the company: 65 to 75 men, each battalion about 200 men.
Armament: 45 light machine guns and 6 heavy machine guns with sufficient ammunition.
Escort company: Consisting of a heavy machine gun detachment with 7 heavy machine guns, a trench mortar detachment with 2 heavy trench mortars and 1 light, and an artillery detachment with 2 anti-tank guns."
And then it sets out the various units, breaking them down. I don't think we need more than comment on these. I would like to call the Court's attention again that now the political commissar is listed for the first assault brigade, and again for the first battalion of the brigade, and again for the second battalion, and then next the secretary of the brigade, the deputy commandant, the deputy commandant of the first battalion, as well as the battalion commandant or battalion commander, and administrative officer.
Again carrying back with the Commissar of June 1941, the reference which has been made before which appears in Document Book I, if Your Honors recall, we submitted two copies, one from Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, at that time Commander-in-Chief OKH, and then an additional copy to show the two different types of distribution which I used. And we hope at a later time to carry the issuance of that order up to show the summary execution of political commissars.
I want to direct the Court's attention to the use of this term as we go through these documents.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honors, I would like to point out that the Commissar's order shows it was only valid for the Russian front, and so far I want to challenge what the prosecution has said and say the prosecution is bound to prove this assertion.
MR. DENNEY: Well, if we are able to. Of course, if we don't, however, we believe it right to call the Court's attention to these references as we go along. Document Book I is a long time back.
In the Second Assault Brigade they again list the Commandant or the brigade commander, if Your Honors please, and the deputies both being unknown, however, they do give the commanding officer of one battalion. For the commanding officer of one company - they didn't have much information apparently about that.
"II Serbian Proletarian Brigade:
"Strength: Four battalions each consisting of three companies and escort company. Present strength of the entire brigade 200 men."
And then their:
"Armament and ammunition: 5-6 rounds in all, 10,000 rounds maximum. Each man having five or six rounds, which would indicate a strength of approximately 2,000 men."
Excuse me, Your Honor, while I check this figure here.
And then under the Second Proletarian Brigade they list the brigade commandant; the place for the Commissar was unknown, and the four battalions, with only one battalion commander known. The IV Brigade strength and armament unknown.
And then the statement:
"Allegedly four further brigades are on the march towards the area Jajce."
They recite: "1 Herzegovinian Brigade, V Montenegrin Brigade, Dalmation Brigade, and the Sandzak Brigade."
(Mr. Denney) And again the signature, "Geitner" is the General staff officer, not the defendant in this case.
And a further report with reference to the partisan situation, dated 10 November, the first paragraph recites the capturing of Communist documents in the second operation at Jajce, Glamoc, Prozor and Travnik which contained valuable statements concerning the formation and composition of the enemy:
And then they set forth the details in these documents.
1 Distribution of enemy forces
II Enemy situation before and during operation I Jajce II
III Attack on Mrkonjic Grad
IV Organization
V Administration
VI General matters."
Then with reference to distribution they cite III detachment with 2 battalions in the area east of Glamoc; the II Brigade in the area northwest of Kupres; the IV Brigade with 3 battalions, area Kupres; Bacu Krajine Brigade, area Kupres-Bugojno; and V Brigade in Area Prozor. And then the enemy situation before and during this operation:
At the end of the month of September 1942, the separate brigades and detachments had already occupied their jump-off positions for the operation pending.
The III Krajina detachment left the area east of Glamoc for the area southwest of Jajce and went into positions underlined.
The II brigade was transferred from the area northwest of Kupres to the area south of Mrkonjic Grad and occupied the line: Trnovo.
The IV brigade went from the area Kupres - Vakuf into the area southwest of Jezero and occupied the line Stupna near Miocici.
The V Brigade was assembled in the area Bugojno.
No statements were found in the captured papers about the movements of the brigade, and the added statement that they did not participate in this operation. Then they assume that the III brigade was assembled from the area Kljuc into the area Gadjavica.
And then they talk about the attack on Mrkonjicgrad:
" 8 Battalions participated in the attack, of those 6 took part directly, 2 were designated as reserve. It was remarkable that the Brigades were not employed in closed formation, but that single Battalions were taken out of Brigades in combat groups and were then formed out of mixed units".
2 Combat groups could be determined as follows:
And then they set up the combat group West and the combat group South.
a) Combat group west:
Commander: The deputy commander of the II Proletarian Brigade.
Composed of: 1st Battalion of the II Brigade, 1st Battalion of the III Brigade, 2 Battalions as reserve.
Command Post: unknown
b) Combat group south:
Commander: Chief of Staff of the Main Staff whose name was not known Composed of:. 2 Battalions of the II Brigade, 1 Battalion of the IV Brigade, the Freiwillige Battalion of the III Krajina Detachment. Command Post: At first Hocuna and later Previla.
With regard to the direction of attack of the individual units the following could be determined:
The I Battalion of the III Brigade which was in the area west of Sibovi advanced as far as Gradina. (6.5 kilometers west of Mrkonjic Grad) - Rogolje (4 kilometers west northwest of Mrkonjic Grad) and locked the road Mrkonjic Grad Sibovi at this point.
The I Battalion of the II Brigade advanced from the Sibovi area in the direction of Rogolje and occupied The line: Tomici (2 kilometers northwest of Mrkonjic Grad) - Brda (2 kilometers west of Mrkonjic Grad) in order to protect the left flank of the attack against Makonjic Grad and to be able to push back possible attacks from the northwest.
The II Battalion of the II Brigade which was in Trnovo advanced toward Okruglo (2 kilometers southeast of Mrkonjic Grad) - Staro Solo (2 kilometers northeast of Mrkonjic Grad) and blocked the roads Mrkonjic Grad, Jajce and Mrkonjic Grad - Banja Luka.
Then they set forth the advance plan of the 1st Battalion of the III Brigade, and then the advance plan of the 1st Battalion of the II Brigade, and then the 2nd Battalion of the II Brigade's advance plan is given, and then they recite the activities of two battalions, the 3rd Battalion of the II Brigade and the 3rd Battalion of the IV Brigade; in their line of advance, showing that they came into Mrkonjic Grad from different sides.
The 3rd Battalion of the II Brigade line of advance, and the 3rd Battalion of the IV Brigade. Then the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the II, and the 3rd Battalion of the IV, subordinated to the main staff of the Brigade which was first in Hocuna at the command post which was listed for the Combat Group South.
Then after the occupation of Mrkonjic Grad, the III Brigade was withdrawn and given the task of preventing and repelling every attack from the direction Stinica while the II Brigade was encamped in the area Mrkonjic as follows: and they give the locations of the staff, of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions, showing the disposition of the troops at the conclusion of the action.
"Approximately in the area of Trijebovo a group of Chetniks had assembled: the partisans therefore had to reckon with an attack of this group in the direction of Mrkonjic Grad. The second brigade, concentrated in the area around Mrkonjic had therefore as its main task the preventing of an attack of this group of Chetniks."
Then the reserve is set up, 1st Battalion of the IV Brigade, and then the report continues on page 100 of the German text and page 94 of the English text, again reciting the units which opposed the 718th Division, in this same action.
I will call the attention of the Court to the designations the "IV Brigade and the Third Krajina Detachment.
The IV Brigade consisting of a staff, three battalions listed I, II, and III and a V battalion.
The Third Krajina Detachment, Staff, Battalions listed, and a Freiwillige Battalion. Total strength 2300-3000 men. Armament 50-60 heavy machine guns; 100-120 light machine guns. Then again subordinate.
Then again, tasks of the various battalions, which I do not think need to be gone into. Your Honors are familiar with them.
They recite the II and III of the IV, the Freinvillige Battalion of the III Krajina Detachment, the I Battalion of the IV Brigade and the I of the III, of the III Krajina, detachment the V Battalion of the IV the III Battalion. II Battalion of III Krajina detachment and then the communication unit of the III Krajina detachment.
On page 101 of the German, and 95 of the English, the 1st Battalion of the III Krajina detachment, and then on page 102 of the German, still on page 95 of the English, "troops of the IV Brigade were pushed back into the area south of Jezero". Also the III Brigade were also brought up as reinforcements. The organization and strength of the III Krajina detachment was ascertained and compiled from original reports", then it is listed. 3 Battalions, each battalion with five companies, one of these as Assault Company. "The strength of the Company varies from 50 to 100 men, though the exact composition of all battalions could not be ascertained it may be assumed that are all the same.
Then again this long list, on the next page, and covering the next four pages in English, and on 103-104 of the German, "Composition of the detachments", and this is for this battalion, the III Krajena Detachment, and lists tho staff, the commanders, deputy, political commissar for the staff and also the commander, deputy, political commissar for the 1st Battalion; Battalion staff, of 15 men.
1 Company, tho Commander, the deputy, the political commissar, the deputy, the platoon leaders, two platoons to a company; strength and armaments.
II Company, commander, deputy political commissar, his deputy, then two companies, strength and armament, 1 heavy, two light machine guns.
Third company, the same material, approximately the same strength; no platoon leaders listed, nor for the fourth company, there is no political commissar listed, as there is none for the Shock Company.
The second Assault Battalion, with substantially the same information, the battalion commander, political commissar, the battalion staff and strength.
1 Company, commander, political commissar, deputy; same information with reference to the second company and the third company.
It is to be noted here that no platoon leaders are given.
Then the same information for the III Battalion, but nothing below the Battalion is given here, except that they have three companies, but there is no information on the companies, and then the IV Battalion, very sketchy information concerning that, just the commanding officer, his deputy and the political commissar. And then continuing to.....
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good place to take a recess. The Tribunal will recess for a few minutes.
(Recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The persons in the Courtroom will be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
MR. DENNEY: If it please your Honors, again continuing with Document NOKW-279 which is Exhibit 236 which is being offered for the purpose of showing the prosecution's contention that the forces here were very well organized and that they were substantial in number and carried the insignia of rank had a regular setup, even as army units of other countries. On page 105 of the German and 100 of the English, the organization of the Freiwillige Battalion which is part of the Krajina detachment, which we are discussing, is set forth. Again the officers are listed: Commanding Officer as deputy, Political Commissar as deputy, strength and armament. The only information they had on this was the name of the Commanding Officer and of the deputy for the Political Commissar. Then they have a portion on subordinations during operations with reference to the organizations.
"During large operations the brigades and detachments committed are subordinate to a "Staff of the Brigades" which is Composed of the Commanding Officers and Commissars of the individual Brigades and Detachments. It comprises a Chief of Staff, his Deputy, a secretary, an Operation Officer and various Political Commissars and couriers.
During the operation Jajce II the II, III and IV Brigade as well as the III Krajina Detachment were subordinated to a "Staff of the Brigades" the head of which was the Commanding Officer of the IV Brigade, Peko Dabcovic. As Political Commissar Mitar Bakic was appointed the Commissar of the IV Brigade.
Every Battalion possesses a so-called "Elite Company", composed of young men from the age of 17 to 20. This Company is equipped with the best arms available and designed for special tasks at each assignment. During the operation Jajce II this Company was employed to construct road blockades and for special surprise attacks against the attacking troops.