If Goebbels would have made a rador speech suddenly I would have grave doubt that the Allies would have reacted to it.
Q. Look at page 171 in the German Document Book 24, page 232 in the English, - this is still part of General Speidel's report. You will note under "Estimate of the situation", he says that the, "central direction of these operations rests in the hands of the English Officers who were with the bands and who certainly are also temporarily with the direction of the EAM in Athens". This coordinated leadership leads one to expect coordinated measures in the event of an enemy landing either in the Pelopennesus or on the West Coast of Central Greece."
You further knew about large Allied Military missions with the bands, did you not, missions numbering 1 to 3 and 4 hundred men.
A. I do not know that, I only know from one report, which deals with the Pelopennesus that about 5 British officers and a certain number of Greek officers and 21 Italian Communist officers were with the bands. I know that later on British, and after that American officers, were with the bands, but from that stipulation, as far as I am concerned, I do not recognize them; in addition they would have the possibility through their diplomatic channels to inform the German government officially, that such a unit in Greece was increased, many of what we called bands, were now a part of the British army.
I believe that something similar was done by General Eisenhower with the Maquis in France, where an official step was undertaken in order to make us recognize the Maquis as being a belligerent unit under International law. This is only hearsay because I was not in France. A step of that sort was not made by us in Greece; otherwise I would have learned about it. A step of that type such as was made by General Eisenhower, would have been entitled to official recognition. Where we had every justification because it was an official measure through official diplomatic channels, and we received official knowledge of it; here we had nothing but vague pronouncements over the wireless.
Q. You never knew that Great Britain or the Greeks claimed belligerent status other than these radio announcements to which you referred?
A. Yes, and I knew that there was a Green Government in existence for a time in Cairo. When things became a little hot there they either went to South Africa or went into exile; the king went into exile in London and Papandreo, the Prime Minister, resided in Cairo, we heard quite a lot about this.
Q. You talked, in direct examination also General, about the terrible treatment the bands meted out to the captured German soldiers. Would you look at Document Book No. 20, at pages 40 and 41 in the German and page 54 in the English? These are enclosures to the War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division.
A. Yes.
Q. And it states under the entry for the 2 October 1943, about missing German soldiers and that 12 hostages would be seized and hanged unless they were turned over to German authorities. The entry on the 3rd of October makes it clear that the German soldiers were only detained by the partisans and they were not killed at all.
A. Yes.
Q. Is this an exceptional circumstance in your opinion?
A. First of all it is an entry in a War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division which I did not see at the time. Secondly, it is an exception because the majority of the reports which were received, were worded very differently, and on many occasions, we found mutilated -we found corpses of people who had been killed or - no - and mutilated when we searched the fighting area.
Q. General, will you point out a single instance of maltreatment on the part of the partisans of German soldiers in any portion of your own 68th Corps War Diary from January to June, 1944, which is completely translated in your Document Book IV?
A. I have not read the Diary from that point of view. I know beyond any doubt the case of Inoi of the Luftwaffe field companies, Kalavrita, and then from some affidavits, or perhaps there are letters - no, they are affidavits which will be submitted later; from newspaper reports, with pictures, which we received rather late from Athens, which therefore have not yet been submitted here; they are from Greek newspapers under the German occupation, which on every third or fourth page showed such mutilations, carried with pictorial evidence.
Q General, if the German soldiers had mutilated the Partisans would that be noted in the German war diaries and in the German reports?
A A German does not do a thing like that. I don't think a case like that occurred. That is a typical Balkan affair. Only the other day the British papers got highly indignant that pictures were published about the period of time about which I am not supposed to talk, and they looked somewhat Balkanese.
Q You said, General Felmy, that the bands wore no uniform insignia. Didn't they usually wear a Soviet star, at least a Soviet star, perhaps full uniform most of the time?
A Uniforms and insignia were the exceptions. From the documents here I saw a report also by the first Panzer division, war diaries of the first Panzer division which at that time were not accessible to me. I found it only here and on direct examination I made statements about that. It said there that Partisans, led by an officer, wear uniforms and are part of Elas, and when my defense counsel asked me a question I said that this was an exception because you don't report as a rule that a member of the enemy's army wears a uniform because that you should take for granted.
Q Was a Soviet star generally worn or was that an exception too?
A I am not able to tell you. I personally never saw the white in the eyes of a single partisan in combat. The only operation at the beginning of June, I believe, 1944, in Southern Argolis in which I participated, the bands took evasive action and I was not actually personally introduced to them. I can say nothing from my own experience. In frequent cases they are supposed to have worn the Greek cockade and up in the Peloponnesus I think some turned up who wore an "X" which is a Greek national unit.
Q Would you accept the statement of the Ic Kleykamp as true when he says in your document book 2, at page 34, that the Soviet star was generally worn?
A Yes, that may be correct. I do not wish to deny it.
Q You also spoke, General Felmy, about the effectiveness of the military occupation of Greece, particularly with reference to your own corps area.
I would like you to look now at document book 20, at page 45 in the German and page 61 in the English. Note in this report it states that, "Except for coastal areas which were occupied by German Forces, the whole Northwestern Peloponnesus is entirely dominated by Communist bands." It goes on to list the supreme command of the insurgents.
A I believe you should read a little more precisely -- "the Northwestern part of the Peloponnes", it reads. It does not mean the whole of the Peloponnes.
Q What does it mean by saying "entirely dominated by Communist bands"?
A That at that time the bands there were ruling, at that time.
Q In other words, you didn't dominate that particular area?
A Not at that particular moment. That does not mean that we would not have dominated it had we wished to do so, because there are always these ups and downs.
Q Look at your document book number 5 at page 64.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Before we go into that I believe we will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
Q. (By Mr. Fenstermacher) General Felmy, just before the recess we were discussing the question of the effectiveness of the German occupation of Greece. Would you look at your document book number 5 at page 64? This is from your own Corps War Diary, the entry for 1730, teletype letter to High Command Southeast. The entry states there that, "The band situation on the Peloponnes is so critical that merely a few constantly occupied coastal sections, including ports and towns located in these sections, as well as the cities of Tripolis and Sparta and their immediate surroundings, are still under the control of the troops." I take it the rest of the territory was under the control of the Partisans; is that correct?
A. That is undoubtedly correct regarding the situation at the time, otherwise we would not have reported it, but when the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone the picture changed completely. After all I don't have to be everywhere in every spot with my troops to effect an occupation. I only have to be in a position to reach every spot I want to reach, and I have to have the forces for this purpose.
Q. The entry goes on to state that there is, in effect, a state of war actually prevailing on the Peloponnes. Do you agree with that?
A. That is why the combat zone was established. Well, whether this expression was used in the meaning of international law or as provided in some clause, in some regulation, I cannot possibly say because this entry was made at the time without consulting any legal expert, namely, the entry that there was a state of war in existence. It says so under the 17th of May. That is why the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone in order to finish this existing state of affairs.
Q. Do you maintain, General, that even though there are references in your war diaries to regiments and battalions and divisions of the Partisans, even though they numbered about 40,000, they did not wear any uniforms or insignia?
A. Just a moment. Where does it say anything about regiments and companies? Before there was once mentioned an attack in company strength. Now you interpret it as though we recognized that an enemy company attacked. That is a onesided point of view. I said there were as many men as would establish a company -- a hundred or a hundred fifty. Furthermore, the number of the bands, the Elas bands, I established for the whole of Greece, not just applying to the Peloponnes because there were never that many on the Peloponnes. I realized and recognized that the bands took the numbers of the old Greek regiments without thus representing a regiment.
Q. Isn't it true, General, that you took these reprisal measures in order to make up for a shortage of troops? You couldn't defeat the bands in regular military combat so you resorted to reprisal measures; is that correct?
A. No, that has no factual connection.
Q. You didn't have enough troops in your Corps Area, did you?
A. If you ask a soldier he will never have enough troops. That's an old story and something that applies to all troops everywhere because, after all, one does not know what one is supposed to do at a certain point and what requirements one has to fill, and I would rather say I have too little than too much. I said on direct I did not have enough troops to encircle the bands on the Peloponnes, That's what I said. I could not eliminate them in one go.
Q. Look at your document book 2 again, General Felmy, on page 35. This again is an affidavit of your own Ic Kleykamp, and he says in paragraph 2: "The few German units which were available did not suffice to effectively control the extensive area. This especially applied to the Peloponnes.
As a result of this large areas in the interior of the country were stripped of German troops and entirely in the hands of the Elas."
A. It is not necessary that to control the occupied area at all times. These statements I took from your own excerpts which you were kind enough to give us. It says there approximately it would be unjustified to demand that the occupation forces use more forces than their own government used as police force in peacetime in order to establish its authority, and compared with the police forces used by the Greeks in peacetime we had in any case as much as that, even more.
Q. Look at your document book 5, at page 16. This is a situation report of the Military Commander Greece for the 16th of February, 1944, and he says under "Summarizing Judgment and Plans: The weakness of our own forces makes increased formation of native units necessary in order to use them for combating Partisans." Isn't it quite clear that you didn't have enough troops to control the area which you were assigned to control, General?
A. No, that's not correct. If the Military Commander suggests here to use more indigenous units and if the Corps Headquarters say that the own troops are too weak, that only means that it is simpler for me to have a small mesh net spread over the occupied area, if I have many troops, and that the small mesh net of occupation makes it easier for me to occupy the country than would a loose mesh net of occupation.
Q. Isn't it true, General, that reprisal measures are militarily unwise; that they, in fact, increase the opposition when they are applied, or didn't you oppose them for that precise reason?
A. Mr. Fenstermacher, reprisal measures seen from a purely humane point of view are always an unpleasant matter. However, in view of the conflict which we, all of us, faced at that time, we could not do anything but this as the population forced us to it, namely, to take reprisal measures as a deterring factor in order to deter the bands at last from their methods of fighting which were in contradiction to international law and to protect out own troops for whom I was responsible.
It is never a pleasant business. I can assure you that it isn't, but unfortunately it was necessary. We are not proud that we had to do it.
Q. Look at your document book 3, on page 34. One of your affiants states there that you, General Felmy, "always made difficulties concerning reprisals because it would only cost more lives of German soldiers."
A. I made difficulties, or rather, I tried to teach my people that this ratio established by the OKW of fifty or one hundred seemed too high to me personally, that it was too general a measure and did not take into consideration the individual case, so that some soldiers even had the impression that I protected the Greeks more than my own troops. I wrapped the Greeks in cotton wool, as one affiant said in an affidavit here. I demanded that the bullets had to whistle around their heads before something was finally done. You see what an effect that can have on the troops.
Q. Look again at the affidavit of your Ic Kleykamp on page 38 of your Document Book II. It states there about six lines from the bottom "Reprisal measures which were wrongly applied could have the opposite effect and drive the sensible part of the population to the partisans."
Do you believe that reprisal measures within your Corps area were wrongly applied or properly applied?
A. Just a moment please, what page? Yes, thank you, I have got it. What passage again, please?
Q. The passage stating, in effect, that reprisal measures, if improperly applied, will have an opposite effect and drive the sensible part of the population into the hands of the partisans?
A. Yes, thank you, I have got it.
Q. Did the reprisal measures which were executed in your Corps area have that effect?
A. The wrong reprisal measure in my case was only applied in the Kalavrita incident, wrong because it was done too hastily. Other than that, I don't know that we took any reprisal measures which could be called wrong. The tactics of the bands, as we found out after some time, were aimed at making us take wrong reprisal measures. Fortunately, we weren't taken in by these methods. I would like to give an example and tell you what we actually experienced at one time. Towards the end of July, a Corps supply column was attacked on the Pylos-Kyparessia road; that is in the Western area of the Peloponnes in the area Gargaliani. I will show it to you on the map.
Q. I don't think it will be necessary for you to go into that, General. We will accept your opinion that in your Corps area you believed that reprisal measures were properly applied. Now a few questions regarding the deportation of persons within your Corps to Germany for forced labor. How many persons do you believe were sent to Germany from your area for forced labor?
A. I can't tell you that. I saw from the files that at one time 3,000 were supposed to be transported but in no document it is said that this transport actually took place and was carried out.
Furthermore, at some point, it is mentioned that the 68th Corps--this is mentioned in a report of the Military Commander--ordered that band suspects or band prisoners were to be deported. The third incident which I remember is a teletype or a telephone call from the Army Group where it is said that a train with 1,000 band suspects leaves for the Reich, and this message came to the Corps because the Railroad Security Regiment was subordinated to the Corps and this regiment was to be committed in connection with this band transport.
Q. Did you issue the orders to subordinate units within your Corpus to send persons to Germany for forced labor?
A. I never had that idea; those were orders from the OKW which I passed on when they arrived at my office.
Q. One further question on the Klissura incident. Will you turn to Document Book 21, at page 9 of the English and page 6 of the German? You stated that in April, on the 5th of April, when the Klissura incident occurred you were deputizing for General Loehr as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E.
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. You said further that you didn't know anything about the Klissura incident. You will note here that in this communication from Neubacher to Weichs he points out that according to reports submitted to him on the 5th of April, 215 inhabitants of Klissura were killed and 27 people wounded. How does it happen that Neubacher got information about this event and you did not, although you were the acting Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E and the unit involved here was subordinate to you at that time?
A. Envoy Neubacher received from the German Consul in Saloniki who was under him a report because he, in turn, had learned from Greeks about the incident, whereas the Army Group or, first of all, the Commander Saloniki Agean received a military report from the SS Regiment and that was all. That this report was just as wrong as the later Distomon report was only found out long afterwards. I don't know, I would have to check up whether the report as it was actually received by the SS Regiment and sent to the Military Commander Salonika Agean - whether this is actually contained in the files here.
This is how the report, as a pure combat report, was sent through channels. The objections which Neubacher made through his own channels. The objections which Neubacher made through his own channels and received through his own channels, as can be seen from the communication, only became known in May. They were then examined and the report about the investigation is also contained here.
Q. The reports came from Neubacher on the 5th of April that nothing came to you regarding the atrocity--is that your statement?
A. Yes. Mr. Fenstermacher, that should be clear from the documents, and if before that a communication similar to the one that Neubacher received had gone to the Army Group, that should be in the documents.
Q. You stated on direct examination, General Felmy, that you did not execute any Kommandos within your Corps area.
A. What do you mean Kommandos?
Q. I mean by that members of British Kommando or sabotage units. You are familiar with the Kommando Order?
A. Yes, I know the Kommando Order. Members of British sabotage troop which would come under the Kommando Orders were, to the best of my knowledge, not executed within the area of the 68th Corps.
Q. You received orders to execute them after captured for interrogation, though, had you not?
A. The order contained the directive to deliver them to the SD, the Kommando order which I doubt that I received personally because when it was issued in October 1942, I was in Southern Russia, and in the East there was no such things as British Kommando troops. However, I knew of the order. One always learns of such things. For instance, the 1st Panzer Division which was subordinate to me had been in the West and on some occasion probably I was told about it. It is also possible that I received it at a later time. At least, the contents of the Kommando Order were that members of sabotage troops were to be killed in combat or to be handed over to the SD.
Q. You think that it was possible that you might have received Kommando directives after the original Kommando Order of 18 October 1942?
That is to say, you might have received Kommando regulations or directives sometime between May 1943 and October 1944?
A. I don't feel inclined to think so but I cannot state this under oath because I knew of the contents of the Kommando Order but I did not know whether I had received it through some channel or whether I knew it from hearsay.
Q. Do you know if you had received it, whether you would have passed it on to your subordinate units?
A. I can't tell you that. That again is a hypothetical question.
Q. Well, suppose you take a look at this document then, NOKW-923? This is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 629, Your Honors. Would you turn, General, to page 7 of the original document which you have in your hand, page 3 of your Honors' document, to the entry apparently under the 15th of March, 1944, 1830 hours?
Activity of Commando will be sent by teletype ordered to General Commando LXVIII Army Corps, Corps Group Joannina, Commander SalonikaAgean, Commander of the Fortress Crete, Shock Division Rhodos, for information to the Admiral Agean.
The Commander in Chief Southeast, has pointed out that due to the revived activity of the Commandos in the Dodecanes, it is important to capture members of Commando Troops, in order to obtain information about points of departure and further intentions of the enemy. As an expansion to all the islands of the Aegean and also to the Ionian islands and Corfu is to be expected all occupation groups of the islands are to be notified to take the necessary "measures. For the treatment of the prisoners after interrogation the Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42 is valid."
It is quite likely that you received such an order as is mentioned here in the entry, isn't that so, General?
A. Where is a reference here which refers to the Kommando Order? Where is this reference? What was it? Was it a teletype order or was it an order transmitted by telephone?
I would like to see it. I would like to see a document where it says "68th Corps addressed to 117th Division, 11th Air Force Division etc..." where all these things are stated.
Q. I would like to be able to show you one, General. The only reference we have been able to find is this reference in the War Diary to a teletype having been ordered to your Corps, and I am wondering whether or not you ever received it.
A. It doesn't say that I received it in writing. Yes, it says here "by teletype." I see. It mentions a teletype addressed to us. That is what is referred to and it means the Kommando Order.
Q. You don't remember having received this particular teletype to which reference is made?
A. No, as I said before I knew of the order. I cannot state under oath whether I received it in the original, so to speak, and quite some time has passed since. It is three years after it was issued because we are now discussing March 1944 and it was issued in October 1943. It is really impossible that one remembers all those similar sounding orders, that one remembers every individual one. In addition, the documents submitted here constitute only a small part of the actual correspondence which we had at the time. I did not deny that I knew of the order and that I knew its contents. I only said I couldn't state under oath whether I actually received it, and I said that I knew about the order as is stated here in the teletype.
Q. The Kommando Order was a very unique order, was it not, General? It provided for the execution of prisoners of war after their capture. You would have remembers it if you had received it, wouldn't you?
A. Could you say this sentence again please?
(The interpreter repeated the question).
A. It was one of the orders which was discussed by this - I mean it did cause a certain excitement. It was interpreted in different ways. Those people who had ever experienced a Kommando operation thought it was quite right because it represented a reprisal measure against the cunning and mean methods which were used by the Kommando members. For instance, they put the German soldiers in shackles so that they suffocated as soon as they raised their heads a little, and they had other pleasant methods.
Often, the members of such Kommando groups were criminals of the first water who knew all about such measures. Therefore, as I said, those members of the troops who had ever come into contact with a Kommando operation thought that the measure was quite correct.
Q Would you please repeat that, General. Did you consider the Kommando Order an unlawful order?
A No, I consider it a reprisal order directed against the unlawfulness of the opponent who also used civilian clothes on the occasion of such operations, whereas usually in wartime uniform is worn. At least, that is what my training has taught me. If I wear civilian clothes in wartime, I have something special up my sleeves, or if I wear a uniform which I am not entitled to wear, or if I do anything that deviates from the regular usages of war.
Q And if you did not consider the Kommando Order unlawful, you would have had no hesitation in passing it on to your subordinate units?
A No, I would not have hesitated.
Q Now the military mission order. The right to the execution of the Allied military missions operating with the band on captures. Would you consider that an unlawful order?
A Members of military missions were to be treated according to this order. That is what it stated, I believe.
Q Did you pass that order on to your subordinate units?
A To the best of my recollection, the order was not to be passed on. It was to remain with the Corps headquarters. The reason for this probably was that the Corps headquarters had the necessary interpreters to interrogate members of military missions etc. There might have been other reasons. I don't know. At least, this order was not to be passed on to the troops.
Q Did you consider it an unlawful order?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, we really didn't think too much about that at the time, nor did we discuss it very much. That is just one of the many orders which we received. We had no cause offhand to think that orders which came from our highest agencies might be unlawful.
Q I am afraid you haven't answered my question, General. Did you consider or do you consider it now an unlawful order?
A I would have to see it again to answer this. I don't know whether you intend anything special with this question.
Q Will you turn to Document Book 21 at page 57 of the German and page 70 of the English.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me inquire, Mr. Fenstermacher, do you feel that this defendant's statement as to what he now thinks about an order is an indication of any guilt as to what may have happened three, four or five years ago?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: No. If Your Honor please, I think my amendment to my original question was a little ill-advised. I do mean now to confine it only to the time when he admits that he received the order. I want to know at that time whether he considered it an unlawful order.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that as of that time it might be material, but as to what he now thinks he shouldn't be held bound by his present opinion for something that happened three or four years ago. I am only speaking for myself, please understand that.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I agree. Your Honor, and I want now to limit the question only to whether or not he considered it unlawful at the time he received it. That is somewhere on or about the 27th of July, 1944.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q If you will look, General Felmy, at page 60 of the German and page 72 of the English where it states that the Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo- American and Soviet Russian so-called military missions are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a Kommando operation and not as prisoners of war, would you give me your opinion as to the legality of that order limiting yourself to your opinion at the time you received it?
A What it says here on page 60 is no order. It is a file note issued probably by General Warlimont and directed to various agencies.
There are comments by the OKW departments for PW's by the C.i.C. Southeast....
Q Let me interrupt you, General. Will you turn to page 63 of the German then, 74 of the English. Do you consider that an order?
A That is a draft. It says "Draft of an order." The order itself is not contained there but we are concerned with the contents, aren't we?
Q On the next page, page 65 of the German and page 75 of the English, is another draft. Is there any doubt that the draft on your page 65, English page 75, is the correct text of the order as it was finally sent out?
A I can't compare it as quickly as all that. I would have to read every word and compare it.
Q The first sentence is to the effect that members of the military missions are to be treated in accordance with the Fuehrer's Order of 18 October 1942 which relates to captured sabotage or Kommando troops.
A Well, it is a draft. Whether it was issued in this same form I cannot say for certain. If it had been issued in this form, whether I would have considered it lawful or unlawful - to that question I can only say I would not have considered it unlawful because an order coming from the OKW and signed by Keitel by order of the Fuehrer I could not assume to be unlawful, since I was a soldier at the front or that it should be even criminal as you said at some other time.
Q You had a court at your Corps headquarters, did you not?
A Yes, I was in the exceptional position to have a legal councillor. The other Corps did not have any. I had a special reason to have them because we had a special assignment.
Q Did you ever ask him about the legality of the orders which you received from OKW?
A Mr. Fenstermacher, such an idea didn't even enter my mind, to put it quite frankly. The idea to doubt any such order simply didn't enter my mind.
Q Did you ever consider paragraph 47 of the German Military Penal Code in that regard?
A No, not either. Of course, I know Article 47 but to connect it up with such orders - in my opinion, I didn't see any cause to do this. An order received from my supreme agency or even from the Head of State and signed by him could not possibly mean a crime. That was an idea which was quite impossible for us at that time.
Q General, who was responsible for the security of Athens during the time you were Commander of the 68th Corps? That is, from May 1943 until October 1944?
A When I was on the Peloponnesus, I did not interest myself in these questions at all. Later, I tried to have these problems cleared up but I didn't quite succeed in doing this. There was a Higher SS and Police Leader who had police troops under him and who, according to German pattern, served in Athens. That is, he represented something like the police president of Athens and last was responsible for law and order in the town. Then there was a Military Commander for the whole of Greece. How far his spheres of duty overlapped with Athens I don't happen to know because I don't know the service regulations in detail. I breathed a sigh of relief when all these intermediary agencies left Athens towards the end of September and I became the only ruler in Athens but this was only as of the 20th of September.
Q When were your Corps headquarters permanently stationed in Athens? During what period?
A. Approximately the first week of October, 1943. Somewhere between the sixth and tenth of October, the Army Group Southern Greece was dissolved and I again took over the 64th Corps which was transferred to Athens or to put it more correctly to Psychikon, a suburb of Athens.
That was in the first week of October, 1943.
Q Now suppose there were sabotage acts committed in the City of Athens during the period, the middle of October 1943 until October 1944, when your headquarters were in Athens? Who would order the reprisal measures?