PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Well, the Tribunal is of that opinion, but we do feel that copies tought to be available so that we can follow along on this cross examination.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: We will certainly try to do that in the future, your Honor. This is a document which just arrived and we were not able to get copies in time.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, you say, then the Rear Army Area referred to here was subordinate to the 11th Army and that the 11th Army was subordinate to you as Commander in Chief of Army Group A?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Before the question is answered, I believe we will take our afternoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
CROSS EXAMINATION (continued)
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, just before the recess I asked you whether the rear army, referred to in the Document NOKW 1902 was subordinate to the 11th Army, and the 11th Army in turn subordinated to you as Commander in Chief of Army Group A?
A. The 11th Army was temporarily under my command as Commander in Chief of Any Group A. This Army had a rear area, but the Commander in Chief of an Amy Group had purely operative tasks, and had nothing to do with the administration of the rear area. That was exclusively the task of the Army.
Q. Were political commisars of the Russian troops captured for the must part during combst, in the operations, or were they taken into custody, generally speaking, in the rear area?
A. I cannot say anything about this, because I cannot recall anything about the capturing of Russian commissars. I cannot recollect having anything to do with Russian commissars.
Q. Do you believe that the 11th Army never reported to you that Battalion Commissar Mahalla had been taken prisoner in Kerkeni, and shot on the 10th of July 1942?
A. I don't believe that the Army ever reported that.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: We will have enough copies of that to go around tomorrow, Your Honor, and it can be offered in evidence then. It can be marked now Exhibit 585-A for identification.
JUDGE CARTER: Why not put it in evidence now and eliminate the cecessity for going back?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: All right. Will you give that copy to the Secretary General then? (last remark to clerk) It is offered as Prosecution exhibit 585.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this exhibit, for the following reasons: The exhibit has no connection with any of the defendants charged here. This connection would have to be proved by the prosecution, and that is something different. As long as this has not happened, this piece of evidence has no probative value. For instance, with regard to the defendant Field Marshall List the Prosecution has not proved that this office has issued this report, and that this office belonged to the 11th Army, and the Prosecution has not proved that the 11th Army was at that time subordinate to Field Marshall List. This exhibit has no connection at all, and must therefore be rejected.
JUDGE CARTER: Objection overruled.
Q. Field Marshall, will you look at this next Document, NOKW 843.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I have sufficient copies of this to go around Your Honor.
Q. (continued) Field Marshall, this is a report of the Secret Field Police, Group 647, for the month of August 1942.
JUDGE CARTER: Is this to be marked Prosecution Exhibit 586?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Yes, Your Honor; I am sorry.
Q. Do you note the receipt stamp of the 42nd Infantry Corps Headquarters for September 3, 1942?
A. Yes.
Q. The report itself is dated "Local Headquarters, 21st August 1942.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you look under Paragraph 4, "Arrests."
"In the period covered by the report a total of 238 persons have been arrested - divided according to the following punishable offenses." That is on page 6 of the original document, I believe. Then a list under Paragraph "a" and beginning with that portion under paragraph "a" which begins, "Others".Members of Red Army 44 Jews and Commissars (turned over to SD) 2" Do you recall whether the 11th Army sent a report to you to the effect that the Jews and Commissars had been turned over to the SD?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what "turning over to the BD" means, Field Marshall?
A. I know this now. At the time I would not have known it. That is completely out of the question that such a report from the 11th Army was at that time directed to me. This is an activityreport of the Secret Field Police, addressed to the Army High Command, and this activity report would. surely have been passed on to the High Command of an Army Group. I must emphasize again and again that an Army Group had at that time purely Operational tasks and this Army Group was formed during an operation, and a part was split up and this part was lead by the newly formed staff of the Army Group, and had only purely operational tasks which had nothing to do with the administration of the rear army area, etc. and was purely taken up with the operations. I do not even know how long the Crimea, was subordinate and how long a time the Army was subordinate. I said the 11th Army was taken away at sometime and transported somewhere else. When and where that took plact I cannot tell you now.
Q. What do you know now that "turning over to the SD" means?
A. In general it is now said that if a person is turned over to the SD that the SD should then execute the person in question.
Q. Field Marshall, isn't it true that the 11th Army had a duty to incorporate in its report to you the most important functions and reports which it had received from subordinate units?
A. I cannot recall that at that time I received any reports from the Army apart from purely operational activities.
Q. You don't believe that the turning over of all Jews and Commissars to the SD would be important enough an incident for the 11th Army to inform you as Commander in Chief of Army Group A about?
A. I just told you the Army group had purely operational tasks and that the other tasks were left to the Army completely independently and without a higher officer, the quartermaster general. The Commander in Chief had in his staff no Quartermaster, for instance. He had only an operational staff.
Q. Now, Field Marshall, will you look at this next document, which is NOKW 848,--
MR. FENSTERMACHER: And when we have sufficient copies tomorrow, Your Honor, we will distribute them. It should be marked Prosecution Exhibit 587.
Q. (continued) This is an activity report of the Secret Field Police Group 647, for the month of July 1942, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you look under paragraph 3 of that report.
"The Politruk Kaliba Josef, 33 years old, and the Battalion Commissar Mahalla Wassili, 35 years old, were shot by order of the Ic of the XXXXIInd Corps. Both had been hiding with a group of partisans in the stone quarries near Kertsch and had tried to make their way to the coast to the Red Army." Did you receive any information about that incident?
A. This is the same report which we have had sometime previously. The document which was submitted to me, at first, mentioning Politruk Kaliba, was this report. If I didn't receive the first report I wouldn't have received this report.
Q. This report is slightly different, because in addition to a reference to a battalion Commissar there is also reference to Politruk; do you know what Politruk is?
A. In the other report this appears as well: it also said "A Politruk Kaliba and the Italian Commander Mahalla, Vassili,-that is the same report.
A. No, this is quite out of the question that I received such a report.
DR. LATERNSER: I object to the introduction of this document It is not to be admitted because it is cumulative. In Exhibit 586 the same document is submitted, and now the same document is again submitted under Exhibit 587. May I add that Exhibit 586 is an extract from this exhibit which is now being submitted under Exhibit 587. By this means material is cumulative, as we have had occasion to observe in other cases here.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: We will withdraw Exhibit 587 at this time, Your Honors, until we can re-check it.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, were the communist insurgent units in the Southeast area organized along the same lines as the Russian army?
A. I cannot say that but bandits can never be as fully organized as an army or as parts of an army.
Q. Do you know whether there were commissars --political commissars among the communist insurgents in the Southeast?
A. No. Commissars being political commissars was mentioned here in one document.
Q. Field Marshal, I believe you testified earlier that you had occasion to capture from time to time certain orders and regulations of the communist insurgents in the Southeast. You spoke specifically of communist regulations for the conduct of guerilla warfare having fallen into your hands.
A, I did not talk about that.
Q. Weren't you asked by Dr. Laternser whether you had ever seen any regulations of the communist insurgents for the conduct of bandit warfare?
A. Only these directives of the communist party for the bandit warfare in Serbia.
Q. Did you ever capture any orders issued by Tito to his units?
A. No. At my time, Tito was a completely unknown concept. He didn't exist at that time.
Q. I believe, Field Marshal, you testified that the Commissar Order was never distributed to the Southeast command. Is that correct?
A. I didn't say it. I didn't put it that way. I said that the Commissar Order was not received by Army Group A or was not sent to Army Group A. You are now referring to the Southeast command in the Balkans? 3411
Q. Yes. Was it ever distributed to you in the Southeast?
A. No.
Q. Do you believe that the Commissar Order was confined only to the Russian theater of war?
A. Yes.
Q. We will turn to Exhibit 14 in Document Book 1. It is on page 49 of the English and page 34 of the German. This is the Commissar Order as distributed by the Commander in Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch on the 8th of June, 1941. Will you turn to the last page of the document where the distribution list is contained? You will note that the 16th copy was sent to the High Command of Army in Norway. Have you any explanation for why the army in Norway received a copy of the Commissar Order?
A. I can hardly give an explanation for that. I can only think that in the extreme North in Petsamo --and I don't remember the name of the other place. I believe there must have been a possibility there of a meeting with the Russian troops. Petsamo and Kirkenes-Kirkenes I mean. On the Fischer peninsula.
Q. You are quite sure, however, that the Commissar Order was never received by you in the Southeast and that there were no political commissars with the communist units in the Southeast?
A. No.
Q. I have just a very few questions concerning your chief of staff, General Foertsch. About how many hours a day did you spend in conference with Foertsch?
A. That was different from case to case. There were no regulations about it, no fixed rule. If something big was to happen, plans for instance to carry out the extention of the Fortress Creata, this might have taken three to four hours, and including interruptions it would probably have taken longer. If that was not the case, it was one hour a day or it may have been two hours, one hour in the morning and one hour in the afternoon.
In the Army high Command these conferences would only take place according to requirements and were not fixed according to any fixed rules. Apart from that, I met the chief for lunch and for dinner.
Q. Was your office adjacent to the office of your chief?
A. No. The offices were in completely separate houses.
Q. Do you know whether Foertsch ever complained to you against certain orders issued by the OKW?
A. Yes, Foertsch repeatedly complained to me about orders from the OKW. We often discussed these orders. If orders arrived which we didn't like and we assumed that they had been just ordered by bureaucrats.
Q. Which orders do you recall that Foertsch protested to you about?
A. I can't remember individual orders regarding which Foertsch complained to me. Against one order the contents of which I do not recall, I protested to the OKW, and then I ordered Foertsch when he went on leave to do the same, because I did not receive a reply to my first written complaint.
Q. Do you remember discussing your order of 5 September 1941 with Foertsch before it was distributed to subordinate units?
A. Of the 5th of September? No, Foertsch was on leave then on the 5th of September.
Q. Do you remember discussing the Keitel directive of 16 September 1941 with Foertsch?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I wonder, Mr. Fenstermacher, what is the purpose of this examination? It certainly isn't cross-examination.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I think if Your Honor please, counsel for Foertsch did develop the relationship that existed between List and his chief of staff.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Well, to the extent that he examined him, I think you have a right to cross-examine him.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I will be very brief, Your Honor.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, you have no doubt heard it said that the relationship between a commanding general and his chief of staff is that of a marriage. Have you heard that expression?
A. I for my person have not used this expression somebody else mentioned it. I believe a witness mentioned it here.
Q. Do you think that is an apt description of tho type of relationship that a commanding officer should have with his chief of staff?
A. That depends on the case. There are good marriages and there are bad marriages. In an ideal case, it is a good marriage and then it is as the witness mentioned. I suppose, of course, it can be different.
Q. Was your relationship with Foertsch a happy marriage, Field Marshal?
A. We certainly didn't love each other ardently. There was cettainly a good relationship.
Q. Would you rely on Foertsch's judgment?
A. Foertsch had very good judgment and was a very good and loyal assistant.
Q. Did you respect the advice which Foertsch gave to you from time to time?
A. That again depended on the case. If I thought the advice was good, I took it. If I thought his advise was bad, I rejected it. I remember that Foertsch made a proposal in Serbia on which he had worked out a long memorandum, which he read to me and he was very proud of it and I rejected it out of hand and I told him "My dear Foertsch, we can't do it this way. This is impossible."
Q. Would you say that you adopted Foettsoh's advice to a greater extent than you rejected it?
A. I believe these are all theoretical considerations. One can hardly say anything regarding it. I said expressly Foertsch was a very good chief of staff, and I accepted many of his counsels that were used when they were good, and in other cases I did not accept them. In many cases he certainly gave me good advice.
Q. Would you say that Foertsch was the most influential man in your headquarters next to you?
A. In every staff of an army, an army corps command, there must be, if it is at all properly staffed, the chief of staff must be after the commander in chief, the one who has the most influential position. This is inherent in the position of the chief because at the same time he leads the whole staff, and is also the adviser to the commander in chief.
Q. Field Marshal, you said that on the 15th of October 1941 you went to the hospital, and that on the 27th of October 1941 General Kuntze was appointed, or at least took over command of the 12th Army and assumed the position of Armed Forces Commander Southeast, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was in command as Armed Forces Commander Southeast, Commander in Chief of the 12th Army, between the 15th and 27th of October 1941?
A. I have already stated that I do not know what other arrangement was arrived at, according to order -- that is according to the order of OKW, Kuntze was to deputize for me from the 18th onwards. Kuntze only arrived on the 27th and he came to see me for the first time on the 28th or 29th for a very brief time. I did not ask him at the time what the arrangement was because my state of health was such that I could only talk to Kuntze for a very brief time when he took over the command.
Q. I think you testified earlier that when you went on leave General Felmy took over command as your deputy.
JUSTICE BURKE: Hasn't this matter been covered by Mr. Denney in his portion of the cross examination of the witness?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, Mr. Denney says he did not cover the period of time from the 15th of October to the 27th of October, 1941, but only covered the period of time when the defendant List went on leave in July 1941.
PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
A. Mr. Denney asked me who was deputizing for me at that time, but I can repeat it now. On the 18th, according to orders, Kuntze was to deputize for me, but he only arrived in Athens on the 26th, and because of my state of health he could only come and see me on or about the 28th or 29th, but he assumed the command de facto as from the 27th.
During the intervening time I do not know who was commander. I do not know the detailed arrangements. During my leave I had determined that General Felmy was to deputize for me. Because of the suddenness of my illness I could not give an order and consequently no such order was issued by me.
Q. Was General Felmy your Senior Corps Commander at that time?
A. I don't know whether General Felmy was the Senior Commander at that time or not. At that time he was, at any rate, present in Athens, and one could not ask a commanding general who was in Belgrade and who had to stay in Belgrade because of the tension there -- one could not ask him to deputize for me in Athens. One would have to transfer him from Belgrade to Athens for that period of time.
Q. Were you ever relieved--
A. I believe that my former chief of staff, who was present at that time, could give more detailed information about this time than I can give.
Q. Were you ever formally relieved of command of the 12th Army?
A. That is a rather undefined state. Officially, I was relieved by being appointed Commander in Chief of Army Group A. Kuntze was again and again reaffirmed as my deputy, and on paper I still had the title "Commander in Chief of the 12th Army", although I no longer had anything to do with it.
It was a custom of Hitler that he often left things like that in a state of indecision because he did not want to, or could not decide, or he had a grouch against somebody, and did not want to come out in the open with it, and similar things.
Q. Did your deputy, General Kuntze, have power to repeal orders of yours with which he disagreed?
A. The successor, and/or all of the deputies, could of course act as he wanted to act, as he pleased. If a deputy is only present for a couple of weeks, he restrains himself in certain circumstances, but he certainly is entitled to order whatever he thinks fit, if he has been appointed deputy.
Q. You mean he does have the power to repeal orders which the previous commander had already distributed to subordinate units?
A. If he thought it was necessary, yes.
Q. Field Marshal, I think you testified that you resigned your command as Commander in Chief of Army Group A because of a tactical difference with Hitler?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. You did not leave because you disagreed with the way Hitler was running the war?
A. The ideas and considerations, of course, played their part when I protested against the carrying out of the order I received at that time. They made my resistance easier for me.
Q. Is it true that you left your Southeast command because of ill health and not because of any disagreement with Hitler, or with the methods of waging war which he had ordered?
A. Which commend, may I ask, are you alluding to now?
Q. Your command in the Balkans as Commander in Chief of the 12th Army and Armed Forces Commander Southeast.
A. For reasons of health.
Q. Did yon ever tender your resignation at any time prior to September 1942?
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think, Mr. Fenstermacher, that we have been all through this a time or two. If I remember correctly, he said that he could not resign if he wanted to, and on this one occasion he did because it was requested.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I think he testified that direct, Your Honor, but I do not believe it was gone into on cross examination.
JUDGE BURKE: My recollection differs from that.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, Your Honors, we will pass it.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, I believe you testified that the measures you ordered for the pacification of Serbia were ordered by you only out of considerations of military necessity, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But isn't it true that the measures which you ordered had a boomerang effect - that is to say, because of the severity of the measures which you ordered, the insurgent movement in fact increased rather than decreased in numbers and effect?
A. I do not have that impression. From all of these documents it becomes clear again and again that we acted on the defensive, that we only became more severe when the insurgent movement had grown to a certain proportion, and we had to expect that if one once dealt energetically with this seat of infection, we could reach a final pacification, and in my view we would have reached this state if these insurgents had not been constantly supported from abroad.
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 30 in Document Book 1, beginning on page 99 of the English and page 77 of the German?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. This is a report sent to you by the Wehrmacht Liaison Office in Belgrade on the 31st of July 1941, and the receipt stamp of the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast for the 5th of August 1941 is on the first page of the document. Will you turn to the second page which is Page 100 in the English, and I believe Page 78 in the German, Paragraph 2: "Though nothing is said publicly about the shooting of Jews and Communists as reprisal for acts of sabotage, these shootings have, however, made a deep impression in Belgrade. It is doubtful whether the shootings will prevent a repetition of acts of sabotage."
Do you remember generally receiving reports to the effect that the measures which you had ordered would probably not have any gainful effect from the Germans' point of view?
A. It is possible that I received such reports, but I cannot recall these reports in detail. But if the one or the other--some minor officials from the Wehrmacht Liaison Office--gives vent to his opinion here that is not at all decisive. We must hold on to the principle idea, and the principle idea, was that our measures were to get hold of the insurgent movement and smash this insurgent movement, and so that we would then come to a final state of pacification. There was no other thought present then but that one definite cauterizing of the wound we would cure the malady. We were only interested in the ruling of a pacified country and nothing else.
Q. Will you turn to the last page of that exhibit which is on Page 110 of the English, and I believe Page 85 of the German, to the sentence beginning: "Reprisal measures, as for instance the severity of the shooting of 81 persons collected haphazardly did not bring about pacification nor did it serve as an intimidation.
On the contrary the feeling of being plundered, chased away or slaughtered with wife and child either by criminal Ustaschi people in Bosnia or Herzagowina or by robber elements, or to lose life and property as the casual object of reprisal at the hands of the Germans has embittered and made desperate the otherwise quiet and politically indifferent and loyal parts of the Seroian population, who are automatically driven into the ranks of some kind of insurgent groups."
A. With reference to this report, I may only say that it is a report from Croatia which was, at that time, not subordinate to me. The report, however, proves the extent of the ethnical fight in Croatia and of the whole of the Balkans. And that not only the German advance was responsible, as this fellow says here for one fact that the Serbian population was driven to take part in the bands, but rather that the Ustashi bands were also co-responsible for this fact. This report proves the sharp confusion and differences on the Balkans.
Q. You didn't believe that this psychological point of view, namely, that harsh measures would drive the loyal parts of the population into the hands of the insurgents, was a valid point of view?
A. I say that these measures had to be taken for reasons of military necessity.
Q. Will you turn to Exhibit 34 in the same document book, Field Marshal? It begins on Page 118 of the English and Page 93 of the German. This is a report of the Ministry of the Interior to the Military Commander in Serbia, Administrative Staff, dated Belgrade, 29 August 1941. Will you turn to the next to the last page of the report which is on Page 120 of the English, and I believe on Page 95 of the German, the paragraph beginning, "The Consequence of the procedure of the German assault troops."
Do you have it?
A. Yes.
Q. "The consequence of the procedure of the German assualt troops will be that a large number of innocent people will be slaughtered and that the Communists in the weeks not only will not be exterminated but will increase in numbers. Because many farmers, even entire villages -- even though up to now, they had no connection with the Communist will flee into the woods only out of fear and will be received there by the Communists. They will be provided with arms and used for combat and for open revolt against the German Wehrmacht. This insurrection will develop on a large scale and will have incalculable and terrible consequences for the entire population."
Did the Military Commander in Serbia ever relay that point of view on to you?
A. No, I cannot remember that he put this point of view to me. In addition, this report from the Ministry of the Interior is dated the 29th of August 1941. Therefore, it had its origin before the strict measures were ordered by me. And I would have read the report in detail in order to find out what is its origin was and what specially caused it. And this report also proves the Communists did, in fact, terrorize the country and that they were fought against in the woods, and it proves that numerous peasants, that whole villages, did join the Communists. It is a complete proof that the whole population in large areas took part in this Communist advance, and our measures were necessary to combat the Communists' advance.
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 103 in Document Book III, at Page 87 of the English, and Page 64 of the German? This is an order from the Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia, dated 25 October 1941. Will you look at the third paragraph on the first page of the order?
"In order to regulate the procurement and execution of hostages according to plan we draw attention to the following points: Indiscriminate arrests and executions of Serbs drive toward the insurgents those circles of the population which have, up until now, stock aloof from the revolt, strengthen the powers of resistance of Communists, weaken the chances of a quick suppression and damage the political aim of the operation."
General Boehme was Commanding General Plenipotentiary in Serbia at that time. Did General Boehme ever mention to you that those severe measures boomeranged in fact?
A. No, this order is dated the 25th of October, and, at that time, on the 25th of October, General Boehme apparently had received reports regarding incidents which had exceeded their aim. In order to get measures under control again he issued this order. That was at a time at which I could not have received this order.
Q. Field Marshal, I believe earlier you testified that during a period of time after the 5th of September 1941, that is to say, after your order of that day was issued and distributed to subordinate units, the insurgent movement increased in numbers. I believe you said that on directexamination. I have a reference to Page 3228 in the English transcript to that effect. Do you recall your testimony in that regard?
A. I said that around about August or September insurgent movements had increased considerably.
Q. Do you believe that it had increased because of the insuance of your order?
A. No, around about August and September and because of the increasing insurgent movement I issued the order of the 5th of September. It was immediately proceeded by the capturing of field guard posts, whole companies, etc. That had preceded the order of the 5th of September.
As far as I remember, I also memtioned during the first days of September the total losses which can be seen from a letter I wrote during my leave to the Chief of Staff as a report to the OKW. During the first couple of days over 400 losses occured and that may explain the opinion that I had given after the 5th of September. Then, because of this order there were incidents taking place at the end of August and the beginning of September. The whole movement increased so that what came afterwards was merely an addition to what had gone before.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(The court recessed at 1630 hours to resume session on Tuesday 23 September 1947, at 0930.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 23 September, 1947, 0930-0945, Justice Wennerstrump presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United states of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
May it please your Honors all defendants are present in the Courtroom.
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Fenstermacher.
CROSS EXAMINATION (continued) MR. FENSTERMACHER: If your Honors please, I pass to your Honors now three copies, NOKW 1902, offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit 585.
German copies of that exhibit were sent to the Translation Information Center last evening. I believe your Honors have from yesterday, copies of Exhibit 586 which were distributed yesterday afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: By way of inquiry, Mr. Fenstermacher, and for my own information, do you have any suggestions as to the paging of these cross-examinations documents, as to where they can be filed advantageously?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: The way I am doing that for myself, Your Honor, is to prepare individual folders for each of the defendants, and to mark them, "List, Cross-Examination documents", and I keep them together with the 25 document books, but separate from the document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. Field Marshal, yesterday afternoon we were talking about the the military necessity for the measures which you ordered, and which your troops took during your term of office in the southeast.