The first one is contained in Document Bonk Felmy I on page 46. It is document 29. I would like to read this affidavit.
"I am acquainted with the General of the Air Corps Felmy--"
JUDGE CARTER: What exhibit number are you attaching to it?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The exhibit number is going to be "4."
Exhibit Number Felmy "4", Your Honor.
I am acquainted with the General of the Air Corps Felmy since 1934. He was my superior in 1934, 135 and 1938 until January 1939. From April 1938 until January 1940 I was next to his chief of staff, his first adviser in command matters. During these periods I came to know Felmy as a man of sincere character and high morality. Harshness and inconsiderateness were foreign to his character.
When he was ordered in 1938 to make preparations in the case of war in Western Europe, Felmy pointed to the dangers of a conflict with Great Britain, as regards air warfare, in a detailed memorandum addressed to Goering. This memo was submitted for the purpose of stopping the German leaders in their policy by a calm judging of the air situation.
Felmy fell into disfavor because of this unvarnished memorandum. After having put up with an embarrassing affront by Goering at the outbreak of war because of his sense of duty and responsibility, he was discharged in a defamatory manner for an inconsequential reason -- he was held responsible for the personal failure, contrary to existing orders, of a subordinate over whose actions he could not exert any influence.
In 1939 Felmy favored my repeated endeavors to call the attention of influential business circles in Hamburg (Rieder Sloman) and in Duesseldorf (Industrial Club) to the dangers of air warfare by way of lectures. He exposed himself to certain reproaches by this attitude too.
After the beginning of the war. Felmy exhorted the subordinate troops to strictest observation of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, although the risk of own losses was increased by this.
Likewise Felmy ordered the dropping of bombs on British soil to be strictly avoided during attacks against British naval targets although the chances of success were considerably decreased by this. (Attack aiming at the destruction of the dreadnaught "Repulse" in the Firth of Forth, ordered by the C-in-C of the Air Force in 1939).
The second affidavit, it it please the Tribunal, is the following document in the same document Book, Felmy I. It is Document 30 on page 48, and I am offering it as Exhibit Felmy 5. The affidavit reads:
In May or June 1934 a conflict occurred between 3 officers of the Air Corps, among them the later Ltn. Col. Schalke of Air Fleet 2, and two SA officers, among them the then Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst, in Warnemuende.
Hereupon Felmy visited general agencies of the German Transport Pilot School in Brunswick, Hildesheim, Fassborg, and Lechfeld, the later Air Force Military Schools. In my presence he called upon the officers there to defend themselves, in uniform as well as in civilian clothes, with arms in hand against any attack on the part of the SA, he ordered in this connection that every officer had always to carry a fire-arm, and threatened every officer with severe measures who exposed himself to an insult by the SA, or who did not defend himself sufficiently.
signed: Herbert Rieckhoff HELMUTH FELMY DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, yesterday afternoon we had stopped when we discussed the map of Athens; I would like to ask you to briefly repeat now what you said yesterday, and then we can continue.
A This map excerpt, -- I am afraid this was the best one we could find in the archives of Washington, -- shows to the left at the bottom of the margin of the map a thick line, which forms a pointed angle. This line is the dividing line between the German and Italian areas of supremacy, as far as regards the Southern part of the Port of Pyrasus. If we follow near the lower margin of the map along to the place where it says "Bay of Phaliron" and follow the thick line which runs almost parallel to the margin of the map, we find that this encircles the enclave of the Airport Calamaki. On this map excerpt we can see quite clearly that the town of Athens and the adjacent area were Italian occupation territory. That's all I have to say about this map excerpt.
Q What was your main task as commander for Southern Greece?
A. My main task was to regulate the supply to Crete.
Q How long did you remain in Greece?
A My first assignment in Greece lasted until the end of August 1942. In the meantime my special staff had been added a German Arabic Instruction Detachment, which later on was to form the skeleton of an Iraq Army. Towards the end of August the special staff F underthe new name "Corps Headquarters LXVIII," under my leadership, was transferred to the Calmueck Desert. The Calmueck Desert is in Southeast Russia near the Caspic Sea, and this area was put under the jurisdiction of the First Panzer Army. At the proper time it was to advance via the Caucasus, then the commitment in the desert was to follow this action.
Q Will you tell us something now, briefly, about your assignment in the East, General, please?
A In the course of the summer of 1942 special units had been established in Germany for commitment in the desert, and these were gathered towards September and October around Stalino. From there they marched via Rostov and Vatigersk into the area around Julinorsk, where they were to protect the wing of the flank of the 1st Panzer Army. The subsequent period was full of offensive and defensive actions against the strengthened 4th Russian Guard Cavalry Corps. When in January 1943 the withdrawal movements started, the Corps Headquarters also evacuated the area, and finally west of Rostov in the so-called Vius position this unit established a new position.
Q Did the corps remain in the Vius position?
A The German-Arabic Instruction Detachment had remained behind in Stalino, and in the meantime this unit had been committed in Tunis Headquarters was to follow there. Towards the end of March it was withdrawn and gathered in Southern Italy near Rellhio in Calabia. I personally flew to Tunis in order to gain a picture of the situation, there. However, due to the course which the war took, the Corps Headquarters was not committed in Tunis. Instead, in the course of the month of May it was transferred to Southern Greece.
Q General, now comes your second assignment in Greece. Would you please tell us something, in large outlines, about this period?
AAfter the German troops had withdrawn from Africa it seemed very likely that the Allies would attack the Balkan area. In order to defend against such an attack the 1st Panzer Division was also transferred on to the Peleponnes amongst others, and subordinated to me, in the same way as was the 117th Rifle Division, two Italian Divisions, and a number of fortress battalions. The capitulation of the Italian Army on 8 September changed the picture completely, particularly since the 1st Panzer Division had been withdraw and transferred to the East. The Corps Headquarters was transferred to Athens, and, here in this area, the 11th Airforce Field Division was subordinated to this Corps Headquarters.
When in August 1944 Roumania, and seen after that, Bulgaria left the alliance with Germany, it was a natural consequence that Greece was also evacuated. On 12 October the evacuation of Athens, and the withdrawal movements started.
Q And what became of the Corps Headquarters?
A The Corps headquarters was in charge of the withdrawal movements until approximately the 20th or 22d of October when we had reached Larissa in Thesselouia. Then the Operational Department was by air route transferred to Syrmia. Syrmia is the most Eastern tip of Croatia, and almost stretches to the gates of Belgrade. Here, the Corps Headquarters took over a sector between the rivers Save and Danube, but, when on November 11, 1944, the Russians had crossed the Danube in Southern Hungary near Batina, the Corps Headquarters was also committed in that area. The defensive actions against the four Russian Corps attacking there stopped towards the end of December southwest of the Drave and near Lake Plaffen.
Q Did you remain in charge of the LXVIII Corps?
AAt that time I left my post as commander of the LXVIII Corps and took over instead the XXXIL Corps and that again gave me the leadership on the Syrnia front.
Q If it please the Tribunal, the reasons for this transfer were at the time given by the witness von Warmbuehler while dealing with questions concerning General Rendulic, but at this point I would like to present an affidavit, which is contained in document book Felmy III, page 44 of that document book. It is document Felmy No. 81 and it will be submitted under exhibit Felmy 6. This is an affidavit executed by one Friedrich W. Esche, which I would like to read in part. On page 44 in the second paragraph it says:
As a major and operational staff officer I worked from about early October until the middle of December 1944 in the army corps headquarters of General (Air Force) FELMY until his transfer to another staff. I was present at most of the tactical conferences and oral reports and took part in their preparation, As far as my position as Ia required or allowed this. During this activity I came to know and esteem General FELMY as a very objective, clear-minded, and personally modest soldier of an exact military - scientific mind.
Without remembering at the moment any dates and figures of the war days from October-November-December 1944, permit me to render the impression unequivocally won at that time, namely that General FELMY with the troops then at his command aimed at a very careful conduct of battle free of any risks in East Croatia (Syrnia), on the Danube River on both sides of Vukovar, in Southern Hungaria (on the Danube east of Fuenfkirchen), which he performed with full success to the benefit of the human material under his command and of the civilian population living in the fighting zone, regardless of his personal fame or reputation which, on many occasions, would certainly have been embellished by harder and bolder decisions.
I clearly remember that General FELMY approved of the retreat, ordered by me independently, of a mixed "Brigade Hildebrand" from the Danube River towards the West, and that he successfully upheld my decision against the Fuehrer-order ("hold positions") as well as against the repeated admonitions by the superior army headquarters, because this retreat was strategically justified and a tactical holding of the position according to the order -- would have exacted too heavy losses from the German, Croat and Hungarian troops under his command.
I know that the orders repeatedly issued by the Fuehrer-Headquarters in connection with a further retreat to the line of the Southern border of Lake Platten - Drau River, to occupy so-called "Fortresses", that is to say local strong - points which were to be held at all events, were not carried out. General Felmy justified this with the following clear argument: "What matters is a tactical - wise conduct of battle, not a "glorious" one."
These very independent decision made by General Felmy were governed by the respect for the life of every man-natural to every soldier - , by his refined sense of responsibility toward every human being, and by his respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention.
From stories told by members of the Staff-First Lieutenant von Koschembahr (the General's personal orderly officer) and others - I know that Felmy's corps headquarters in the Russian campaign - Eastern Ukraine or Donez Basin in 1942 - did not forward and carry out the order for the creation of a "desert zone", that is to say the burning down of all communities in the course of the retreat operations on all fronts.
The industrial plants at Fees (Fuenfkirchen) - Hungaria - namely as far as I remember - iron or coal mines which lay in the immediate vicinity of the city and of the swelling houses, were by order of General Felmy not blown up in October 1944, out of consideration for the civilian population. - I was present when the then engineer major on the Corps Staff reported to General Felmy on the "peaceful" discussions held, as ordered, with the Pecs plant managers, which aimed at a shut-down of the plants "for a limited time" and which did not entail any subsequent destruction nor even any serious injury of the whole plants.
I saw with my own eyes how much sympathy General Felmy showed to the old Hungarian staff officers and commanding officers of the Military District Pecs, when the problem arose to give warning to the civilian population, within limits of place and time but at any rate in due course, about the approaching battle and to protect it against any danger, in conformity with the Hungarians' desire.
General Felmy did not carry out the order for the evacuation of the "fortress lines" to the West of the Danube River, for the formation of which new orders had been issued, since he clearly realized that in view of the expected conduct of battle by his army corps and out of consideration for the peaceful population such a "whirl of glory" (Ruhmeswirbel) was untimely and, moreover, of secondary importance from a military point of view.
I would then like to read one more paragraph, which is the last paragraph on page 46.
In the middle of December 1944 General Felmy was relieved of the command of the LXVIII Army Corps and, after having had to pocket the most severe reproaches for his allegedly "easy" conduct of battle, he was given the command of another army corps. On the part of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht one would probably have liked to take stronger measures against him if the Army Headquarters (Second Panzer Army) had not at that time "pleaded" on behalf of General Felmy and if the strained situation had allowed more time for the investigation of the events."
General, how long after that did you remain on the Syrnia front?
A. Defensive and offensive actions alternated on the Syrnia front. On 11 April, 1945 here, too, large withdrawal movement started. Approximately around 23 April, when the front became increasingly narrow, 100 kilometers of Zagreb, the XXXIL Corps headquarters was relieved from that area and transferred to the area of Leibach, from there it was to be committed either on the Essence river of in the so-called Alpine fortress. However, this future commitment did not take place and toward the beginning of May we transferred to Carynthia and when the capitulation was announced, we surrendered to the British.
Q. Did you remain with the British?
A. No, toward the middle of June we were taken to a place south of Salzburg and there we were delivered to the Americans. I, myself, have been in various American camps and toward the middle of October, 1945, I was brought to Ulm.
Q. And how long did you remain in Ulm?
A. I remained in Ulm until 20 March, 1946. The time during which the Generals were accommodated in the stables, I did no longer experience there. We were quartered in barracks. The way in which this camp was equipped and fed was not in accordance with the previsions of International Law. I only want to mention one example.
In February, 1946 the Generals were collected in the riding ring and in the meantime under the supervision of an American officer our rooms were being searched. When we were allowed to go back, we found the following: Admiral Marshal had been robbed of his razor, General Reinhardt's gold watch had disappeared, General Reinecke's silver cigarette case had been taken, which had been a present made to him by Trukish officers during the first World war, and had sentimental value. In the other rooms similar things had happened, for instance, General Schmidt had lost a traveling alarm clock, which happened to belong to me and I loaned it to him as he did not have a watch.
We complained about this and compiled lists of the things which had been stolen, which we submitted, but nothing happened.
Q. and where did you go on 20 March 1946?
A. On that day, I and six other Generals were brought to Dachau.
Q. How was the situation there?
A. If there were a few things which were objectionable in Ulm, the situation in Dachau was in flagrant violation of the previsions of the Geneva convention. Three of us, General Judge Beckelberg, General Vegel and myself were detained in the cell, the measurements of this cell were 2 meters and 96 cents long and 2 meters and 26 cents wide and 3.05 meters high. These measurements were written on the wall of the cell and we had made a note of them.
For 26 days without any examination of any kind, without any statements of any reason whatsoever, we were detained. I asked in a telegram to General Truscott, the commander of the 3rd American Army, for an explanation of this. I wanted to know why we were not treated as prisoners of war, but I did not receive any reply. Only toward the last ten days of April the situation changed somewhat and we were transferred into a barracks camp, which had been an annex of the SS hospital in Dachau. The accommodations, food, etc., here was not bad. In the same SS barracks, where we were quarters, there were also detained, for some time, Field Marshal Kesselring, Field Marshal Sperle and Field Marshal List. Frequently around noon there were visits and inspections by some visitors to whom we were shown like wild animals in a zoo.
Q And how long did you remain in Dachau?
A With the exception of a five-week stay in London, I remained in various camps in Dachau until 10 October 1946. On that day, we underwent a mock-dismissal from the armed forces. We were not really dismissed and we did not get any certificate of discharge but instead the text of the American provision, which I saw myself, stated, after mentioning the various names, "are to be discharged and re arrested." I therefore consider myself still a general who is prisoner of war.
Q and how were you treated after this so-called discharge?
AAs internees, we were after that brought to the infamous Cage 3 in Dachau. This Cage 3 was under Polish supervision. Treatment and accommodation, food, and everything else that plays a part in the life of a prisoner-of-war was worst of all here. We were more than 100 men and quartered in one large barrack room. When it got dark early during the winter days, all we had were two or three weak electric bulbs to illuminate the whole big room.
Three times a day we had to pass a rollcall which was not customary in other camps. These rollcalls were mostly held at a time when we had just received our meals. I myself, for instance, received only after six weeks a straw sack for my wooden bedstead. Before that, all I had was blankets. The Polish camp commander had amongst others, told the German camp physician that he was not allowed to enter the kitchen. Finally, after a report made by Dr. Besuden-
Q Who was Dr. Besuden?
A Dr. Besuden was the German camp physician. After a report made by Dr. Besuden, an American doctor who had been called there stated that almost all inmates had ailments of some sort and that their state of health was such as was a consequence of malnutrition. I myself also was to have been assigned to a so-called Gandhi company because of my state of health; however, this did not come about because on 14 January 1947 I was brought to Nurnberg.
Q General, before you received the indictment, were you interrogated in Nurnberg?
A Yes. It was here that I was interrogated for the first time about the facts since I had become prisoner-of-war. I was interrogated three times; it was not made clear to me whether I was to be a witness or a defendant. No counsel was present.
Q Did you sign any records of interrogation?
AAll I signed was the statement of my curriculum vitae.
Q General, one concluding question to this introductory part of your examination. What were the decoration you received during the Second World War?
A During the Second World War I received the clasp to the Iron Cross First and Second Class, and the German Cross in gold.
Q When did you receive the German Cross in gold?
A In January 1945.
Q If it please the Tribunal, I would now like to deal in detail with the two assignments in Greece during the years 1941-1942 and 1943-1944, which are subject of the prosecution's case. First of all, I want to discuss the assignment in 1941-42. General, in a different context you have already told us that in June 1941 you were appointed Military Commander for Southern Greece?
A That is correct. In June 1941. I came to Greece as Military Commander for Southern Greece.
Q I would now like to discuss with you in detail the documents with which you are charged by the prosecution. Wherever possible, I shall adhere to the sequence of the document books. In order to make the proceedings as easy and clear as possible, I would like first of all to deal with two groups of documents in bulk without dealing with every one individually. The first group of these documents contains a number of orders of which it is quite certain that they did not reach General Felmy since at that time he was not yet present in Greece and his agency did not yet exist.
I would like to read the numbers of these documents into the record:
They are contained in Document No. 1 of the prosecution: NOKW-1522 which became Exhibit 9. This is the Fuehrer Order concerning the commitment in this Southeastern area. NQKW-1382 which became Exhibit 10; that was the order about the commitment of the agency of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. NOKW-484 which became Exhibit 13 which is the Commissar Order. NOKW-1076 which became Exhibit 14; that is the supplement to the Commissar Order by the OKH.
And General, will you please confirm, looking at your own list, that the four documents just named by me were distributed before you reached Greece for your first assignment and that, therefore, you did not receive them and would you also confirm that your agency at that time did not exist?
A Yes. I can confirm this, and it can also be seen from the date on which the orders concerned were issued.
Q The second group of documents contains documents which exclusively concern the Serbian area and which are dated in the year 1941. You are charged with these documents. There is quite a number of them. I think I shall be very brief here too, and I shall not deal with them individually, but just read the numbers into the record.
The documents of the prosecution concerned are the following, contained in Document Book II. NOKW-1424 which became Exhibit 48. NOKW-1492 which became Exhibit 49. NOKW-1334 which became Exhibit 50; NOKW-876 which became Exhibit 51. NOKW-1560 which became Exhibit 52. NOKW-1041 which became Exhibit 54. NOKW-1043 which became Exhibit 67.
In Document Book III the following documents are concerned: NOKW-3402, Exhibit 83; NOKW_560, Exhibit 84, NOKW 1362, Exhibit 85; NOKW_557, Exhibit 88; NOKW_1208 which became Exhibit 89; NOKW_1154 which became Exhibit 91; NOKW 967 which became Exhibit 92; NOKW_225 which became Exhibit 93; NOKW_1070 which became Exhibit 94; NOKW_1411 which became Exhibit 96; NOKW_197 which became Exhibit 97; NOKW_191 _A which became Exhibit 98; NOKW_387 which became Exhibit101; NOKW_1046 which became Exhibit 102; NOKW_907 which became Exhibit 103; NOKW_561 which became Exhibit 104; NOKW_1378 which became Exhibit 104_B; NOKW_802 which became Exhibit 105; NOKW_1202 which became Exhibit 106; NOKW_226 which became Exhibit 107; NOKW_1219 which became Exhibit 110; NOW_1073 which became Exhibit 111; NOKW_1017 which became Exhibit 112; NOKW_1665 which became Exhibit 113.
In Document Book IV the following documents are concerned; NOKW_891 which became Exhibit 117; NOKW_1055 which became Exhibit 118; NOKW 595 which became Exhibit 119; NOKW_1022 which became Exhibit 122; NOKW_980 which became Exhibit 123; NOKW_980 which became Exhibit 123; and NOKW_1157 which became Exhibit 124.
All documents in Document Book V come into this category with the restriction of only the following three documents: NOKW_123; Exhibit 127; NOKW_251, Exhibit 128; and NOKW_1056, Exhibit 130. These three documents are only concerned inasmuch as they do not apply to the period of 23 July until 23 August 1943. During this time General Felmy deputized for Field Marshal List. These three documents will therefore, later have to be discussed in due course at the proper time.
Then in Document Book VI the documents NOKW_191, Exhibit 135; and finally, as the last one, in Document Book XXV, Exhibit 554, which is the Jugoslav photographs.
Q General, will you please give us your brief comments on this second group of prosecution documents?
A Looking at my own notes, I can confirm that the documents which you have read belong to that group of documents with which I am not connected in any way. Particularly I would like to say about the documents which are dated during the time of Field Marshal List's illness -- that is, in October 1941 -- that I did not deputize for Field Marshal List during his sickness.
Furthermore, this seems to be mixed up with the question of Boehme because amongst others an affidavit by General Boehme is amongst those documents with which I was incriminated.
Q I shall now start going through the document books. I would like to discuss with you in Document book I the document PS-454 on page 55 in the English Document Book and page 38 in the German Document Book. It is Exhibit 15. This document is a Fuehrer order dated 9 June 1941 which regulates the channels of command in the Southeastern area. I have to ask you one question in connection with this document.
General, in accordance with this Fuehrer order, was the agency of the Military Commander Southern Greece created?
A Yes, that is correct. On the basis of this Fuehrer order No. 31, dated 9 June 1941, for the area Athens, Crete, Cytheria, Anticytheria and Melos the agency of the Commander South Greece was established to be filled by an officer of the air corps.
Q I shall later discuss this document with you again. What was the situation you found when you arrived in Greece as Commander for Southern Greece?
A When in the middle of June 1941 I arrived in Athens about six weeks prior to that the capitulation of the Greek Army near Saloniki and Larissa had taken place. The Greek officers and soldiers had been discharged and sent home. The officers had been left their swords and they had stated on their word of honor that they would not fight again against the German or Italian occupation forces.
Q How do you know that?
A I know that from General Bakos who was the Minister of Defense in Athens at that time. This word of honor was a security measure.
Prisoners of war I would only intern to reduce the manpower potential of the enemy so that the prisoners of war can no longer participate in any fighting, and that is exactly what happened here. The occupation power remained in the country and the soldiers and officers were sent home to their country, in my opinion, that is the least demand which I could make at such a time to an officer who had previously been my enemy.
The prosecution has asserted that we did dismiss the Greek soldiers because we didn't want to feed them or because we couldn't feed them. In the campaigns in Poland and in the West at that time I am sure we had more than a million prisoners and these Greek divisions the total strength of which was about 150 thousand men, would not have made any difference; but since the Greek soldiers came from the Agricultural districts for the most part, these districts would have lacked the labor strength of these soldiers if we had put them in prisoner of war camps. In the coming winter not only the townfolk would have had to go hungry but also the country population.
The dismissal of the Greek soldiers was, in my opinion, more than a generous gesture. It proved clearly that the war with Greece was over, that we harbored no hostile attitude against the Greek population. If we remained in the country we only did that in order to shut the gate for an invasion.
Q General, would you please show us the borderline on the map on the right?
A The borderline between the German and Italian troops ran approximately to the northern edge of Thessalia. Everything to the north of that line -- for instance, Saloniki -- was occupied by German troops and the area south of that by Italian troops.
Q Now, what about the occupation forces at that time?
A With the exception of the 10th Air Corps and one Mountain Division which remained on Crete, the bulk of the German troops had been withdrawn from Southern Greece and committed in Russia. I had my official agency in Athens and was subordinated to the armed forces commander southeast. He was at the same time commander in chief of the 12th Army and he and his staff were located in Caphyssia which is a suburb of Athens.
In Fall 1941 towards the end of October the corps headquarters of the 12th Army was transferred to Salonika.
Q I would like again to refer back to Document PS-454, Exhibit 15, on page 55 of the English and page 38 of the German document bock I.
General, will you please comment in detail on this document?
AAccording to this document, the area of Athens and the islands Crete, Cytheria, Anticytheria and Melos were subordinated to me.
Q Will you please show it to us on the map?
A Crete, Cytheria, Anticytheria and Melos. On Melos later on a German naval coastal battery was established while Cytheria and Anticytheria were not occupied by German troops. Under the District of Athens one has to understand the area around the air ports: Tatoy in the north of Athens, Eleuses in the west of Athens, Calamaki in the south of Athens; and localities near there, which were used for the quartering of troops, furthermore, the German tone of occupation comprised the southern part of the Port Pyraeus and the district Laureon where the special staff "F" was accommodated.
The island of Crete was territorially subordinate to me and under my jurisdiction.
Apart from German troops there were on Crete one Italian division which had occupied the eastern part of the island. Territorial supremacy in Southern Greece and in Athens was held by the Italians. According to paragraph 6 of this order, the island of Crete occupied a special position in the southeast area. The commandant there held executive power and all troops on the island were tactically subordinated to him, and from the island of Crete the air warfare in the eastern Mediterranean Sea was to be waged. The organization of the air base and the construction of this air base was the main task.
Q General, did you have anything to do with reprisal measures on Crete?
A No the executive power on Crete, as can be seen from the order, was held by the commandant of Crete. Furthermore, the island was more than 300 kilometers distant from Athens and was separated from Athens by the sea, I as commander Southern Greece did not even dispose of communication lines. When radio messages were to be sent to Crete, the help of the 10th Air Corps had to be asked or the air district had to be asked for help. To the best of my recollection it was only during winter 1941-1942- that is so-called dezimeter telephone connection was established with Crete.
Furthermore, as of November 1941 Field Marshal Kesselring was appointed Commander in Chief South and his official seat was in Italy and he was involved in the questions of air warfare in the southern area and thus also in the ground organization of the air forces. He was interpolated into the organization in Crete and thus he had great authority there which did not make the channels of command any easier.
Q Were German troops stationed in the twon area of Athens?
AApart from two battalions, two infantry battalions, which were subordinated to the German headquarters in Athens, there were in the capital only staffs.
There was my own staff as military commander southern Greece and the staff of the air district, the staff of the Admiral Agean; furthermore, a number of German Army Economy staffs which, however, food depots for the army and the naval agencies. I personally had jurisdiction over the local headquarters in Athens and over the district headquarters Pyraeus and I disposed altogether over three reserve infantry battalions which mainly served the purpose of guarding.
My main task was to regulate and protect all supplies to Crete which was not quite easy because the bulk of the ships necessary for this task had to be put as our disposal by the Italians. There was only very little purely German shipping space in that area.
Q The next document which incriminates you in Document Book I is NOKW_1432, Exhibit 16, page 60 of the English text and page 44 of the German text. This is the regulation for the execution of Directive No. 31, issued by the Chief of the OKW on 15 June 1941.
What can you see from these provisions for the execution of Directive No. 31, General?
A These provisions for the Execution of Directive No, 31 contain purely formal provisions for execution and limitations for the area of the newly created commander in chief Southeast.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: We will take our usual morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will be in recess until eleven fifteen.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed, Dr. Mueller-Torgow.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q May I, at this point, draw attention to Document NOKW-902, Volume I? It is on page 66 of the English Document Book and page 48 of the German Document Book. It is Prosecution Exhibit No. 18. This document represents the War Diary of the Commanding General in Serbia. It says there under 19 July 1941, on Page 67 in the English Document Book: "During the leave of Field Marshal List, General of the Air Corps Felmy will be Deputy Wehrmacht Commander Southeast."
Q General, did you in actual fact deputize for List when he was on leave? If so, for how long?
A I deputized for Field Marshal List, as the Wehrmacht Commander, from 23 July until 23 August.
Q What did you do in actual fact while you deputized for him?
A I retained my official seat in Athens and simultaneously I looked at the business of the Commander in Southern Greece. In that capacity no deputy had been appointed for me. The Chief of the General Staff with the Wehrmacht Commander, General Foertsch, would call on me twice or three times a week from Caphyssia. Caphyssia is about half an hour from Athens by car. As I said, he came and reported orally to me twice or three times a week, or else he informed me about current affairs by telephone. I still remember that, for instance, Oberkriegsgerichtsrat (Senior Military Judge), Dr. Gruen, called and reported to me orally once or twice. For the rest it was not customary for one to issue orders of a basic character while he deputized for such a short period of time. Moreover, there was no cause to do so.
Q Do you remember who produced those documents covering any special events in Serbia which are concerned with that time of your deputizing?