"Point B) has been clarified so that a limited number of Security Police vehicles will receive special identification papers 'Secret Service Trip' which will free them from the control of Wehrmacht patrols."
"For the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia", signed "von Geitner". The signature is typed and is signed.
Then the date 12 October 1942 with reference to a teletype of the previous day, a communication to the district headquarters from the Commander in Serbia, Military Commander Serbia:
"As reprisal measure for the racial German policeman shot in Samosch on 10 October 42 the hanging of 50 Communists is hereby approved."
On page 69 of the German and 56 of the English, report for 15 October 1942, with reference to activities of the SS Division Prinz-Eugen to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, from the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia;
"After the destruction of Xriva Reka the armed and resisting male population were killed.
Mayor and municipal civil servants near Trstenik convicted as insurgents. Houses burned down in reprisal.
Then for the 22nd of October, -- it says "27" on the mimeographed copy, it should be the "22", at the bottom of page 69 in the German, to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, again from the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, 717th Division, 1st Company of the 700, -Could I see the original again please?
MR. DENNEY: "The 1st Company of the 737th Infantry Battalion encountered enemy group in Mhaljevci, 5 enemy dead, 18 prisoners shot to death, own losses: 8 wounded." And the Daily Report of the 23rd to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, "In reprisal for the racial German policemen murdered on 10 October, 50 Communist executed in public." And this is a reference back to the report of the 12th of October for the 10th of October, which is contained in Exhibit No. 228. That is Page 69 of the German and Page 55 of the English. And then, "1st Royall Bulgarian Occupation Corps: 6 Communists shot to death." Page 71 of the German and Page 58 of the English, report for the 24th October, to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, Croatia: 714th Infantry Division: During mopping up operations, 4 enemy dead, 7 suspects captured, 16 rifles, 2 machine guns and equipment captured. Shelters for insurgents burned down. During reconnaissance of II Battalion , 741st Infantry Regiment contact with the enemy, 2 dead, 2 prisoners shot, 1 Ustascha dead, 1 wounded." And then for the 25th, still to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and still from the Commanding General Commander in Serbia, on Page 71 of the German and Page 59 of the English, "Own patrol fired on by band northwest of Cacak, 13 inhabitants arrested, farm burned down. Influential Serb murdered near Cacak. Of 64 arrested (Daily Report 22 October) 4 convicted persons shot to death." And for the 26th--I believe in the German copy that is an error; it should be for the 26th of October, the next one. "Croatia: 714th Infantry Division: Kozara operation concluded. Additional 19 enemy dead, 6 prisoners (will be shot after interrogation)" Report on the same date for the "Prinz Eugen" Division, "Leading unreliable Cetnik shot dead for unauthorized possession of arms." And then, the last page of the document, Page 72 in the German and Page 60 in the English, the report for the 29 of October, "SS Division "Prinz Eugen": During operation Eizer Voda, 3 insurgents shot in public by the 2nd Mountain Jaeger Regiment." Turning then to Page 73 of the German and Page 61 of the English is Document No. NOKW-1156. This is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit No.
229 in evidence. This is a report for the Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, for whom the Defendant Geitner was Chief of Staff, for 30 October 1942, with reference to the title, "The Communist Insurrection Movement in the area of former Yugoslavia." Paragraph 3, "Leadership:" "The supreme leader of the Communists of Yugoslavia is "Tito". His origin is probably Croatian of Slovanian. He is alleged to have participated in the Spanish Civil War. Up to now, no details could be ascertained regarding his person. Headquarters are situated in Mliniste in the Klekovac Mountains (23 Southwest of Kljuc). "Tito" considers economic co-operation of the partisans as equal partners with Germany as absolutely possible even in the Yugoslav ares."
Strength: Reports available estimate the total number of Communist insurgents to be 28,000 to 30,000 men, 60% of which are armed. Only a minor part can be considered convinced Communists. The masses composed of farmers and workers who were mislead by propaganda and /or fled into the woods for fear of reprisal and elimination measures.
Active participation of women and girls as nurses and as couriers is common practice in all units.
Organization: The basic unit of the armed Communist groups is the peoples' liberation partisan unit which corresponds approximately to a Battalion (frequently also to a regiment) and which is organized in companies, platoons and groups.
When the movement grew, it became necessary to organize brigades which were assembled according to ancestral origin as Serbian, Bosnian and Herzegowinian brigades. A further step was the organization of the Proletarian Brigades which were to accentuate symbolically the part played by the workers in combat. The assault brigades represented a specialization which was due to the acceptance of selected fighters and choice equipment.
In the 1st unit of the staff for the Bosnian Krajina even a Youth Battalion has been found to exist.
"A political commissar --"
MR. DENNEY: And again the reference is called to the Court's attention "-----is assigned the leader in all of the units as far as the company.
Rank insigna: All are worn on the upper part of the left sleeve. Commandant of the zone of operation: like his staff officers an open chevron with the point on top and the red star below. Battalion Commander: 1 red star; 1 vertical stripe below. Company Commander: 3 red stars. Platoon Leader: 2 red stars. Group Leader: 1 red star. Unit Political Commissar: 1 red star, hammer and sickle in gold superimposed 2 vertical stripes below. Battalion Political Commissar: 1 red star, hammer and sickle in gold superimposed, 1 vertical stripe below. Company Political Commisar: 1 red star, hammer and sickle in gold superimposed.
All wear the Soviet star in their hat.
Method of Combat: In Combat, the insurgents apply the principles of guerrila warfare as they were made available to the troops as early as Fall 1941.
MR. DENNEY: And then there's a reference to a Command Staff Section communication of that day.
However, as can logically be expected, the developments of the movement has brought along a change in combat method. One can differentiate three variations.
a. The ambush of small bands with the purpose of acquiring weapons ammunitions and equipment to equip new members.
b. The open attack of medium size bands with the purpose of annihilating the legal armed forces having for a secondary aim, the acquisition of loot.
c. The conquest of strategically important villages in such numbers as to make possible a total occupation of the territory desires.
If a large size hand is scattered, the sub-leaders return to the methods of guerrilla warfare.
The attack on morally or materially infeior enemies is considered customary. The bands evade superior forces because signal communications supply them in time with the information necessary for an estimate of the situation. If a band is surrounded, it scatters according to orders and attempts individually under the protection of the night to leave the encircled area. During the day, all means of camouflage are used like digging in, covering with foliage, climbing up trees, etc. The treatment of prisoners differs. Frequently it is based on propaganda reasons and is carried out in such a manner that the prisoners are not shot to death but are released after having been robbed of everything. If the leadership considers it practical, exchange is also suggested. Officers were shot to death in almost every case.
And the attention of the Court is called to the part of rank insignia of Battalion Company political Commissars and the similar but not identical language in the Commissar order which appears at page 51 of Document Book 1 at -and that is NOKW-1076.
Then turning to page 75 of the German and 65 of the English, NOKW-1394 is offered as 230 in evidence, This is again a report with reference to insignia and it is an enclosure to the 718th Infantry Division report from the staff of the Division Commander and there are also annexed to the original, which I should like to hand up for the Court to examine, some small diagrams of the distinguishing insignia of the units which were fighting with the partisans under the direction of Tito. It is dated 1 November 1942.
"Information about the enemy No. 9. At the beginning of October 1942 a group of Communists 500 to 600 men in strength was reported south of Travnik in the area BistroRastovo, and on the Vranica Plain. Another group moved on 8 October 1942 from Kupros towards the east to the Vranica Plain, These two groups form a brigade under the leadership of Steva Kovacevic, a former farmer from Montenegro whose staff is at a point 2107 Locike in the Vranica Plain."
Up to now the 3 battalions were determined. The III Battalion, it gives its area, strength 200 men, armament unknown.
The IV Battalion with a staff, gives its area, strength 180 men, armament 2 heavy machine guns, 3 light machine guns of Italian origin; leader: Milovan Saranovic; Political Commissar: Vrbica, alias "Migo".
The V Battalion, gives its area, consisting of indigenous peasants, men only, strength 200 men; armament; 5 light machine guns and rifles (of Yugoslave origin).
"The whole Brigade is not uniformly clothed. In addition to civilian clothes German, Croatian, Italian and Serbian uniforms are worn. All however wear a rod star on the cap. The medical service is very bad. The food supplies are good, but there is no salt and no tobacco. Ammunition is very scarce.
The IV and V Battalions were alerted on 51 October 1942 as they presumed an operation of the German Wehrmacht and retreated allegedly in direction Bugojno on 1 November 1942.
The V Battalion has with it as a prisoner Corporal Buerger of the 3rd Company of the 668th Regiment. The negotiations of exchange offered by the Communists on 31 October 1942 remained without success on account of the alerting of the Brigade."
For the Commander of the Division The 1st Officer of the General Staff" And the Geitner who is mentioned here is the one we have referred to before and not the defendant Geitner.
Page 76 of the German and 67 of the English, Document NOKW-1412, is offered as prosecution's exhibit 231. These are some extracts from the War Diary of the Commanding General in Serbia with reference to the exchange of hostages with the SD, together with an order for shooting mayors who. show a passive disposition.
Page 77 of the German and 68 of the English under date of 26 November, the Army Chief of Staff -
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, you now refer to page 68?
MR. DENNEY: Page 68 of the English and 77 of the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, will you repeat what it is, please.
MR. DENNEY: 68 of the English.
THE PRESIDENT: And what document number?
MR. DENNEY: 77 of the German, Document NOKW-1412. The first page is just the cover page of the War Diary.
THE PRESIDENT: My document book -
MR. DENNEY: Sir, we can get your pages for your Honor. Are some pages omitted?
THE PRESIDENT: Apparently so. I am using the Secretary General's book this time.
MR. DENNEY: I am sorry it has happened, your Honor. We will certainly endeavor to correct it at the recess.
Under date of 26 November 1942, the Army Chief of Staff -- that is a reference to the defendant Foertsch -- requests by telephone the shooting to death of all mayors remaining passive.
"Teletype order to 610th Administrative Sub-area Headquarters to exchange in agreement with the SD the 60 hostages (for kidnapping of a German police sergeant) which have been seized unauthorized by the Commanding Officer of the II. Battalion of the 5th Police Regiment primarily for persons those who are suspected of Communism.
The Commanding General agrees to the successive shooting to death of a certain number of these hostages if the kidnapped police sergeant does not return within a definite time limit. The population is to be informed.
And the Commanding General who is here referred to is -this is an extract from the War Diary of the Military Commander and Commander in Serbia.
Teletype order to 704th Infantry Division and to Administrative Sub-area Headquarters 599 to shoot to death 25 hostages in reprisal for Organization Todt man who was found murdered near Zagubica and to proclaim it publicly."
These again are typewritten excerpts, andon page 69 of the English and 78 of the German, NOKW -
JUDGE CARTER: In this previous document you say that the Army Chief of Staff refers to Foertsch?
MR. DENNEY: Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast, yes, your Honor.
JUDGE CARTER: I thought this was the diary of the Commanding General in Serbia.
MR. DENNEY: It is the diary, sir, but it says the Army Chief of Staff and the only army that is down in that area at that time was the 12th Army, if Your Honor will recall, which at this time was the commanded by the not present General Loehr to whom the defendant Foertsch was Chief of Staff? It had been carried over from first List, then Kuntze, and now Loehr.
NOKW-1250, which is at page 69 of the English and page 78 of the German is an order of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for increased partisan combat during the winter of 1942--1943. This is offered as prosecution's Exhibit 252 and on this we would pass it up to your Honors and direct your attention to the initial of the defendant Foertsch which appears to the right of the signed copy of the order. It is dated 7 December 1942, top secret, 20 copies of which this is the 20th copy, under Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and the distribution appears on the third page, page 71 of your Honors' book.
Intensified Combatting of Bands during the Winter 1942 / 1943
1). In the expansion of the overall position in the Mediterranean area the enemy powers will attempt more than they have done so far, to create the prerequisites for establishing a new front in Europe through inciting and supporting the insurgent movements in the Balkans. All the more we must do everything to prevent this. Every band formation which proclaims itself must be nipped in the bud, every enemy group which appears must be destroyed and exterminated immediately ...
2). This knowledge, as well as the fact that additional units from Germany cannot be expected, forces us to an intensified conduct of warfare. This must adjust itself to an increased extent to the fighting methods of our enemies and must surpass them. Surprise, speed, stratagem and ambushes, raids, espionage, effective reprisal measures (hostages), pursuit detachments, and shock troops led by hold commanders, etc., are the means for this. The concept "Winter Quarters" does not exist. But above all we must also become mobile with regard to the concentration of larger formations. The mission can only be accomplished if the largest possible concentration of fighting strength, in keeping with the appropriate traffic and terrain situation, can be attained within the shortest time possible, and relentlessly overcoming all terrain and weather difficulties. Any formation of the enemy that shows itself can be effectively destroyed and it must be accomplished under any circumstances. A shifting of units to combat enemy forces that have landed within the entire coastal area of the Southeast can also be considered.
3). This means increased efforts in all fields with the total exploitation of all possibilities and all sources of assistance offered gy the country. The concept "Improvisation" hereby stands at the beginning of every thought and action. Everything, serving to increase the fighting strength and seeming suitable to accomplish the assigned tasks, is right. Bureaucratic concepts are to be opposed with a very loose interpretation of the directives.
"An order concerning the establishing of combat echelons and emergency units, as well as further individual directives necessary, follows.
Signed (Loehr) And in the distribution, it is to be noted that there was an advance message by teletype to Commanding General and Commander in Serbia, to the Commander of the German Armed Forces in Croatia and to the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia.
Page 81 in the German and 73 in the English, Document NOKW-1251is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 234 in evidence.
JUDGE CARTER: 233.
Mr. DENNEY: 233; thank you, Your Honor.
This is dated 15 December 1942, bears the heading Wehrmacht Commander Southeast, and is a report on experiences in connection with the dynamiting of the Gorgopotamos Bridge:
1.) Course of events:
On 25 November 1942 about 20:00 hours an attack was executed by a band of about 200-300 men on the Gorgopotamos Bridge South of Lamia. (This bridge is) about 211 meters long and crosses a rugged valley. The approach was made in three columns from the mountain side. Without being noticed the two flank columns occupied the heights rising above the railroad and bridge on both sides. From here, a concentric surprise fire attack on the Italian bridge heads took place which immediately caused losses in the shelters which are not bullet proof. In addition both flank groups immediately blocked the road to the left and to the right of the bridge by mines or rather detonations making impossible the bringing up of reinforcements by railroad.
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The blasting material was of English origin and had been prepared carefully. The method of execution shows the hand of an expert blasting specialist; the auxiliary personnel had been instructed well but as yet it worked without experience. The demolition charges were fastened ready for use into pieces of wood which were inserted with prepared rope or by the use of a magnet holding it in place.
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f) Employment of the population for the security and patrolling of railroad tracks for short periods of time. In case of a mine explosion, loosening of rails, etc., to call to account the civilian who was patrolling there previously, if necessary to shoot him. In case of a surprise attack, to punish the villages situated near the locality of the attack ! To seize hostages! To arrest non-residents!
g) Employment of the civilian population extensively and ruthlessly for the construction of fortification!
For the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast (12th Army) The Chief of the General Staff (Signed) Foertsch And, there were 70 copies of this order signed by the Chief of Staff, defendant Foertsch, which went out and I would like to pass the original to Your Honor so you may see his signature and then perhaps counsel for the defendant Foertsch would like to see the document.
Turning then to page 83 of the German and 76 of the English, Document NOKW-950, is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 234. This is a situation report of the Commander of German Troops in Croatia to the Armed Forces Commander Southeast for the period 7 to 16 December. The first date is 22 December 1942, situation report to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast and the note for the enclosure, and then an estimate of the situation from 7.12 to 16.12:
"Enemy situation: The enemy situation in the sector reported on here has become aggravated. The assault power of the partisans in the area between Livno and Karlovac has strengthened. The forces are mainly organized in 5 Partisan Divisions (3 to 400 men) consisting of 3 to 4 brigades each. The Divisions are equipped with heavy weapons including some artillery. Supply and rear services have been organized militarily.
Though, considering the difficulties involved in organizing an illegal army, these efforts should not be overestimated, the combat power of these units seems to have improved so much that they have been able to make a general advance between the Bosna and Una in a North-East direction.
A Corps Staff is situated in Benakovac (West of Sanski Most). Seemingly advancing are:
The 4th Partisan Division (?) some units toward Bosni and Novi and some units towards Prijedor.
The 5th Partisan Division toward Prijedor.
Parts of the 1st Partisan Division are assumed to be still in the area around Vacar Vakuf, units might possibly have advanced into the area Banjaluka-Prnjavor via Kotor Varos.
The 3rd Partisan Division has advanced toward the Bosna Valley between Zenica and Zepce via Jagce and North of it.
The 2nd Partisan Division is alleged to be near Livno.
If it is true, it has a mission to secure the partisan state against DM Chetniks in the Southeast and probably to invade the Makarsak-Zone evacuated by the Italians - in order to include this area in the Partisan State.
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3. Acts of sabotage:
As compared with the period covered by the last report acts of sabotage on the main railroad line have increased. The following acts of sabotage and attacks took place and then it lists the various kinds of sabotage, for instance:
Railroad sabotage:
a) On the main line ......................... 15
b) On the unsecured branch lines ............ 18 Road sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sabotage on telephone lines . . . . . . . 11 Attacks on members of the German Wehrmacht 1 Other attacks.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cases of looting . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.) Own tactical situation and intention:
The tactical situation is conditioned by the advance of the partisans against the ared of Bosna and Una as stated in paragraph two. This advance was stopped in the Western Part between Bosni Novi and Sanski Most but due to the frequent failures of Croatian units has not been entirely taken care of. In the Eastern part the East wing of the partisan group near Jajce suffered a considerable set back. Enemy losses during this operation: 431 counted dead, 60 wounded, prisoners and shot to death, 4. Losses of our own: Two officers and 58 men dead; wounded, two officers and 93 men; missing 8 men.
. . . . . . . . . .
Then on page 85 of the German, 79 of the English, NOKW-956. This is a situation report of the Commander of the German troops in Croatia to the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast. 30 December recites the enclosure of the situation report for the 17 December to the 26 of December, the report just following the one that was submitted before as Exhibit 234:
"The large Communist Group on the other side of the line of demarkation threatens now as before the area secured by German troops. By the occupation of Livno and Tomislavgrad the "Reich" of the Supreme Communist leader Tito has achieved its largest expansion to date. His present day territory is 250 kilometers long and approximately 80 to 100 kilometers wide, and the court's attention is respectfully directed to those figures which set up an area approximately 135 miles which a minimum of about 50 to 54 miles.
According to orders which were found there are allegedly 63,000 armed men in this partisan state who have at their disposal heavy weapons, several guns, motorized and horse-drawn vehicles and a sufficient train of beasts of burden. The heavy offensive activities of these Communist units have abated since the period covered by this report. However numerous enemy reports disclose renewed assembly and preparations for attacks on Jaice, and possibly on Banja Luka too.
Because of the clever evasion on the part of partisan units, our own troops despite uninterrupted offensives were unable to fight with any noticeable effect the partisan brigades near Sanski Most. Sanski Most itself is again threatened from three sides. A similar situation exists near Jajce which is threatened for the fourth time by strong Communist units. Obviously, the enemy is attempting to bring about a decisive success (interrupting the main railroad line?) in connection with the Russian offensive (Before spring). Another reason that one may not count on a decrease in attacks is that the partisans constantly gain new confidence from the failures of the Croatians.
. . . . . . . . .
3 Acts of Sabotage:
During the period covered by this report railroad sabotage has increased. The following cases of sabotage and of surprise attacks have taken place:
1. Railroad sabotage:
a) On the main lines. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 cases
b) On the unsecured branch lines road sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 cases 2. Sabotage telephone lines . . . . . . . . . 1 case 3. Attacks on Members of the German Wehrmacht ----4. Attacks on farms, town halls and the like . 1 case 5. Pillaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---. . . . . . . . . . . .Operation Tusla II:
Was concluded on 21 December. The intention to annihilate the partisans in the area Northeast of Tusla is fully realized. Due to the failure of Ustascha Battalion remaining partisans were able to break through to the south but they were scattered near Sekovici by Pravoslav volunteers. A pacification of the area Northeast of Tusla may be expected shortly. Result 250 enemy dead, 160 delivered for compulsory labor, the Grossgespan of Brod for weeks in captivity of the Chetniks was freed and 80 Chetniks disarmed.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Signed in draft Lueters Turning to page 83 of the English and 88 of the German, NOKW-979, it is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 236.
These are reports of the 718th Division with reference to the operation against Jajce, and they contain a detailed description of partisan units. Dated 30 September 1942 and carry through to the 20th of December, the same year.
"1. General matters:
"The insurgents in the area Jajce belong to a large well-organized group of partisans. The leader of this large group is the already wellknow 'Tito'. His headquarters is at Glamoc (50 kilometers southwest of Jajce).
"This group of insurgents is divided into several brigades which are again divided into three battalions each of which consists of three companies. The strength of one company is from 60 to 100 men.
"From enemy papers and statements of prisoners it is deducted that the 2nd Serbian Proletaria Brigade is situated west of Vrabas and the 5th Montenegrinian and the 1st Herzegovinian Brigade south of Jajce. The latter two brigades are meant for the interruption of the road and the railway line Travnik-Jajce.
"From the south further brigades some with Italian tanks are supposed to be approaching for support.
"From interrogations and enemy papers it is evident:
"1. In every unit a special confidential agent of the political staff is commissioned with the supervision not only of the partisans but also of the Commissar and the Commandant.
"2. The intelligence service of the partisans is excellent. As scouts they mostly make use of: beggars, youths, and Dalmatian peddlers.
"3. In every partisan battalion there is a signals officer whose task it is to organize an intelligence service of the civilian population.
"4. During an attack they first throw in shock troops equipped with hand grenades and bottles of gasoline. Then follow lines of riflemen. In the meantime in the terrain still further back, groups specifi cally provided for the purpose, commence firing in order to direct attention to themselves.
"5. The partisans have penal battalions. Members of these units must work hard; they must remove mines, must construct road blockades and tank traps and must serve as a carrier service. Furthermore they are employed in especially dangerous operations.
"6. The brigades have at their disposal anti-tank groups. The members carry beer bottles filled with gasoline which have a fuse 20 to 25 centimeters long. The fuse is lighted with a match or a lighter and from a safe cover they are thrown against the tanks.
"7. Furthermore they have at their disposal nine detachments eleven men strong. The members are former foremen of blasting gangs or workers from artillery workshops. Their task is the manufacturing of mines from bombs or artillery duds.
"8. By preference the attacks are made by night. Moonlit nights are avoided; rainy nights preferred.
"9. Before the attack the adversary is put under the effect of alcohol.
"10. Premiums are paid for the capturing of prisoners.
"11. The losses of the partisans are kept strictly secret even from their own people.
"12. The food supply of a part of the partisan units is unsufficient. Once in a while only there is bean soup or a small piece of meat. The bread consists of a mixture of barley, oaths and bran - every second or third day a small piece.
"13. Examples of enemy ground signal:
red: enemy in that direction.
white: enemy encountered, green:
we advance, green-red:
we retreat, green-white:
attack, twice green:
we request aid.
"14. The partisans fix signs of recognition several days in advance; they are different during the daytime than at night. For example, during daytime: moving the body to the left and right or holding the left hand against the mouth.
at night: copying the noises of goats or the cuckoo.
Issuing of various passwords consisting of challenge and password. For instance, Sari...Suhaca, or Faschists...is withdrawn.
I don't think I need to read the insignia rank. We just had them. They are similar to those we had before. However, I would like to point out for Your Honors' notice, "Political Commissar" we have here, and on the prior page, and with reference to the hammer and sickel embroidered in gold on the star, and the reference back to the Commissar of June 1941, which is in Document I.
Turning to page 91 of the German, page 86 of the English, details about the enemy;
"II. Details about the enemy.
"After having taken Mrkonjic Grad on 24 August 1942 the partisans advanced with small units up to the near neighborhood of the town Jajce. After small weak attacks a stronger attack was made on the towns Prudi and Carevo Polje for the first time on 21 September 1942. At the same time Bukovic and the electricity works in Jajce were attacked. The partisans received reinforcements from Mrkonjic (2000 to 3000 men) on 24 September 1942. Thereupon on 25 September the concentric attack on Jajce and places south of it took place. The electric train line between Duganovci and Jajce was cut and destroyed in several places. Jajce was taken on 25 September at 1700 hours.
"According to our own land reconnaissance and Croatian reports the advanced posts and fortifications along the line Bunar - Bistrica Doribaba and various instances of distance and direction. Near Vericki Kam and Duganovci the partisans are in possession of machine gun positions which dominate the approach roads to Jajce.
"One of the leaders is supposed to be a certain Yugoslav Major Djokic who is now in the area of Podmilacje and Divicani with about 500 men.