to the 11th Italian Army near Athens and this Italian army was in turn subordinate to the army group in Salonika. The corps headquarters had the order to prevent enemy landings from the sea or from the air on the Pelopenes. The corps staff therefore went to Vidina, that is about a one hours car ride north of Tripolis.
Q In this connection, I want to submit from Felmy document book No. V, document No. 90 on page 6 of that document book. This will be offered under exhibit No. 22. This is a regulation for conduct issued by the Military Commander for Southern Greece on 11 May 1942 in the event of an anticipated enemy landing, I don't want to read the whole of this document, but only the very first part of it:
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"A recent attempt to land, which failed, was made immediately after an air raid by a large number of airplanes under the protection of navy units. On that occasion the enemy had disguised his ships as German vessels, giving German countersigns which were in force at that time, and running with position lights. Only because of the construction of the boats the enemy was recognized in time. Similar attempts, even on a larger scale, must be expected."
This incident was apparently the immediate cause for the issuing of these directives.
This brings me to document book No. 12 of the prosecution. First of all, I would like to discuss document NOKW 1079, which became Exhibit 292 on page 37 of the English text and page 32 of the German text. This document contains an order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated 14 July 1943, concerning security and reprisal measures against the hostile population in the event of an enemy landing. I would like to ask you, General, whether this order ever reached you at the time and if so was it ever practically applied?
A The order reached the Corps headquarters, but actually applied it was at no time because no enemy landings took place on the Peloponnes, which would have formed the pre-requisite for the execution of this order, because it says in the first sentence of the order, "In the event of enemy landings", and so on. The measures provided in the order, as is customary, were prepared, but they never were actually applied.
Q That brings me to two more documents in this document book with which you are also charged. There are two organizational provisions concerning the southeastern area. The first one of these documents is NOKW 1523, Exhibit 297 on page 75 of the English text, which is page 66 of the German document book. This is a Fuehrer directive dated 26 July 1943. It is directive No. 48 for the Command and Defense of the Southeastern Area. In this order, among others, the LXVIII Corps is put in command of all German and Italian units on the Peloponnes, General, do you see an incrimination in the transfer of this command to your Corps?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A No, I would not know where this incrimination could be found. It was a very natural tactical measure that the German and Italian troops on the Peloponnes should be under one common head agency, one common command post. In that particular case it happened to be the LXVIII corps, which as I have mentioned just before was in turn subordinate to the Italian 11 Army, then the Italian army should also be incriminated with this document if the Corps is incriminated with it.
Q The second document of this type is the last document in that document book XII, NOKW 1437, exhibit 310, on page 160 in the English text which is page 134 in the German text. This is an order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated 15 August, 1943. This order concerns also a regulation of the command authority in the southeast; do you in this document see an incrimination of your person, General?
A That document contains, as you said just now, a new regulation of the command authority in the Southeast and this regulation is to apply to the higher agencies. The LXVIII is not even mentioned in this document.
Q In this connection, I would like to discuss a document contained in document book 14, because according to its content it belongs in this context. This is NOKW-1010, Exhibit 351 on page 89 of the English text, which is page 65 of the German text.
JUDGE CARTER: The exhibit number of that please?
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q 351, Your Honor, 351. This is a provision regarding organiza tion, issued by the Commander in Chief Southeast dated 30 October 1943. The order again deals with the channel of command in the Southeastern area; do you have anything to say regarding this particular provision, General?
A Here again the LXVIII Corps is not even mentioned in one word. I cannot see what forms the basis for the incrimination.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Since we are just talking about organizational facts, I would like to read in this connection from document No. 99 in document book Felmy V, this is on page 37 of document book V for Felmy. The document will be offered under exhibit No. 23. It is an order regarding the organization in wartime of the 117th Light Infantry division. I would like to ask you, General, to describe this organization in its main parts and to tell us from this the information of a division and the relation of a division to a corps?
JUDGE CARTER: Will you give us the page number again, please?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: Page 37 in document book 5.
JUDGE CARTER: Thank you.
A I don't want to discuss the individual tactical symbols, but this description shows that the 117th Light Infantry Division consisted of two Light Infantry Regiments, the 137th and 149th.
Q Will you give us the most important characteristics of a division, a regiment, a corps, etc., - only the most important ones?
AA triangle and the divisional standard, it is black and white and that is on the first line. Then follows two rectangular black signs, those are the signs for the regimental staff, the infantry regimental staff 737 and 749. Underneath there is a small triangular flag, which shows that every one of the infantry regiments contains three battalions. Under the next line, we have again a division into two parts, on the right, the reconnaissance battalion with the number 116. The anti-tank detachment 117 was equipped to fight tanks. Then under the next line is again the rectangular regimental flag and this is the symbol for the artillery regiment of the division. Here again we have the small triangular flag, similar to the one of the battalion of the infantry and we have here the detachment of the same ranks, that is the battalion of the artillery. The regiment has three battalions of different types of guns. Under a further line, there follows on the right the Engineer battalion of the division and the signal battalion of the division and furthermore the field replacement battalion of the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
division and as an annex the field reconnaissance company. Then one step further down underneath the next line, we find the so-called rear service, that is the supply columns, also the administrative group, the bakers detachment, butchers detachment, etc. In the very last column, in the horizontal column, we have the medical units of the division, the veterinary unit of the division and the motorized units or the units in charge of motor maintenance of the division, the mail units and the guard units and field gendarmerie.
Q This then is the subdivision of a light infantry division. Are other divisions quite differently organized or is it in principle the same?
A No they are not vastly different from light infantry divisions There are certain deviations, all according to the particular purpose of the division concerned but in the main points a division is for tactical and administrative purposes independent. It is a combat unit complete in itself. I might almost say it is independent. It can live by itself through its own installations. In this way the divisional commander is the judicial authority within its own division.
There again are certain limitations. He represents, so to speak, the first instance. That is, he can pronounce sentences for men only up to five year prison sentences. Sentences exceeding that limit and all matters concerning officers have to be detailed to the army and the army decides about them.
The immediate superior of the divisional commander in a tactical respect, the commanding general or the corps headquarters, has no influence on the judicial activity of the division. This influence is solely reserved for the commander in chief of the army. That would be the main points concerning this sketch.
Q General, how did the situation develop in Greece during the time between your first departure from Greece and the beginning of your second assignment there?
A In Greece during these nine months, while I was absent from August 1942 until May 1944, the situation had changed inasmuch as also in Greece the band problem had newly arisen. On the Peloponnes up to that time where we were stationed up to that time surprise attacks of bands had only been directed against the Italians although in July and August some surprise attacks on German soldiers took place also but these remained exceptions.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I would now like to offer three documents from Felmy Document Book V, the first of which is Felmy Document No. 97 on page 31.
This concerns a secret information note of the 1st Panzer Division dated 12 June 1943 regarding the band situation in Greece. I shall offer this document under Exhibit No. 24. I don't want to read this document.
The next document to offer is Felmy 94 on page 21 of Felmy Document Book V. That will become Exhibit 25. This is a report by the Military Commander Greece addressed to the Military Commander Southeast dated 6 April 1944 and this report encloses an excerpt from a newspaper, "The Democratic Flag." From this newspaper article it can be seen that the leader of the DES groups, General Zervas, had been awarded a high decoration for the successful demolition of the Gorgopotamos Bridge which had taken place some time ago.
The next document to offer is Felmy Document 100 on page 38 of Felmy Document Book V and this will be offered as Exhibit 26. This is an Order of the Day issued by the Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division dated 16 August 1943. It reads as follows:
"Soldiers of the Infantry Group of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
"For the first time larger forces of the young 117th Light Infantry Div. are going into action, in order to clear in cooperation with their Italian comrades as ordered, extensive areas of the Peloponnes from bands. Difficult marches and perhaps also hard days of fighting are ahead of us. Heat, dust, exertions and a shrewd enemy will demand of us endurance, cunning and courage. I know that every one of you will do his duty wherever he may be.
"Manliness and discipline are the basis for success also for the operation. During it nothing of what was learned is to be abandoned.
"Smart and firm in the hands of the leaders everyone of you is obligated through his appearance and attitude on the march, during battle and while resting, wherever he may be, to feel as a proud member of his division, Not plundering,murdering, burning like bands do we go about our task, but justly and if necessary by energetic action will we bring this operation to a successful end.
"Against lack of discipline, damage to the reputation, honor and arms of our Division, thievery and plunder, I shall have to proceed with the utmost severety. May everyone take notice of this in advance lest he may suffer severest punishment."
This order of the day is signed by the Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division, General von LeSuire.
Q General, as of what date did the band situation in Southern Greece become quite different?
A Comparatively soon after the collapse of the Italian forces.
Q In this connection was there an organizational change concerning the channels of command in Southern Greece?
A Yes, on 9 September I had taken over the provisionally created Army Group (Armeegruppe) Southern Greece and the task of this Army Group was, firstly, to regulate and transport the members of the 11th Italian Army. That was an organizational task and the parallel tactical task was, as it had been before, defense against an enemy landing which now not only threatened the Peloponnes but also Attica, Boetia and the islands. These were times of a great tension again. If the allies made use of this weakness of our and attacked, then Greece would have been theirs. We could have never prevented that.
Q How long were you in charge of the Army Group Southern Greece?
A Roughly, four weeks until it was dissolved around the 1st of October or rather in the first days of October.
Q What effects did the dissolution of the Army Group have on the 68th Corps?
A The 68th Corps took over the tasks of the Army Group and had to leave the Peloponnes with its staff. They went to Psychikon which is a suburb of Athens and is quite near. The corps area had, therefore, been extended to twice its previous size and corresponded to the area usually under the jurisdiction of an army.
Q How were the troops under your command distributed within the Corps area?
A The 117th Light Infantry Division remained on the Peloponnes in addition to which there were three fortress battalions and, in the course of the winter, further fortress battalions were added. These new, together with the old, battalions formed 41st Fortress Division. This 41st Fortress Division was stationed in the coastal sector for the permanent security of that area while the bulk of the 117th Light Infantry Division was intended to he a mobile unit and was kept in reserve. The 1st Panzer Division had been withdrawn and transferred to the East, approximately around the same time when the Army Group was dissolved during the first days of October 1943.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will be in recess until three-fifteen.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will he seated, please.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may continue.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, the last thing you talked about before the recess was the distribution of the units under your command within your Corps area. Did you, at that time, think it expedient to safeguard the whole of the coast?
A No. In view of the fact that the forces were relatively too weak to repel an Allied landing I suggested to the Army Group, as early as September, 1943, to evacuate the whole of the coast-line on the Peloponnes and to get the troops to take up bolt positions in the interior of the country where there were very few thoroughfares. The country was mountainous; so this seemed the obvious thing to do. I thought about a defense along the same lines as in Italy. Offensive ideas we could not afford anymore after the 1st Panzer division had left.
Q And what was it you hoped to achieve thereby?
A To shorten our supply lines for one thing, and to intensify the defensive power of the troops. The Allied forces would have had less opportunity, in the event of a landing, to annihilate isolated troops committed in coastal sectors. Instead of that they would have to fight laboriously to reach the interior of the mountainous country.
Q Was this proposal of yours successful?
AArmy Groups E and F had given their consent, but, as usual, OKW turned this proposal down. They ordered, as they had always done, that the coast must be the mainline of fighting. And that eliminated the advantages which I have just sketched briefly. The troops were scattered over several areas.
Q General, would you please show us, on the map, the geographical situation and the communication lines as well as the places where the troops were committed on the Peloponnes in Boetia and in Attica?
A (THE WITNESS STANDS WITH POINTER AND REFERS TO THE MAP) The Peloponnes is a very mountainous country, and the coast is a very rock one. The Peloponnes is roughly of the same size as Belgium. From Athens a railway line goes across the Channel of Corinth, along the northern bank of the Gulf of Corinth, in an eastern direction to Kyparethia from there via Tripolis, back to Corinth, and thus closes the circle. From Megalopolis there is another railway line to Kalamata and the south. And there is another one from Argos to Naublia. This is a small-track railway. In some cases Diesel engines are used sometimes steam engines. Of similar quality and number are the thoroughfares. There is one from Corinth which goes along the Gulf of Corinth. This road is negotiable for motor vehicles. It reaches up to the neighborhood of Arexos where there is a big air base built by the British. And then if the weather is dry one can take a car as far as Pirlos. From Pilos one can go via Vikina to Tripolis. That part of the country from Pirlos to Kyparetyia - where there is a railroad line - has no road at all. One can only use donkeys there. Then one can go on from Kyparethia to Pylos, where there is the Gulf of Navarino, where there was a naval battle against the Turks in 1337, when the Greeks were liberated from Turkish oppression. From Pirlos a road leads to Kalamata and from Kalamata to Tripolis via the pass road of Kalamata to Argos and Corinth. A second north-south communication leads from Tripolis via Sparta, to the small harbor town of Kythion, South of Patras, in what is known as the Taygotos Mountains, we have mountains higher than 2,000 meters. The mountainous district is very poor because there is very little wooded country in the Peloponnes. Naked rocks are visible; therefore, in this mountainous area one can just feed sheep and goats. Cattle breeding is scarcely in existence down there. The valleys, however, and the rivers are all the more fertile. The whole of the coastal area between Corinth and Patras is a winegrowing country.
The plains of Elis are very fertile, also the valley of Kalamatha, the basis reaching from Tripolis via Sparta, but, above all, the Argolis, where there is a large fruit-growing country-figs, oranges, a good deal of mellons and vegetables and, above all, olives. As far as the large cities are concerned there are in the Peloponnes Patras on the Gulf of Corinth, a city of about 60,000 inhabitants. The next big city is Kalamatha on the southern bank, with about 40,000 inhabitants. Then we have Tripolis, the actual capital of the Peloponnes, which has 30,000 inhabitants. Then, there are a few less significant town on the coast, such as Corinth, on the Gulf of Corinth, Naublia, Argos, Kythion, Pylos, Abaiass, and others. The villages and the plains are rich, but the mountainous country is very poor. I might briefly tough on three of the old cultural cities since I am talking about the Peloponnes. For one thing there's Olympia, Mycene. Then there is Epidauros along the eastern coast of the Argolis. But, apart from those, there are a large number of old buildings.
From this geography it becomes clear what military use can be made of the country. We had to safeguard the harbor towns, and we had to defend the plains which were suitable for landings from the air, above all Elis, the vicinity of Tripolis, and the neighborhood of Argos and Naublia. Thus the fortress divisions were committed in regiment. One regiment safeguarded Elis from the air base of Araxos right down to Pyrgos. This stretch from Pyrgos to Kyparethia. remained unoccupied; and then the valley near Kyparethia and the vicinity of Pyrgos had been fortified. There were other bases near Kalamatha, near Kythion, and near Naulia; and, of course, along the Channel of Corinth, and along Xylocastron there were also bases. Often navy or army artillery had been attached to these strong points or had been concentrated around them. Climatic conditions made fighting difficult.
Summer is very hot, and the basins and valleys of the rivers are infested with fever--particularly the stretch up there. (POINTING TO THE MAP).
Attica and Boetia are of a similar character. Their scenery also is mountainous. Attica, of course, has Athens as its most important city. There is only one railway from Athens to Salonika, and it joins the Balkan network near Belgrade. And then it goes via Zagreb, via Nish to Sofia. There again are very few thoroughfares, the road from Athens to Corinth and the one from Athens via Thebes up to the North into Thessaly. Bolt positions were established in the interior of the country while the harbor town of Pyraeus was protected by the island Salamis in front, it, quite apart from the fact that Crete blocks the entrance to the whole of the Aegean anyhow. In the Corps area were also included the islands Euboea, Xante, Mylos, Paros, and Syros. In Attica and Boetia we have wine and olives again. The area which is interesting from an agricultural point of view is the area around Kopais. This is a lake country which the English have dried out to an extent of nearly 100,000 Prussian hectares. Almost one-third of this can be artificially watered. One can plant cotton, wheat and other things in plenty. The actual corn growing part of Greece is situated in Thessaly outside the old Greece-of ancient times, that is. It ends at the Gulf of Malakkia. These areas--Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thrace became part of Greece only in later years by conquest.
Q Now, General, what units were stationed in Attica, Boetia, and Euboea at that time?
AAs far as Attica was concerned--Boetia, and Euboea--we had the XIth Luftwaffe Field Division at our disposal, and for a certain period of time we had the First Regiment Brandenburg. In Boetia there was, moreover, the Police Regiment 18, but that was under the command of the Higher SS and Police Leader. They were serving there. Then interchangeably with the Brandenburg Regiment we had, in the course of time, the Arabic Division, which I mentioned before-consisting of two or three so-called Mountain Battalions.
Q What about the defense of Attica? What was the idea?
A I said before that in Attica we took up bolt positions, but, unlike the positions held in the Peloponnes, we had not committed any troops there. In July, in view of the vastness of this area, we had to wait and see whether an enemy attack would be directed against the eastern or southern coasts of Attica. The south seemed to be less suitable for surprises because there we had a number of islands in front of the mainland where naval or army batteries were stationed. Any surprise attacks there were not to be feared.
Q General, what part of your Corps area was the main area for the bands?
A The main area for the bands, after the Italian collapse, was the Peloponnes. But, depending on the situation we had a fairly lively band activity in Euboea, in Parnass which is to the west of the road, (POINTING) from Thea to Lamya, and then in the Sparcheies Valley which forms the approaches to the Epirus, via the notorious band nest at Tarpenision. Particularly by the Autumn of 1943 we felt the influence of Communist elements to be on a mounting scale. Many of them came from Bulgaria, and ELAS had the upper hand in the Peloponnes and Southern Greece, after the last EDES forces in the Peloponnes had, in the late autumn, been destroyed by ELAS.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q What year?
A This was the late autumn of 1943. In the Peloponnes and in the areas which I have just indicated we had only ELAS. ELAS formed a small isolated group in the west of the Epirus as we have heard from General Lanz.
AApart from the Italians, were the bands also supplied by any other party?
A Yes, as early as the summer the British had supplied the bands with arms. British, and later on American, officers had appeared with the bands. The scenery of the Peloponnes, which is so mountainous in the interior, with its rocky coast, was an ideal country for guerilla warfare, which is the explanation why German troops there were exposed to the greatest risks. For one thing, expecting the enemy landing there, we were committed to the coast and the air dromes; and for the rest we had to suffer to a mounting scale from band activities.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Were the German soldiers prepared to fight the bands? Had they trained for that purpose?
A No, guerilla warfare was quite unknown to the German soldier up to that time. He had been trained for normal combat fighting, as we were expecting it, for instance, in the case of an Allied landing.
Q According to your experience, did the bands observe the rules of international law?
A Bands and international law? They wore a completely different pair of shoes. Bands in rare cases would wear uniforms, and sometimes they would wear insignia; but as a regular troop, we could never identify them. Open combat, the sort of combat our soldiers were trained for, I mean, never occurred, but the bands fought as they were used to, from ambush, and with surprise attacks; nor did they observe the regulations of international law in any other way. In some cases it is true, in their areas, they had adopted the numbers of the proper Greek regiments which were formerly stationed in those areas. That was one of the means to pretend a national organization, a method which they used successfully in the first period; but any real connection with the old Greek regiment certainly did not exist, nor did they have uniformed leadership. They did not wear their arms openly. Cruelties were a daily occurrence. Every soldier knew that, and therefore they were not regarded by us as a belligerent force under international law.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please, I would like to offer a few documents in this connection. First from Document Book Felmy Number 2, there is an affidavit by Dr. Herbert Schwoerbel, Document Number 52 which I offer as Exhibit 14, on page 15.
"From frequent conversations with FELMY I know that FELMY most strongly condemned and regretted the deterioration of the political struggle in Greece. In this connection, FELMY intentionally disobeyed the severe orders emanating from Berlin and which provided for the shooting of hostages at a ratio of 50 to 1 in reprisal for assassinated Germans. I believe that FELMY had to resort to these reprisals altogether Court No. V, Case No. VII.
due to force majeur. Today, it is already a historic fact, and especially also proven anew by the current events in Greece, that the EAM was the attacker and the first party to set off with all means the cruel fight against the occupying power. Assassinations from ambush, tortures and mutilations were the order of the day. The German troops were so excited about these incidents that a troop commander for that very reason would have known of no other solution than that of trying to set an end to the assassinations and to intimidate them by application of reprisal measures. However, it was of an even more decisive influence that the treacherous warfare of the EAM was directed to an almost increased degree against the Greeks and not only against the Germans. The kidnapping and murdering of 50 Greek gendarmes was the opening signal. In Athens I myself was an eyewitness to political murders by the EAM against Greeks in full daylight and it must be said that the EAM did not at all act only against pro-German Greeks. I knew that, at the time, the urgent request was expressed from the circles of Greek politicians, the Greek police and the Greek population that the Germans should take measures against the communists. Especially the Greek police complained that it would be beyond their power to maintain security and order any longer if the German authorities were not in a position to protect them against the terror of the EAM. It is, therefore, my opinion that the reprisal measures, as far as they were at all caused by FELMY personally, were decreed out of an uncontrollable situation and against the inner desire of the General, who much rather would have carried out his mission in peace and friendship with the Greek population. I have no doubt that, had, at the time, the German authorities left it to the Greek security authorities to take punitive measures these would have been carried out in a manner by far more cruel and to a much greater extent than they actually were executed by the German authorities. Proof therefore is the hanging of 5 communists by the Evzons, which was done in the most cruel manner at the beginning of 1944. In Greece it is a well-known fact that the communists feared the Evzons more than they did the Germans, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
that the hatred among the Greeks themselves was altogether greater than the hatred of the Greeks against the Germans."
The next document offered is contained in Document Book Felmy 2. It is Document Number 61 starting on page 46. This is offered as Exhibit 27. It is an affidavit by Walter Barth, who at the time in question was the first General Staff Officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division. I shall read from page 48 of Document Book 2.
"4. How the Partisans 'Conducted' war. The Partisans 'conducted' was exclusively according to the 'guiding principles laid down by Soviet Russia for Partisan warfare'; that is, according to the motto: 'Kill the Fascists wherever you find them.' With this they placed themselves outside the regulations of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. There were no regular uniform. As insignia now and again they wore the Greek Cocarde or the Soviet Star. Often the Partisans were disguised as farmers, shepherds, priests or women; not until the last moment before the clash or the attack were weapons shown."
On the same page at the bottom under paragraph 6.
"The expression 'hostages', as it was used by the troops, was false. By 'hostages' the troops understood such persons who were without a doubt Bolshevists and who were brought in for reprisal measures."
On the next page, paragraph 7.
"The arrest of these so-called hostages took place after their Bolshevist attitude was positively ascertained. In doing this, Greek nationals often worked together with the Secret Military Police and the Ic. Communist attitude, cooperation, or support of the bandits was a reason for arrest. Lists of names, captured papers, statements of captured partisans, denunciations, etc., divulged the names of Greeks with communist leanings. Only such persons were arrested."
And the next document I'd like to offer is Document Felmy Number 62 in Volume 2 on page 52. It is offered as Exhibit 28. It is an affidavit by Erhard Gemmrig who at that time was first general staff Court No. V, Case No. VII.
officer with the 68th Army Corps, as it says in the second paragraph, "From 10 October until 27 November 1943, and from 3 January until 14. January 1944."
I shall read only the last paragraph on this page.
"In about November 1943 the 68th Army Corps received a letter from the leader of a Greek guerilla division to the effect that if the attacks (by regular German regiments) on his unit north of the Attic area would not cease, he would shoot at a certain spot a number (I believe 50) captured German soldiers. The General Command could not discontinue the attack since the supply lines in that area were constantly interrupted by attacks on individual vehicles.
"The attacking regiments actually found German soldiers murdered, at the spot mentioned (partly badly mutilated). Herr Felmy even prohibited reprisals against hostages for that."
And now, from Felmy Document Book III, I beg to offer an affidavit by Dr. Tilk. It is Document No. 82 on page 48; it is offered as Exhibit 29.
Dr. Tilk states as follows:
"From October 1943, to August or September 1944, I was stationed at the Luftwaffe base hospital in Athen, and I also stayed with this motorized medical unit during the retreat.
"What our relations to the Greek population were can be gathered clearly from the fact that the Luftwaffe hospital was housed in a section of the former University Clinic, while the greater part of the building system was at the disposal of the civilian population. The X-ray equipment. The Greek hospital personnel was provided with messing facilities by the unit and were allowed to take food home with them. In the event of sickness Greeks were treated in the hospital by military doctors, both as bed-cases and as visitors.
"In the Luftwaffe hospital in Athens, prisoners-of-war were cared for, above all, British and Americans. One of the prisoners of war, a wounded British officer, left me a letter of gratitude after his convalescence, when he was being transferred.
"In the aforementioned neighboring Greek hospital wounded Evzones were also accommodated and these were often abducted by Partisans. Only under the strictest protection were they safe from their own country-men (EAM-Partisans). As it turned out later, the Greek civilian gate-keeper of the Luftwaffe hospital was an EAM agent.
"That wounded Greeks are supposed to have been thrown out of the hospitals after the comings of the Germans, as a Greek witness is supposed to have testified in the case against the so-called Southeast Generals, I will not believe at any time. For the protection of the Greek population from the Partisans, Greek troops, who maintained their own hospitals, were allowed to keep their arms. As far as I know, the occupation troops were placed under the command of the Italian Supreme Command after the Germans entered the area. The responsibility for the alleged evacuations from Greek hospitals would, in my opinion, thus fall on the Italians.