BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, was there no successful operation which resulted in the capture of the bands themselves?
A. No. On that occasion also there was no successful action and the bands themselves could not be captured. Only very small-scale battles were fought and the results were about 10 dead on the German side. The Divisional Commander, as a consequence, ordered reprisal measures for the murder of the 78 German soldiers. The reprisal measures were carried out by the troop which was committed at the time. Therefore the tactical operation, that is, the relieving action, was followed up by the reprisal measure proper.
Q. I do not particularly want to deal with the many details of the tactical operation since, on the basis of the indictments, these are not of great interest. What was your connection with the Operation Kalavritha, General?
A. I neither ordered the relieving action nor the reprisal measure.
Q. When did you hear about the incidents?
A. I am afraid I cannot tell you that exactly, now. Possibly the Division had reported the starting of the relieving action to liberate these prisoners. Such tactical operations could be ordered by the Divisional Commander at any time. The Divisional Commander was authorized to do that and, seen from a formal point of view, everything was in order. Approximately between the 8th and 15th of December 1943 I deputized for the Commanding Chief in Salonika. During this time the Corps Headquarters was led by General von LeSuire, as my deputy. From Salonika I undertook a trip which lasted for several days, in order to inspect the German Arabic Battalion which had remained of the former German Arabic Instruction Detachment. The Corps Headquarters had, at the time, been appointed as the expert agency for all Arabic questions by the OKW and therefore a connection still existed with this battalion. At a later tine this battalion joined me in the Athens Area. As a consequence of my absence from Salonika, I only learned about the incident of the reprisal measures and the other incidents of Kalavritha when I returned to Athens.
It is even possible - at least that is how I remember it - that only after I returned from my Christmas leave, in January 1944, that, through an oral report given to me by General von LeSuire, I learned about the events as a whole and gained a picture of the whole situation.
Q. In any case, the Divisional Commander reported to you orally after the operation had been concluded?
A. Yes, that is correct. Only, I am afraid, I cannot give you the exact date nor do I know the exact words exchanged in the subsequent discussion. I can give you only the substance of this discussion.
Q. Did you agree to the reprisal measures?
A. No, on the contrary. I told General von LeSuire that reprisal measures for the murder of the 78 German soldiers had been ordered rather hastily. He should have announced this fact in every way at his disposal before he took reprisal measures. Only in this way the one-sided propaganda which resulted could have been prevented. In the way in which it was actually handled, the German leadership was discredited and we were regarded as the only guilty persons, as though the 78 people involved had not been harmed at all.
Q. That was more or less a formal point of view, General. What was your material attitude to the reprisal measures taken?
A. I was against the destruction of so many villages because part of the population which had lost their homes were thus necessarily driven into the arms of the bands. Furthermore, it had not been proved that all persons shot in reprisal were actually band sympathizers, although it was established that the area around Kalavritha was a center of resistance and was well known as such.
Q. What was General von LeSuire's attitude toward the objections raised by you?
A. General von LeSuire had to admit that these objections were justified but he replied that the reprisal ratio had not even been 1 to 10 and that his soldiers would necessarily lose their confidence in him if he did not avenge such atrocities at once.
He again pointed out that we had been too lenient near Eleus and that this mildness on our part had not borns any fruit - we had not achieved anything by it. He pointed out that from the area of Kalavritha constant surprise attacks had taken place on the coastal road and they had to be stopped at some time.
Q. General, did you, at the time, think about the problem - whether it might have been expedient to take any measures against General von LeSuire -- either to call him before a Court Martial or to ask higher agencies to have him replaced?
A. I had such ideas and reflections at that time but I came to the conclusion that I should desist from doing that for the following reason: Taking into consideration the mentality of the O.K.W., such a step did not promise any result. I would probably have achieved the exact opposite. If such a decision had been put up to Hitler, and that is what would have had to happen, he would probably have reproached General von LeSuire because he had not adhered to the reprisal quotas as ordered and had not taken even more stringent reprisal measures. I do not believe, therefore, that such a step would have had any success.
THE PRESIDENT: What happened to this General that you are talking about?
THE WITNESS: Later on he was put in charge of Corps Headquarters during the course of the summer.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is he now?
THE WITNESS: As far as I know, he is a Russian prisoner-of-war.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
BY DR. MUEKKER-TURGOW:
Q. General, what do you think would have happened to you?
A. I am fairly certain that I would have been replaced by somebody else and I am fairly certain that my place would have been taken by a man who would have suited the purposes of the O.K.W. better than I did and who would have adhered correctly to the orders given by the O.K.W. After the events of 1940 I was not persona grata with the O.K.W.
Q. You are referring to your dismissal at that time?
A. Yes, to have me replaced by somebody else would not have been a hard decision. God knows, I did not want to stick to my post. Seen from a military point of view, I had been put on ice long before. After I had been reactivated in 1940, I did not get an assignment with the air force, although I was the man who created the basis of the new air force. I was overlooked wherever promotions were concerned, and with the army I was naturally regarded as an outsider. I was not filled with any military ambition. As the total situation in Greece had developed by that time, no laurels could be gained down there.
Q. General, before the operation Kalavrita had taken place, did you see any occasion to take General von Le Suire to task because of too severe reprisal measures?
A. No. Before that, I had seen no cause to do that.
Q. After your discussions with Le Suire, did you gain the impression that in future he would act in accordance with your opinion and with your directives which you gave him on the occasion of the case Kalavrita?
A. Yes, that was my impression. Furthermore, I had told him that in a similar case before he undertook any large-scale destructions, he was to inquire from the corps headquarters. Besides, in January the directive we mentioned briefly before, had become known in accordance with which Ambassador Neubacher was the political plenipotentiary for Hitler and as such in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief Southeast. He was to determine the extent of the reprisal measures which he had limited, since no longer it had to be strictly adhered to. The authorization to cover reprisal measures was still within the sphere of work of the Divisional Commanders. As a consequence, General von Le Suire covered by orders from higher agencies could go on as he had done before to take reprisal measures such as seemed expedient to him.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
If it please the Tribunal, in conclusion of this incident, I would like to state that General von Le Suire has been granted me as as witness for some time.
I have tried everything in my power to get him to appear here so that he, as the man responsible at the time on the Peloponnes and as the most suitable person, could give us a picture of the band situation which prevailed at that time. Unfortunately, I did not succeed in doing this because General Le Suire, as has been stated just now by General Felmy, is a Russian prisoner-of-war. I managed to ascertain his prisoner-of-war number but the defense information center has not received any reply to the request for his appearance here from Russia.
Q. General, you said just before that, after the Kalavrita incident, you had told General von Le Suire to consult with the corps headquarters before he undertook any larger actions. After the Kalavrita incident, did the 117th Light Infantry Division carry out any large-scale reprisal measures?
A. Yes, there was one occasion on which a large-scale retaliation measure was carried out and that was in March, 1944.
Q. Did General von Le Suire, before this operation, consult with the corps headquarters in accordance with your instruction?
A. Yes, and that can also be seen from the War Diary of the Corps which has been submitted by the Defense as Document Book IV.
Q. I shall refer back to this operation when dealing with the corresponding prosecution documents. General, what is your evaluation and judgment of General von Le Suire as a soldier and as a man?
A. General von Le Suire had excellent qualifications as an officer. He had gone through general staff training and he had been Chief-of-Staff of a Corps. He came from the Mountain Troops. Physically, he was a very able-bodied man. He was very brave, and he never spared his own person in any way and his demands on his subordinates were accordingly. On the other hand, he would in any way stand up for the last one of his men. He was a soldier through and through. His weakness was that from all his inclinations he disliked dealing with political matters. He lacked the intuition for this. Therefore, he was inclined to regard the situation on the Peloponnes too much from a military point of view.
I have to admit, however, that on the Peloponnes in view of the total situation, there was little room for considerations other than military. As the responsible leader for the defense of the Peloponnes, he had to put the military necessities into the foreground on the Peloponnes more than this would have been necessary in any other theater of war. He had to act in accordance with these facts. Regarding his abilities as a soldier and troop leader, he enjoyed great reputation also with the Army Group.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Now, I would like to refer back to Felmy Document Book II, and to Document No. 61 in particular. This is an affidavit by the former first general staff officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division, whose name is Walter Barth. I am reading from page 50, the last paragraph on that page, number 13. The paragraph is entitled "Punishment of the Ic Captain Weber of the 117th Light Infantry Division."
"With regard to the punishment of the Ic of the 117th Light Infantry Division, Captain Weber, 8 March 1944, for disloyal remarks about the position of the Corps Headquarters the reprisal measures, General Felmy said, 'With the true patience of Job, I have tried to win the Division over to my point of view.' (A more lenient attitude toward the partisans). After the punishment of Captain Weber, the relationship between General Felmy and General von Le Suire became worse and worse. The reason was the opposing point of views of the two gentlemen as to how to bring peace to the Peloponnes. General Felmy wanted to build a spiritual counter-balance to the Bolshevism by an appeal to the good and nationalist Greeks by leniency and a policy of understanding. General von Le Suire was of the opinion that only by brutal fighting of Bolshevism would it be possible to bring peace to the country. In his attitude toward the Greek population, General von Le Suire was extremely correct and objective.
"Abuses on the part of the troop commanders were punished with the most extreme severity. (Alleged looting of the city of Nemea south of Corinthia by the Panzer Anti-Tank Battalion 117 in March 1944, which later turned out to be absolutely false and had been reported by the partisans to the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters.)" If it please the Tribunal, I would now like to discuss Document NOKW-044 contained in Document Book 17 of the prosecution.
This was Exhibit 418 and it was contained on page 87 of the English text and page 65 of the German Document Book. In the Daily Report dated 17 December 1943, for the area of the 68th Corps, it is reported "A reprisal for blasting of bridge and murder of a German soldier in the area of Tripolis, band village destroyed. 30 Communists shot."
This same incident appears in the following further documents: Document Book 19 --NOKW-755, Exhibit 449, page 77 of the English and page 103 of the German text; and in Document Book 20 in the following documents: NOKW-1363, Exhibit 471, page 84 of the English and 61b of the German; NOKW-1555, Exhibit 475, page 104 of the English text and page 74b in the German; and finally NOKW-1402, Exhibit 476, page 117 of the English and page 82b of the German text.
General, do you remember this incident?
A No, I don't remember this incident, nor can I say whether it was reported to me at the time.
Q This brings me to page 91 of the English text, which is page 67 of the German text still in the same document book. Under the heading "68th Corps," it is stated that as a reprisal for a band attack, southeast of Cythion, 25 hostages were shot. This incident also appears in various other documents. They are the following. In Document Book 20, Exhibit 471, NOKW-1363; 472, NOKW-1246; 474, NOKW-1257; and 476, NOKW1402. Do you remember that incident?
A No, I do not remember that one either. Possibly this took place at a time when I was absent from Athens.
Q In the Daily Report dated 6 December 1943, which is on page 92 of the English text, you find under "68th Corps" the report that 50 hostages were shot as a reprisal measure for the attack on the railroad head Southeast of Tripolis. This report is also included in Exhibit 479, NOKW-755, in Document Book 19; and in Document Book 20 in the following documents; Exhibit 471, NOKW-1246; 474, NOKW-1257; and Exhibit 476, NOKW-1402. Do you remember that report?
A No, here a gain I can make no exact statements? Only now I ascertained from the War Diary that during the surprise attack, ten German soldiers were killed and four were seriously wounded. The Division has retaliated the loss of these fourteen Germans with a ratio of one to 3.5, which the Division thought necessary.
Q The next report of interest in this document is contained on page 92 of the English text and page 68 of the German text. The same document book. This is the report dated the 5th of December, 1943. According to this report in Aigion, 50 hostages were shot. This report is also contained in Document Book 19 in Exhibit 449 and in Document Book 20 in Exhibit 472, 847, 475, and 476. Can you give us your comments on this incident?
A I am sorry but here again I cannot make any detailed statements and I cannot reconstruct the incident. Also, I did not find any indications in the War Diary concerning the German losses.
These losses were the cause for the reprisal measures.
Q The next reprisal measure mentioned in this document which concerns you is one concerning the shooting of 100 hostages contained in the daily report of the 29th of November, 1943, on page 94 of the English and 68 of the German text. It says, "As a reprisal for the band attack on the road Tripolis-Sparts, 100 hostages were shot at the place of the crime." This incident is also reported in the following document in Document Book 19 in Exhibit 449, NOKW-754; and in Document Book 20 in the Exhibits 471, NOKW-1363; 472, NOKW-1246; and 476, NOKW-1555. Do you remember that incident, General?
A Here also I cannot give you any detailed statements because I do not remember the incident. From the War Diary, I could only see that during that surprise attack, four German soldiers were killed and nine were kidnapped. Under no circumstances could one count on a return of those nine kidnapped soldiers. The Division in this case applied a reprisal ratio of one to eight.
Q That brings me to the daily report of the 25th of November, 1943, on page 98 of the English text and page 71 of the German text. Here the shooting of 20 communists is reported as reprisal for a band attack near Aigion. The same incident is dealt with in Document Book 20 in Exhibit 471, NOKW-1363, in the report dated the 24th of November, 1943. Can you remember that incident, General?
A No, I cannot remember that incident either, nor can I reconstruct the facts in their connection. In the War Diary and in other documents which I saw, I found no indications which would show how this reprisal measure was caused.
Q If it please the Tribunal, I would now like to deal with Document Book 18. The first document contained in that volume and which incriminates you, General, is Exhibit 473 on page 42 of the English text and page 49 of the German text. The Document Number is NOKW-670. It says here in the report of the Military Commander Greece, dated 22 March 1944, from the combat Commander in the Peloponnese, "59 hostages reprieved.
In Corinth, 45 hostages were shot to death."
In connection with this is the evening report dated 22 March, the preceding report in the same document. Here shootings in Tripolis and Sparta are mentioned which I shall deal with in a different context. What are your comments, General?
A I assume that these are reprisal measures caused by the surprise attack on the truck column on 11 March along the read Sparta-Tripolis. During that surprise attack, 21 German soldiers were killed and 42 were wounded. The reprieve of 49 hostages as mentioned in the report should be understood to mean that those persons who could not be proved as having contact with the bands were dismissed after the investigation had been concluded. I would assume with certainty that these investigations were carried out in conjunction with the staff by Col Papagondonas.
Q The shootings of hostages offered in the three reports on 22 March 1944 on page 41 in the English text, and page 48 in the German text, I shall refer to when dealing with the surprise attack on the motorized column on the road Tripolis-Sparta.
I shall now turn to an attack which occurred south of Tripoli on the truck column on the 11th March 1944; according to the morning report of 15 March 1943, page 44 of the English and page 50 of tho German document book, during this surprise attack, 21 soldiers were killed. As reprisal measures, among others, the shooting of 200 hostages was ordered and the burning down of 10 villages. According to tho order persons co-responsive for the attack were to be arrested as hostages. This incident is also dealt with in the following documents. In Document Book 18, Exhibit 436, NOW 208, page 30 of the English text and page 41 of the German text. In Document Book 20, Exhibit 458, NOW 1551, page 1 of both the English and German text. Exhibit 478, NOW 1417, page 130 of the English text and page 93 of the German text. Exhibit 480, NOKW 1065, on page 138 and 140 of the English text and pages 100 and 101 of the German text. Document Book 21, Exhibit 490, NOKW 1557, page 79 of the English and page 70 of the German text, and finally in Document Book 25, Exhibit 571, NOW 1667, pages 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 119 and 120 of the English text, and pages 53 to 55, 57, 58 and 91 of the German text. General, will you please give us your comments on the attack on 11 March south of Tripolis on the truck column?
A This is the event which I have hinted at before, when I discussed the events of Kalavritha. The 117th Light Infantry Division had received authorization to carry out these reprisal measures after it had asked for it at the Corps Headquarters. I happened to remember this incident so clearly because only after I had discussed the incident with Colonel Papgondonas, the Commander of the Greek volunteer battalions, I had given permission to destroy those villages which were reported by the Division as band strong points. Col. Papagondonas confirmed that these villages were known to him also as band hide outs, and had for sometime been evacuated by the population.
Q First of all the 200 reprisal prisoners were to be shot; as we found out 59 were reprieved. Do you think that the shooting of the remaining 141 reprisal hostages was a measure which could be militarily justified?
A Yes, in view of the German losses it was a reprisal quota of a little over one to two. We had suffered losses of 21 dead and 42 wounded.
Q Did you also think that the burning down of the band strongpoints was a military necessity?
A Yes, particularly since Col. Papagondonas had confirmed my own suspicion that the villages involved actually were band strong points. As early as November two surprise attacks had occurred on this highway, one on 23 November on a Naval truck column, and one on 25 November on a convoy of the 115th Light Infantry Division. On 20 of December another surprise attack occurred on a convoy of the 117 Light Infantry Division. All these dates I have taken from the entries in the War Diary which was received here from Washington. In addition there was a fourth surprise attack on 11th of March. Therefore, the situation was not as could be gathered from this document, that it was just one isolated occurrence. After these band strongpoints had been eliminated nothing further happened along that particular highway. There was no further surprise attack, which is proof from me, that we hit on the right thing.
Q The next incident of interest is on page 47 of the English text and on page 52 of the German text in the same document book. This is a 1-C evening report of the Military Commander of Greece dated 25 February 1944. According to this report as a reprisal for the attack on a truck column near Megalopolis on 22 February 1944, it was intended to shoot 200 hostages in Tripolis. These 200 hostages as can be seen from other documents were actually shot. The fact is also contained in the following documents: Document Book 20, Exhibit 477, NOKW 1556, page 124 of the English Document Book and page 38 of the German.
Exhibit 478, NOKW 1417, page 128 of the English text and page 92 of the German. Exhibit 480, NOKW 1065, page 139 of the English text and page 100 of the German text. In Document Book 21, Exhibit 490, NOKW 1557, page 78 of the English text and page 69 of the German, and finally in Document Book 25, Exhibit 571, NOKW 1607, pages 67 and 68 of the English text, and pages 51 and 52 of the German text, and also in Exhibit 579, NOKW 1804, page 119 of the English text and pages 90 and 91 of the German text. According to the entry of 23 February 1944 in Felmy Document 4, which I have offered today, which is the War Diary of the 68th Corps for the first six months of the year 1944, the "own losses" amounted to 15 dead and 7 wounded. General, will you please give us your comments on this?
A Even after having looked at the documents I can no longer recall this incident. The reprisal measure had been carried out by the Division. From the War Diary the losses reported were those you have just mentioned, 15 dead and 7 wounded. Further, I have gathered from the War Diary that two days prior to that, on the 20 February, another surprise attack had occurred in the area of Megalopolis. The Prosecution Document does not contain any reports about that surprise attack. The surprise attack on the 20 February was, I deeply deplore it, 9 more dead German soldiers and two wounded. 5 were kidnapped. I might well be justified, therefore in assuming that the division retaliated the losses of both those surprise attacks which are only separated by two days, and has therefore retaliated the losses of 38 German soldiers, which in this case would have amounted to a ratio of a little over one to five.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, might I make one brief statement? Yesterday afternoon, Your Honor will recall, we distributed to your Honor and filed with the Secretary General a third memorandum of law, regarding provisions of law applicable to these defendants, and the inapplicability of tho Geneva Convention to them. There German translation of this is ready, and will be distributed to the Secretary General and to the defense counsel.
This is the last memorandum of law the prosecution intends to file regarding the issues at point in this proceeding.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess until tomorrow morning.
(Thereupon an adjournment was taken until 9:30 a.m. 4 December 1947).
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 4 December 1947, 0930, Justice Burke presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Burke will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may continue.
HELMUTH FELMY - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW (Counsel for defendant Felmy): Yesterday, we stopped when we discussed documents in Document Book XVIII of the prosecution and this particular document NOKW-670, Exhibit 437. I would now like you to turn to page 49 of the English text. That is 53 -- 5* in the German text. This is the I-c evening report of the military commander dated 9 February 1942. According to this report, the sea commander had three neighboring villages set on fire on the Peleponnes as a reprisal measure and had 149 residents shot. The same incident is dealt with in the following documents, in the same Document Book XVIII, in Exhibit 434, NOKW-661, page 17 of the English text and page 20 of the German text; further in Document Book XX in Exhibits 477, NOKW-1556, page 122 in the English and 86 in the German text.
I may interpolate here that in that particular document 159 Communists shot are mentioned whereas in the document we have in front of us 149 are mentioned, in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, page 137 of the English and 100 German and in Document Book XXV in Exhibit 571, NOKW1667, page 66 of the English and 50 of the German:
and finally in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804, page 119 of the English and page 90 of the German.
The cause for the reprisal measure is an attack by bands on a naval truck column north of Calamata.
According to other reports, there were not 149 but 100 Communists shot: their own losses, according to the War Diary of the 68th Corpsreport, dated 7 February 1944, Exhibit 480,-10 dead and wounded.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, did you at the time gain knowledge of this incident?
A. No, the naval commandant was not subordinate to me. At a later time, however, when I made an inspection trip I came through one of those destroyed villages and the reason for the destruction was pointed out to me when I asked why the village had been destroyed.
In the war diary which came from Washington I found out that that was not the first attack carried out on a naval truck column but the third surprise attack and only then the naval commandant decided to take a reprisal measure. From the war diary it can be seen that one surprise attack had been carried out on a naval motorized column on the 2nd of November 1943 and a further attack on the 23rd of November 1943 and this one mentioned hero was the third one, which is mentioned in this document. The Navy lost a total of 25 soldiers in these three surprise attacks so that the reprisal quota, if one takes a basic figure of 100 shot, is a ratio of 1 to 4 and, if one takes a basis of 149 shot, then it would be a ratio of 1 to 6.
Furthermore, in one document it was mentioned that the inhabitants of villages had supported the bandits. Presumably, that is the reason why the village or the villages were destroyed.
Q. Yes, that is mentioned in Exhibit 434, NOKW-661, on page 17 of the English document book and page 20 of the German document book. In this report it does not say: "Naval Commander", but "Combat Commander."
What can you tell us about that, General?
A That is a report passed on by the military commander Southeast and he was located in Belgrade and, apparently, didn't seem to know that on the Peleponnes on Calamata there was a naval commandant and another one in Patras on the northern coast. That is the explanation which I can give.
Q In all other reports the naval commandant and not the combat commander is referred to.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: I would now like to turn to Exhibit 439, NOKW-647 on page 72 of the English and of the German Text. In the I-c morning report of the military commander Greece dated 27 July 1944 the shooting of 100 hostages as a reprisal measure for a band attack on an ambulance convoy near Blacherla northwest of Tripolis was mentioned. The same incident is dealt with in Document Book XX in Exhibit 460, NOKW-942, on page 14 of the English text and 11 of the German text, also in a report from Army Group E to the Commander in Chief Southeast from the 24th of July 1944.
Q General, do you remember that incident?
A I don't recall the incident itself, the surprise attack on an ambulance convoy which would be marked with a red cross; this surprise attack shows that the partisans did not adhere to the provisions of International Law because if they did. they would not have attacked an ambulance convoy clearly marked with a red cross.
Now, looking through the documents which we received from Athens, Greek newspapers, et cetera, I found a paragraph which dealt with this particular attack and which says amongst other things, that "25 German soldiers, most of them wounded in this particular attack lost their lives during that attack. That's all I can say about this incident.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: The next incident of interest to us is on page 80 of the English text and 79 of the German text of the same document book.
Under the date of 13 May 1944 it is reported that in Patras as a reprisal for a surprise attack 10 Communists hanged. This is a reprisal measure taken for the wounding of 2 members of the Navy by bandits. This same incident is dealt with in Document Book XX in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, on page 142 of the English text and 103 of the German text, also in Document Book XXV, in Document NOKW-1640, Exhibit 573, page 77 of the English and 77 of the German text.
Q Do you remember that incident, General?
A Since here also members of the Navy are attacked, the reprisal measure was ordered by the naval commander in Patras and I did not receive the order directly presumably because he had his special channel or because the Navy was concerned so that I was not informed about it. The Navy, after all, was not subordinate to me.
Q The next report which I will deal is the evening report of 3 May 1944 on page 82 of the English text and page 80 of the German text. According to this report, 350 Communists were shot because of a surprise attack and 10 Communists were hanged because of the attack on a train. This incident is also mentioned in Document Book XX, in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, on page 142 of the English text and page 102 of the German text; also in Document Book XXV, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 83 of the English text and page 65 of the German text; and in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804 on page 123 of the English and page 93 of the German text.
As can be seen from these documents, the surprise attack took place near Chani-Derweni, C h a n i - D e r w e n i.
Do you remember that incident, General?
A I don't remember the details of this incident either. Unfortunately, these were almost daily occurrences that sabotage acts occurred on the communication routes. Here again I tried to establish the reason for the reprisal measure and the only source which could possibly be connected with it is a Greek newspaper which reports from the end of April that in a train from Athens to Patras, -- this Chani-Derweni is situated between Athens and Corinthe, still on the mainland -- 42 Greek policemen who intended to go to Patras were murdered on the occasion of this surprise attack, so that might possibly establish a certain connection with the document in front of us here. I couldn't find any other indications.
Q That brings me to page 85 in the English text, page 83 in the German text. Here we have a I-c morning report of the military commander Greece dated 30 April 1944.