MR. DENNEY: And that is the incident which was reported in the prior Exhibit No. 237, the report from the 704th Division. Your Honors will recall it; we had it in the last document. Report for the 27th of December, "Serbia: 11 arrests in Belgrade. 250 Draja Mihajlovic followers shot in reprisal for attack on members of Organization Todt."
Report for the 28th of December, "Serbia: 9 arrests in Belgrade, 2 well known Draja Mihajlovic leaders arrested by pursuit detachment and shot after interrogation. 35 reprisal prisoners (Draja Mihajlovic adherents) were shot. An attack with explosives on railway bridge 25 km North Northwest of Nisch was driven off. Sporadic attacks on communities.
MR. DENNEY: For the 29th of December, "Serbia: In Belgrade 10 arrests. Draja Mihajlovic radio station Belgrade seized. Head of Draja Mihajlovic Station's news service in Serbia arrested together with 4 insurgents; will be shot after interrogation." Now, coming to page 159 in the English and page 159 in the German, Document No. NOKW 1054, which is Prosecution's Exhibit No. 239. This is the report on the enemy situation on Crete, dated 3 November 1942, submitted by the 22nd Infantry Division.
"Estimate of Enemy Situation on Crete The Island of Crete, as seaplane tender in the Eastern Mediterranean Supply base for Africa, naturally continues to be a target of the English, and according to the situation in Africa its importance is more or less in the spotlight.
The main targets of the English are therefore:
1. The Air Fields, 2. The installations of the ports, 3. The supply roads to these installations.
Except for 1 air field, all installations are along tho North Coast of the Island and are therefore, in the first place, exposed to air raids. Larger attacks from the sea are at present rather unlikely, however, this does not preclude that disturbances by submarines and also larger Commando operations.
MR. DENNEY: And the attention of the Court is directed to the term "Commando operations", in connection with the Commando order, Document C-51, in this book, which is in evidence as Exhibit No. 225. "carried out by parachutists will not occur. The air raids of the adversary are in the first place directed against the air fields Iraklion, used as a jumping-off base for combat units to Egypt, and against Malemes, trans-loading point for supplying the Panzer army in Africa with troops and supplies. The other jumping-off bases, Kastelli and Timbakion have thus far been attacked only in a small measure. The installations of the ports Suda and Iraklion were attacked comparatively little and most of the time without success.
The above mentioned objectives will, in connection with the combats in Africa, continue to be important targets for the adversary.
In the activity of the adversary thus far, the following special cases are to be noted; the firing on several places of the North Coast by submarines and the attempt to land small detachments on the Island Kufonissi, off the Eastern part of Crete, and near Palaeochora, these attempts remain so far without success. Furthermore, the landing of a sabotage Commando by a submarine in the area East of Iraklion is noteworthy; this Commando seriously damaged in the night from the 13 to 14 June 42 on the air fields Iraklion a rather great number of planes partially, Four members of this Commando, 1 Major and 3 Gaulist soldiers (1 shot to death) were taken prisoners as they tried to reach the South Coast. One English Captain and 1 Greek Lieutenant were able to escape.
According to reports, leaflets, food packages as well as pieces of clothing are being dropped from planes in the Messara area and in the area southeast of Rethimnon. Landings of submarines in the Maricaki bay to fetch Englishmen who are on the Island and to leave agents and land arms and equipment have been confirmed. Also illegal ship traffic with Egypt by means of small sailing ships from various points of the South Coast has been reported by confidential agents.
Since the conquest of the Island, at the end of May 41, a large number of English soldiers are still at liberty on the Island, who in part had not yet been imprisoned and in part had escaped from imprisonment.
In the course of time, a great number has been seized by means of several fairly large operations, and other occasions such as surrender statement made by Greeks, etc. According to reports of confidential agents another number succeeded to get to Egypt by means of submarines and illegal sailboats. The number of English soldiers on the Island, outside of agents that have been landed by plane is not thought to be very high any longer and again the Court's attention is directed to the landing of agents by plane according to statements of English prisoners about 2 to 300. They stay in the mountains in the Western Part of the Islands, and in the area around the Ida Mountains. The support that was given to these Englishmen at times by the civilian population has diminished considerably as a result of the severe sentences. This has led to denunciations on the part of the inhabitants of the country or compelled Englishmen to surrender just because they lack this support. For the reasons mentioned above, one can count on the fact that the remainder will soon be apprehended. Due to foreign domination, that has lasted for centuries, and the combats against the oppressors, the population is accustomed to the possession and the use of arms, and it is therefore difficult for the population to part with them. Campaigns, searches and fixing dead lines, brought considerable amounts of arms to light. As however, it is certain, that before, every Cretan possessed a rifle, and that during the combat in the last year a part of the arms of the combatting parties went over into the possession of the population, it may be assumed, with a fair amount of certainty that there is still a considerable amount of arms in the possession of the population.
Robber bands and cattle thieves have always been a plaque to the population, and now too, these must continue to be tough with all available means. The main areas of the activity of these bands are:
1.) The area around the Ida mountain range, the Messara plain and the Asterusi mountain range which is situated South of it. In these mountain ranges several rather large bands of robbers (Panduwas, Satanas) render the country insecure.
It has been established that there is cooperation with the English. These bands are also responsible for the murder of persons friendly towards Germany, persons who in part were appointed mayors, in the area of the Messara plain, which occurred inside of four weeks in May and June of this year. Shooting of 12 hostages search of a whole series of villages held under suspicion, requisition of property belonging to Pandawas, arrest of his relatives, burning down of his house, offering of a reward for his head, evacuation of a broad strip of the Messara plain along the coast as far as the Italian sector, has brought about a considerable pacification in this area. According to reports of confidential agents Panduwas is said to have fled to Egypt. . . . . . . .
The cattle thieves are all equipped with firearms and continue to be a considerable plague to the population.
Comparatively few acts of sabotage have been committed up to now. Only in July and August of this year, a certain number occurred in the district Chania. So far a unified organization could not be proved. It is mostly sabotage of cables, evidently with the aim of obtaining precious metal to manufacture copper nails, copper sulfate to combat parasites of the wine plants, material for bandages and such. Only in very rare cases could the perpetrators be captured. Measures taken, such as contributions, guarding of the lines by the population, arrest of hostages, advancing hours of the curfew brought about a considerable pacification in this matter also.
Franc-tireurs: Right after the termination of the combats, a serie of reprisal measures were carried out due to the participation of the population in the battle against German troops, the murder of parachutists and the atrocities which had been committed. Later on after a careful preparation a rather large scale troop operation was conducted at the beginning of August and September 1942 in the Western part of the Island, that is, in the area Alikianu - Lakki - Prasses and the Omalos Plain. During these operations a fairly large number of Greeks were shot to death by court martial, because their participation in combat had been established.
The population consisted and still consists, for the greatest part of Venezilists, that is of elements, friendly towards England, which does not mean that in general German soldiers are not treated politely and with especially pronounced hospitality. The reason for this is found in the character of the people. The hope of a large part of the population for the return of the English, depends considerably on the situation of the war in Africa and has accordingly suffered in the various ups and downs in times gone by.
The sensible part of the population has however on account of the development of war events gradually given up this hope, whereas the other large part still under the influence of the "Whispering propaganda" and the enemy radio broadcasts, which they listen to in spite of its being forbidden. The bad food situation and incapacity of the Greek authorities to bring about a change (inflation) also contribute to a lack of improvement in the attitude towards the occupying power. Summing up, it may be said that larger actions of the population are hardly to be expected as long as an attack by the English does not occur with the purpose of reoccupying the Island from outside. The general tendency of the occupying power naturally is to achieve a general pacification of the country in every respect. Nevertheless, in view of the friendliness toward England described above, it is necessary to keep strict reserve when associating with the population. This refers especially to the maintenance of secrecy.
For the Division Command The 1st Officer of The General Staff Dr. LATERNSER:
Your Honor, I believe there has been a translation mistake here which might be of importance. On the last page of the document which has just been read, it says in the middle of the page, page 161 in the German and page 163 in the English document book, the English text says:
"A fairly large number of Greeks...." It is actually on page 163 of the English text, It says: "During these operations a fairly large number of Greeks were shot to death by court martial, because their participation in combat had been established." Oh, "Established". I have made a mistake. I withdraw my objection.
MR. DENNEY: The next document is to be inserted, your Honors. I don't know whether your Honors have it in your document book. It is NOKW -- no, I beg your pardon, this is one later.
The next document, is NOKW-132 which is at page 165 in the English and 162 in the German. This is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 240. This is an order of the General Braeuer who is commanding the fortress at Crete and it is dated 3 November 1942 and the first reference is to the OKW order of 16 September 1941 which is their order No. 2060/41 which has already been placed in evidence as prosecution's exhibit 53 and it is to be found on page 57 of Document Book II, and your Honors will recall the Keitel order which was offered at that time. It is the order setting up the ratio of 50 to one for the reprisals. The second page of the order, "In such a case the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists generally must be deemed appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier."
O R D E R For the Combatting of Insurgent Movements I.
1.) The OKW has ordered that all insurrections of bands in all countries occupied by the German Wehrmacht including all seemingly minor individual incidents are to be blamed on an insurgent movement prepared by Moscow. In view of the many economic and political tensions in the occupied territories, that means in Crete also, one must also take into consideration that nationalists and other circles will ex ploit this opportunity in order to bring about difficulties for the German occupation Wehrmacht in connection with the Communist revolt.
2.) Measures taken up to now to counteract this general Communist insurgent movement have proved inadequate. As early as Fall 1941 the Fuehrer ordered severest measures to be employed to combat this movement. And that of course is referring to the Keitel order of 16 September.
3.) The following directions on procedure are to be followed:
a) Each incident of insurrection against the German Wehrmacht regardless of particular circumstances must be assumed to be a Communist origin.
b) In order to nip these intrigues in the bud the severest measures are to be applied immediately at their first instance in order to demonstrate the authority of the occupying power, and in order to prevent a wider development.
One must keep in mind that frequently a human life does not count for anything in the affected countries and a deterring effect can be achieved only by unusual severity. In such a case the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists generally must be deemed appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier and that language, it is submitted, is the same as the language in the Keitel order.
The manner of execution must increase the deterrent effect.
The opposite procedure of employing relatively mild punishment at first and being content with the threat of more severe measures as a deterrent is not in line with these principles and is therefore not to be applied.
c) Propagandistically it is to be underlined that a severe procedure rids the indigenous population of Communist elements, cattle thieves and other criminals and thus, will also benefit the population.
Consequently a clever propaganda of this kind will not lead to undesirable effects in the right thinking sections of the population following upon the increasing severity of measures against Communists and bandits.
d) The indigenous police generally will fail in the execution of such measures of force. That is why the troops themselves are to carry them out.
However, the cooperation of the population in combatting bandits is absolutely essential. Rewards and recompense for people deserving it are to be given liberally and in no picayune amounts.
They are to be real incentive. And on the other hand, the reprisal measures for any assistance to the bands must be the severer.
e) If in exceptional cases court martial proceedings are initiated in connection with insurrection, sabotage, etc., the severest punishment is indicated. Here only the death penalty can be a real deterrent agent. Especially must espionage activities, acts of sabotage, and attempts to join a foreign Wehrmacht always be punished with death. Also in cases of unauthorized possession of arms is the death sentence generally to be pronounced. Persons who are met with the weapon in hand or who are under suspicion of having participated in combat action must be shot to death.
f) Persons fleeing or committing an assault on a soldier with intent to kill are to be shot at immediately with live ammunition.
The men are to be trained again and again to hardness and ruthlessness. In this way only will the lives of German soldiers be spared.
II.
In carrying out the above policies the units are to proceed according to the following directions:
1.) The Winter ahead will compel the bands, etc., still in the mountains, to return to settled areas more than it was necessary in Summer. Mostly they will appear as harmless farmers and will not easily be recognized. To catch these bandits is the most important task of the units at the beginning of the Winter. Coincidentally all villages must be cleared of non-residents. For this purpose the population must be checked even now. The commandant of the fortress, Gr. Inn, will take the necessary steps. Greatest suspicion of the mayors is indicated.
However, our units, too, will find increased difficulties of terrain and of the weather in pursuing the bands.
2.) The units will take these facts into account:
a) By increased guard control of the isle,
b) By increased training of the searching commandos and patrols.
The entire control of the island is to be organized and directed by the sector commander. All planned patrol and other operations are to be reported to them. At his discretion he can request troops of all Wehrmacht branches for guard duty in his sector in so far, as he does not thereby endanger their special assignments (For instance anti-aircraft).
3.) To 2.a) is ordered
a) The guard of the islands must be increased to the extent the occupation forces are increased. Through frequent maneuvers in the terrain, particularly in remote parts of the island, through regular sending of patrols even into rough areas up to the remotest mountain villages, the population must become aware again it cannot escape the German Wehrmacht guard at any spot on the island.
b) This guard must be carried out not only by the Infantry but by all branches of the Wehrmacht. Precisely those troops that are permanently stationed (for instance, coast artillery, flak) will welcome being sent on patrol as a change from service with the troops.
d) All guard assignments are to be carried out with arms because the bandits are equipped both with machine guns and machine pistols.
e) The guard must fulfill its duties especially well at night.
4.) To 2.b) is ordered
a) All leaders of patrols must adapt themselves to the methods chosen by the enemy in band combat. The enemy fights with cunning. The combat will admittedly be hard.
b) The unit employed is to be instructed on its task and prepared for the difficulties awaiting it by briefing as well as by physical training.
5.) Carrying out of the Guard Operation A difference must be made between guard and search operations.
Generally, the search operation will be ordered by the Commandant of the Fortress, but may become necessary during a patrol operation if the pursued men find refuge in a village or the patrol are shot at. In such a case the leaders concerned will act on their own authority and responsibility. Consequently only experienced soldiers are to be used as leaders.
In the same way sector and sub-sector leaders can order searches on their own authority where there is danger in delay.
However, all independently executed search operations are to be reported immediately after wards to the Commandant of the Fortress Crete.
6.) Insofar as the population behaves loyally correct treatment is indicated. Exaggerated hospitality is to be rejected. Inappropriate confidence in the inhabitants of the country, particularly in those working for the Wehrmacht is to be opposed sharply. One must be on the alert everywhere for spies and informers.
7.) The unit may - for search operations - find it advantageous to ask the cooperation of the Secret Field Police and of the Field Gendarmerie
8.) It is forbidden that the unit take reprisal measures subsequent to a search action without approval by the Commandant of the Fortress Crete. Should such measures be necessary this approval is to be secured with all possible speed.
9.) Drum-head court martials are not necessary on the island since summary courts are available at any time. (KSTVO 13s).
10.) A short report on all guard and search operations is to be submitted to the sector commander. He will pass on important points to the Commandant of the Fortress.
11.) Otherwise all guard operations are to be carried out according to the policies laid down in the "Order for the Defense of the Island of Crete" (1300/42 1.11.42).
(signed) Braeuer Generalleutnant And the distribution to the Regiments, and also to the 3 Summary Courts of Division, one of the Division, one of the Fortress Brigade and one of the Commandant of the Fortress and a handwritten note at the bottom:
"All civilian officials to be notified." The "2" is illegible.
We now come to the document which is to be inserted which is NOKW 1710. It has two pages and we ask that they be inserted as pages 170 a and b in the English text and 166a and b in the German text. This is offered as Exhibit 241. Three copies have been handed to the court; there are 11 copies for defense counsel; a copy in English and German each for the interpreters and reporters.
This is a communication of 14 December 1942 from the 187th Reserve Division and it is distributed down to its three component regiments, Artillery Battalion, and other copies within the Headquarters unit. It is to be noted that this is passed on only through hands of officers.
(Handwritten notations)
Enclosure 7 II b n 187th Reserve Division Dept.
Ia File 11 Local quarters, 14.12.42 No. 42/ 42 top secret Top Secret 8 copies.
7th copy.
Reference:
1) Teletype of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast (12th Army) No. 3370/42 top secret, of 7.12.42.
2) Teletype of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast (12th Army) No. 3371/42 top secret, of 7.12.42
3) Teletype of Wehrmacht Commander Southeast (12th Army) No. 4852/42 secret of 8.12.1942 Refer:
4) Teletype Wehrmacht Hq. XVII Dept. Ib/Org. No. 1177/42 top secret dated 12.12.42.
5) 187th Reserve Division Dept. Ia File 11 No. 402/42 secret of 12.12.1942.
ONLY THROUGH HANDS OF OFFICERS Subject:
Intensified combatting of bands.
In this case: formation of Reserve groups.
I.
With the overall situation in the Mediterranean area, becoming spread the enemy powers will seek to create the prerequisites for a new front in Europe by supporting the insurgent movement in the Balkans.
The combat of partisans in the Croatian territory must therefore be conducted ruthlessly and with the utilization of all available means. The method of combat must be adapted to the methods used by the insurgents. Surprise, speed, cunning and ambush, attacks, reconnaissance and effective reprisal measures (hostages) represent means which will suppress band activities.
All measures, which serve to reinforce the fighting strength and appear to contribute to the solution of specific problems are correct. There should not be any bureaucratic impediments.
And the courts' attention is called to the references to the various communications in this connection from the Supreme Commander Southeast.
And the last document in this book is NOKW 1489, which is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 242 and is on page 171 of the English and 167 of the German. This is the Hitler order which appeals the earlier Hitler order of 9 June 1941 which was placed in evidence as Exhibit 15 at page 55 on Document Book I and although we don't come to the portion until the end of the document perhaps we ought to call the court's attention to it at this time. It does not appear until the last paragraph on page 178. This is dated 28 of December 1942, transmitted by officers only, 24 copies of which this is the 10th.
Instruction No. 47
I.) The situation in the Mediterranean area renders feasible an attack on Crete and the German and Italian footholds in the Agean and the Balkan Peninsula in the not too far future.
It must be expected that this attack will be supported by revolts in the western Balkan countries.
The augmented influence of the Anglo-Saxon powers on the attitude of Turkey demands increased attention in that direction.
11.) Based on this situation and on the development in North Africa I transfer the defense in the Southeast area including the neighboring islands to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast who as "Commanderin-Chief Southeast" (Army Group E) is directly subordinated to me.
For the carrying out of the coastal defense the rules of instruction No. 40 are valid.
The army forces of the allied powers will be directly subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast tactically only in the case of an enemy attack.
The Naval and Air Forces of the allied powers will then be submitted tactically to the High Command of the Headquarters of the corresponding German Wehrmacht unit.
This chain of subordination will be made effective by special orders.
For the preparation of such defensive combat the following tasks devolve on the Commander-in-Chief Southeast:
1.) Preparation for defense along the coast with main efforts in the Dodekanese, Crete and the Peloponnesus which are to be developed for fortresses. (Exceptions Mytilene and Chios).
2.) Final pacification of the Hinterland and destruction of the insurgents and bands of all kinds in cooperation with the Italian 2nd Army.
3.) Preparation of all measures which become necessary in case of an enemy attack with the aid or consent of Turkey against the Balkans, in agreement with the Bulgarian High Command.
In addition the Commander-in-Chief Southeast controls for the German area: 875 macht committed in the Southeast, according to their request and the transport space available for the purpose.
Decisions in all questions which result from the unified Command of all transports and communications in the occupied Southeast area for all three sections of the Wehrmacht.
Organization of Command
A) In the German area:
1.) The Commander-in-Chief in the Southeast is the supreme representative of the Wehrmacht in the Southeast and exercises executive power in the areas occupied by German troops.
He supervises the Civil Administration established by the Commanders and the Commandant of the Fortross Crete.
The subordination of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast under the Commander-in-Chief, South, is cancelled as of 1 January 1943.
2.) Subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast are:
a) For the area Croatia "The German GeneralPlenipotentiary in Croatia" (except for his position as Military Attache) and "The Commander of the German Troops in Croatia".
b) For the area Old Serbia "The Commanding General and Commander in Servia."
c) For the area Saloniki and the islands Lemnos, Mytilene, Chios and Strati as well as for the neutral zone towards Turkey in Thrace, the "Commander Saloniki - Agean."
d) For the area of the port of Piraeus, the quarters and area of the German troops in Attica as well as the island Melos the "Commander Southern Greece."
e) For the area Crete "The Commander of the Fortress Crete."
f) The "Admiral Aegean" in all questions of coastal defense.
g) The "Military Attache in Sofia" in the scope of his tasks beyond the asks of an attache. For the Navy the limits existing up to now between Navy group
3.) Luftwaffe:
a) Command of Air Warfare aa) The Command of the Air Warfare in the entire Mediterranean area, except for the Mediterranean area belonging to the south of France, remains the task of the Command in-Chief South.
He receives instructions for the conduct of battle.
(1) in the middle Mediterranean through the Commando Supreme.
(2) in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan area through the Commanderin-Chief of the Luftwaffe, according to my directions.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Commando Supremo adjust their essential intentions for the conduct of aerial warfare with one another.
bb) In order to guarantee in joint combat actions especially in the costal defense the centralized conduct of battle in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan area, the Commander-in-Chief South must designate a Headquarters which cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief Southeast with regard to the command of air warfare in that area. To this also belongs the preparation of the ground organization in the Balkan area, and the preparation of cooperation with the allied powers in case of enemy a attacks.
b) Air Defense:
aa) Preparation and command of the air defense in the Mediterranean is the task of the Commander-in-Chief South under the Commando Supremo.
bb) In the Balkan area the preparation and command of the air defense is incumbent on the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, according to the instructions of the Commanderin-Chief South, in order thereby to establish uniformity of Command of the Air Warfare also for the eastern Mediterranean.
B) The preparation of the conduct of battle and the internal pacification of the country is to be guaranteed by close cooperation with the allied powers. In cases where it has not yet been done, Liasion officers are to be exchanged.
1). Italy:
a) Army:
Instructions considered necessary for the Italian area are to be submitted to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and synchronized by the latter with the Commando Supremo, who then gives the corresponding orders to the Italian armies operating in the southeast area.
b) Navy:
Instructions of the Commander-in-Chief Navy Group south to the Italina Admiral Dodekanes intended for preparatory measures are to be submitted to the Operations Division by the Navy Group South as orders in draft, and the Operations Division decides upon the corresponding orders together with Supremarina. The orders in question are issued by Supermarina after the consent of Commando Supremo has been obtained.
c) Luftwaffe:
Instructions considered necessary for the Italian Luftwaffe in the southeast area are to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief South who synchronizes them with the High Command of the Italian Luftwaffe after having obtained the consent of the Commando Supremo, and effects the issue of a corresponding order.
2.) Bulgaria:
A similar procedure in cooperation with the Bulgarian Wehrmacht is being strived for (the result of the conversations with the Bulgarians is not yet available).
3.) Croatia:
The cooperation with Croatia and the utilization of the Croatian Wehrmacht continues as previously. It is the duty of the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, and the headquarters of the German Navy and Luftwaffe, to guarantee the centralization of preparations for defense in the entire Southeast area and they are authorized to examine the measures ordered for the purpose.
IV.) The Commander-in-Chief Southeast possesses all powers of a territorial Commander in relation to the three sections of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS in those parts of Croatia, Serbia and Greece including the Greek islands, occupied by German troops.
The areas exclusively occupied by German troops form an Operational area there, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast holds executive power via the Commanders subordinated to him.
Those parts of Croatia occupied by German troops or in which German troops operate are also counted as operations areas.