Q. Yes.
A. What do you mean by "proportion?"
Q. Well, would you say that you actually read half of them and that half of them were simply orally summarized to you by the Chief of Staff or would you say that you read two thirds of them or what?
A. One can't put it that way. At some times, if time pressed, the Chief of Staff would summarize everything in an oral report and some time I would not have had the opportunity to read everything myself. It might be that one day I would have to leave quickly after an hour or two and then another day there would be a more explicit oral report. That would depend on the situation and it changed daily.
Q. Well, now you have repeatedly emphasized here the importance of the presence or absence of your signature on these daily reports as proving either that you read these or didn't read them.
A. Yes.
Q. Well, from what has now just come out that doesn't seem to be so important, does it, if the documents were summarized to you by the Chief of Staff even though you didn't read them it makes very little difference whether your initial is on them, does it?
A. Then again there would be a day where I had time to read everything myself.
A. It was very certain that whenever I read a document I initialled it. I did that on principle and I can rely on that fact for certain. Every referant had the duty to point it out to me in case I should forget it.
Q. But the mere fact that your initial doesn't appear on one of these reports doesn't mean that you were not fully apprized of what that particular report contained at the time.
A. Well, it might be possible that reports were submitted to me which are not initialled but the final copy was not initialled. It is possible that I just initialled the drafts and maybe at the time it was amended to the first document.
Q. You mean-- I beg your pardon.
A. You see, what you see here, after all, does not include everything I saw. I saw much more, many more things, which you don't know about and about which you couldn't know -- daily reports, et cetera. Many daily reports are missing.
Q. But you think it is possible that among these documents t there is a final draft included whereas you saw and initialled only the preliminary draft?
A. All that is, well possible. It is possible that I only saw a preliminary draft which I initialled and then was later asked by the Chief of Staff whether measures could be carried out in accordance with that draft. It is also possible that I saw the final copy, possibly at one time also a report which was in a telegram style with the two usual lines on it. That is also possible.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Then, according to what you say, there are really two possibilities, when one reads a Daily Report here and doesn't use your initials on it: First, you may not have read the document at all, but you may have been told about it by your Chief of Staff; and secondly, you may have actually read the preliminary draft and initialled that, but the documents submitted here are the final drafts on which your initial doesn't appear.
A That could have happened differently. It's quite possible that it was the way you stated it; but I can only repeat that whatever I saw I initialled on principle.
Q But it doesn't prove very much then, simply to look at one of these documents here and see that it has not your initial on it. That doesn't necessarily prove either that you didn't know about it, or that you didn't read it.
A It proved that I did not see that particular document--the document involved.
Q You mean that you didn't see that particular draft of that particular document.
A That I did not see that particular document; that is what it proves.
Q I see. Now, let us go back to these absences of yours from Corps Headquarters. Who acted for you in your absence?
A During my absence the ranking divisional commander deputized for me, and that was Major General Brauner.
Q He was the ranking divisional commander in the Corps?
A Yes, indeed.
Q Now, Colonel Steinbeck was your Chief of Staff, wasn't he?
A Yes, he was.
Q Well, now, in your absence--say you were gone for a week-what were the respective parts which Colonel Steinbeck and Major General Brauner played? I don't under the relationship between what the Chief of Staff did in your absence and what the senior divisional commander Court No. V, Case No.VII.
did. In the first place--excuse me--before you answer that question, the divisional headquarters, I assume, of General Brauner's Division, would usually be in a different place from the Corps Headquarters would it not?
A The Corps Headquarters was located in Vukovar, as I have mentioned before.
Q Well, you said it moved two or three times.
A (POINTING TO THE WALL MAP): The divisional headquarters of Major General Brauner was up here in Brod, 75 Km. distant.
Q But you said -- Pardon me; go right ahead.
A General Brauner deputized for me. That is, he was responsible when I was absent for a longer period, that is to say, on leave. When I was absent for only a shorter period, visiting the troops, then the Chief of Staff would deputize for me in current matters.
Q Well, in other words, whether Colonel Steinbeck was your deputy or whether General Brauner was your deputy depended on the length of your leave. Is that it?
A Yes, when I was away for a longer period of time, then it was regulated by an order from a higher agency. It was an Army order that during my period of leave I would be represented by the ranking officer in the Corps area, and that was Major General Brauner.
Q Well, was this arrangement whereby your Chief of Staff deputized for your during short absences, unique with the LXIXth Army Corps, or was that the general rule in the German Army?
A That was the usual way it was handled in the German Wehrmacht. It was a custom everywhere in the Army.
Q And it was also the custom that the senior officer in the entire outfit--where there happened to be an Army Corps or even an Army, or a division--would take over and deputize when the commander was gone for a longer time? That was also customary throughout the whole German Army?
A It was the customary way it was handled in the German Army.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Now, during these short absences of yours exactly what was the authority of Colonel Steinbeck? I'm assuming, now, taking your word for it, that it was only on the longer leaves that General Brauner came into the picture at all. I'm now assuming that you're going to be gone for only a week and that Colonel Steinbeck is going to take over for that time. What was his authority?
A He had the authority which is laid down precisely in the Manual of the General Staff. He deputized for me during the time of my absence in current matters, and if an urgent case occurred at some time or other, then he had to take over responsibility for this urgent case also; but that was an exception. He was authorized to deputize for me in current matters.
Q In other words, he could do two things: He could handle any routine matter of the Corps, or he could even make a more important independent decision in case of emergency?
A If it was urgent, yes--if a courier was there or something like that.
Q Well, suppose that you were gone for four or five days and an emergency arose, and Colonel Steinbeck made a decision which resulted in a rather disastrous outcome. Whom would the Army hold responsible for that--you or Colonel Steinbeck?
A While I was absent the Chief of Staff deputized for me in routine matters only. If a matter of importance occurred he would try to reach me over the telephone which, however, in most cases, was not possible because I was with the individual troops units, and there were no telephone connections there. But when I returned he would report to me orally about it.
Q In other words the Army held you responsible for what happened in the area of the LXIXth Corps, regardless of whether Colonel Steinbeck was deputizing for you or not? Is that correct?
A The Army, of course, would turn to me for anything--that is quite obvious.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q And -
A I beg your pardon. And if I had any inquiry to make, or if the Chief of Staff did not inform me correctly, then the Chief of Staff would be taken to account. As a matter of course the Army would have to rely on me.
Q When you say that the Chief was responsible--that is, you mean that you would see to it that the Chief was responsible.
A Well, it's possible that the Chief might forget to inform me. This could happen, couldn't it? And then I would again have to take somebody to account for that. I was responsible to the Army.
Q And that same thing was true if you were gone for a short leave, was it not? Did the Army hold you or General Brauner responsible for what happened in the area of the LXIXth Corps?
A What do you mean by "short leave?" If I went on leave, the ranking divisional commander always deputized for me. If I did go on leave the ranking divisional commander deputized for me, and this regulation was made public by an order by the Army for every leave; it applied to every leave.
Q I see. So that is the distinction. You actually had to be on leave before the senior divisional commander came into the picture, General?
A Yes, and that's what I meant saying "if I was on leave."
Q Yes. Now, suppose you were on leave and he had been deputizing for you--I'm speaking now of General Brauner--and some disaster occurred in the Corps area, would you or General Brauner be held accountable for it?
A I couldn't have been held responsible because I was not there. It would be my deputy, who had all the rights and duties of the Commander and who exercised them in that case.
Q Do you remember the order which Colonel Steinbeck issued in your absence, in which he made various statements, among others that the partisan nuisance was becoming greater, etc.? Do you know the order Court No. V, Case No. VII.
which I mean? In the last part of it he refers to hostage camps. I can show it to you. It's in Document Book XVI, Page 92 in the German--if you care to see it--Page 38 in the English.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it might be well to take up the discussion of this document after the noon recess. We'll take our noon recess at this time.
(The Tribunal recessed to resume at 1330).
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 19 December.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
ERNST DEHNER -- Resumed.
CROSS EXAMINATION -- Continued BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q. Do you still have that document, General?
A. Yes, I still have it. You mean the order of the 24th of December?
Q. Yes. Now, at that time I believe you said that you were on vacation in Germany?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Well, now, there is that order of the 24th, and then, another one just before it, which is also signed by Steinbeck.
A. Yes.
Q. And you were on leave when both of these orders were signed?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Well, according to what you said, then the deputy at that time was General Brauner?
A. General Brauner.
Q. Well, why is it that if Brauner was incharge Steinbeck seems to be signing these basic orders?
A. This is not a basic order in that sense. This order is based on the order issued on the 15th of September by the Army.
Q. You mean that this is simply supplementary to the so-called "50 to 1 Order"?
A. These are simply more detailed explanations. On the oasis of an inquiry coming from a different division.
Q. Well, I still don't quite understand why it is that if General Brauner was in charge at that time Colonel Steinbeck was the man who was signing these directives.
I just wish you'd explain that to me because it's not clear to me at all.
A. This being not a basic or er, but merely bases itself on the old order, Steinbeck was certainly entitled to issue this order. Even if the order had been a basic one, he still could have issued it, if he previously would have contacted General Brauner who might not have been available at the time.
Q. In other words, in issuing these directives Colonel Steinbeck was just exercising the discretion, which you would have had if you had been there, in carrying out this basic order of September 15th?
A. What I would have done had I been there I cannot tell you today, but Steinbeck in this case acted in accordance with orders.
Q. And when you got back did Colonel Steinbeck show you these directives?
A. I'm not sure about this today. One should assume that he informed me about events which had occurred during my leave.
Q. Well, it would have been rather unusual would it not for Colonel Steinbeck to have issued a directive such as this if he were not fairly sure beforehand that it was not contrary to your own basic policy?
A. In that case he would not have done it, I should think, nor did I have any reasons to raise objections to this order because all the order intends to achieve is that no innocent persons will be seized as hostages; it is a moral principle. And he has also the obvious endeavor to make it impossible for the SD to seize hostages. Steinbeck knew very well that this was entirely in accordance with my own policy.
Q. Now, you testified yesterday, I believe, General, that the policy of shooting hostages was at least effective. That is to say, that after it was carried out resistance dwindled and that the areas where the hostage executions had then became peaceful again.
A. I'm afraid I didn't quite follow you.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt for just a minute?
MR. FULKERSEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Your voice is rather resonant, -
MR. FULFERSEN: I'm sorry , Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: And amplified by the sound system -- it isn't grating, but it comes in with considerable force. I wonder if you could -
MR. FULKERSEN: Moderate -
THE PRESIDENT: Moderate it a little bit.
BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q. Did you understand the question, now?
A. What I said was that reprisal measures had their effect insofar as from time to time rest, calm, and order had been established, as the documents show.
Q. Well, when did this beneficial effect commence to manifest itself -- the beneficial effect on these hostage executions -- about what time?
A. One can see that from the War Diary it happened from case to case. It happened in waves. Sometimes there was peace and order, then there came another wave of sabotage acts and then calm and order reigned again. When these things happened, I could not tell you but you can find it in the documents.
Q. Well looking at the overall picture, not just one particular area or one particular incident, do you think that the execution of hostages had this same beneficial effect through the whole Corps area? Do you think that the result of it was that sabotage dwindled and lessened as a result of it? Of these executions?
A. Yes, that is what I said just now.
Q. Well now, look at this first order that Col. Steinbeck issued. It is Document NOKW-657. Do you have it there?
A. On page 90 of the German.
Q. That is right, 37 of the English. Now look at paragraph 2-A.
A. Two you mean?
Q Yes, 2-A. "Notwithstanding the discomforts which living in the forest no doubt entails, particularly during the winter months, the band nuisance increased steadily."
A. I ask you where this is? I haven't found it yet. Well, it is entirely possible from the overall situation but nevertheless in between there might have been periods of order. Let me offset this with the War Diary. It shows quite unequivocally which says that band activity has decreased. I can show you a number of passages. If you give me a moment, I can tell you where. In the War Diary on 18 September "Activity by the bands against the railroad remained on a negligible scale."
Q. Now, what particular area did that refer to, General? The passage you just-
A. Quite generally in the Corps area, the area of my Corps. On the 17th of September, it says "Activity by the bands has decreased the last 24 hours." This you can find on the 17th September.
On the other hand, on the 24th September, you find "increase in band, activity."
On 28 September, you find. "In the last 24 hours, activity by the bands was relatively small as it would appear that an operation has taken its effect."
And there are several more passages.
Q. Well, Col. Steinbeck, as your Chief of Staff, was familiar with those reports that you just alluded to, wasn't he?
A. I assume so, yes, but after all these are entries in the War Diary. Whether he knew them or not I of course couldn't swear to it, but I assume so.
Q. Then in spite of those entries for the month of September, he was still making the statement in December that the band nuisance increases steadily?
A. But there are later entries as well where it says that it decreased. This expression there where ho says "Band nuisance despite living in the forest during the winter increases steady," you must not take this expression too literally, because after all there are other things in the documents as well. He merely wants to stress his own opinion thereby. Therefore, one should not proceed arbitrarily but very deliberately. This merely shows how very careful and scrupulous he is.
Q. Now let's go back to this basic order of September 15. When did you say you first saw that?
A. What order do you mean--the army order?
Q. Yes.
A. On page 11 in Volume 14, I believe. I assume that my Chief of Staff reported to me about this after I returned from leave.
Q. And you testified on direct examination that it never occured to you that there could be anything illegal about an order which the army had issued. Is that correct?
A. Whether I said that in detail I don't know but what I did say was if I remember rightly that it never occurred to mo that an order coming from a higher or the highest agency could contain anything illegal.
That, I think, is what I said.
Q. Now, it didn't occur to you that this provision to the effect that you ought not to take prisoners might possibly constitute a departure from the recognized rules of warfare?
A. As I said, on direct examination, this provision which is quoted here was never applied at all in the area of the Corps.
Q. Well, but we are talking about your reactions to the order. You said it never occurred to you that there could be anything questionable about it. Now you are talking about something else. When you first saw this order or when you were first told that an order had been issued, according to which you were not to take prisoners, that didn't strike you as unusual from the standpoint of the rules of warfare?
A. What I thought at the time I cannot tell you today.
Q. Well, tell us, though, General. That is the thing. You said that you didn't see anything wrong with it.
A. Yes, speaking quite generally. If an order came from higher up, I thought at once that under no circumstances could it contain anything, against international law nor do I believe that it contains anything which is not in accordance with international law, if I may quote you a report which you probably know yourself from the daily reports where it says that bandits, for instance, dumped their arms or something, I forget what the passage said in detail--then raised their arms and suddenly got hold of their arms again and then shot, which surely was against international law and I assume that this passage in the army order was thinking of something like that. But as I said before, this provision was never applied at all in the area of the Corps.
Q. Well, what was your reaction to the provision that hostages were to be executed in a fixed ratio? Didn't it occur to you that that perhaps might be a violation of the rules and customs of war, either?
A. The ratio mentioned here leaves everything at one's discre-tion. It gives here as the rule and the way we looked at it was that the minimum measure was to suffice for us to achieve what we wanted to achieve, so that was left to us, in other words.
There is no definite order that so and so many must he seized as hostages. It says "as a rule."
Q. In other words, the way you interpreted the order, you were given some discretion as to how the execution of hostages should be carried out?
A. Yes, quite, nor was the order ever carried out in the sense it is put down here.
Q. Well, how much discretion did you think you were given?
A. If something occurred which we had to take a reprisal measure for, then there was in Croatia, above all, the Croatian authority holding executive power and they were responsible in the first place and it was they who as a rule carried out the reprisal measure. If in an exceptional case, a Divisional Commander acted on the basis of this order, then of course he had first of all to investigate the case scrupulously. Then he had to issue a warning and issue more warnings. Then he had to seize hostages and finally he had to inflict a reprisal measure if and when too much had happened and the partisans left no other possibility open to him.
Q. Now the way you are describing this order now, it sounds as though you interpreted it as a restriction on your power to execute hostages. That wasn't really your interpretation of it, was it?
A. There is no restriction there at all. I would like to point out that we were then committed in a sovereign state who was holding executive power. Now if the state does that itself, we could only be pleased because no soldier likes to do this work.
Q. Well, if this order was not mandatory, then did you interpret it as simply a suggestion?
A. What do you mean "suggestion?" "Suggestion" from whom?
Q. From the army?
A. The order by the army is so worded that it leaves a certain amount of latitude.
Q. That is what I am getting at. Now then, how much latitude?
A. It says "as a rule", so therefore you had to decide from case to case because each case is different from the other.
Q. Well suppose, for example, that you felt on principle that the execution of hostages was not only inhumane but useless, that it didn't accomplish its purpose, would you have felt that you were given enough latitude under this order so that you could ignore it entirely and not execute anybody?
A. Yes, this is my opinion.
Q. So that the fact that you, as Commander of the LXIX Corps, agreed fundamentally with this order is the reason that hostages were executed in your area, is that right?
A. I haven't understood the question.
(The question was repeated by the interpreter.)
A. I don't know why you should say that.
Q. You said the order gave you a certain amount of latitude?
A. Yes.
Q. And I asked you how much latitude and you said that it gave you enough so that if you didn't want to, you wouldn't have had to execute any hostages at all--at least that is what I thought you said.
A. Well it didn't depend on us. It depended entirely on the behavior of the population, how they behaved themselves.
If the population remained calm, the Commanding Officer has no reason to do anything, and for the rest it was always the Croatian authorities and police who did everything. After it was entirely up to the population. Had the population remained calm, nobody would have dreamed of doing anything. We would have only been too happy. That would have suited us very well.
Q. In other words, you had the discretion to execute hostages or not to execute hostages, and whether you decided to do it depended on how well satisfied you were with the behavior of the population?
A. It depended on the population. I might mention here that I had nothing to do with this business because if the necessity arose at all, the Divisional Commander concerned had the authority to do these things because he was the judicial authority. I myself had nothing to do with it. I would not issue the order to shoot hostages. That authority has been once and for all invested in the Divisional Commander by the highest headquarters.
Q. Well, who then had this latitude, this discretion you are talking about if you didn't have it? You are saying now that the Divisional Commanders had it but that you didn't?
A. This becomes quite clear from the order. The Divisional Commander is the responsible man, which is for the various reasons which I have given on direct examination. He is the judicial authority. He is geographically closer to the incident than I would be as a Commanding General who had no possibility of coming into close contact with these things. Sitting hero in Zagreb, for instance, how can I know what is going on 150 kilometers up there, which is one of the reasons why it is monstrous to say that I would have been in a position to overlook the matters or to carry these things out.
The order makes it quite clear that the responsibility rests with the Divisional Commander.
Q. Now you testified that you spent a good deal of time traveling around in the area of your command to visit the various divisions.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever discuss this matter of hostages with the Divisional Commanders?
A. As a rule, there was no cause to do so because, as I have said time and again, this work or these problems of the hostages were dealt with by the Croatian authorities who held executive power. That was the rule; it might have occurred in individual cases that the Divisional Commanders did it. In fact, that they used their right which was given them in the army order. Of course, I discussed these things with the Divisional Commanders but what I discussed I can't say in detail.
Q. Now you testified on direct examination that from a number of these daily reports from certain divisions, it is not clear whether the execution of hostages was carried out by the division itself or by the Croatians. Didn't you ever interest yourself in that? Didn't you ever make any inquiries of the Divisional Commanders when you got these ambiguous messages about people being executed?
A. I don't think the reports were ambiguous at the time. I am quite sure that my Chief of Staff would make inquiries of each case and report to me in every detail; it is only ambiguous now because it is laid down hero in telegraphic style. Four years have elapsed and all particulars arc lacking. The many reports which are missing make everything so difficult now. In the old days, it was entirely clear. My Chief of Staff never came to see me without knowing very well what had happened and so on.
Q. Now you of course knew perfectly well that there were executions of hostages going on in the Corps area?
A. Yes. As a rule carried out and executed by the Croat Agencies, as the reports clearly show.
Q. Well, you have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the part that the Croatians played in executing these hostages "but let's look at this order of General Rondulic's for a moment. This same order of the 15th of September. Look at paragraph numbered five which deals with hostage executions and then please read the next to the last sentence in that paragraph, that starts our "In no case." or-
A. There are only two sentences there. You mean the last but one sentence?
Q. That is right, just a moment please.
A "Surprise attacks on members of the Wehrmacht"--do you mean that one?
Q. No, just a second. It is on page 13 of the German. It begins "Keinesfalls."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the English page, please?
MR. FULKERSON: Page 15 of the English.
BY MR. FULKERSON:
A "In no case must it be allowed that German soldiers be endangered by delaying action on the part of the Croats."
Q. What does that mean?
A. No disadvantage must arise from the fact that perhaps reprisal measures were not taken in good time. I don't know any more. In urgent cases, a responsible officer can act on his own.
Q. Well, that is without consulting the Croatians?
A. In urgent cases, -- well as I said--that in individual cases the Divisional Commander is responsible and has the authority but an order was available, in fact several orders, whereby the Divisional Commander concerned had to act always by closest arrangement with the Croat authorities, closest arrangements. I know of no case which would come under the category which you just pointed out to me.
Q. What was the procedure for executing these hostages? Was it done by the army? I am speaking now of the cases in which the army ordered the execution?
A. No.
Q. Now if the army actually ordered the execution of hostages, I mean if some unit of your Corps did, who actually carried them out?
A. That case is not debatable because it never happened. The army never ordered-
Q. I meant - I said some unit of your Corps. If one of the divisions in your Corps area ordered the execution of hostages, then who actually carried it out?
A. It was always the Croat authorities. That is contained in the army order even.
Q. Where were these hostages obtained? Did the divisions already have the hostages on hand or did they go out and round up some?
A. As far as I know, there were small hostage camps available at first. Under the 187th I believe--but very soon they were turned over to the Croat authorities and the hostages were either looked after by the Croatian authorities or by the police as far as I know.
Q. Who rounded them up in the first place?
Q. Who rounded them up in the first place?
A. What happened was usually this. Following an operation prisoners would cone in and those prisoners after having been screened were turned over to the Croatian authorities end in that short period of time when they were being screened, they remained with the troops. If they were found not guilty, if it was found that they did not belong to the bands, they were released, but if it could be proved they had belonged to the bands, they were turned over to the Croatian authorities. This is the purpose of the order issued by the chief of staff. It was the Corps endeavor to avoid under any circumstances that innocent people would be seized as hostages at any tine. It was there that my very conscientious chief of staff directed his principle efforts with my approval.
Q. And it was for that reason that you used these elements of the SD from time to time to do this screening?
A. I believe, Mr. Fulkerson, you will see from the orders which proceed this that we made every effort not to be connected with the SD and that we did not want anybody to fall into the hands of the SD. This becomes clear from the order which we discussed before, dated December. I think it makes it unequivocally clear, I believe it is 1694 where it says on page 92: "If members of the bands are being apprehended in the course of this operation and if the troops do not have sufficient trained personnel to screen the suspects, there is nothing to be objected to in calling the SD." And now comes the decisive thing, Civilians are to remain prisoners of the Wehrmacht, however pending the results of the investigation are to be treated as civilians." It then says specifically: "Those who are arrested for being hostages must not be handed over to the SD."
Q. But, the SD actually did the screening for you?
A. No, they did not. If many prisoners came in we were always short of people who were sufficiently trained as interrogators. The SD of course was well trained and equipped for that purpose and the SD was asked by us to help us out, but the commanding officer concerned had always to watch so that the SD would not keep anyone.