A I would like to say in this connection that it was not my method. If I may point this out here, it is well possible that the 1st Mountain Division, which had been in the area for many months before I arrived there and took it over. Until then it pursued a different practice to get results. I was thrown into the circumstances without having any connections with them prior to my arrival. I arrived from the Kuban bridgehead at that time and there no hostage measures were taken at all. The opinions between the division and myself differed.
Q General Lanz, in the course of explaining certain of the documents which Dr. Sauter put to you you made certain assumptions. Can it be assumed that the 1st Mountain Division which was subordinate to you received its orders from you and that this is simply an issuance by the 1st Mountain Division of an order which you had previously issued to it.
A I beg your pardon; could you please repeat that?
Q The ordinary channels of command were from the OKW to the Army Group F, to Army Group E, to the 22nd Corps, to the 1st Mountain Division. Isn't that so?
A Yes, that is quite right.
Q Can it be assumed that this 1st Mountain Division, prior to issuing its order, received an order of this kind from you?
A You mean in that particular case here? That is an assumption which might easily be taken and I believe that is the customary channel which you have described here too. To me, however, it is not known that this order was issued by me. If I am not mistaken, the experts of my staff of the Ic Department who worked on such matters expressed in their affidavits that this order was not known either, after all it is strange that the participants claim that they don't know the order.
On the other hand, I would like to stress that the 1st Mountain Division has been in the Epirus area two months before I got there. The 1st Mountain Division had before that been committed in Serbia and in the nature of things they must have received some sort of directives in that direction. That can only be assumed.
Q General Lanz, would you say that it is likely or unlikely that this order is based on a prior order which you had issued to the 1st Mountain Division?
A I maintain the point of view to the extent to which I can overlook things now that it is not likely that I issued this order to the 1st Mountain Division. If I knew it, I would surely tell it but I just don't know. I assume that the 1st Mountain Division, out of their own competency issued that order and it was perfectly entitled to do it.
It was in a position to do it. The divisional commander was the judicial authority and he certainly had the right to give an order without reporting to me prior to giving it or to ask my consent. He was not obliged to do that.
Q If the OKW had called you on the telephone or sent you a message and asked what was being done within your corps area regarding hostages you would have been expected to tell them precisely what was going on and what orders were issued and outstanding in your corps area? would you not?
A If the OKW had called me on the telephone in order to ask your hypothetical question, then I would certainly have reported to the OKW that I would inform myself of the orders or order and subsequently report to the OKW what I have learned. That most likely would have been my answer.
Q On such a basic matter would you be expected by the OKW to be informed immediately and generally and give a spontaneous answer rather than going about to inform yourself?
A Before in such an important matter one reports to the OKW one reflects about the facts and does not do it out of the blue on the telephone. Then one would make very bad experiences. Besides, the matter was not that urgent; I would have reserved the right to inform and then report.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Now would you turn to page 137 in the German, Book XIX, page 118 of the English, your Honors.
Q This, General Lanz, is your own order of the 3rd of October which is just about three weeks after General Stettner's order?
A Yes, that is right.
Q It is a coincidence that you here in this order adopt a 10-to-1 ration which appears in General Stettner's order?
A It is possible that it is just coincidence. I don't know. I don't know how I happened to put it just that way. I am not in a position today to answer that question.
I am afraid I can't do that.
Q Do you believe that an order which establishes a flat ratio of 10 to 1 is a lawful order, General Lanz?
A I believe in order to answer your general question that one cannot judge these things generally nor can one answer them on such a basis. One can maintain the point of view that the proportion 1 to 10 is illegal or inhumane; one can maintain the point of view such a hostage proportion is in some instances necessary any permissable. I know, for instance, that the French occupation forces have not only ordered this proportion 1 to 10 but have also applied it. Therefore, I believe one cannot reject or accept such a proposition on principle.
Q Would you say, General Lanz, that a ratio of 10 to 1 for every case, whether it be a serious case or a slight case, is lawful?
A In any case, the proportion 1 to 10 is such that it can only be applied if the dire necessity exists to do so.
Q Do you see any limitations in General Stettner's order to the effect that it should be applied in some cases but not in others? Doesn't General Stettner's order say that it should be applied in all cases?
A Just a minute. I would just like to read it over.
Q That is on page 110 of the German, page 84 of the English.
A It says here: "In order to take stringent counter measures against the continued raids on convoys and members of the Wehrmacht, it is ordered that as of 20 September 1943 for every German soldier wounded or killed by insurgents or civilians 10 Greeks from all classes of the population are to be shot to death." No exception is mentioned here but it is a basic order.
Q Would you that it meant then that in every case a 10 to 1 ratio should be applied?
A It says here; "For every German soldier wounded or killed by enemy insurgents." Therefore, from this text I would take it that it was to be applied for every case. That is how I read it.
Q Now, General Lanz, return for a minute to your own order of 3 October 1943. You state that the population is to be notified that for cable sabotage in the future 10 of the hostages which have been seized have been shot to death. Suppose the cable sabotage was the result of a commando raid by British commando units $ would you then have ordered the hostages to be shot?
A During my examination I have stated that I did not pass on the commando order. That shows my attitude to the question which you have touched upon here.
Q Your order says nothing about whether or not the hostages will be shot if the cable sabotage results from a legitimate military operation. Are we to assume that if the cable sabotage had resulted from a commando raid or from low flying aircraft that then the hostages would not have been shot?
A I believe that case is a bit far fetched, if I may put it that way. After all, one has to consider the events in the light in which they have developed. The facts are the following. In the district around Arta, as we had heard, there were quite frequently the telephone communications cut not by low flying aircraft but by the partisans. That was quite obvious. Against those continuous measures we directed our counter measure my counter measure. I would particularly stress it was just a precautionary measure. It can be proved that the people were not actually shot. They were arrested and the arrest in such case I consider my perfect right.
Q Suppose, General Lanz, that the cable sabotage had resulted from the activities of a band which wore insignia, which was commanded by superior officers, which bore arms openly and, so far as you knew, follow? the rules and customs of war; would you then have executed these hostages?
AA band which fulfills these prerequisites, Mr. Fenstermacher, as you have mentioned them here, would have been such an exception in my area that that would have, under all circumstances have been reported to me prior to the measure being taken. In that case I would have had the possibility to decide about the future steps to be taken.
Q Will you turn now, General Lanz, to page 140 of the German document book XIX, page 122 of the English. In this report to you from the 1st Mountain Division, one day after your order for the seizure of 40 hostages, it is stated that the male population of the neighboring villages along this particular road are to be employed and that in case of further attacks or acts of sabotage the hostages would be shot.
You saw nothing wrong with holding Greeks responsible for attacks which other Greeks made on a particular supply road which the Germans were using? You have in mind here danger hostages. I take it, General Lanz. At least, the 1st Mountain Division had danger hostages in mind with this report?
A. I believe, Mr. Fenstermacher, that I have stated during my examination that when I encountered those people along the highway, which I remembered very clearly and described very clearly, that the people lived in straw huts along the road. I can still see them now, the way they lived there. These huts were in stretches of about 100, 200 or 300 meters distance along the road. When I saw these people on my trip I stopped and made inquiry as to that measure. When I returned I discussed this measure "with the division and rescinded it. I considered it a senseless and unnecessary measure. I believe I stated that once before. That is connected with the measure you are discussing here.
Q. Did you mean that the tactic of danger hostages was considered by you to be unnecessary?
A. I mean to say that the measure which I saw there I considered senseless and unnecessary and, therefore, I rescinded it.
Q. Will you turn now, General Lanz, to Page 144 of that book? Page 129 of the English. This is another report from the First Mountain Division, dated the 5th of October, which is two days after your "seizure of the 40 hostages order," and the preceding report, regarding the employment of danger hostages. Here it's reported that hostages are to be taken for truck trips to a prisoner collection camp they are to be returned to the camp editor the trip is terminated. I take it we had in mind here--at least the First Division had in mind again -- the employment of danger hostages.
( TO THE COURT INTERPRETER): Do you know the translation for the word "danger hostage?"
THE COURT INTERPRETER: There's hardly a translation for this word. I could say "vorbeugungsgeiseln" -- "preventive hostages."
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed. We have had the interpretation from the Interpreter.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Lanz, isn't it entirely possible that British air-craft would attack the trucks upon which these hostages were situated and that the hostages would be killed as a result of those attacks?
A. I think that is possible. British airplanes attacked all vehicles which they saw moving along a road. If I am talking about Greece here, they even attacked me on repeated occasions. I, therefore, think this is entirely possible, but it was not within our power to avoid it.
Q. Would you say that in using hostages in order to prevent a regimental military attack, which I take is an attack by Allied aircraft on such trucks would be, is it a permissible military measure?
A. No, I wouldn't consider that fair. But that was by no means the intention, Mr. Fenstermacher, to avoid that British planes should attack a moving column. The situation was entirely different. The bandits raided the roads or mined the roads, and the danger which threatened us from the bands was countered by this measure. This measure was not directed against an attack from the Allied air forces.
Q. It Could, however, have intended to prevent Allied attacks upon such truck columns could it not?
A. I must apologize, but here, again, I would say that it is a rather far-fetched conclusion. At least it is not known to me that any such situation became acute, although I myself, in the summer of 1944, I was attacked by British low-flying air-craft on almost every trip that I made. Still no case is known to me where such a vehicle was actually damage in such an incident. I didn't hear anything about that.
Q. Did you ever forbid the First Mountain Division to use this technique of talking hostages along on truck trips?
A. I did not recall an order forbidding this. But I have to point out that I was not quite clear how the taking of hostages by the First Mountain Division was carried out. All these things only became clear to me here when reading the documents. At the time such a practice was made from case to case, and only at some periods. I did not realize that at the time because the division did not report it to me. Apparently the division did not even deem it necessary to inform me about that.
Q. Would you turn now, General Lanz, to Page 150 in that volume? It is Page 139 of the English. This is another order of the First Mountain Division, dated the 25th of October 1943--roughly a month after the 10 to 1 order. You will note here that the ratio is changed to read 50 to 1, and I believe you said you didn't know anything about this order either.
A. That is what I said, and I pointed out that the distribution list attached to this order shows that this order was passed on by the First Mountain Division within its area and that no copy went to the Corps. Otherwise this would be mentioned here.
Q. Isn't this order based on one which you have previously issued to the First Mountain Division, General Lanz?
A. I have pondered this question, Mr. Fenstermacher, but I cannot recall that I ever issued such an order to the First Mountain Division. Otherwise I would have mentioned that during my examination. I just don't know. It is furthermore striking that a provision is contained in this order that a shooting have to be carried out through the Military Commander Greece, and one can hardly assume that I would issue an order containing such a sentence. If I had done that I would have reserved the consent to the execution for myself and not to somebody who was far removed from the scene. This is the very sentence from which I conclude that this concerns measures which were taken before my time when I was not even down there yet.
Q. General Stettner was subordinate to you when you issued it was he not, General?
A. Yes, that is quite correct.
Q. You will note in Paragraph 1-b he states that the ratio of 50 to 1 is to apply even for the losses which occurred during combat.
A. I read that. It is a measure of which I did not approve, but I can only prevent it if I know it.
Q. Are you in sympathy with that particular provision and the 50 to 1 ratio generally, which appears in this order?
A. It is not in accordance with my own opinion that a ratio is ordered here which refers to losses during combat action.
Q. You will note in Paragraph 1-e that there is a 10 to 1 ratio ordered in the case of the murder of a pro-German Greek or a Greek working for the Germans. Did you hear anything about that ratio?
A. No case is known to me where this provision was applied within my area.
Q. You will note also, General Lanz, in Paragraph 1-c, that it's stated that the band directly followed the tactics of making peaceful village suspected of being accomplices of the bands, so that they may gain recruits in the population which fears German reprisal measure. Isn't that perhaps an explanation why the Greek villages were deserted when your troops approached?
Perhaps the population left out of fear of German reprisal measures. I believe you intimated that on one occasion a priest told you that that was precisely why the population had left the village at the approach of you and your troops.
A. Well, we can hardly assume that Paragraph 1-c of this order would come to the knowledge of the population. For this reason I don't believe that this order can have any connection with what you mentioned. I'm sure the population must have had reason to leave the villages. Possibly they were afraid.
Q. Why would they be afraid, General Lanz.
A. The population wasn't only afraid of us. It was also afraid of the partisans. The partisans had frequently shown a very unfriendly attitude towards the population. I have endeavored to show in my testimony that there were in Greece two groups of partisans which fought each to the utmost. I recollect some incidents where there were fights between the National and Communist partisans without the Germans' firing a single shot. The population was under the greatest pressure from the partisans. Food and cattle were taken from them. Men were recruited by force; houses were burned down if the population didn't do what the partisans wanted them to do.
It was by no means the case that the population was only afraid of the occupation forces. They were at least as much afraid of the Communist partisans, and that is even the case today down there.
Q. Isn't the fact that there was forced recruiting by the partisans, General Lanz, an indication of how strong the partisans really were and how large an area they really did control?
A. Could you repeat the question again, please?
Q. Isn't the fact that there was forced recruiting by the partisans an indication that they had many of the-- that they resembled in many respects a regular state and that it indicates precisely how large an area the partisans controlled?
A. It is an indication for the fact how ruthless and fresh the partisans were and that they did not shy away from any means that they could take against their own fellow citizens. If we gained knowledge of the fact that somewhere in an isolated area such measures had been taken by the partisans, then we ordered and carried out operations against these partisans. I have repeatedly mentioned such operations on examination here.
Q. Isn't General Stettner saying here in paragraph 1c, General Lanz, that German reprisal measures, the burning of villages, in fact increasing the number of recruits which went to the partisans?
A. I beg your pardon, I will have to look at the text again for a minute.
Q. It is on page 150 of your volumen.
A. Thank you very much. Yes, this is a measure which I believe he wanted to take for the protection and in the interests of the population. He did not want to expose the population to the possibility that it should further come under the pressure of the partisans. I read from this a certain consideration for the population.
Q. He is also saying, is he not, General Lanz, that by burning villages, the population, which fears German reprisal measures, is joining up with the partisans?
A. He believes that the partisans forced the population to participate in their operation as a result of these measures.
Q. General Lanz, how many hostages would you say were executed in your corps area during the time that you were in command in Greece?
A. Well, that is a very difficult question. It is impossible for me to answer this question with any amount of exactness and, Mr. Fenstermacher I have no information or documents on which to base my answer. It is not very advisable to take just any figure and mention it here.
Q. Well, General Lanz, incidents of that kind were reported to you, were they not? You were the Commanding General of the Corps; you must have known what was going on within your area.
A. I believed that I know that along general lines, but I would like to stress again that today one seems to think that the Commanding General had to think only about hostage measures. That is seeing things upside down. That was not my main task. I had other tasks which were more important than this hostage question. Of course, I took an interest also in that, especially when these facts reached my knowledge, but my tactical tasks occupied the greatest part of my time. That would be the same with any general in any army.
Q. Can't you hazard an approximation of the number of hostages which were executed within your Corps area?
A. Since I have no indication and no basis on which I could base such a figure, I would like to refrain from doing this. I could only hazard a guess and I don't think that is advisable.
Q. Doesn't your memory help you on this point, General Lanz? Must you always have documents?
A. I have mentioned during my examination a few dates which I knew and they are known to the prosecution to the extent to which they arc contained in the documents so that I don't believe I have to make any further statements here. I don't think you would need such a statement. Any other incidents which I have not yet mentioned are not known to me.
Q. Would you look at this document, General Lanz, NOKW-1833. This is offered as prosecution Exhibit 619, your Honors. There will be occasion to refer to this document from time to time, your Honors. I would suggest therefore, that it be paginated from page one through page eight Will you turn, General Lanz, to page five of the document which you have, page four of your Honors' document--this is a daily report, General Lanz, which your Corps sent to your superior office, Army Group E, for the 12th of December, 1943.
You will note the last paragraph of the report states that "At noon on 12 December 1943 a nationalist leader was killed by a hand-grenade in the street in Corca. As reprisal measures, five hostages were shot and several houses were destroyed in the vicinity of the place of the occurrence."
Do you remember this occasion on which five hostages were shot for the death of one nationalist leader?
A. I don't remember that incident.
Q. Do you believe that your Ic or your Ia reported the incident to you at the time?
A. That is possible but I am not in a position to say that for certain. That would depend on the fact of whether or not I was in Joannina on that day. I might have been away from the town which happened quite frequently. Therefore, I cannot answer your question. At least, I don't remember that particular incident, not even now when I am reading it.
Q. Would you look at this document, General Lanz, NOKW-1827? This is offered as prosecution Exhibit 620, your Honors. This, General Lanz, is a report from the 1st Mountain Division for the 24 October 1943, and you will note the receipt stamp of your Corps on the first page. It talks about the political situation first.
"The Greek population has not changed essentially its attitude toward the German occupation forces. The reprisal measures commenced at the beginning of the month on account of the increased bandit raids have intimidated the population considerably, but on the other hand have raised the regard" for the Wehrmacht, since it became clear that the German Wehrmacht, in contrast to the Italians previously, took appropriate counter-measures at once."
Would you say that your reprisal measures were more severe than those which the Italians had previously taken?
A. In any event, the 1st Mountain Division believed that the measures taken by the 1st Mountain Division were more effective than those taken by the Italians. That is what I gather from the text of the document issued by the 1st Mountain Division; furthermore, I would like to remark that this enemy situation report arrived at my corps but it was not submitted to me. Otherwise, it would have been initialed by me because all those documents which I saw and which got to my office I signed in my initials. I can therefore not even say that I gained knowledge of this report.
Q. And your Ic would inform you of matters of this kind, would he not, General Lanz. Wasn't that precisely his duty.
A. Principally what you say is correct, that it is his duty to inform me, but it is also a question how such a matter would be reported to me. Such a report can be submitted in the most various manners and it all depends on what he actually tells me and that just is what I no longer recall. All I can say for certain is that the document such as we have it in front of us now was not submitted to me at the time. Otherwise, I would have initialed it.
Q. Will you look at paragraph six of the document, General Lanz, on the second page of the original? It says there:
"The activity at the end of the last and the beginning of this month has subsided considerably, since the shooting of 58 hostages for a surprise attack on German soldiers was carried out."
Do you remember the execution of those 58 hostages?
A. Yes, Mr. Fenstermacher, and that is one case which I expressly mentioned during my examination. I even stressed during my examination that this concerns one incident which the Greeks mention in their indictment. This document is contained in Document Book 19. I am afraid I don't know the page by heart.
It is a report of the Third Battalion/99, that is correct. But still it is the report which was not passed on to me. I received a report which described the fights in that area and which says literally 50 enemy dead under the reports of lives lost.
I therefore don't know for sure whether intentionally at that time I was shown this text so that I should not interfere with procedures. In the report, however, it says 50 enemy dead 10 wounded. If I read such a report in connection with something which is obviously a combat action, I can see no cause immediately to assume that this could possibly concern 50 hostages. That must be granted. I am talking about conditions as they prevailed then.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 26 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 26 November 1947, 0930, Judge Burke presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if all the defendants are present in the court?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the court with the exception of defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue, Mr. Fenstermacher.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Thank you, your Honor.
HUBERT LANZ - Resumed CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q General Lanz, yesterday afternoon before we discontinued we were looking at Document NOKW -1827 which is Prosecution Exhibit 620. In paragraph 6 of that document there is a reference to the shooting of 56 hostages for a surprise attack on German soldiers. Do you recall that incident?
A Will you excuse me a minute? Paragraph 6 is paragraph "b" in my copy. Is that right? Thank you.
I believe that yesterday I commented on that incident. This incident became known to me through the documents which I was shown a few weeks ago. The incident is described in Document Book XIX. I am afraid I can't give you the exact page. It is somewhere around 132. I have made statements here about that case while on direct examination. It is a report of the 3rd Battalion 99.
Q General Lanz, are you referring now to the evening report of 29 September which is on page 132 of the German Document Book.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: And 110 of the English, your Honors.
Q Is that -
A That is the one I am having reference to.
Q That, General Lanz, refers to 50 Greeks being shot and it is apparently on or about 29 September whereas this report, Exhibit 620, refers to the shooting of 58 hostages and it is a situation report for almost a month later, on the 22nd of October 1943.
Do you believe that they both relate to the same incident?
A I am certain that it is the same. It says in the text here that the shooting of 58 hostages as a reprisal for an attack was carried out and this again concerns a surprise attack on a reconnaissance unit. It is the same district which is striking the district of Paramythia and I am not quite sure whether 50 and 58 is not a misprint the 8 would be a zero. I think that is quite possible.
Q How do you explain that the 58 hostages report is almost a month after the report which refers to 50 Greeks having been shot?
A I assume that it is a situation report which was written concerning a certain period of time and in which a survey is given over a certain period of time. That is, this is my explanation.
Q Exhibit 620, General Lanz, says it is a situation report for the 22nd of October 1943. That appears on the first page of the document you have.
A If I may give my explanation to this, the situation report was concluded on the 22nd of October. That is the last day of the report. That is the date up to which the situation report surveys the situation but such reports, according to experiences made, always cover a certain period over which they are written. That is my own explanation and this is how I take this incident here. I don't happen to know of the case and it is rather striking that it concerns almost the same figure and I assume actually the same figure, in the same area, for the same reason. That brings me to the conclusion that the same incident must be involved in the same cases.
Q Now will you turn to page 148 in Document Book XIX?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Page 136 in the English, your Honors.
A 136?
Q 148 in the German.
A I see.
Q Now you note that the file notes for the commanding general are dated October 18, 1943, just a few days before the 22nd of October to which date exhibit of 620 refers and you will note under paragraph "c", under "Paramythia," the figure "58."
Now as a reprisal measure for 6 murdered German soldiers it would appear that this "58" refers to the 58 hostages which are mentioned in the situation report of the 1st Mountain Division.
Do you recall this latter incident now or not, that reprisal for six murdered German soldiers?
A I see this entry here and I have made statements here about this file note and I believe what I expressed was that I had the matter clarified on the basis of the file note. At that time I commissioned my Ic to clear up the matter on the basis of the file note and I stated this here in this courtroom. I assume you remember that.
Q Do you believe, then, that these 58 hostages either were never shot or that they were shot in combat? Is that your explanation?
A The causes and circumstances which led to the measure are not known to me. I gather from the wording here that as a reprisal measure for six murdered German soldiers the 1st Mountain Division shot these 58 people.
Q Do you believe -
A The incident in its details is not known to me.
Q Do you believe that the execution of 58 hostages in reprisal for 6 German soldiers is an unusually high ratio?
A I don't know the details and the circumstances under which the six German soldiers were murdered and I believe that these circumstances would have played an important part for the ratio taken in the reprisal.
This is a ratio which is not quite one to ten. This is what I am gathering from the text in front of me.
Q Do you consider a ratio of one to ten particularly high?
A I am afraid I cannot make any comments of a basic nature on this subject. The measures taken will always have to depend on the circumstances under which the losses occurred. I don't believe that one can comment in any way mentioning principles in this connection. I believe I mentioned yesterday that I know that on the part of the Allies the ratio one to ten existed and was carried out.
Q How do you know that, General Lanz?
A How do you mean that?
Q How do you know that the Allies had a ratio of one to ten for the execution of hostages?
A I know that from a document which I believe will be submitted and I know of an incident which confirms this and which will also be mentioned in the later course of these trials.