A (THE WITNESS STANDS WITH POINTER AND REFERS TO THE MAP) The Peloponnes is a very mountainous country, and the coast is a very rock one. The Peloponnes is roughly of the same size as Belgium. From Athens a railway line goes across the Channel of Corinth, along the northern bank of the Gulf of Corinth, in an eastern direction to Kyparethia from there via Tripolis, back to Corinth, and thus closes the circle. From Megalopolis there is another railway line to Kalamata and the south. And there is another one from Argos to Naublia. This is a small-track railway. In some cases Diesel engines are used sometimes steam engines. Of similar quality and number are the thoroughfares. There is one from Corinth which goes along the Gulf of Corinth. This road is negotiable for motor vehicles. It reaches up to the neighborhood of Arexos where there is a big air base built by the British. And then if the weather is dry one can take a car as far as Pirlos. From Pilos one can go via Vikina to Tripolis. That part of the country from Pirlos to Kyparetyia - where there is a railroad line - has no road at all. One can only use donkeys there. Then one can go on from Kyparethia to Pylos, where there is the Gulf of Navarino, where there was a naval battle against the Turks in 1337, when the Greeks were liberated from Turkish oppression. From Pirlos a road leads to Kalamata and from Kalamata to Tripolis via the pass road of Kalamata to Argos and Corinth. A second north-south communication leads from Tripolis via Sparta, to the small harbor town of Kythion, South of Patras, in what is known as the Taygotos Mountains, we have mountains higher than 2,000 meters. The mountainous district is very poor because there is very little wooded country in the Peloponnes. Naked rocks are visible; therefore, in this mountainous area one can just feed sheep and goats. Cattle breeding is scarcely in existence down there. The valleys, however, and the rivers are all the more fertile. The whole of the coastal area between Corinth and Patras is a winegrowing country.
The plains of Elis are very fertile, also the valley of Kalamatha, the basis reaching from Tripolis via Sparta, but, above all, the Argolis, where there is a large fruit-growing country-figs, oranges, a good deal of mellons and vegetables and, above all, olives. As far as the large cities are concerned there are in the Peloponnes Patras on the Gulf of Corinth, a city of about 60,000 inhabitants. The next big city is Kalamatha on the southern bank, with about 40,000 inhabitants. Then we have Tripolis, the actual capital of the Peloponnes, which has 30,000 inhabitants. Then, there are a few less significant town on the coast, such as Corinth, on the Gulf of Corinth, Naublia, Argos, Kythion, Pylos, Abaiass, and others. The villages and the plains are rich, but the mountainous country is very poor. I might briefly tough on three of the old cultural cities since I am talking about the Peloponnes. For one thing there's Olympia, Mycene. Then there is Epidauros along the eastern coast of the Argolis. But, apart from those, there are a large number of old buildings.
From this geography it becomes clear what military use can be made of the country. We had to safeguard the harbor towns, and we had to defend the plains which were suitable for landings from the air, above all Elis, the vicinity of Tripolis, and the neighborhood of Argos and Naublia. Thus the fortress divisions were committed in regiment. One regiment safeguarded Elis from the air base of Araxos right down to Pyrgos. This stretch from Pyrgos to Kyparethia. remained unoccupied; and then the valley near Kyparethia and the vicinity of Pyrgos had been fortified. There were other bases near Kalamatha, near Kythion, and near Naulia; and, of course, along the Channel of Corinth, and along Xylocastron there were also bases. Often navy or army artillery had been attached to these strong points or had been concentrated around them. Climatic conditions made fighting difficult.
Summer is very hot, and the basins and valleys of the rivers are infested with fever--particularly the stretch up there. (POINTING TO THE MAP).
Attica and Boetia are of a similar character. Their scenery also is mountainous. Attica, of course, has Athens as its most important city. There is only one railway from Athens to Salonika, and it joins the Balkan network near Belgrade. And then it goes via Zagreb, via Nish to Sofia. There again are very few thoroughfares, the road from Athens to Corinth and the one from Athens via Thebes up to the North into Thessaly. Bolt positions were established in the interior of the country while the harbor town of Pyraeus was protected by the island Salamis in front, it, quite apart from the fact that Crete blocks the entrance to the whole of the Aegean anyhow. In the Corps area were also included the islands Euboea, Xante, Mylos, Paros, and Syros. In Attica and Boetia we have wine and olives again. The area which is interesting from an agricultural point of view is the area around Kopais. This is a lake country which the English have dried out to an extent of nearly 100,000 Prussian hectares. Almost one-third of this can be artificially watered. One can plant cotton, wheat and other things in plenty. The actual corn growing part of Greece is situated in Thessaly outside the old Greece-of ancient times, that is. It ends at the Gulf of Malakkia. These areas--Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thrace became part of Greece only in later years by conquest.
Q Now, General, what units were stationed in Attica, Boetia, and Euboea at that time?
AAs far as Attica was concerned--Boetia, and Euboea--we had the XIth Luftwaffe Field Division at our disposal, and for a certain period of time we had the First Regiment Brandenburg. In Boetia there was, moreover, the Police Regiment 18, but that was under the command of the Higher SS and Police Leader. They were serving there. Then interchangeably with the Brandenburg Regiment we had, in the course of time, the Arabic Division, which I mentioned before-consisting of two or three so-called Mountain Battalions.
Q What about the defense of Attica? What was the idea?
A I said before that in Attica we took up bolt positions, but, unlike the positions held in the Peloponnes, we had not committed any troops there. In July, in view of the vastness of this area, we had to wait and see whether an enemy attack would be directed against the eastern or southern coasts of Attica. The south seemed to be less suitable for surprises because there we had a number of islands in front of the mainland where naval or army batteries were stationed. Any surprise attacks there were not to be feared.
Q General, what part of your Corps area was the main area for the bands?
A The main area for the bands, after the Italian collapse, was the Peloponnes. But, depending on the situation we had a fairly lively band activity in Euboea, in Parnass which is to the west of the road, (POINTING) from Thea to Lamya, and then in the Sparcheies Valley which forms the approaches to the Epirus, via the notorious band nest at Tarpenision. Particularly by the Autumn of 1943 we felt the influence of Communist elements to be on a mounting scale. Many of them came from Bulgaria, and ELAS had the upper hand in the Peloponnes and Southern Greece, after the last EDES forces in the Peloponnes had, in the late autumn, been destroyed by ELAS.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q What year?
A This was the late autumn of 1943. In the Peloponnes and in the areas which I have just indicated we had only ELAS. ELAS formed a small isolated group in the west of the Epirus as we have heard from General Lanz.
AApart from the Italians, were the bands also supplied by any other party?
A Yes, as early as the summer the British had supplied the bands with arms. British, and later on American, officers had appeared with the bands. The scenery of the Peloponnes, which is so mountainous in the interior, with its rocky coast, was an ideal country for guerilla warfare, which is the explanation why German troops there were exposed to the greatest risks. For one thing, expecting the enemy landing there, we were committed to the coast and the air dromes; and for the rest we had to suffer to a mounting scale from band activities.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Were the German soldiers prepared to fight the bands? Had they trained for that purpose?
A No, guerilla warfare was quite unknown to the German soldier up to that time. He had been trained for normal combat fighting, as we were expecting it, for instance, in the case of an Allied landing.
Q According to your experience, did the bands observe the rules of international law?
A Bands and international law? They wore a completely different pair of shoes. Bands in rare cases would wear uniforms, and sometimes they would wear insignia; but as a regular troop, we could never identify them. Open combat, the sort of combat our soldiers were trained for, I mean, never occurred, but the bands fought as they were used to, from ambush, and with surprise attacks; nor did they observe the regulations of international law in any other way. In some cases it is true, in their areas, they had adopted the numbers of the proper Greek regiments which were formerly stationed in those areas. That was one of the means to pretend a national organization, a method which they used successfully in the first period; but any real connection with the old Greek regiment certainly did not exist, nor did they have uniformed leadership. They did not wear their arms openly. Cruelties were a daily occurrence. Every soldier knew that, and therefore they were not regarded by us as a belligerent force under international law.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please, I would like to offer a few documents in this connection. First from Document Book Felmy Number 2, there is an affidavit by Dr. Herbert Schwoerbel, Document Number 52 which I offer as Exhibit 14, on page 15.
"From frequent conversations with FELMY I know that FELMY most strongly condemned and regretted the deterioration of the political struggle in Greece. In this connection, FELMY intentionally disobeyed the severe orders emanating from Berlin and which provided for the shooting of hostages at a ratio of 50 to 1 in reprisal for assassinated Germans. I believe that FELMY had to resort to these reprisals altogether Court No. V, Case No. VII.
due to force majeur. Today, it is already a historic fact, and especially also proven anew by the current events in Greece, that the EAM was the attacker and the first party to set off with all means the cruel fight against the occupying power. Assassinations from ambush, tortures and mutilations were the order of the day. The German troops were so excited about these incidents that a troop commander for that very reason would have known of no other solution than that of trying to set an end to the assassinations and to intimidate them by application of reprisal measures. However, it was of an even more decisive influence that the treacherous warfare of the EAM was directed to an almost increased degree against the Greeks and not only against the Germans. The kidnapping and murdering of 50 Greek gendarmes was the opening signal. In Athens I myself was an eyewitness to political murders by the EAM against Greeks in full daylight and it must be said that the EAM did not at all act only against pro-German Greeks. I knew that, at the time, the urgent request was expressed from the circles of Greek politicians, the Greek police and the Greek population that the Germans should take measures against the communists. Especially the Greek police complained that it would be beyond their power to maintain security and order any longer if the German authorities were not in a position to protect them against the terror of the EAM. It is, therefore, my opinion that the reprisal measures, as far as they were at all caused by FELMY personally, were decreed out of an uncontrollable situation and against the inner desire of the General, who much rather would have carried out his mission in peace and friendship with the Greek population. I have no doubt that, had, at the time, the German authorities left it to the Greek security authorities to take punitive measures these would have been carried out in a manner by far more cruel and to a much greater extent than they actually were executed by the German authorities. Proof therefore is the hanging of 5 communists by the Evzons, which was done in the most cruel manner at the beginning of 1944. In Greece it is a well-known fact that the communists feared the Evzons more than they did the Germans, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
that the hatred among the Greeks themselves was altogether greater than the hatred of the Greeks against the Germans."
The next document offered is contained in Document Book Felmy 2. It is Document Number 61 starting on page 46. This is offered as Exhibit 27. It is an affidavit by Walter Barth, who at the time in question was the first General Staff Officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division. I shall read from page 48 of Document Book 2.
"4. How the Partisans 'Conducted' war. The Partisans 'conducted' was exclusively according to the 'guiding principles laid down by Soviet Russia for Partisan warfare'; that is, according to the motto: 'Kill the Fascists wherever you find them.' With this they placed themselves outside the regulations of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare. There were no regular uniform. As insignia now and again they wore the Greek Cocarde or the Soviet Star. Often the Partisans were disguised as farmers, shepherds, priests or women; not until the last moment before the clash or the attack were weapons shown."
On the same page at the bottom under paragraph 6.
"The expression 'hostages', as it was used by the troops, was false. By 'hostages' the troops understood such persons who were without a doubt Bolshevists and who were brought in for reprisal measures."
On the next page, paragraph 7.
"The arrest of these so-called hostages took place after their Bolshevist attitude was positively ascertained. In doing this, Greek nationals often worked together with the Secret Military Police and the Ic. Communist attitude, cooperation, or support of the bandits was a reason for arrest. Lists of names, captured papers, statements of captured partisans, denunciations, etc., divulged the names of Greeks with communist leanings. Only such persons were arrested."
And the next document I'd like to offer is Document Felmy Number 62 in Volume 2 on page 52. It is offered as Exhibit 28. It is an affidavit by Erhard Gemmrig who at that time was first general staff Court No. V, Case No. VII.
officer with the 68th Army Corps, as it says in the second paragraph, "From 10 October until 27 November 1943, and from 3 January until 14. January 1944."
I shall read only the last paragraph on this page.
"In about November 1943 the 68th Army Corps received a letter from the leader of a Greek guerilla division to the effect that if the attacks (by regular German regiments) on his unit north of the Attic area would not cease, he would shoot at a certain spot a number (I believe 50) captured German soldiers. The General Command could not discontinue the attack since the supply lines in that area were constantly interrupted by attacks on individual vehicles.
"The attacking regiments actually found German soldiers murdered, at the spot mentioned (partly badly mutilated). Herr Felmy even prohibited reprisals against hostages for that."
And now, from Felmy Document Book III, I beg to offer an affidavit by Dr. Tilk. It is Document No. 82 on page 48; it is offered as Exhibit 29.
Dr. Tilk states as follows:
"From October 1943, to August or September 1944, I was stationed at the Luftwaffe base hospital in Athen, and I also stayed with this motorized medical unit during the retreat.
"What our relations to the Greek population were can be gathered clearly from the fact that the Luftwaffe hospital was housed in a section of the former University Clinic, while the greater part of the building system was at the disposal of the civilian population. The X-ray equipment. The Greek hospital personnel was provided with messing facilities by the unit and were allowed to take food home with them. In the event of sickness Greeks were treated in the hospital by military doctors, both as bed-cases and as visitors.
"In the Luftwaffe hospital in Athens, prisoners-of-war were cared for, above all, British and Americans. One of the prisoners of war, a wounded British officer, left me a letter of gratitude after his convalescence, when he was being transferred.
"In the aforementioned neighboring Greek hospital wounded Evzones were also accommodated and these were often abducted by Partisans. Only under the strictest protection were they safe from their own country-men (EAM-Partisans). As it turned out later, the Greek civilian gate-keeper of the Luftwaffe hospital was an EAM agent.
"That wounded Greeks are supposed to have been thrown out of the hospitals after the comings of the Germans, as a Greek witness is supposed to have testified in the case against the so-called Southeast Generals, I will not believe at any time. For the protection of the Greek population from the Partisans, Greek troops, who maintained their own hospitals, were allowed to keep their arms. As far as I know, the occupation troops were placed under the command of the Italian Supreme Command after the Germans entered the area. The responsibility for the alleged evacuations from Greek hospitals would, in my opinion, thus fall on the Italians.
"With respect to professional medical treatment of wounded Greeks, we doctors were completely unhampered. Likewise, on the retreat when wounded native inhabitants, Russian fliers who had crashed, and genuine Partisans, were brought for treatment to the hospitals and/or to the dressing station. Even at the taking over of the hospital in Zagreb (December 1944) wounded Partisans were taken over from the German hospital trains and attended, i.e. at a time when, as is known, German prisoners of war had their eyes gouged out and their genitals cut off by the Partisans. On the other hand, I have operated on a German Luftwaffe soldier from the air base Tatoi, near Athens, who had drunk with Greeks in a Greek tavern, and was attacked by his Greek 'friends' when he went to the toilet. They slashed his throat in such a manner that his larynx gaped apart between the true and the false vocal cords like a frog's mouth. Since I was still able to save the man, I later learned this incident from him.
"A soldier of the Navy, who was standing guard before the Navy laundry in Athens, was attacked there, apart from any fighting engagement, and had his frontal skull and lower jaw completely shredded by a pointblank shot. He died during the operation.
"On the retreat, during a rest of several hours, my unit was subjected to machine-gun fire on the part of Partisans in the Balkan passes, in spite of Red Cross insignia recognizable from afar and the abandonment of every camouflage. This took place after the Partisans had recognized our Red Cross insignia and had taken note of the fact that we had lost contact with the anti-aircraft unit which was covering us and that no other armed units would follow us at our rest-station.
"On the retreat we passed by a large column of destroyed Red Cross vehicles and we heard that this large medical unit had been attacked by the Partisans following a 12 hours rest and had been annihilated down to the last man, without any chance for defense.
"In consequence of this mode of warfare of the Balkan guerilla bands, which mocked all International Law, a medical unit could reckon with its liquidation at any hour during the retreat.
Already in 1943, near Delphi, individually traveling medical trucks were raided and the wounded and medical soldiers massacred and hanged."
As the final contribution to this, I should like to read once again from Document No. 73, on page 24 of the original which I have offered before. It says there on page 25, in the third paragraph:
"Things looked bad for the Italians. They were continuously fighting the bands, while we had comparative peace. Frequently I alone with the driver drove through half the Peloponnes, unharned. Our situation grow more severe only after the collapse of the Italian front in Greece. The bands often attacked us in German or Italian uniforms and with Italian arms. Bestially and cruelly they mowed down anything that crossed their path. We could hardly dare to go into the villages any more and we only drove with an escort. I frequently had the impression that whole village communities were kidnapped by the bands and forced to attack us, for, on the whole, the civilian population did not sympathize with these mostly communist bands of the ELAS or EAM. The main purpose of the continuous raids probably was the looting. Even women and children participated in these. Such a battlefield looked terrible. The soldiers usually were mutilated and clubbed beyond recognition. It is a fact, for instance, that a finger would be cut off for the sake of a ring. Smaller vehicle crews disappeared in villages, where before they had enjoyed hospitality and which they therefore entered trustingly. Frequently they were later found, looted and naked and beaten to a pulp. Many of them, however, were never seen or heard of again.
"From the 10 October to 14 December 1944, we fought our way through from Athens to the Balaton Lake, Lake Flatten. In the course of this retreat we suffered considerable losses due to attacks by bands. The attackers, among them women and half-grown boys, could only be called bands of robbers. Frequently we saw, in the retreat area, dead comrades, who had been cruelly mutilated. The arms, legs, and feet of many had been broken so that the the clothing could be removed more quickly and easier.
The throats of some of then had been cut through to the vertebra, although these dead also had clearly visible bullet wounds. I saw dead people whose heads were torn off almost completely, or who had large holes in their stomachs or chests. Since one of the dead once had an unexploded Italian egg-shaped hand grenade tied around his neck with a wire, the cause could easily be explained.
"As rear-guard leader and at times as base commander, I had constant dealings with the bands. For instance, in an attack between PryjepoljePryboj, near the monastery of Banja, I was once forced to retreat during the night and could only regain my position after being reinforced by a field railway detachment. All my dead were plundered and horribly mutilated. The genitals of one had been cut off and pinned to a branch. The bands had also destroyed a farm about 100 meters distant, which had no part in the fighting, and shot the only son. I noticed an extraordinary great number of women in the hand-to-hand battle. I tore the cap of one of them. She was wearing a red five-pointed star with hammer and sickle. Many peasant families had lost everything in this manner and tried to go with us to Belgrade or Zagreb. On the top of a pass in the vicinity of Visegrad, we wanted to come to the aid of a medical company which had been attacked. This motorized unit, clearly narked with the Geneva Cross, had a load of wounded. The vehicles were a blaze and only few of them could still be saved. Most of the wounded in the cars burned. Here also horribly mutilated, plundered and clubbed dead. Hardly a day passed without attacks, and only once during the whole time, in Zagreb, did we sleep all night in a house."
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did the German soldiers give any cause to the bands to violate International Law as they did and fight as they did?
A. No. The initiative in all these cases lay with the bands. They had been incited. They were also better supplied, as time went on, and they conducted war according to their Bolshevik manners.
Truth of this statement lies in the period of time when everything was calm, when I was down there in 1941 and 1942, and in the appearance of the hands after the autumn of 1943.
Q How were relations between the bands and the Greek civilian population, according to your experiences?
AAs time went on, the bands had become a veritable scourge of the country. They terrorized everybody and above all they did that in those parts of the country which were populated by people who did not sympathize with them. They recruited by force. They requisitioned food supplies. In order to safeguard their own supply of men and material, they kidnapped their political opponents, if they did not murder them, of course. They kidnapped them and put them into special camps. We had a number of instances when we were out on operations against the bands that we liberated national Greeks from such camps. Their number amounted to almost 500 in the various camps.
Q Were there any Greek authorities who turned to German authorities in order to obtain help against the bands?
A Yes, we had many cries for help from agencies who asked to be protected by German garrisons which for military reasons we could not do to the extent that the population wished us to. As we were menaced with an Allied landing; we had to keep our troops on the alert and I could not scatter them at large over a number of garrisons.
Q In this connection, there is a document in Felmy Document Book No. III which is document No. 67 on page 1. It is offered as Exhibit No. 30. This is an affidavit by Franz Fritsch. In the second paragraph he says:
"The last rank I held during the war was that of a Lieutenant Colonel in the signal corps of the regular army, Commander of the Corps Signal Unit 468 and, between 15 May 1943 and 31 January 45, Commander of the signal units of the 68th Army Corps."
I shall then read from page 4:
"The attitude of the Greek population towards the bandits was generally one of rejection with only a few exceptions caused by local conditions, their inner feelings being against them, but always full of fear. Many Greeks literally told me: "We only hope that the German occupation force will remain here until the end of the war, or else we will have a dreadful civil war."
When the imminent evacuation of Greece by the German troops became known, the Greeks had only the one desire that "handing over" to the British would be done without any time interval if possible. Repeatedly I was asked by Greek mayors for military protection against bandits and Communists (for instance in the villages of Levidi, Merkovuni, Paiania, Koropi, Markopoulon) and repeatedly I received reports about the appearance of bands from the Greek population, which probably were exaggerated in most cases, but nevertheless were evidence of fright and anxiety. It never was a question of international deception. With two combat units formed from my own force, I myself had to carry out an action against the bandits in the summer of 1944 in the area between Athens and Levadia. The bandits could not be apprehended any more in the mountainous districts, and the villages, which I had been ordered to clean up, had already been "cleaned out" completely by the guerrillas, and only old men, women and children were to be found, the whole male population having been dragged away into the mountains in the very sense of the word."
General, whose idea was it that these volunteer units which were mentioned in the affidavit just now were formed?
A The idea came from conservation Greek circles whose positive attitude to Britain was obvious. These volunteer units were formed in the Peloponnes under the leadership of the Greek Colonel Papadongolas. The Greek government issued a law and dressed them in Greek uniforms.
Q How strong were these volunteer units and how were they recruited?
A The strength of these volunteer units amounted soon to 5,000 men. They were divided up into so-called security battalions. The influx into them mounted and mounted. I could have formed units up to 10,000 men if I had the necessary weapons; but unfortunately I could arm only 5,000 men with rifles, machine guns, and trench mortars.
The volunteers from the various districts of the Peloponnes--it was their endeavor to protect their home districts from the bands and German and Greek interests there completely coincided.
Q Were these volunteer units subordinated to the army throughout that period of time?
A No, at the beginning of April they were put under the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q Did the leader of these units, Col. Papadongolas, guarantee to you that his soldiers would not stab you and the Germans in the back?
A Col. Papadongolas, it was my impression, was an officer of a conservative mentality and of the old school and, as such, he regarded the band terror as a national disaster just as much as we did; until the end he would wear the Royal Crown on his shoulder. The Greek government did not like the idea that Col. Papadongolas was to take over these units in the Peloponnes because he was so conservative,- they would have preferred a liberal or democratic leader, I suppose,-but I always felt that Col. Papadongolas was sincere and honest. He assured me that should the Allies land, he and his men would go up into the mountains in order to avoid this dilemma which would not have been too simple for him. He also assured me that then his men would not stab us in the back. He offered me his wife and daughter as hostages. Of course, I did not avail myself of this offer because I trusted him and his word.
Q What was the attitude Col. Papadongolas took towards reprisal measures, especially as these measures were directed against members of his own country?
A We discussed that problem in great detail as a matter of fact. We were quite clear about the fact that reprisal measures were inevitable. The way the bands fought forced us to take these measures because they did not observe international law.
Q Did Col. Papadongolas take any active part himself in the carrying out of reprisal measures?
A Yes, in various ways. When he went out on raids, he arrested band suspects as reprisal hostages and on some occasions he would have them shot. He also used his staff, as it were, as a screening agency at my request. He was to screen our reprisal hostages whether and how far they were connected with the bands.
Q Why did you have this screening agency, as you call it?
A Well, I thought that was the best and safest means to find the guilty as Col. Papadongolas was a Greek and knew the confused and chaotic conditions as they prevailed there better than anybody else and he knew them in great detail. After all, he himself came from the Peloponnes, he was born there.
Q Did you have permanent contact with Papadongolas?
A Yes. There was a liaison detachment of The Corps permanently with him led by an officer. Later on, I attached a signal unit to this liaison detachment, and the detachment with the signal unit remained with Col. Papadongolas when the German troops evacuated the Peloponnes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will stand in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 3 December 1947, 0930, Judge Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Doctor.
HELMUTH FELMY DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued).BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, last night we discussed the volunteer units and Colonel Papadongelas and we had finished that chapter; how did the situation develop, particularly in Athens?
A. In Athens itself the situation became more and more acute. Athens could be compared to a powder barrel and I was always of afraid that incident might occur, such as occured in Warsaw such a situation did develop in Athens, but only after we left. The British at that time broke the power of the Elas in Athens and of the whole Pyracus. No less a person than Mr. Winston Churchill wrote an article in Life, an American magazine.....
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I object to mention here as to what Mr. Winston Churchill is supposed to have written in an American magazine.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your objection, what basis?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, complete hear-say.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the objection is good, but I think we should have some basis on which we can rule, though the objection will be sustained BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. Where was it that the situation in Athens became particularly acute, was it particular quarters in the city or was it quite generally in Athens itself?
A. In certain parts of the city and suburbs where the Communists held the power you could only enter with a special pass. There above all the Evzones, who had been established by the Higher SS and Police leader, were fighting all Greek police and gendarmes, who had been reinforced. Moreover Elas interrupted the flow of food supplies to Athens, thereby they wanted to increase daily worries and unrest in wide circles of the population. Nightly shootings occured almost constantly. In those instances members of the national circles, of the right, fought their opponents of the EAM. There was an attack made one night on the corps headquarters, and so therefore it was quite possible to say we were sitting on a powder barrel and only one small incident might be sufficient to bring it to an explosion.
Q. General, you said yesterday that an important turning point was brought about the by capitulation of the Italians on 8 September, 1943; were you prepared for this capitulation to happen?
A. Yes, we were not surprised. Ever since the loss of Sicily and Mussolini's resignation, Italy's situation both in internal and foreign politics had become so dramatic it had to be expected that our former ally would desert us and get out of the war. Anyway, I expected it and I told the local commanders in the villages and towns of the Pelepennes to issue a proclamation in that event, which was to be handed to the Italians as soon as the cede-word "Axis" was spread. I had to prepare this because if the cede word "Axis" was mentioned, I was to go to Athens in order to negotiate with General Vocchiarelli and in that moment I was in no position to draw up a proclamation and especially I could not deliver at to the various garrisons in good time.
Q. May I submit this proclamation as document Felmy No. 102, Volume V, it is offered as exhibit 31. This is how the proclamation reads - it is on page 52 in volume V: