BY DR. TIPP:
Q. Is this attitude of General von Leyser's--was that known outside of the staff at that time, Her von Besser?
A. Yes, it was known, it could not, if I may put it this way, be avoided on account of the spontaneous manner of General von Leyser. I have already said that his attitude to the questions mentioned was known well within his officers corps. Beyond that, rumors of his attitude reached even the SD. The consequence was that he was denounced and so was his staff. I gained knowledge of this in the spring of 1945. A friend of mine, who was also an officer in the Army Group -I believe his name was 1st Lt. Schurf -- phoned me at that time and asked me to see him and discuss something with him. During a visit in Zagreb I went to see 1st Lt. Schurf, and he informed me, under the pledge of secrecy, of the fact of this denunciation. He left it to me to inform General von Leyser of this fact and to warn him and caution him.
Q. Do you still remember, at least approximately, what the contents of this denunciation were?
A. Its meaning was approximately that General von Leyser's political attitude was a negative one. It was said that from a sense of duty he acted in the way it was demanded of him, but that he did not do all these things out of a full heart. He himself, as well as the whole of our staff, was termed reactionary.
Q. Did you tell General von Leyser anything about this warning which you received from 1st Lt. Schurf?
A. That was a matter of course. Immediately after my return, I informed General von Leyser of the report I had received. General von Leyser knew of this charge already from a third party, and he did not attach any particular importance to it.
Q. One more question in this respect, Witness. Was a denunciation of that kind dangerous at that time? By this, I mean could it have very serious consequences for an officer?
A. The consequences of such a denunciation I might almost say are very serious indeed, and any officer realized what it would mean to be involved in a proceeding which undoubtedly would follow such a charge.
Q. One last question in connection with this. Did General von Leyser change his attitude in any way as a consequence of this charge; I mean his attitude which he showed towards political and religious questions before that?
A. No, I am certain he did not.
Q. Then I would like to leave that particular point. You said that as of November, 1943, you were General von Leyser's personal companion. Were you during the whole time that he led the 15th Corps together with him all the time?
A. From October, 1943, until the middle of July, 1944, I was with the 15th Mountain Corps without being absent for any length of time. Subsequent to that date, I went on furlough.
Q. If I understood you correctly a while ago, you said that you and General von Leyser stayed together when he took over the 21st Corps. Were you during that period constantly his ADC?
A. As I have stated, I was ADC and personal companion of General von Leyser while he was with the 21st Corps, but not during the very first period. While during August and September, 1944, I was on leave, General von Leyser and General Fehn changed posts. It had been intended that after I returned from my furlough I was to follow him to Tirana. Through an accident which I suffered on my return trip to Knin, it was only towards the middle of October, 1944, that I joined General von Leyser. For about three months, then, I was away from him. Subsequent to October, 1944, until the time when General von Leyser became sick and left the Corps at the beginning of May, 1945, we stayed together constantly.
Q. Now, a number of specific questions. First of all, a few concerning General von Leyser's personal relation with subordinate troops. As his constant companion and ADC, I am sure you gained an impression whether or not General von Leyser through checking up and personal investigation attempted to convince himself of whatever conditions prevailed with his troops, or whether he contented himself with reports; that is, with ruling from an office desk?
A. General von Leyser has at all times convinced himself on the very spot of the events and conditions. I might almost say that General von Leyser was always away on official trips. He did that in order to gain a very clear picture of the situation and to be independent of the reports of the troops. It was known of him--and his subordinate commanders knew that -- that frequently and surprisingly he would turn up for check ups and investigations. He took ruthless measures when he found out that things had been neglected anywhere. The troop commanders always had to inform him down to the last detail, and he would not rest until he had inspected the last shelter and the last foxhole personally. As his constant companion, I observed and sometimes cursed his patience in this respect, because it was not very pleasant to go from one position to another if it was very hot and there was no shade anywhere.
Q. Did the fact that General von Leyser informed himself on the very spot of everything that went on have any particular importance in Albania and Croatia, any importance which might be of interest to us here?
A. The reason for the frequent inspections was on the one hand that the communications quite frequently did not work. Radio connections were exposed to atmospheric disturbances quite frequently on the mountainous region and therefore could not be counted with any regularity. The telephone communications and therefore also the teletype communications were almost daily disrupted by the Partisans. These were the reasons why sometimes one couldn't even dispense with informing oneself of the position on the spot. On the other hand. General von Leyser had a strong feeling of responsibility which always brought him to the focal points of any occurrence.
Q. Were these inspection tours, if I may call them thus, connected with any particular difficulties where the units were concerned?
A. Yes. I, as his ADC, can confirm that these inspections on the spot were always connected with difficulties and danger. A furlough from the Croatian area back home was through the constant attacks on highways and railway lines, through explosions on the railways and low-flying aircraft, almost a small military operation. Therefore, a trip from the Corps headquarters to the front troop always meant a commitment of human life and materiel.
Q. Can you describe a few personal experiences that you and General von Leyser made together and that show his feeling of responsibility which caused him to take these risks?
A. Yes, I remember any number of events and I would like to just quote a few of them. On the occasion of the first trip which the General made to Zara on the 18th of November, 1943 -- that will be four years ago tomorrow -- I remember this very clearly because it was the General's birthday and I accompanied him on that trip -- we overtook parts of the 264th Division. These parts had at that time been caught in a band attack and confronted a military situation, if I may call it that, in a somewhat helpless way.
The Division had just newly arrived in the area from France and was not familiar with the Band fighting. General von Leyser in spite of the firing -- machine-gun fire -- which crossed the highway, went up to the Front to the leader of the troop and had the situation reported to him. The troop leader reported that a Band Division confronted his columns, against which he with his few men could do very little. General von Leyser informed him to the effect that he, the troop leader, was apparently under the wrong impression concerning such a Band Division. Then von Leyser issued the order to put a few guns in position and open fire. The resulting success was obvious. The Partisans ceased fire quite soon and our own troops could continue on their march. We and our convoy then overtook these columns and advanced to Zara.
Then there were a few other experiences. On a trip from Zagreb to Sisak in December, 1943, we encountered a mine. Flying in a "Storch", which is a special type of aircraft which was used a lot down there, the General had frequently to make emergency landings, which were not very easy with the inadequate means of landing on this Croatian coast.
Near Dimes, near Knin, the general's car was attacked by a low flying aircraft in summer 1944, and set on fire. The car burned down to the last and General von Leyser escaped certain death only by a miracle.
In order to inspect the fortification building of the 392nd Division, General von Leyser had on repeated occasions to go along the coast in a very small boat. These boats very frequently fell victim to British vessels.
In Albania also General von Leyser's car was also repeatedly attacked by low flying aircraft or we were shot at from ambush. During a flight to Tirana our plane had to make an emergency landing northwest of Sarajewo. General von Leyser and all the crew of the plane at that time were taken prisoners by the Chetniks. I shall discuss this particular event later on.
Q. You said, Witness, that accompanied General von Leyser on all these many trips. Did you also happen to be present then when General von Leyser had discussions and conferences with subordinate troop leaders, so that you would be in a position to tell us something about these?
A. I was not always present. When we arrived at the units which we visited it was mainly my task to look after the accommodations of the general officers accompanying us and to look after the maintenance of our vehicles. This was all the more necessary because mostly we arrived unannounced. Therefore it was not possible for me to participate in all conferences and furthermore General von Leyser did not call me into all conferences.
Q. Can you tell us, Witness, whether during conferences where you did take part the ordering of reprisal measures was discussed with the subordinate commanders?
A. I cannot recollect any such a discussion or conference. I know of no case either where General von Leyser ordered such a reprisal measure. I only know General von Leyser's basic attitude toward this question, which he explained to me at one time and which is also laid down in a memo to the Army, made by him.
His basic attitude was that reprisal measures should only represent the last resort. In the foreground was the task of the military destruction of the bands in the interest of peace and order in the country.
Q. If I understood you correctly, Witness, you were saying that General von Leyser's car once struck a mine and that at some other time you were attacked from ambush. Could you now tell us whether General von Leyser took such incidents as a reason to ask the subordinate commanders to carry out reprisal measures in that particular case?
A. No. Such a measure is not known to me.
Q. Witness, before I asked you to testify here as a witness I briefly informed you of the contents of the indictment and you yourself have had an opportunity to read it.
As we know, you will have gathered from it that the Prosecution asserts that the execution of reprisal measures was, if not the most important thing, at least one very important and main part of the command of the German troop leaders in Croatia. Although you, as you said, had no connection whatsoever with the leadership and had no concern with tactical matters, I believe you would still have gathered a few personal observations at the time concerning this particular point. I would like you now to give your personal attitude toward the indictment to the Tribunal here.
MR. FULKERSON: If Your Honor please, I would like to object to that question. I don't think that the witness's personal attitude toward this indictment is of any importance here. He has in effect disqualified himself partly already by saying he was not familiar with the orders and so forth which formed the main part of the evidence which we have been discussing, and having done that, he is now asked to give his attitude toward the indictment.
DR. TIPP: I believe the Prosecutor did not get the meaning of my question. May I briefly say something? I believe the representative of the Prosecution misunderstood my question. All I wanted to know was whether Dr. von Besser who for a long time accompanied General von Leyser could from his own observations tell us something as to what part reprisal measures played in General von Leyser's activities. That is a question asking for the knowledge of the witness. If the witness says he is in no position to testify about it, that's all right; but the question as such is quite justified.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any further comment, Mr. Fulkerson?
MR. FULKERSON: No, Your Honor, as I understand the question as rephrased, it is quite different from the question which was asked, and I have no objection to his asking the witness what the witness knows. No sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Keeping in mind the limitation which you have now put in your question, you may proceed, Dr. Tipp.
Q. Dr. von Besser, you may answer the question as I have qualified it now.
A. If I understood you correctly, I am to make comment on the extent to which General von Leyser was occupied with reprisal measures; seen from the point of view of his work as a whole. All I can say in this connection is that I personally have never either through comments of General von Leyser or in any documents which I might have seen accidentally as A.R.C. -- as bearer of same,-- gained any knowledge that reprisal measures were ordered by General von Leyser. I believe I have said this before.
Q. It is not possible for you to say anything in a more general way, is it?
A. From the indictment which I have seen, I saw to my great surprise that the execution of reprisal measures is described as almost the main portion of the leadership in the Croatian area. I can only repeat that from the orders, or of the execution of such measures, I did not observe anything of that kind. In discussions in the officers' club which undoubtedly took place, I can only say that reprisal measures were only discussed as a complete side issue, so to speak. And they have never achieved that importance which is asserted today. The primary task which we had to carry out in the Balkans at the time was the occupation of the country, the destruction of the Bands by military means and the fortifications along the coast in the event of a possible enemy landing.
Q. Herr von Besser, you said that you accompanied General von Leyser on his many official trips throughout the Croatian and Albanian area. One question to this point, which you can perhaps answer on the basis of your knowledge of the territorial conditions: The warning to the population not to participate in sabotage acts plays a rather important part in this proceeding, and I believe the Prosecution is rather doubtful whether the population was actually warned.
Can you tell us something as to whether you knew of these warnings, such as seeing warning posters with your own eyes?
A. Yes, I can testify that I have seen such warning posters. I cannot say anything about the text -- actual text -- of these posters, because I do not understand the Croatian language. But there were sufficient picture posters which left no doubt about the meaning of these posters. They warned the population against surprise attacks.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Can you tell us in this connection, Herr von Besser, who put up such warning posters?
A. These posters were put up by the Croatian authorities as well as by German troops.
Q. The warning posters then were to serve as a warning of civilian population with regard to participation in sabotage acts; can you from your knowledge of General von Leyser's personality tell us anything about his attitude towards the civilian population?
A. The attitude of General von Leyser towards the civilian population was based on great understanding for the difficult conditions under which our allied state found itself. Therefore, he wanted his subordinates troops and subordinate agencies to be as considerate as possible.
Q. Can you at this point also give us a few concrete examples, Herr von Besser?
A. Yes, the first one which I would like to name is General von Leyser's attitude at the time of the band attack against Banja-Luka on New Year's Eve 1943-1944. After the town had been liberated the Croatian agencies tried to carry out ruthless reprisal measures against band suspects in BanjaLuka. General von Leyser took measures against this very emphatically. I myself had to get the responsible Ustasha leader to see the General, and during this conference General von Leyser forbade expressly that any excesses should take place against the population. At that time there was a state of emergency declared. Furthermore General von Leyser complained in Zagreb and asked that this particular Ustasha leader be replaced immediately. This man took particularly stringent measures, and he was eventually replaced by somebody else. Furthermore, General von Leyser insisted that some people arrested by the Croats, who had allegedly been found with weapons, were put before a German Summary Court Martial.
These persons were not to be shot by the Ustasha immediately, as had originally been intended.
Q. I beg pardon, Herr von Besser. So that we have no misunderstanding here, who was it who intended to have these people quickly shot by the Ustasha?
A. The Ustasha had arrested these people in BanjaLuka, and wanted to make a brief job of the whole thing. General von Leyser protested against this, and demanded that these arrested be put before a German Summary Court Martial, and that they be sentenced by a German Summary Court Martial.
Q. Do you know any details, witness, about the carrying out of this Court Martial procedure, and about the sentence which was reached?
A. I was at that time the only legal man on the staff. General von Leyser therefore issued the order to report orally, to him on the constallation of any summary court martial. I did that and General von Leyser told me in this connection that in no event would he sign a verdict as judicial authority of the area which would not be quite clear in legal and factual respect. He did not want to expose himself to any later difficulties, as he expressed himself. Today I can no longer recall exactly what the results of this Court Martial procedure were, but I can say with certainty that no death sentence was arrived at. General von Leyser, after the Court Martial procedure, expressed his satisfaction with the verdict of the summary court martial, alone for having proved to the Croatians that he could not receive the instructions from them concerning such a procedure.
Q. Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said that the Court Martial procedure was carried out because these people were accused of owning weapons without permission. Can you tell us whether at that time in Banja-Luka it was forbidden to own weapons, what were the reasons for such directives and what punishment was provided in regard to this, if you know?
A. I don't know anything about that.
Q. You further said that General von Leyser was the judicial authority of the area; why did he in that particular case have judicial authority over the area?
A. That was because a state of emergency had been declared in the area at that particular time.
Q. May I understand your answer to the effect that otherwise General von Leyser would not have been the judicial authority?
A. That is quite correct. Otherwise in any other circumstances he was not the judicial authority and we had no summary court martial with the corps staff.
Q. You told us that General von Leyser demanded that a Ustasha leader be replaced because he was going to take to stringent measures against the civilian population. This seems to show that General von Leyser was concerned with the welfare of the civilian population, making, as he did complaints against a representative to the Croatian stale; can you tell us whether this care for the civilian population was also expressed at any other occasion?
A. Yes, there are some other cases which I remember. For instance, in Knin we put air raid shelters at the disposal of the population. Knin was at that time repeatedly attacked by the allied air force. The population, without exception, had to suffer under these attacks, particularly, since they had no adequate means of shelter. General von Leyser put shelters at their disposal, which partly were Wehrmacht shelters, and later on he had special shelters constructed by a pioneer staff, which was stationed near Knin. Furthermore, I remember that in Knin, on his order, great medical care was taken for the population. I have repeatedly visited a German Military Hospital which ms located in a school building outside Knin.
In this hospital indigenous people were also treated, and above all those people whose health had suffered in the ethnic conflict. A further measure which showed the care of the General, I would like to mention the salt transports which we carried out from the Isle of Rhab to the surroundings of Knin. The Croatians did not give any salt to the population, but the distribution of salt was an immediate necessity, because salt was extremely necessary for human consumption as well as for the feeding of the cattle.
DR. TIPP: Your Honor, this brings me to a new chapter. Might I personally suggest we take a recess now?
THE PRESIDENT: Let's keep going for two or three or four minutes. Let's keep going.
Q. Witness, did you have an opportunity to gain any insight in the internal situation of Croatia?
A. Through my long stay in Croatia, and through the frequent trips which I made with General von Leyser I believe I am in a position to give a statement on the internal situation in Croatia. Croatia, was at the time an independent and allied state, whose sovereignty was respected by the German Armed forces in every respect. For this reason we had Croatian liaison offices with our staff and representatives of the Croatian Government. These plenipotentiary representatives discussed all measures with us and we with them, inasmuch as they demanded interference with internal Croatian conditions. For instance, Minister Benac was with the staff of the 15th Mountain Corps in Banja-Luka. During our stay in Knin it was a Ustasha colonel, whose name I do not remember. All I know is he had been at Staff Headquarters in Benkovic near Zara. Next to these constant liaison offices the Croatian Government on special occasions was asked to sent special Plenipotentiaries. Thus it happened that amongst others the minister for the damaged districts, the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister came to Banja-Luka to visit us on several occasions.
General von Leyser immediately after he took over command of the office corps in Croatia went to see the Peglavnic, and he further visited the War Ministry and other high ranking personalities in Zagreb at that time. There was a constant good social relationship between him, the Minister Benac, and later in Sarajewo, he entertained the same relationship with Minister Sekovic. Before he left Croatia General von Leyser reported to the Croatian head of the state and he also paid a farewell visit to the War Minister and to the Chief of Croatian General Staff, etc.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(Thereupon an adjournment was taken until 9:30 a.m., November 18, 1947.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 18 November 1947, 0930, Justice Carter presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs who is absent due to medical reasons.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
HANS JOACHIM von BESSER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. TIPP (Counsel for defendant von Leyser):
Q. Herr von Besser, yesterday we had stopped when we discussed the inner-Croatian conditions and the last thing you described to us was the way the conditions were in the administrative sphere and what General von Leyser did in order to reach a good relationship with the Croatian authorities.
One additional question: Can you tell us whether in the Corps area there was a Croatian civilian administration?
A. Yes, there was a net of Croatian agencies all over the country.
Q. And then to another set of questions: can you, from your personal observations of the conditions, tell us something about the ethnic conflict in Croatia and how this influenced the inner Croatian conditions?
A. The political, national and religious contrasts in Croatia were the strongest in all Europe, I believe.
Q. Can you briefly sketch for us what opposing groups faced each other in this area?
A. In contrasts consisted on the one hand between the Croatian and Serbian element. This was expressed in the fighting between the Ustasha and the Cetniks. Then there were serious contrasts between the Ustasha and the Moslems and, finally, there were the contrasts between the Cetniks and the Communists who were the partisans.
Q. I believe the ethnic struggle in Croatia has been discussed in the courtroom so frequently that these indications which you gave us are sufficient. Can you now tell us whether the corps took any measures caused by General von Leyser in order to mitigate the effect of this Ethnic fighting? Please do not make too general statements but rather give us one or two particular examples.
A. I can give you a few examples from my own experience. Where the fights between the Ustasha and the Cetniks are concerned, I remember one incident which took place in 1945 in Sarajevo. At that time near Sarajevo a German hospital train had been stopped by the Ustasha. In this German hospital train there were wounded Cetniks who were looked after by German medical men in this hospital train. Against the protests of the German medical personnel these Cetniks were taken from the train and shot. General von Leyser investigated immediately this incident and issued a strict order to the German troops to the effect that in the future every German soldier had to expect a court martial procedure who would not use his weapons and his guns to protect those wounded in his camp.
Q. That was an example, then, for the differences between the Ustasha and the Cetnik troops. Is it perhaps possible for you to give us another example from another sector of the Ethnic fighting?
A. A further incident which took place illuminates the contrast between the Ustasha and the Moslems. Shortly before our staff left Sarajevo in the spring of 1945 in the City Park of Sarajevo a number of hostages had been hanged by the Ustasha. Amongst these hostages were a number of important personalities of the Moslem group and all hostages which had been hanged wore posters around their neck and these posters were also exhibited on the official posters in the town.
It could be read there that these measures were carried out by the Croatian authorities in agreement with the German Armed Forces. Immediately after this incident became known General von Leyser ordered that Minister Lorkovic be phoned up.
General von Leyser, in the discussion which followed blamed the Ustasha for this procedure and, above all, he protested against the statement that the German Armed Forces had taken any part in these measures. He insisted that immediately the Croatians issue a dementi stating that these measures were exclusively ordered by the Croatians and that the German troops had not known anything of this measure before it was carried out.
Furthermore, General von Leyser demanded a thorough investigation of the incident and protested against future occurrences of this kind which, in the final analysis, would be bad for the account of the German Armed Forces.
Q. If I understood you correctly, Herr von Besser, the hanging of these hostages was a measure taken by the Ustasha.
A. Yes, it was purely a measure taken by the Ustasha.
Q. You told us a few things, Herr von Besser, about the contrast which existed between the Ustasha and the Cetniks, between the Ustasha and the Moslems; you also told us that General von Leyser tried to do something against this and what he did against this. Could you possibly tell us something about how the differences between the Cetniks and the Communist Tito groups affected the conditions?
A. Here again I can describe a personal experience. As I have already mentioned, during a flight to Tirana our plant had to make an emergency landing. On this occasion we were taken prisoner by the Cetniks and every one us was in a position there to establish exactly how strong the contrast was between the Cetniks and the Partisans.
During the ten days which we spent there as prisoners not one single day passed were there wasn't suddenly an alarm because of advancing partisans and this alarm was given in this small camp in which we stayed. Every time there was a terrible panic amongst the Cetniks and this only calmed down when it was established that there was no reason for the alarm.
One day again there was such an alarm and the Cetniks left the camp in a hurry and took us along. After a march of about one hour we stopped and after a further hour we went back to the old quarters because the partisans allegedly took off again. After our return we found out that the luggage which we had left behind had been stolen in the meantime. Fortunately, we had taken our arms along and, above all, the machine guns from the airplanes, because the partisans were particularly keen on these instruments.
Q. In this connection I would like to ask you to clear up a discrepancy for us, Herr von Besser. You said that you were the prisoner of this Cetnik group. On the other hand, you tell us that you had your arms on you and with you. Isn't that a contraditions? Can you clarify it?
A. I see no contradition in this. Undoubtedly, our states was that of prisoners. At least, we were not actually at liberty. Apart from the fact that we were prevented from marching on to the North as we had wanted to, we were also taken along high up into the mountains. Furthermore, we were constantly accompanied by Cetniks. On the other hand, one has to consider the fact that it would not have been so very easy to take the arms from us which we had with us because, after all, we were 15 people and every one of us had his machine pistol with him which he would not give up. Apart from this, we also had the machine guns from the airplane.
Concerning this question, whether or not we were prisoners, we, of course, discussed this fact amongst others, with one doctor who was amongst the Cetniks. The Cetniks hastened every time to assure us that were were not prisoners and, in order to emphasize this thesis, they told us that if we actually had been prisoners of the Cetniks we would have long since, as they called it, been "liquidated."
They emphasized that we were guarded for our own protection and detained by them because of the partisans who were around in the neighborhood.
In actual fact, we all fully realized that the Cetniks were only interested in the General's person and we all presented some welcome hostages in their hand. The General and all of us could have possibly been handed over to the partisans by the Cetniks, for instance, as an exchange against important Cetnik prisoners who might have at that time been in the hands of partisans.
On the other hand, we represented a good means of pressure on the German troops because possibly we could be exchanged against weapons, munitions, medical equipment, et cetera. We all realized that we were prisoners.
Q General von Leyser, while on the witness stand, described his stay with the Cetniks in all details. Herr von Besser. I believe we can now conclude this particular problem.
I would only like to know from you how you managed to got back to the German troops after you were prisoner there.
A In captivity we had tried everything we possibly could to contact the German troops. For this purpose we had at the time asked one of our officers to go with a Cetnik in order to take up contact. Later on when we were freed we found out this officer, as could not be expected any differently, was completely led astray by this Cetnik. This officer was led around in circles for days and never did reach the German lines.
When the 1st Mountain Division or, rather, the last remnants of this division gathered together in the Serbian area they were committed along the River Drina in order to represent a protection of the flank against the East. When these units advanced from the North suddenly the Cetniks informed us of this fact and told us that, because our own troops were approaching at this point, the partisans who were around in the neighborhood had suddenly withdrawn and, therefore, our way was suddenly clear.
Then one day we were put on a truck, after we had been led down to the valley, and this truck took us to Vigadina where the Division Staff of the 1st Division was stationed.
Q One last question which I would like to put to you, witness; the collaboration between the German Armed Forces, the SS and the SD plays an important part in these proceedings. Can you from your own personal knowledge of General von Leyser tell us anything about whether he was on good terms with any of the leading personalities of the SS and Croatia and Albania, or any personal contact or any official contact? Under the leading personalities of the SS I would like you to understand the representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Croatia and the representative of the Reichsfuehrer SS in Albania, SS Gruppenfuehrer Fitzthum.