Finally, under:
III, Our tactical position and plans.
...............
The task of the division is to:
"Reinforced 117th Light Infantry Division is to defend the Peloponnesus against enemy attack from the sea, the land and the air".
...............
The reports which I now want to deal with contained in NOKW-1245, Exhibit 468, which we are just discussing contain the arrest of band suspects during mopping-up operations in various localities. Will you please briefly give us your comments on this? General?
A. Such mopping up operations took place quite frequently. They served the purpose of apprehending the unreliable elements within the population. In my opinion, that is a very natural Security measure which every occupation power is entitled to take if grounds for such an action are given. That was the case in these particular instances.
Q. In the Ic Daily Report dated 31 December 1943, on page 81 of the English text and page 58 of the German text, it says amongst other things, "In Athens by German Police was arrested 117 Communists. "
A. This report also shows that under the common denominator, 68th Corps, events were reported which were not carried out by units subordinate to me. The German police in Athens, as is well known, was not subordinate to the 68th Corps.
Q. General, does the same apply to the Daily Report dated the 24th of December, 1943, which says "SS arrested one bandit leader and ten bandits at Levadia?"
A. Yes, the same applies here because the SS also was not subordinate to the 68th Corps.
Q. In the next Ic Daily Report dated 11 November 1943, it says:
"During raid at Levadia, 67 band suspects and communists were arrested." What can you tell us about this?
A. Levadia was part of the area where the 18 Police Regiment was committed and this regiment was not subordinated to the 68th Corps.
Q. On page 84 of the English text, which is page 61 of the German text, in a report dated 20 November 1943 the destruction of several houses in Kastritsi near Patras is mentioned.
A. You mean the report of the 20th of November, 1943.
Q. Yes, that is the one. Do you remember that incident?
A. No, I don't remember any details. From the report, however, I gather that in Kastritsi, rifles, ammunition, and signal equipment was seized and that ten band suspects were arrested. It can therefore be assumed with a certain amount of certainty that only those houses in Kastritsi were destroyed where rifles, ammunition, and signal equipment was found. The inhabitants were obliged to deliver up such equipment which served purely military purposes. If they did not comply, they became liable to punishment.
Q. The next report, the Ic Daily Report dated 23 December 1943, is also contained in Document NOKW-1246 which was Exhibit 472 of the prosecution on page 93 of the English text and page 65 of the German text. According to these two reports, during the mopping-up of the area on both sides along the Sparta-Tripolis Highway, 13 bandits were shot while attempting a sabotage act on a telephone line. Do you remember that incident?
A. Around that time I was on furlough. The report merely shows as it says here: "Bandits are continuously making sabotage attempts on the telephone line Tripolis-Sparta. 13 were shot to death during the mopping-up operation carried out against this."
They were caught during the act in this case.
Q. This brings me to the next document in this document book, NOKW-1246, Exhibit 472. This is on page 88 of the English text and page 63 of the German text. Here we have the War Diary No. III, which has already been mentioned, of the 68th Corps covering the last six months of 1943.
On the page just mentioned, page 88 of the English text and 63 of the German text, in a report dated 30 August 1943 it is mentioned that a village, Skupi, was burned down. General, do you know of that incident?
A. I don't remember. The report is so brief that one cannot gather from it whether Skupi was burned down in a reprisal action or whether there was some fighting around Skupi. It is merely said "one of our own patrols encountered bandits in a skirmish."
Q. The entry dated 25 October 1943 mentions a band attack North west of Argos on a surveying detachment, as a, reprisal measure eight hostages were arrested and some houses destroyed. Can you tell us something about this?
A. Here again I cannot give you any details. I don't remember that particular incident.
Q. I would now like to discuss Document NOKW-1257 which is Exhibit 474. Here again we have an activity report made by the 117th Light Infantry Division. General, at least you could not have gained knowledge of the incidents in the form in which they are reported here. We will discuss in another context most of the events mentioned in this report. I would like to ask you this. Can you remember on page 94 in the English and 66 in the German--the reprisal action reported under the 5th of November which entailed the burning down of the village Verbatim. Can you remember the band attack reported under the 6th of November which was carried out on a German freight train near Aghion?
A. No, I am afraid I can't do that. Along that particular railroad line there were quite a number of surprise attacks which were started from the Area Kalvrita; therefore, I cannot distinguish between all the individual cases now in retrospect.
Q. Under the date of 5 November 1943, under Paragraph 4, it is stated that "after lengthy negotiations Sub-area Administrative Headquarters 1042 claimed that the right to order reprisal measures was to be transferred to the Division. Was anything of that known to you, General?
A. No, I did not hear about that, but the authority to order and carry out reprisal measures, had been invested in the Divisional Commandery. Every single directive from higher agencies expressed that. I don't see anything special in this particular report, quite apart from the fact that it was not shown to me at the time.
Q. That would bring me to Document NOKW-1063, which is Exhibit No 480, on Page 136 of the English text and Page 99 of the German text. This document contains excerpts from the War Diary No. 4, for the LXVIIIth Corps, covering the period from 1 January 1944 until 30 June 1944. Yesterday I offered the complete War Diary for this period as Felmy Document Book No. 4. The majority of the entires contained in the excerpts in Document Book XX have been dealt with in other contexts. Therefore, I only want to deal with the entry of 17 January 1944, which is contained on Page 137 of the English and Page 99 of the German text. In this report it says: "As reprisal for an attack on one officer, Second Battalion, 670th Artillery Regiment, near Ritsais one kilometer southeast of Tripolis, 20 Communists were executed." These same facts are reported in Document Book XXV of the Prosecution, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667 and Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804, on Pages 65, 119, and 125 of the English text and Pages 49, 90 and 92, respectively, of the German text.
General would you please give us your comments on this incident?
A. I can't tell you any details about this incident, but I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize again that it has been proved through statistics, on the basis of the War Diary which was presented by the Defense, that during the six months from January until June, 1944, inclusively, in every month there were 55 sabotage acts, surprise attacks, and clashed with bands, which shows that one cannot possibly remember details. This amounts to almost two of such incidents perday.
Q. If it please the Tribunal, that concludes my discussion of Document Book XX of the Prosecution, This brings me to Document Book XXI.
General, the first document with which you are charged in this document book is the first document contained in the book. It is NOKW-469. Exhibit 482. This is the so-called "Blood Bath of Klissura" with which you were also charged in the Indictment, as Commanding General of the LXVIII Corps. Will you please give us your comments on this operation?
A. I don't know why the Prosecution charges me with this action. Klissura was not situated within the area of the LXV III Corps. The place Klissura which is meant here, as I gathered when studying the documents, must be located in Macedonia, somewhere within the vicinity of Salonika. The 7th SS Regiment, mentioned in the document was, at that time, not subordinated to the LXVIIIth Corps. The proof for my assertion is contained in the document. On Page 3 of the German text is Exhibit NO. 482. The investigation of this incident is undertaken by the Corps Group Salonika under Ia, No. 3509/7323/44 Secret; it is dated the 12th of June 1944. Reference is made I suppose to the Army Group, and the report is made to the Army Group. It is signed by General Pflugradt. I, therefore, do not see why this incident should be charged to the account of the LXVIIIth Corps.
Q. In the next two documents, contained in Document Book XXI, NOKW-081, Exhibit No. 483, and NOKW-467, Exhibit No. 484 the socalled Operation "Distomon" in mentioned.
General, was Distomon situated in the area of your Corps?
A. Distomon was situated in the area of my Corps.
Q. Was the SS Tank Infantry Regiment 7 which is involved in this incident subordinate to you at that time?
A. According to the War Diary of the Corps, this regiment was, for a limited time, subordinated to the Corps Headquarters. This was the time when the 18th Police Regiment had to be withdrawn from the Levadia area for combating bands on the Peloponnes. That was the time period around the end of May and the beginning of June and July, 1944. It was sent to that area because of threats from the bands directed against the Itea-Lamia Road. Itea is situated on the Gulf of Corinth. Another threat was directed against the ThebesLamia Road which lead to the Thermopyles Pass. The railroad leading along that stretch was also threatened. That district could not be left unprotected; so the Army Group transferred the SS Tank Infantry Regiment 7 to that area for this particular time in question. During this particular time the regiment was subordinated to me or rather to the Corps Headquarters for tactical purposes.
Q Of which division was this regiment a part and where was the division stationed?
A The Regiment was part of the IV SS Tank Police Grenadier division. Where the divisional staff was stationed and where the other parts of the division were located, I don't know, how did I know it at the time either, certainly they were not located within the Corps area.
Q For what period of time was the Regiment subordinated to you at the time for tactical purposes?
AAs I have already said, approximately during the months of June and July, 1944, the Police Regiment 18 had to be committed counter activities against bands on the Peloponnes. After that period was over, the 18th Police Regiment returned to its old area of committment around Levadia, and the 7th Police Regiment was withdrawn from that area. To the best of my knowledge, it was transferred back to Macedonia.
Q General, during these two months in question while this Regiment was for tactical purposes subordinated to the Corps was there a close relationship between the Corps and the 4th Police Regiment, I beg your pardon, I mean Police Regiment VII, a relationship approximately of the type which existed between the Corps staff and the troop unit, which were subordinated to the divisions under the Corps?
A I did not know the Regiment prior to its subordination to me, because it was stationed outside of the Corps area. Also during the eight weeks it was subordinated to me I did not get to know it particularly well, because in this comparatively short period of time I had no opportunity to visit it. Furthermore I did not feel any inclination to take up close contact with this Regiment, because the contrasting attitude, which existed between the Waffen SS and the army units were not particularly inviting to make any efforts to get into any good relationship with the SS. It was just a cool existance of the units next to each other and the contacts were purely official.
Q When and how did you gain information of this operation Distomon?
A The incident near Distomon reached my knowledge through a report of the VII SS Regiment shortly afterward.
It struck me that in the Greek propaganda and from the district chief in Levadia the whole incident had been described in a completely different manner, at least different compared with the way in which the Regiment described the incident.
Q In Felmy document book No. 4, which is the war diary of the Corps, it says on page 64 in the entry under 10 June, 1944, under Boeotia:
"During the course of a mopping up operation in the area of Distomon southeast of Arachova, strong partisan forces offered stubborn resistance from well constructed positions with machine guns and mortars. The enemy was beaten back after a long flight and withdrew to the mountains. Cur casualties: 3 dead, 14 wounded; enemy casualities: 105 dead, a number of wounded could not be determined."
General, how did you learn the true facts?
AAround the 11th or 12th of June I must have learned of these, because on the 10th day of June the incident near Distomon took place. Then, as I mentioned, the Greek press and propaganda made quite a number of assertions which was nothing particularly new. It was part of the sphere of work of propaganda to exaggerate, to give false reports, to lie, so for the moment I did not take this fact very seriously. I became suspicious, however, when I heard from a non-commissioned officer of the secret field police that the statement made by the Regiment could not be correct. This non-commissioned officer whose name was Koch was stationed with a small command staff near Levadia. Secret police is usually dispersed in small units all over the country, that was in the nature of their assignment and task. This particular non-commissioned officer Koch had taken part in the operation Distomon. Since this group of the secret field police was subordinated to the Corps, he reported his observations to the Corps Headquarters.
I saw from this report quite clearly that the Regiment, the SS Regiment, had reported the events in Distomon to the Corps headquarters incorrectly. Consequently the event was reported to the Army Group, because the original report, as it has been read just before in the war diary, could not longer be sustained.
As a consequence, the Army Croup commissioned me to investigate the incident. There can therefore be no doubt that the Army Group was informed by me in writing and orally about the true facts. Unfortunately among the documents here there are no copies or excerpts from those reports, but they must have been submitted because otherwise the Army Group would not have commissioned me to carry out an investigation. How could the Army Group know about it unless I reported it?
There can also be no doubt that the conduct and behavior of the Regiment was strongly disapproved of by the Corps Headquarters. If I had been in agreement with the conduct shown by the Regiment, I would not have contributed to uncovering the false report and to making sure of the true facts.
Q General, but you agreed to the disciplinary procedure that was undertaken?
A That is quite correct. There is a note which I put under the report of the Regiment to the effect that I agreed to the disciplinary procedure suggested by the Regimental Commander, but this remark refers to the false report, which was issued, not however to the incident which forms the basis of this report.
Why I wrote a remark to that effect at the time is difficult to state for me, as now I don't know it any longer. I can only admit that this note is illogical. The Regiment was not subordinated to me in a disciplinary respect, all Waffen SS units had their disciplinary channels which led up to the Reichsleader SS. I was in no position to force the division to start a court martial procedure, all I could do was to report to the Army Group, which I did. Thereafter the O.K.W. had to contact Himmler, he was the only man who could decide about a procedure taken against the Division.
Q General, was the regiment which undertook the Operation Distomon the same regiment which was also responsible for the Action Klissura?
A Yes, it is the very same regiment.
Q Did you know at the time that this regiment was also responsible for the incident in Klissura?
A No, I did not know it at the time. I gathered it here from the documents - from a communication from Army Group E in answer to the report sent in by me.
Q This would be contained in Document NOKW-467, Exhibit 484, in Document Book XXI of the Prosecution, on page 39 of the English text and 28 of the German text. In this report of the High Command of Army Group E addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 10 July 1944, it says in the second paragraph, and I quote verbatim: "Obviously it is a similar case to that which happened at that time near Klissura....." (and then in brackets comes the reference number) ...."Here, as there, the incident reports pertain to the SS Tank Grenadier Regiment No. 7." General, you are telling us that at the time you did not know that the same regiment was involved in the Klissura Operation?
A No, I did not know it at the time.
Q And you are further telling us that your agreement to the disciplinary procedure taken in the matter only extended to the issuance of the wrong report, not, however, to the incident which formed the basis. Why is that?
AAs I have already stated, NCO Koch of the Secret Field Police, who presented quite a different channel, informed me that the report of the regime, which had originally been submitted to the Corps, did not represent the true facts. I therefore investigated this discrepancy. I was interested in it and I wanted to clear up the differences and I wanted to establish whether the regiment had actually lied to me. When I had the report from NCO Koch I reported the whole incident to the Army Group. That can, in my opinion, be clearly seen from the report of the regimental commander, where he asks for consent to the disciplinary procedure regarding the inconsistencies, as he put it, in the combat report.
Following that I granted my consent.
Q Just before you mentioned a report which is missing in the document - a report by you to the Army Group. What kind of a report was that? Can you give us details?
A This can only have been the report which described the action taken near Distomon as an excess committed by the regiment without any cause for such an excess. This must have been reported in conjunction with the first report made by NCO Koch. If that report could be found amongst the files then it would quite clearly show the correctness of my statements.
Q The incident Distomon -- was that further pursued by the Army Group?
A Yes. The Army Group, as can be seen from one of the documents, contacted the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, the High Command of Army Group F, and passed on the report to this agency.
QNOKW-467, in Document Book XXI, is Exhibit 484 on page 22 of the German text and page 54 of the English text. Will you please give us your comments on this report?
A The Army Group again commissioned me with the investigation of the incident. Also, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast had, as can be seen from the document, reported the incident to the Operational Department of the O.K.W. It says here, literally, "68th Corps has been commissioned to investigation a deliberately false report." These words also show that I consented merely to the disciplinary facts. Then all I would have had to do was to show no reaction to the report issued to me by NCO Koch.
Q General, why were you, as you say, not authorized or competent to give your consent for the disciplinary procedure taken in the incident?
A Because the regiment was subordinated to me only for tactical purposes but not for administrative purposes.
Q What do you mean by that?
A No Administrative subordination means that the members of the regiment were not personally subordinated to me. I could neither grant furloughs for them nor could I promote them; or take disciplinary action against them. I had no judicial authority over them. I could neither give directives to the Court Martial of the 4th Armored SS Division to start and to carry out an investigation, nor would I have been in a position to confirm or refute the sentence pronounced by this Court Martial. All I had was the right to issue orders of a tactical nature to the regiment for that time period during which it was tactically subordinated to me.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, I would now like to submit another Defense Document which is contained in Felmy Document Book III. This is Document No. 78, on page 38. It will become Exhibit 50. This is an affidavit executed by one Wilhelm Hammer. I am reading from the second passage of this affidavit?
"From my work with the Army Group E during the summer of 1944, I still recall the incident Distomon, with respect to which General Felmy submitted a report to the Army Group, concerning the Commander of the 7th SS Armored Police Regiment of the 4th Armored Police Division. As far as I remember, Greeks, among them a cleric, had turned to General Felmy for help who, because of his correctness and fairness, enjoyed special confidence in many Greek circles, as some units of the aforementioned SS Armored Police Regiment had arbitrarily shot the inhabitants of a village and burned down the village itself. The report, sent to General Felmy upon his request, tried to gloss over the facts. In a report to the Army Group, General Felmy himself voiced his opinion about the above report and after a detailed examination of the incident, came to the conclusion that the commander of the Police Regiment had evidently and knowingly made a false official report. It was clearly evident from the data available that the unit had acted arbitrarily, that is to say, without the knowledge of, or even the instructions of the Commanding General, General Felmy himself was indignant about the action of the unit, as being a soldier of the old school himself, he detested all unmilitary actions.
The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E shared General Felmy's opinion. As, however, as far as I recall, the 4th SS Armored Police Division was in the meantime no longer stationed within the area of Command of the Army Group, the whole matter was transferred for further action to the OKW. In this connection I would like to say that the 4th Armored Police Division, as far as I remember, was stationed in the area of Kozani, which was under the command of the Saloniki Aegaeis commander."
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will conclude the reading of the affidavit at the termination of the recess.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Doctor.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. May I continue reading the affidavit by Wilhelm Hammer which is contained in Document Book V? I shall continue on page 39.
"In this connection I would like to point out that General Felmy, to whose staff I belonged from September 1941 until about September 1942, constantly reminded the commanders subordinated to him to see to it that the units under their command maintained a soldierly bearing and behaved correctly towards the Greek population. The reason for issuing these reminders was the very bed behavior of the Italian troops in Greece whose outrages, lootings and burnings were, as is well-known, the first reasons for many Greeks banding together.
"Strict punishment was meted out by General Felmy in cases where members of the Wehrmacht had committed excesses in individual instances with respect to the Greek population. This fact is confirmed by the relevant Military Court Martial verdicts.
"General Felmy can be considered as a pronounced fried of the Greeks. Not only was he a warm sponsor of all aims purporting to lead to a cultural German-Greek collaboration (see his sponsorship of the work of Professor Wetter on Aegina, sponsoring the publication of a book about the Peloponnea and other things), but he was always trying to ease the burden of the Greek population during the time for the occupation. Among other things he had in mind the improvement, from a point of view of agriculture of the Kopais, an area of about 40,000 ha, made fertile by artificial irrigation, by means of better irrigation machinery, and by a more thorough cultivation in order thus to increase the food supplies for the Greek population.
He often voiced his intentions; I do not know, however, whether in view of the guerrilla situation it was possible to carry out these plans.
"The fact that on the German Memorial Day in 1942, General Felmy deposited a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Greek Soldier in the City Castle in Athens, does not in itself demonstrate his soldierly and pro-Greek attitude, but this is demonstrated in particular by his behavior at the time when the last German troops moved out of Athens in 1944. At a solemn ceremony, he had the German flag, flying on the Akropolis, hauled down, and before he himself left Athens, he deposited a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Greek Soldier. It is also in conformity with his attitude that he prevented the destruction of the Marathon-dam and with it the breakdown of the entire water supply of the whole of Athens.
"When retreating in the autumn of 1944, General Felmy was trying to evacuate the area if possible in such a way, as to make it possible for it to be occupied step by step by British or National-Greek troops; what mattered to him at the time was the idea to save the Greek people the terrors of Civil War and to let peace and order reign in the territories given up."
General, the next document which has been used to incriminate you is contained in Volume 21. It is NOKW-649which is Exhibit 486. It is on page 64 of the English and 49 of the German. This document represents two situation reports by the Military Commander Greece for the time between 16 May to 15 July 1944. In the second report it says on page 68 of the English and page 54 of the German book, "68th Infantry Corps has issued orders to hold in readiness people suspected of belonging to bands, and also hostages for deportation to Germany.
These people will be employed in Germany in closed working camps."
Would you please give us your comments on this alleged order? Was it issued at the time and if so why?
A. This instruction was based on an order by OKW to the army group.
Q. Did yon at the time have any doubts as to the admissibility of this order which came from higher up?
A. No, in no sense of the word because even in Greece those people who were suspected of belonging to the bands could scarcely have been left at large. For reasons of security they had to be apprehended. Whether this happened in Greece or in Germany couldn't matter to me in the least.
Q. General, did you at the time on that occasion have any misgivings about the fact as to whether those people who were to go on forced labor would be treated in the same way as those who had gone voluntarily or whether they would be treated differently?
A. When the order arrived, the troops drew my attention to the fact that labor allocation of those elements, namely those who were suspected of belonging to bands would not be expedient because one had to expect them to indulge in sabotage in German plants. Nobody thought that they liked us or had any favorable opinion of us. I shared that opinion and, as far as I can recollect, I expressed it in a letter or telephone call to the army group.
Q. Do you mean to say that you did not expect a different treatment of those elements from those who had gone voluntarily?
A. Yes, I did not expect that. Otherwise I would not have assumed that they might indulge in sabotage. What they were to be allocated to was not known to me and the reports by the Military Commander did not reach me which becomes clear from the distribution list.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
The next document used to incriminate you by the Prosecution in this volume is PS-537, Exhibit 488, on page 75 of the English and 65 of the German. This document concerns treatment of members of foreign military missions kept together with partisans. The OKW orders were that members of these military missions were not to be treated as prisoners-of-war but in accordance with a Fuehrer order concerning the annihilation of terror and sabotage troops of 18 October 1942. This Fuehrer order which I have just mentioned we have discussed in a different context. General, did you ever see this order of the OKW of 30 July 1944?
A. At the time I am inclined to assume that. I could not speak with certainty but if it reached the Commander in Chief Southeast, I assume that the Commander in Chief Southeast passed it on as it says in the distribution list. Anyway, according to my information, I have to assume that but, as I say, I cannot speak with certainty.
Q. The next document which has been used to incriminate you is NOKW-933 which is Exhibit 495. It is on page 88 of the English and page 76 of the German. This document is the war diary of Army Group E for the period of time between 1 July 1944 to 31 December 1944. On page 99 of the English and 79 of the German text there is in this document, under the date of 27 August 1944, an entry which says that a transport of 1,000 people suspected of belonging to the bands were to be deported to the Reich. For the unit employed for railroad security....
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: From what page is counsel reading? From what page are you reading?
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I am reading from page 99 of the English. According to my notes, it should be on page 99, 79 in German and 99 in English.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: It is found on page 90 in the English document book.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I am just informed it is on page 90. I apologize, your Honors.
To repeat, under the date of 27 August 1944 it says under the heading of, "Transport of Band Suspects".
"On 28 August 1700 hours a transport with 1,000 band suspects leaves for Reich territory" and later on it says, "for the units employed for railroad security and an increased degree of alertness is to be ordered while the transport is under way."
Why, General, did this order reach the 68th Army Corps among other agencies?
A. The only reason can be that the 68th Corps was in charge of the railroad security regiment which guarded the railroad track between Athens and Lamia to prevent any attacks on this particular railway train whereby the band suspects would be liberated. Actually it was only here from the documents that I learned of this incident. I mean I do not recall the order nor do I believe that it was submitted to me personally.
Q. Now, I should like to discuss Document NOKW-1641which is Exhibit 497, which is on page 110 of the English and page 97 of the German. I suggest that we turn immediately to page 119 of the English and 102 of the German document book. It says there in the daily report by the commander in chief Southeast of 23 August 1944 on page 119 of the English:
"For the area of the 68th Corps north of Erseke during local mopping up one band village destroyed, 12 prisoners taken"; but it may also be "12 people killed." The abbreviation actually is "GEF". General, can you tell us anything about that incident?
A. I do not know where Erseke is situated. I do not think it was part of my corps area and there is nothing else I can state in this connection.
Q. May I in this connection read from Document Book Felmy No. V, Document 115, which is on page 85, which makes it clear that in this report we are not concerned with the area of the 68th Army Corps and that Erseke was not in the area of the 68th Corps. This document, No. 115, is offered as Exhibit No. 51.
General, the next document is NOKW-96 which is Exhibit 495. It is on page 122 of the English and on page 105 of the German. This document is a daily report by Army Group E, addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast of 5 September 1944:
"From the area of the 68th Army Corps, it is reported that on Euboea supply convoy of North Caucasian Battalion 845 annihilated by band south of Kyne; 40 own dead; all weapons and equipment completely lost. For attack upon convoy (see yesterday's daily report) 186 suspects shot."
General, will you please give us your comments on this teletype letter by Army Group E?
A. I am scarcely in a position to do so. This daily report to which allusion is made here is not in my possession and, therefore, I am unable to go into the background of it. The evacuation of the Peloponnes had already started on the 5th of September and the decision had also been reached to evacuate Greece altogether. I was overwhelmed with organizational tasks and for that reason this particular report I no longer recall. I cannot give any detailed statements about it.
Q. The next document I should like to deal with is NOKW-981, Exhibit 497 on page 125 of the English and 107 of the German text.