view -- namely, the orders and the intent or will expressed therein and the groups designated in the orders as prisoners of war were to be made available for execution. Reinecke said that that was correct and correct for reasons of ideology and he further expressed that the officers or the officers' corps had to dissociate itself from concepts and ideas which originated from an earlier period, this was a favored expression that was used quite a lot at the time and possibly originated with Reinecke. It might be possible that in the future these concepts and the orders founded on these concepts would be mitigated. That was the only concession made to us at the time by the then Chief of the AWA in conclusion to the arguments which I had raised representing Canaris.
I had summarized the results of the conference in a file note and after the conference I passed on this file note to my superior, Admiral Canaris, and I believe that he used it when compiling his diary.
Then I had a brief discussion with Colonel Breyer who was present at that time also and during this discussion I remarked that I had not been very successful with my arguments and that the result was rather a poor one. Breyer himself, as he told me, had been a prisoner of war during the First World War. I believe he was a British prisoner of war; I am not quite sure. He said, "Well, what do you expect? You know Reinecke, don't you?"
QWitness, before we go any further will you first tell us who was this so-called legal advisor, Moltke, that you were talking about?
AIn the department Ausland (foreign countries) of the counter intelligence service there was a group which dealt with questions of international law. Moltke belonged to that group and another gentleman whose name I no longer recall. At least, I only discussed these questions with Moltke in that particular connection.
QWhat became of Moltke? What happened to him?
AMoltke was executed -- not after the 20th of July but before Court No. V-A, Case No. XII.
the 20th of July. That is why just before I hinted at a certain circle of people who were already executed before the 20th of July. Moltke was a member of this circle. I believe, Generalkonsul Kiep was also executed before the 20th of July 1944. Moltke was executed in connection with Kiep. Moltke belonged to the Greisau Circle (Greisau was the name of the Chateau), and he was actually the leader of this circle which was in opposition to the Circle Beck, Canaris, Oster.
QWitness, will you tell us now, to the best of your recollection, just what was specifically the intent -- I have special reference to where were these commissars that you are talking about to be liquidated -- who was to do it and whose cooperation or coordination was necessary and who carried it out?
AThe executions were carried out by the Einsatz Commandos of the SD according to an agreement which, to the best of my recollection, was made between the OKW and the Reich Security Main Office.
QWhere were these executions to be carried out? Are you speaking now from the front lines in Germany proper, in prisoner-ofwar camps? Just give us what was discussed. What was the suggestion made?
AThe executions were as far as possible to take place in the Soviet area.
QRight in the open or within camps -- and was the method of the liquidation discussed?
ATo the best of my recollection today, the people were segregated, first of all, inside the camps and then taken to the execution squads. I don't remember any details at this point.
QNow, was this plan also to be operable in those camps in Germany where Russian prisoners of war were stationed?
ANo, not as far as I remember -- not in Germany itself, not in Germany proper.
QHad it happened in Germany proper?
ATo the best of my knowledge, it did not happen in Germany.
QNow, was it ever intended and had it come to your attention in the counter intelligence that Russian prisoners of war were to be evacuated to Germany after capture?
AWell, originally, according to the plans and preparations of the General staff, the prisoners were to be sent to the home area. This measure, however, was stopped. I believe this was done through immediate order issued by Hitler and in the final analysis this was one of the causes for the events which took place with the enormous number of prisoners that were driven together during the capture. What I mean to say is: it was based on the conditions in the very poorly equipped camps.
QDuring the conference, or right after the conference, did Reinecke make any statement to you which had any reference as to the administration and procedure being employed in prisoner of war camps?
ADuring the conferences it was expressed and pointed out that the treatment of the Soviet prisoners of war in the camps, of course, was not to be put on the same level as the treatment of our western opponents-and this based on the ideological reasons which I mentioned initially. After all, we were not dealing here with a soldier but instead with a Bolshevik; that is, the mortal enemy of National Socialism. That was the guiding spirit of the whole conference and, therefore, the Soviet prisoner in the camps could not expect the same treatment as was afforded to the prisoners of our western opponents.
It was considered quite expedient, therefore, if draconic measures were applied -- that is, if whips sticks and other means were used. This is a trend of thought which was expressed by the then Chief of the AWA Reinecke.
In answer to this remark, Colonel Breyer, who at the time was the Chief of the prisoner of war department or somehow connected with the prisoner of war administration and as such familiar with the conditions in the prisoner of war camps, said to me ,"Well, you know Reinecke, don't you?"
QI would like to know from you, witness, why it was necessary for the SS or SD to get the agreement from representatives from the OKW like, for instance, General Reinecke, to carry out this task.
AA certain collaboration must have been necessary because matters were involved which were to be applied in the prisoner of war camps-- that is, the selection and segregation of the prisoners -- and the prisonerof -war camps were institutions which were subordinate to the OKW or, at least, quite generally speaking were subordinate to the Wehrmacht. I can answer only quite generally here because I am not competent for organizational questions with regard to the prisoner of war administration.
QIn any event the SD could not just step into these camps and shoot people without having informed the OKW prior to such action?
AI suppose that that was the reason but from my own knowledge I cannot give you any confirmation of this.
QNow, witness, did Admiral Canaris, prior to dispatching you to that conference as his representative give any other idea which may have motivated the SS to call this meeting? Did he possibly at that time discuss with you that the SD may have had ulterior motives?
AWould you please repeat the question? I didn't quite get its meaning.
QDid Admiral Canaris indicate to you that he felt that the SD or Mueller may have had ulterior motives in calling this whole scheme to the attention of the Wehrmacht cooperation?
AI understand the question now. Concerning this topic -- that is, the intention, and that was an intention on the part of Himmler and Heydrich, to involve the Wehrmacht in all these matters -- that is, in terror actions and the like -- I believe it had existed for some time already. Canaris has in reference to myself and other people-- as, for instance, the then Colonel Pickenbruck, who was a great friend of Canaris-made statements to this effect -- namely, that it was the firm intention of Himmler, Heydrich and the whole circle around them, part of which Mueller was also, of course,to soil the White vest of the Wehrmacht through participation, and forced participation, in these and similar actions.
This had started as early perhaps as the Polish campaign or, rather, at the time when the measures were taken in connection with the Polish campaign, in Poland proper, measures were taken against the Polish population and mainly against the Polish intelligence. At that time, I recall the conference which took place on the 13th of September in the Fuehrer's train in Illnau, this was 13 September 1939, when matters were discussed by Canaris and the then Chief of the OKW, Keitel. At that time the so-called -- and this is one of Hitler's expressions -- political "clean-ups" in Poland -- that is, the liquidation, extermination of the Polish intelligencia, Jews, et cetera -- were discussed. At that time Canaris warned the Chief of the OKW very urgently not to make the Wehrmacht available for such actions and countered the arguments of the then Chief of the OKW, Keitel -- that Hitler had already made his decision and that such things were done by other people -- namely, by the SS and SD; saying literally -- and that is laid down in the files notes: "The world will some time make the Wehrmacht responsible for this also if these matters went on under their very eyes, even if the Wehrmacht themselves did not actually, carry out these things."
I have had to testify to this in great detail during the IMT in 1945. During the discussion in question Canaris warned against the bombing of Warsaw very urgently. That bombing had at that time not yet taken place . He stressed the foreign political conse quences of such a bombing. This record or file note was compiled by myself and was submitted and dealt with during the IMT.
To come back to the discussion which took place with the Chief of the AWA, Canaris at that time, when the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was involved, a question which for some time had played a considerable part, because the conference which I have already mentioned took place after the beginning of the Russian campaign, after some such executions had already taken place and after we, the department for counter intelligence abroad had already received reports and objections from the fighting troops at the front, et cetera, Canaris again brought up that topic and in particular stressed this affair -- that is, the parti cipation of the Wehrmacht.
QAll right; proceed, please.
AThe participation of the Wehrmacht, and this time in comparison with the Polish campaign, was not to exist just next to the events taking place, but the Wehrmacht would be involved in them, involved through the whole problem of theprisoner of war administration. These were, after all, soldiers who had been taken prisoner of war, and there was a great impending danger for the Wehrmacht, a danger inasmuch as one of the basest aspects of the system would thus involve the Wehrmacht also.
QWitness, during your testimony you stated that it was originally planned to bring Russian prisoners of war into Germany proper and that as far as you can recall, Hitler, possibly himself, was the one who cancelled or changed that order. Do you know why?
AI cannot give you any details about that. I only know that it was so, and if I say I know it, that only refers to a knowledge which I possibly gained from Canaris or from one of my department colleagues.
QWhat did they tell you ? Did I understand you to say they told you the reason why, but you didn't know it by yourself?
AI myself didn't know it, this fact or this apparent fact, namely, that Hitler himself had stopped Russian prisoners of war being sent to Germany. I gained that knowledge along the channels which I described just before, just as I learned that the General Staff had intended to return the prisoners. I wanted to express that I myself knew nothing about it because I did not deal with these matters; they did not fall into my sphere of competency.
QWhat was the result of this change in policy, that is to say, keeping the Russian prisoners of war in Russia, in the operational areas or in the areas right behind the front lines?
AThe result was, and I believe I pointed this out at a previous occasion, the result was an enormous congestion of the masses of prisoners, which for purely technical reasons could hardly be mastered, neither in respect to accommodations nor in respect to food, nor in respect to medical care; so that, the consequences arose that prisoners because of lack of food died, that epidemics started, and that in some parts the conditions took such a shape that reports which we received shewed that even cannibalism occurred.
Those were the apparent consequences of this measure.
MR. RAPP:If Your Honors please, we are prepared, at the Tribunal's desire, to either go on with the examination of this witness covering the phase that we have later on informed Defense Counsel, or, if the Tribunal wishes, we can discontinue now, go on with some documents, and start again at 1:30.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal feels that it will be a more orderly process if you continued with this witness until you have finished with him. As I understand it,the time is up at 1:30 so you can complete your entire examination; is that right?
MR. RAPP:Your Honor, we would not be through prior to the recess now; we would probably have to go on after 1:30; so the cross examination in any event would not take place until this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes can finish then with this witness if we now recess until 1:30, that is, you will take it up.
MR. RAPP:Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:And not in violation of any of this rule that was objected to.
MR. RAPP:That is correct, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will recess until 1:30.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours, 11 February 1948.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Marshal, are all of the defendants present this morning in court?
THE MARSHAL:Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT:You may proceed with the examination.
MR. RAPP:Thank you, Your Honor.
HANS JOACHIM RIECKE - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY MR. RAPP:
QWitness, prior to the recess we concerned ourselves primarily with the selection and subsequent execution of certain Russian prisoners of war, and the conference in which you participated, together with General Reinecke and others. I would now like to ask you some other questions which have arisen in connection with your job in the Counter Intelligence of the OKW. You were already a member of the German Armed Forces and in the Counter Intelligence Office of the OKW at the time that the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia took place; is that correct?
AYes.
QNow, you know this is the part outside of the Sudetenland.
AIf I understand you correctly, you mean the remainder of Czechoslovakia?
QThat is correct. Did Admiral Canaris at that time comment to you and others on this annexation and, if so, what did he say?
AAt that time, I was in conjunction with Canaris, Oester and Colonel Laungiene, a former Austrian officer, we went to Prague almost directly in the wake of the advancing German troops; and the persons I have just mentioned could watch Canaris' reaction on this occasion. I should like to interpolate that Colonel Laungiene is still alive and is somewhere in Austria, and Canaris and Oester are dead, both of them. The reaction of Canaris was very peculiar; Canaris at the time held the view, the firm conviction that the Czech Army would resist; that they would shoot, and he was of the opinion that if at that time any bloodshed occurred, England would have been induced to enter the war immediately.
or, that Great Britain would have joined in the ensuing war. He subsequently returned to this trend of thought; that was almost directly before the outbreak of hostilities with Poland.
DR.LATERNSER: (Attorney for the defendant von Leeb) May it please the Tribunal, I should like to object to the testimony; the question is only aimed at hearsay evidence, and now the witness is reporting the opinions of a third party, but not facts, and that is not admissible.
It cannot be the subject of a testimony by a witness.
THE PRESIDENT:I think that the objection to the fact that it is hearsay is not good. The witness should, where he can, state, I thinks what was said, as near as he can what was said by the party that indicates their views.
ACanaris referred to this opinion of his at a subsequent interview which he had with the then chief of the OKW, Keitel, on the 17th August. I can state the date with certainty because I have had an opportunity to refer to a diary entry of Canaris', one of the very few complete entries which noted this interview, and I have had the opportunity of inspecting this diary entry, and on this occasion where the question was vary largely as to whether the imminent Polish campaign would automatically involve British intervention, and, therefore, would lead to a World War, Canaris in this interview referred to this view which he held at that time, and mentioned it towards Keitel. I repeat he said approximately, at the time the remaining Czechoslovakia was annexed that, if resistance had taken place and there had been bloodshed, then, according to C anaris' view, Great Britain would have entered the war immediately. In this context I was struck by the reaction of Canaris under the circumstances, and, therefore, I recall it.
QNow, witness, later on at the beginning of the Polish campaign, on the 1st of September, 1939, what specifically did Canaris tell you in connection with that campaign; as far as you can remember.
AI believe that I have already commented on this episode in the course of my first examination in the Grest Nurnberg trial before the IMT. I myself and a few others, I believe that I can recall with certainty the names of Oster and Piepenbrock(?) on the eve of the invasion of Poland, witnessed how Canaris was completely shaken and unset; how he entered our room and told us about the imminent invasion, adding : that is the end of Germany.
QWitness, during your tour of duty in the OKW, did you ever become acquainted with the defendant Warlimont?
AYes.
QIn what capacity, if you remember, was Warlimont serving at the time that you met him first?
AAs far as I recall today, I met General Warlimont for the first time in the National Defense Department (Landesverteidigung)
QCould you approximately say when you first met him?
AI believe it was before the Polish campaign, it may have been at an even earlier stage.
QDo you recall the rank of Warlimont at that time?
AYes, Warlimont at that time, as I recall it, was Colonel in the General Staff. GSC.
QAnd you said that you met him in connection with his activities in the Department of National Defense?
ALandesverteidigung, (National Defense)
QDo you specifically recall what his position was at that time in that department?
AI believe at that, time - that was before the Polish campaign, General, or that is the then Colonel Warlimont, was Chief of the Department for National Defense, Landesverteidigung. Jodi was not there at the time; I think he was attached to the troops at that time. He was serving with the troops.
QDid you have to see Warlimont at that time in connection with your business in the counter-intelligence?
AThere were certain counter-intelligence measures which had to be discussed with the National Defense Department. Counter-intelligence measures in connection with the impending Polish campaign.
QDid Canaris ever see him?
AYes.
QAnd in what connection?
AAccording to my recollection, and I would like to emphasize that. of course, I can only convey that impression which has particular reference to those conversations and meetings between Admiral Canaris and General Warlimont which I, myself, attended.
QGo ahead and tell us, please.
AExcuse me. I didn't finish my sentence. On these occasions, questions of the counter-intelligence department were usually discussed. When I was present they were usually matters which pertained to my department.
QYou told us that Warlimont at that time, as Chief of the Department of National Defense, was a Colonel?
AYes.
QWas that in any way indicative as to his position?
AI cannot find anything significant in this, because I myself was a Colonel and also was a Departmental Chief at the time.
QSo it was quite customary, I understand, that a Colonel headed a Department in the OKW?
AYes
QNow, did Canaris, as far as you know, ever consult with Keitel?
AYes and I testified about some of these discussions on departmental matters in the IMT trial, i,e. those discussions and conferences which I myself attended.
QIf the court permits, I would like possibly to tell the witness that despite the fact that he may have already testified to a lot of that material before the IMT, if he feels that he would like to say something about it, that he can do so, and that the court is not bound to merely, shall I say, read the witness' testimony in the IMI case, but the Court should ask or instruct the witness that he could repeat this without being repetitious.
THE PRESIDENT:Did you desire that the Tribunal instruct him as to that?
MR. RAPP:I would appreciate that, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:The fact that you have already testified to this in the IMT trial does not prevent you from again testifying to those things. If it calls for an answer that you have already testified to in that case, you should answer any of the questions notwithstanding you have once given your testimony in that case. You need not worry about its being repetitious, because it should also be in the records of this case. That was what you desired?
MR. RAPP:Yes, Your Honor.
AMay I draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that my testimony in the IMT trial was given over two years ago, and that there are therefore gaps of memory, or there may be statements of mine which are not quite in accord with my testimony in that case.
THE PRESIDENT:Notwithstanding, that what you are asked is to give your best recollection as of today.
AI understand, Your Honor. BY MR. RAPP:
QNow, the last answer you gave us was that Canaris consulted occasionally with Keitel?
AYes.
QDid Canaris see Keitel usually, as far as you know, about the same matters he discussed with Warliment?
AIn those cases in which Canaris talked to General Warlimont in the first place it was usually concerning a matter pertaining to his office, and subsequently he discussed the same topic with Keitel, usually in order to get a decision which was made by Keitel, and thus the matter was ended.
QWitness, in connection with the War against Poland, do you recall now a specific instance involving at that time your office and your chiefs, Keitel and Warlimont?
AI believe that I have already testified on this in the first trial before the International Military Tribunal; that is, I mentioned the name of General Warlimont at the time in connection with the procurement of Polish outfits and equipment by the Office for Foreign Counter-Intelligence for the so-called "Himmlar Operation". This has also been recorded in the diary of the Counter-Intelligence Department, that is, in the official war diary. As far as I recall, either I myself or my deputy were summoned to the National Defense Department, and there General Warlimont gave us the order to be transmitted by me to Canaris to make available the equipment and material and Polish uniforms previously mentioned for this so-called "Operation Himmler". I can add additional information on this operation, that it was an operation which was to represent the Poles as being the aggressors. It was the affair involving the Radio Transmitting Station Gleiwitz in Silesia; a fact which, however.
was revealed only afterwards. At that time when the National Defense Department discussed this situation, I think everybody participating and involved in the discussion, at least I myself, was under the impression that it was a kind of rival operation of the SD as against the CounterIntelligence Department; the objective being to initiate some kind of action against Poland. That this entire maneuver was designed to deceive the German people into believing that this war had been provoked by an invasion of the Poles on German territory,--nobody at that time thought of that. It is evident from the diary of the department, moreover, that one of those present asked: "Why these uniforms for Herr Himmler? What has Herr Himmler to do with Polish uniforms, and particularly with operations which are within the scope of Wehrmacht operations"? That was a concrete example of one of the matters which I had to deal with in connection with Landesverteidigung (National Defense Dept.) and General Warlimont at the time. Of course, there were various other operations planned by the counter-intelligence department within the scope of military operations planned for the impending war, which formed the subject of this and similar conferences with the National Defense Department.
QWitness, was it customary at that time that the head of the department of National Defense, the OKW, or Warliment instructed you to procure these uniforms, or was that something that up to that time had not been done?.
AThe entire incident was unique in the atmosphere then prevailing. It happened for the first time. I think that is true for all participants, and it was a complete surprise.
Q.Did you or Canaris try to trace the purpose of this request?
A.Of course, we had our own ideas as to the purpose and objective of the request. In the first place it was most unusual. In the second place, thename of Himmler, rather the designation "Operation Himmler", filled us with grave mistrust and apprehension. I have to add, in order to make this quite clear, that my department at that time had the order from the General Staff to try and prevent disturbances and friction in the Upper Silesian industrial area, and that this was to be attempted by the Counter-Intelligence Service by the infiltration of agents and teams of agents -- that is a number of agents. We, the chiefs of the departments in the counter-intelligence, assumed that Herr Himmler had also been informed about these directives and that now the Wehrmacht generally and the Military Counter-Intelligence in particular , were to be outdone by him, that is by his organizing an operation of his own with the same or a similar objectives in order to claim credit for his own organization, that is, the SD, in reportingit to Hitler. In any case, Whatever these presumptions and surmises or combinations on our part may have been, they all centered on the East; that is, we suspected something directed by Germany against Poland in order to thwart some Polish plan. In this particular case we were concerned with the destruction of the Upper Silesian Industrial Area , an area which was vital to Germany. That was the line of thought which was current in our minds, that is, the minds of the department chiefs of the Counter Intelligence, regarding this request for Polish uniforms. Never, however, as I have previously said, would the idea have occurred to us that in this case some jugglery or a sleight ofhand , some trick -- I am at a loss to find a more suitable word -- was to be played in order to deceive our own people into thinking that the aggression was started by the other party, in the case the Poles, let alone the methods by which this was to be achieved. When the first Wehrmacht report in some version, which, of course, I do not recall today , expressed that Polish troops had forcibly crossed the border and invaded German territory, it was as if scales fell from our eyes, and Colonel Piepenbrock (?), then the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Dept.
I, who was the person who had the Wehrmacht report in his hands and was reading it to all of us, immediately made the comment: "Now we know why the uniforms were needed. The uniforms which we" --that is, the Counter-Intelligence Department I, that is speaking for Colonel Piepenbrock (?) --"and my own Department II had to furnish".
Q.Witness, did you later on during your tour of duty find out how it actually was done?
A.I, and likewise the other Department Chiefs, learned shortly afterwards from Canaris, who at this time -- that is, after the event, apparently knew something about it. We received the first intimations about it, and they were to the effect that for this operation people had been taken from concentration camps and put into Polish uniforms in order to feign this alleged attack of the Poles on the Radio Transmitter Gleiwitz. I should like to add in quite general terms that the knowledge and cognizance and complicity in these matters, that is, as to how this war was set into motion, substantially influenced the attitude toward the war of the circle of my closer friends and comrades, whom I referred to at the beginning of my testimony.
Q.Do you know what happened to the participants in this provocative attack?
A.In order to get a clear picture of the entire matter, which as far as its actual implementation was concerned was completely concealed and kept secret from our circle, we interested ourselves for a long time in it, particularly General Oster and Dr. Donani, an assistant of General Oster, who was likewise executed in connection with the events of the conspiracy of the 20th of July 1944, without trial. I must say that until the surrender I had no exact knowledge as to how these events in the Radio Transmitter Gleiwitz incident really occurred. After the surrender, in a hospital, I met an SD Fuehrer ...
DR.LATERNSER: (Interrupting) If it please the Tribunal, I object because there has never been a clearer case of hearsay evidence. The Prosecution, if they attach importance to this, should present this SD leader, who has just been mentioned, as a witness, but it is improper to resort to hearsay evidence in order to prove such important and vital events.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal rules that because evidence is hearsay it is not inadmissible; it merely goes to its weight. If the Prosecution has the witness, he should be produced. The objection is overruled, in any event. BY MR. RAPP: Witness,please finish the story in a few words
A.All this has already been stated in my first examination. The name of this men I do not recall today,but it must be contained in the record of the IMT. At that time, that was after the capitulation, this man told me that in their circles also -- that is, in SD circles -this affair was quite mysterious and was kept Top Secret, and that as far as he knew the people who took pert in this affair of the Radio Transmitter Gleiwitz had been allegedly liquidated.
QNow, witness going to another subject, will you tell us what you know about the commando order.
DR. LATERNSER:I object if it please the Tribunal, that is not a proper question. "Do you know about the commando order"? Perhaps one knows a great deal but the question ought to be put first whether the witness know of a comando order at all even then the witness ought to be asked on the topics. A general question cannot be answered.
MR. RAPP:Believing, Your Honor the proof of the pudding is in the eating, I believe the witness is perfectly qualified to answer the question -- if he is not we will just save time.
THE PRESIDENT:I think the way this witness has answered questions he probably understands the question and he may answer it.
AI should like to state in the first place that regarding all things which contributed toward the genesis of the commando order I am not informed, that is regarding the antecedents of the commando order, I can merely report the reactions of the department for counter intelligence -- my own department. Their reaction to this order -
DR. LATERNSER:I object; If it please the Tribunal, reactions to something if they are being described, constitute a judgement. The prosecution ought to ask for facts. This has been laid down that only facts must be asked for so as to have proper evidence to be submitted to the tribunal. Reactions are a judgement or opinion, but they do not constitute facts.
THE PRESIDENT:He started to state the reactions of his department. I think that is competent and he may answer the question.
AThese reactions were not confined to my department but in general, above all for purely objective reasons inherent in the nature of the counter intelligence service, our reaction was completely negative. The negative reaction of my department is explained by the fact that the Brandenburg regiment -- that was a formation which pursued objectives similar to those of the enemy commandos -- was attached to my department and therefore the raction was particularly violent because reprisal measures would in all probability rebound in thos Brandenburg people for whom I felt responsible and for whose safety I was bound to feel responsible.
To put it briefly, the commando order was -- the point of it was that enemy soldiers apprehended while carrying out their commando activities, were to be killed. The men attached to the Brandenburg regiment were also soldiers. They were therefore liable to suffer a similar fate as a result of reprisal measures which were to be expected. That in substance was the gist and core of our reactions and our attitude which as far as I believe was also put down in writing in a file submitted by the Counter-Intelligence Dept for Foreign Countries and which was formulated by -
QWere there any other salient reactions which you can recall at that time besides the element of possible retaliation against the Brandenburg units?
AThere were of course considerations of International Law which were discussed in this circle to which the Counter-Intelligence foreign countries department and its chief, Admiral Burkner, belonged. The Commando order was looked at from the aspect of his department and discussed accordingly, that is from the aspect of International Law and therefore the reaction was negative from these aspects.
QWitness, your office of counter intelligence under Admiral Ganaris, did I understand you correctly was the top organization dealing with counter intelligence in the OKW, is that correct?
AYes.
QWere there any provisions made for counter intelligence with the field units?
AField units, that is army groups and armies, it was to the best of my recollection the counter intelligence detachments and groups which had to perform so-called front line service, that is had to perform counter intelligence service on the front and were directed by the 1-C., of whatever field unit was concerned.