I believe this to be the proper time to give the high court in brief a picture of the special conditions in which the defendants were placed in the Balkans.
Every appraisal of the military-political measures in the SouthEast area will remain incomplete and inadequate with regard to the actual conditions as long as it is not based on knowledge of the completely abnormal circumstances in occupied territory. No historian would be able to name a political area that could measure up to the Balkan area as far as the entanglement of the problems, the multiplicity of the political currents and the fanatic sullenness of the contracts are concerned.
1. This begins already with the split-up character of the country; nowhere else in Europe do we find in an area of about 1600 kilometers so many heterogeneous, tiny self-contained life-cells laid out by the geographic nature of the country. Whereas, for instance, the United States in an equal stretch of 1600 kilometers between Wisconsin and the Missisippi delta uniformly cultivate gigantic plains, a conglomeration of highly contrastly landscapes is to be found here in the Balkans. Every one of has its own individuality. They are littered around in a confused fashion, as though a child had emptied out a couple of big boxes of building blocks and the many-colored cubes now were mixed up in a completely disorderly way on the floor of the room.
The mountains have steep slopes. They often have remote dens and lonely mountain forests and thus offer welcome hiding-places and secret corners. Shepherds and farmers in distress retreat there as do highway robbers, Komitatschis and revolutionaries of many kinds. That has been going on for thousands of years and since the waves of the migration of peoples, since the great population upheaval that came about with the invasion of the Osmanians and since the nationality struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Partly in consequence of the geographical disruption appears also a far-reaching disruption of communications, commerce and population.
Communications lack transcontinental lines laid out by nature, only the Morowa-Wardar-furrow in the East might have provided such a connection. But even that trails through territories which despite their moderately favorable conditions, as far as lines of communication are concerned, developed rather centripetally than centrifugally. Not even the Adriatic-Ionian seashore in the West remains as a natural line of communication since the course of the mountains condemns the sea to inefficacy. The mountains mostly run parallel to the coastline and thus deprive the ocean of its influence on tho interior. A very good map with a scale of 1:500 000 or even better of 1: 200 000 is needed in order to comprehend the splitting up of tho South-East into Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Greece.
Railroad construction has only underscored the geographic disruption splitting-up of tho lines of communications of tho Western Balkans. It is not necessary to get lost in the many details of the territorialpolitical-economic-historic and ethnico-cultural disruptions: It suffices to state that to date the Balkans are lacking an oven halfway efficient rail-raod communications system. The only trunk line of European importance, tho line Belgrade-Nisch with the extensions to Sofia-Istambul and Saloniki-Athens is single-track; several territories such as tho Peloponnesus have only narrow gauge tracks. Well-known mines have to content themselves with animals as a means of transportation and small cable cars.
Thus, in connection with all those facts always only small communication systems developed in tho Western Balkan penisula; therefore, also always only small economies and small isolated settlements. People live only in villages, small or medium size towns, and the only large cities such as Athens, Saloniki and Belgrade are on the periphery. Hand in hand with nature the historical development, in particular the agrarian tendency at the beginning of Osmanian rule, has contributed its share; it has driven the Christian population into the mountains and has led to small dispersed settlements in the secret corners up there.
This difficult territory had always made it possible to escape the authorities and combat them.
The Balkans show an amazing conglomeration of nationalities. An understandable variety if one considers how landscape and economic lines of communication are split-up. This ethnic division comprises Pomakes and Muhadschirs, Kutzowlachs and Croats, Greeks and Slovenes, Serbs and Macedonians, Bulgars and Makedoslaves", Sarkatsaneans, and Albanians, Turks and Armenians, Gypsies and others. Until the redistributions of 1912/13 and the great resettlement of 1923 all of these lived intermingled to an extent that the ethnological map of the Balkans looked like the tangled mess of threads of an overcolored carpet. And it partly looks that way even today.
One must realize how a military government is faced with unending difficulties on account of such an ethnic division, particularly since there is no perfectly correct diagram of the existing division. The few top scientists who can at all survey the conditions have come to the conclusion that all statistics, and that includes all old and new statistics of Balkan nationalities, show more or less great inaccuracies.
In the still undeterminated state of development hard and cruel battles occur about the nationality of the individual under the motto "if you don't choose to be my brother I am going to smash your skull".
We must imagine, though, that this struggle follows the forms of fighting in the cultural ways of Middle Europe or of the harmless skirmishes among the sects of the Anglo-Saxon area of culture. No, in the Balkans, from time immemorial all means are being used: Apart from pulpit addresses - be it in the Slav or Greek languages, apart from evening classes for adults and apart from all possibilities of fiscal policy, use is made of personal suspicions and, even in peace, of dagger and musket.
4. The result of such conditions are quite specific ways of life for the Balkans which are entirely different from those of the real European area of culture: different as far as their fervor, their impulsiveness are concerned, but also their sullenness and their cruelty. Always have there been all sorts of illegal fighters here and here especially; from the common highway robber to the fending sons and grandsons, from the religious fanatic to the gang leader and every kind of underground movement. Accordingly, it was quite normal that the Serbian kings died through assassinations. Europe, not to talk of the world, learned only little of what happened behind the mountain walls of the Balkans. In the seclusion of that part of the world revolts flared up again and again, and all efforts by the states, were unable to up subdue either the robberies or the cruel fight against and suppression of dissenters. What has not been said and written about the "Macedonian question"? Europe and the world shuddered when the scope of the Macedonian atrocities came to light and an International Commission published its report at the end of the Balkan Wars. Yet we must take into consideration the fact that the commission could only visit the localities that could easily be reached from the outside world and that the ruins of the remote hamlets and villages in the mountains remained unknown, ruins whose population for the most part had been murdered.
Under such conditions the war added new political and ideological groups to those already in existence. A wild battle of every group against the next one set in with all furor and the age old cruelty.
"In Greece, the revolting nationalist groups (Edes) under ZERVAS were in opposition to the communist movement of the E.A.M. and ELAS. The nationalist Cetniks in Yugoslavia under MIHAILOWITCH were the enemies of the Croatian Ustascha detachments, and the adversary of both of them was TITO, the leader of the communist bands.
Even the struggle against the outside enemy sometimes took second place in the efforts to finish off the political opponent in the own country.
With such conditions, however, the defendants had to cope; in the interest of the military tasks to be expected they had to establish tranquility and pacification in occupied countries, This military necessity alone required severest actions. It will be the task of the defense to show that the fight against the bands in the Balkans was dictated only by these military exigencies, but never-as is claimed by the prosecutionin execution of a plan for the weakening and decimation of the Balkan population.
When I now proceed to explain to the High Court the line that I propose to follow in the defense of the Field Marshals List and von Weishs which I represent I would like to state the following at the very outset with particular emphasis:
1. Both defendants were during the time of their Balkan activity, which will have to be illustrated in detail as far as scope, authority and responsibility are concerned, the highest strategic leaders. Thus, it was they who before all others were responsible to the Supreme Military Command for the execution and preparation of operational tasks.
This most important task within the scope of the entire conduct of the war had to and was to commit a secondary place all other tasks resulting from the occupation of a country.
For a field commander, such as wore Field Marshals List and von Weichs, actual warfare is the main thing once a war has broken out in consequence of a decision by the politicians.
All other tasks resulting from the occupation of the Balkan countries appear, within the scope of the strategic task that was assigned to my clients, to be of minor importance. These occupational tasks were transferred to territorial commanders for independent action, and their chain of command did not go through the strategic leader but through the Military Commander Southeast to the OKW. It follows quite naturally from the cooperation that is necessary for military command posts at the front that they inform one another whenever they are outside of the chain of commands. The fact that this principle was followed in itself explains the communication of the events that took place within the areas of the territorial commanders. On the whole they were bound to interest the strategical leader because they might be of importance connection with the initiating or carrying out of operational tasks. But this reporting of territorial events could in no case constitute a reason for establishing the competency or even tho responsibility of the strategic leader as the Prosecution is trying to do.
2. Concerning the knowledge of all the happenings which make up the contents of the indictment, the Prosecution seems to hold the opinion that the defendants represented by me had full knowledge of all happenings during their term of assignment. It is inferred that these happenings were in accordance with a plan designed to weaken and decimate the population of the Balkans:
Gentlemen of the Court. Field Marshal List and von Weichs learned about this plan for the first time through the Prosecution, as I am going to prove subsequently.
As to the actual extent of the knowledge of the defendants, however the Prosecution in a way is charged with the onus probandi. It has to produce evidence to this effect through introducing certain reports issued by military offices in the Balkans. Apart from the fact that it still remains incumbent on the Prosecution to prove the connection and the relevance of many of the submitted documents qs far as the defendants are concerned, the following circumstances ought not to be overlooked as easily happens in consequence of the documents being introduced according to purely chronological points of view and not to the proceedings of the case:
Generally, I maintain that the defendants represented by me can t h e o r e t i c a l l y have knowledge of the reports and the accounts only when they were addressed to their office and had actually been received by the same.
I say deliberately: t h e o r e t i c a l l y.
For in practice; Gentlemen, of the Court, you cannot presuppose even this amount of knowledge. A commander-in-chief, who does not receive incoming reports personally, will from these reports learn only the facts presented to him during the daily discussions with the officers of his staff. And this presentation is necessarily done with a view to the main tasks of a commander-in-chief, that means to the information that must be of interest to him in connection with his operational tasks. This makes the conclusion obvious that a commander in-chief in a certain theater of operations must be much more interested in the fact that his own troops have been assaulted than in the retaliatory measures which might have been ordered, and which, moreover, were subject to the competency of another command. As to these measures he could assume that they had been carried out in accordance with existing regulations, as long as no special facts which had a c t u a l l y been r e p o r t e d to him, gave him reason for a different conclusion.
For, after all, the appropriate quarters issuing the orders directing retaliatory measures had the same authority as a commander-in-chief of an army or an army corps.
When these important points of view are considered, it becomes quite obvious h o w t h e s i t u a t i o n a t t h a t t i m e m u s t a p p e a r to the defendants List and von Weichs represented by me.
Field Marshal Wilhelm L i s t, for whom I shall now present the defense in broad outline, was by no means a Nazi general as the prosecution is trying to make him appear, in complete misrepresentation of the real facts of the case. He was an unpolitical, especially efficient officer and army commander with a strictly Christian attitude. Towards National Socialism he had no sympathy at all; his premature separation from active service in the year 1942 is evidence of this.
His activity in the Balkans was only of brief duration. At that time he watched with anxiety the growth of the resistance movement which he in his capacity as chief of operations of the German forces in the Balkans was bound to prevent and combat.
That was his task and his duty and by no means a culpability.
a.) As evidence justifying Count 1 of the indictment the Prosecution presents above all the directives issued by Field Marshal List dated 5 September 1941, Exhibit 42.
I am going to prove that these directives had their origin only in consideration of military exigencies.
In this document murder of the civilian population is ordered with no word or sentence, which sircumstance solely could make it pertain to Count 1 of the Indictment.
Gentlemen, of the Court, I may ask you to read the document in full, instead of only the passage underlined by the Prosecution. You will then receive the impression that it is a question of directives serving the purpose of repressing insidious attacks by ambush.
A "pacification through terror" is nowhere mentioned.
Further I shall prove that the subsequent orders issued by subordinate quarters were based not on these directives of Field Marshal List, but on the order issued by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht dated 16 September, Exhibit 49.
b.) In no case did Field Marshal List order or allow the w a n t o n d e s t r u c t i o n of towns or villages, and only if this had happened could he be charged with Count 2 of the indictment.
c.) Concerning Count 3 of the indictment the Prosecution has not yet proved that the commissarial order Exhibit 13 (12b of the indictment) and the order issued by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht dated 23 July 1941, Exhibit 25 (12c of the indictment) were effective for the Balkan theater of operations, Murder of p r i s o n e r s of w a r, as alleged in 12 d, e, and f of the indictment, has not been proved by the Prosecution; it was here a question of reprisals in the course of which insurgents were killed.
d.) Concerning Count 4 of the Indictment I intended to prove that Field Marshal List only considered the internment justified of such persons as had participated in or supported the resistance movement. And to do so was his right and his duty.
Field Marshal von Weichs, by nature perhaps more a scholar than a soldier, also repudiated National Socialism aid its methods. He was a Catholic of profound devoutness, and for this reason he was never completely trusted by HITLER.
I have already brought to the attention of the Tribunal - and I still advocate the opinion - that Field Marshal von Weichs because of his physical condition is incapacitated for appearing in court. I base this opinion of mine
1.) on the export opinion of Dr. Riffard who confirms the danger of a sudden perilous complication as does also
2.) the American prison physician Dr. MARTIN who, it is true, subsequently considers this danger mo more certain to the same extent as in his report made on his own initiative and dated 29 July 1947.
In a short time I shall submit a new petition for examination since in the meantime a d d i t i o n a l symptoms of a severe illness have appeared.
Gentlemen of the Court:
At the beginning of the campaign in the year 1941 Field Marshal von Weichs was only for a brief period in the Balkans as commander-inchief of the 2. Army.
A.) Within this period (April 1941) the shooting, alleged by the Prosecution, of 100 Serbs in retaliation for the death of assaulted German soldiers took place.
I maintain that this shooting of 100 Serbs in a proclamation, still unproven, was only proclaimed as a threat but was never executed.
Neither did Field Marshal von Weichs within this period over issue an o r d e r according to which 100 Serbs would be shot in retaliation for every German soldier killed. The Prosecution had introduced no such o r d e r. The document submitted (Exhibit 7) is only a p r o c l a m a t i o n to the Servian population, t h r e a t e n i n g with shootings in this ratio only, in order to warn against assaults on German soldiers. This is a l l that so far has been p r o v e d concerning this count.
When at the end of August 1943 Field Marshal von Weichs was again transferred to the Balkans - this time as strategic leader - the situation in this theater of operations had become much more critical. In spite of this he used his influence only for the purpose of m i t i g a t i o n, as I am going to prove. His order dated 22 December 1943 (Exhibit 379) is evidence to this effect.
Against occurrences reported to him and constituting misbehavior on the part of the troops Field Marshal von Weichs took action in every way possible.
Besides, he in no case ordered or allowed civilians to be killed, as alleged by the Prosecution.
This is what I have to say concerning Count 1.) of the indictment.
b.) Concerning Count 2 of the indictment the Prosecution has proved no case in which Field Marshal von Weichs ordered or knowingly tolerated a w a n t o n d e s t r u c t i o n of towns or villages.
c.) In count 3 of the indictment Field Marshal von Weichs is charged with having forwarded or complied with unlawful orders, but such orders wrer partly not issued, partly disregarded.
Under 12 a) of the indictment Field Marshal von Weichs is charged with having ordered that persons being caught in uniform and in possession of weapons after the conclusion of the armistice should be shot.
This refers to a stipulation contained in the armistice conditions which had been laid down through agreement with the state of Yugoslavia. In this connection it will be sufficient to refer to previous explanations in my address.
The commissarial order mentioned under 12b) of the indictment did not apply to the Balkans, as I am going to prove.
The executive order dated 18 October 1942 (12 h of the indictment, Exhibit 225) was forwarded to the Balkan theater of operations, and the army corps was unable to prevent this order from being received. As I am going to prove, Field Marshal von Weichs raised an objection to this order. In no case was the order carried out, as I likewise intend to prove.
The measures against the Italian officers and troops following the capitulation (12 i - 1 of the indictment) were necessary from a military point of view. Executions of Italians took place only by virtue of sentences pronounced by military courts or courts martial for wartime treason committed through surrender of weapons to the partisans, support of the same in other ways, and of the illegal resistance in connection therewith.
Concerning Count 4 of the indictment I intend to prove that also during the time at which Field Marshal von Weichs was the highest strategic leader in the Balkans only such persons were and were supposed to be interned as had connections with or supported the partisan movement.
I am at the end of my statement and hope to have presented to the Tribunal the following evidence in broad outlines.
MR. DENNEY: If Your Honor please, I have just been advised that the statement for counsel on behalf of the defendant Lanz is being mimeographed and should be ready shortly.
THE PRESIDENT: There was word sent to the desk here that the address for counsel Kuntze is now prepared and has been delivered.
MR. DENNEY: I have been sent a copy here in the courtroom, Your Honors. I will be glad to see if they have delivered one to Your Honors' secretary; I will see if it has been brought in.
THE PRESIDENT: If you will check that, Mr. Denney, we will appreciate it.
The Tribunal is informed that Dr. Sauter, counsel for von Geitner, is ready and prepared to present his opening statement at this time. Is that correct?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, may I inquire as to whether or not there will be two opening statements, one on behalf of the defendant von Geitner and one on behalf of the defendant Lanz.
DR. SAUTER: Two, yes. One for von Geitner and the other for Lanz.
THE PRESIDENT: You are now prepared to present your statement for the defendant von Geitner?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And the one for the defendant Lanz we are informed will be up here shortly and if it is here by the time you complete your statement for von Geitner you can then proceed with the one for the defendant Lanz.
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: If that is not true, we will take it up when it is reached or brought to the Tribunal.
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you may then proceed. May I inquire of the Marshal as to where the English translations are of Dr. Sauter's opening statement concerning the defendant von Geitner. Is there more than one copy?
THE MARSHAL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Sauter.
DR. SAUTER: It is undisputed that the defendant v. Geitner is accused in his character of Chief of the Commanding Staff (Operation Staff) to the Commanding General and Military Commander in Serbia and afterwards in his character as Chief of the Commanding Staff (Operation Staff) to the Military Commander Southeast and that his former military activity is also not debated in those counts of the indictment in which the prosecution does not cite summarily a longer space of time of the Second World War.
He held the first position in the time from 12 July 1942 to 26 August 1943, the latter position in the time from 26 August 1943 to 6 October 1944.
V. Geitner was in these positions during the time of July 1942 to August 1943 under General Paul Bader, in the time from August 1943 to October 1944 under General Hans Gustav Felber, who gave the affidavits of 19 February 1947 and was interrogated as a witness before court on 11 to 13 August 1947.
Consequently the responsibility of the defendant v. Geitner could not be in question for the cases of the indictment of 10 May 1947 for reasons of timing already.
In the cases concerning the defendant Geitner I need not repeat this summary and I continue on page 3 under Roman 2.
II The attitude of the defendant v. Geitner towards these accusations is as follows:
1) In general:
a) V. Geitner was never during the given time commanding officer of a unit, but always only Chief of the Operation Staff. As such he never had any commanding power. The responsibility for the orders directed to the troops rested according to German conception always and only with the commanding officer; this is also unequivocally recognized in the "Handbuch fuer den Generalstabsdienst in Krieg" (Handbook for the Service of the General Staff in War) of 1 August 1939. The Chief of Staff of a commanding authority is merely the first collaborator of a commanding officer in questions of tactical leadership and supplying of troops and had to organize the staff of his commanding officer besides.
It was his responsibility to turn the decisions taken by his commanding officer into orders, which were technically unobjectionable from the General Staff's point of view and to secure their execution. But the orders issued to the troops were always only orders of the commanding officer, never orders of the Chief of Staff. If the commanding officer instructed the Chief of his Staff to issue an order, so was according to the German conception only the commanding officer responsible for it. This legal position found its expression in the German service of the General Staff also in the fact that the Chief of Staff, it is true, had the right to express his dissenting conception towards the commander in case of differences of opinion, but that the decision rested solely and exclusively with the commanding officer; the Chief of Staff had in such cases not even the right to have his conception recorded and registered in the files. He had, on the contrary, to use all his power for executing the will of the superior leader.
b) In consequence of this fundamental conception it was not the commanding officer's Chief of Staff who acted for him in case he was prevented, but the highest ranking troop leader of his territory; only in exceptional cases when the commanding officer was really only quite temporarily absent the Chief of Staff could act for him, then, namely, when the commanding officer could not be reached immediately but when the situation demanded an immediate decision. But the orders were to be considered as orders of the commanding authority even in these exceptional cases, not orders issued by the person of the Chief of Staff. Such exceptional orders did not occur in the case v. Geitner and can, therefore, be left out of consideration.
c) V. Geitner in his character as Chief of Staff had nothing to do with the work (report, establishing, and decreeing) on retaliation measures. These measures are no tactical actions but are derived from the "executive power". V. Geitner and his two commanding officers, Bader and Felber, always also took the stand that its release be tied to the character of the commanding officer as "Supreme Judicial Authority" (Gerichtsherr). The sphere of retaliation measures was out of the field of the Chief of Staff's advisory duties.
This goes especially for all questions in the field of the justice which undisputedly was and is a part of the "executive power". Although the commanding officers have talked about the "fundamental" of the retaliation measures with the Chief v. Geitner, General Bader as well as General Felber reserved the decision on retaliation measures and the decreeing of them exclusively for themselves. They used for work on the cases the service of an officer destined for this purpose. This was never v. Geitner, but in the office of the Commanding General and Military Commander in Serbia and later in the office of the Military Commander Southeast of the 0 1 an administrative jurist.
d) The fact that v. Geitner in his character as Chief of Staff had to put his sign (Signum) also under such orders of the commanding officer which decreed retaliation measures and similar things is not in contradiction to this regulation. Such a sign by the Chief of Staff meant within the service according to undisputed German conception only that the Chief of Staff expressed by it that the order corresponded according to his personal opinion to the commanding officer's views and to the directions of the superior office and was formally all right.
On the basis of orders from the top the proscribed daily reports were signed by the Chief from a certain time on. But the Chief of Staff assumed merely the responsibility for the correctness of the report, with the signing of a daily report that means the responsibility for the correct rendering in the report of events, happening in the report time within the territory of the order. But the Chief of Staff did absolutely not assume the responsibility for the measures given in the report which were taken by the commanding officer or the troop or intended by them. The daily reports were submitted to the commanding officer every day before delivery through the operational department (Fuehrungsabteilung) and signed by him.
If retaliation measures had been undertaken they had to be told of in the next report, and it made no difference who had decreed them and who was responsible for them and no difference, whether the Chief of Staff approved of them or had previous knowledge of them. Absolutely not all happenings were reported (sabotages, attacks form the ambush). the reports of such happenings wore frequently suppressed with the knowledge and approval, partly oven at the inducement of v. GEITNER in order to evade the retaliation measures decreed from the top.
e)The fundamental attitude of the defendant v. GEITNER towards retaliation measures and similar things was absolutely negative. He also expressed the conception of his towards his commanding officers (General BADER and General FELBER) from the beginning to the end over and over again, emphasized always the principle of a "winning administration" (gewinnende Verwaltung) and turned aside every thought of a permanent domination of the Serbian people by the Germans. V. GEITNER never even heard of a plan to exterminate the Serbian people, as the prosecution asserts, much less did he agree to it. Both his commanders however saw themselves forced, despite inner hesitations, to carry out such retaliatory-measures, not only on account of compelling orders which the commanders received from their superiors, but most of all because of the totally illegal and often cruel fighting methods of the partisan units and because of the hostile attitude of a part of the population, which again and again allowed itself to be carried away to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism.
When GEITNER took over his position as Chief of Staff to the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, the question of retaliatory measures was generally regulated by reason of superior orders, through an order of General BADER, dated 20 February 42. This order made the carrying out of retaliation measures of killing of human lives principally depending on the assent of the commander. By this all violations and arbitrary acts of the troops were to be prevented. On 28 February 43 General BADER had this order issued in a new form (NOKW No. 382, exhibit 263) without that GEITNER assisted thereby.
f) GEITNER'S attitude towards the Serbs (serbophile attitude) put him in a considerable contrast to the Higher SS and Police Leader MEIYSZNER: the latter acted in matters of police-security but only according to direct instructions issued to him by Reichfuehrer SS HIMMLER, Therefore v. GEITNER had no influence on that.
2) In particular:
Pertaining to the cases mentioned and under I, the defendant v. GEITNER intents to submit as evidence the following facts:
To No 5 e:
Had not been ordered by v. GEITNER To No. 5 f:The same.
Moreover, it has to be remarked that this measure was not only carried out for the assassination of 3 German soldiers but also on account of a shooting attack on a Bulgarian leave train, whereby another 3 were killed and 2 wounded. The orders themselves were issued by General BADER end are to be found in document NOKW No 340 exhibit 276 document book XI page 44 To No 5 g:Had not been ordered by v. GEITNER.
Those shot, were not "hostages" as assumed in the indictment, but retaliation prisoners.
To No 5 h:
Had not been ordered by v. GEITNER.
To No 9 d:
Had not been ordered by v. GEITNER. Moreover, no "retaliation" is in Question in this case, but it concerns a battle action on a larger scale in the course of a continuous series of military operations on both sides of the Moravica against the DM Main Staff and against the DM bands, by the 24. Bulgarian Division and the German Police Regiment No 5. Nor did v. GEITNER order any destruction of inhabitated places.
To No 12 b:
The "Commissar order" of 6 June 41 resp. 8 June 41 had been issued long before the activity of v. GEITNER in Belgrade. In any case, v. GEITNER did not forward this order to the troops or brought this order to the recollection of the troops.
As a precaution, it is remarked, that the order of 10 October 42 (document NOKW No 1722, exhibit 228, document book IX, page 66) was not issued by the defendant v. GEITNER, but by the Commander, General BADER (in understanding with the Higher SS and Police Leader) and that this order, which refers to the general treatment of all rebels (insurgents), only states that Commissars who are found with weapons in their hands among the bands, are to be treated just s the other insurgents, yet are to be interrogated before shooting. This order has therefore no connection with the "Commissar order" of 6 June 41.
To No 12 h:
Order of the Command of 18 October 42:
v. GEITNER is absolutely unable to recollect, that the so-called order of the Command of 18 October 42 was ever received or forwarded by the Commander for Serbia; the detailed reasons given by HITLER, as stated in Document C-81 PS, exhibit 225, were unknown to him.
V. GEITNER assumes that this Commissar order never reached the Commander for Serbia. This Commissar order had also no validity for the battle against the guerilla bands, as follows from document PS No 1279, exhibit 487, document book XXI, page 57. It never was applied in Serbia.
V. GEITNER can also not recollect an order of the Chief of the OKW of 30 July 41 regarding the treatment of Military Missions with the bands in the South-East; it was not applied in Serbia and was certainly not forwarded, because according to an explicit "regulation" it was not to be distributed beyond the General Commands and Staffs of equal rank of other Wehrmacht parts. The forwarding of this order to subordinated units was therefore quite out of the question for v. GEITNER, just as he had nothing to do with the carrying out of this special Command order.
To No 12 i:
The order concerning the Italians, of 11 September 13 (document NOKW No 910 exhibit 327 document book XIII page 41) had not been carried out in the Serbian territory of the Military Commander South-East. Much more so, the Italians in Serbia had been transported according to rule as prisoners of war into camps; besides, the prosecution has already acknowledged, that this order concerns only the defendant RENDULIC but not the other defendants.
(Minutes of the session of 31 July 17, page 1931)
To No 14:
In SEMLIN (North of Belgrad, on croatian territory) existed a camp of the Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia, which sometimes was defined as a collecting camp and sometimes as a concentration camp, but, to be sure, was never a concentration camp in the sense of to-days interpretation. It served for the detention of prisoners from guerilla band fightings. V. GEITNER had nothing to do with this camp.
The Higher SS and Police Leader was not subordinated to the Chief of the Command Staff (v. GEITNER) but directly to the military Commander personally, who repeatedly intervened, partly upon proposal and instigation of v. GEITNER, when improprieties in the camp became known.