The far-reaching strategy which underlay Germany's policy with respect to Slovakia is well illustrated in a memorandum, prepared for Ribbentrop by the defendant Woermann on 5 October 1938. In a portion of this memorandum entitled "The Slovak Problems" Woermann set forth that there were four theoretical possibilities:
1. Independent Slovakia, 2. Autonomous Slovakia with close relations to Hungary, 3. Autonomous Slovakia loaning on Poland, 4. Autonomous Slovakia within Czech federation.
Commenting on these four possibilities, Woermann set forth that Germany had "no interest" in a union between Hungary and Slovakia, and even less in any connection between Slovakia and Poland: "A sphere of Polish economy enlarged by Slovakia, could put considerable difficulties in the war of German economic endeavors in the southeast." Indeed, preservation of the existing relations between the Slovaks and the Czechs, through "an autonomous Slovakia leaning on Czechoslovakia", was deemed by Woermann "preferable to the Polish and Hungarian solutions as the lesser evil". However, Woermann strongly recommended against any of these three solutions as compared with the establishment of an independent Slovakia, and I quote him again: "as the solution most favorable to us":
"An independent Slovakia would be a weak political organism" he said, "and hence would lend the best assistance to the German need for pushing forward and obtaining space in the east."
As early as December, Weizsaecker was pointing out to the diplomatic representatives of Italy and Hungary that the Munich guarantees of a couple months previous Czechoslovakian territorial integrity were worthless, and he said:
"Czechoslovakia, is exclusively dependent on Germany. A gua rantee from any other power is worthless.
.." and he adds:
"Czechoslovakia's future is in Germany's hands, and a gua rantee from any other power would be meaningless."
Now that Czechoslovakia was ready for the kill, Keppler and Weesenmayer stepped into the picture. Keppler had been released from his Austrian duties, and in December 1938 Hitler had asked him to familiarize himself with the Slovakian problem. Strong German support was given to the Slovakian sepraatist movement and early in March 1939, several Slovakian politicians were received by Goering in the presence of Keppler. On 11 March 1939, Hitler sent Keppler (accompanied, as usual by his assistant, Veesenmayer) to Slovakia in order to intensify the pressure on the Slovakian leaders to declare their independence and put themselves under the protection of Germany. As Keppler put it in a letter written shortly thereafter to Himmler: "It was possible to save the confused situation and to bring Prime Minister Dr. Tiso to a conference with the Fuehrer in Berlin." The conference referred to took place in Berlin on 13 March 1939: Hitler delivered an ultimatum to Tiso, saying:
"It was not a question of days, but of hours. If Slovakia wished to make herself independent, Hitler would support this endeavor and guarantee it.
If she hesitated and did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible."
Three days later, the Slovakian legislature declared the country independent. The next day, we are now on 15 March 1933, Hacha, President of the pitifully small remnant of the once proud, independent country of Czechoslovakia was arrogantly summoned to Berlin and, in the presence of the defendants Weizsaecker, Keppler, Meissner, and Dietrich, was ordered to sign an agreement for the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German Reich as a Protectorate. Hacha was told that German troops had received orders to march and that any resistance would be ruthlessly suppressed; Hermann Goering added the threat that he would destroy Prague from the air. Faced with these threats, Hacha had no alternative but to sign the agreement by which Czechoslovakian independence was finally extinguished. Keppler's part in this most shameful of all the Nazi conquests was saluted by Heinrich Himmler in the following words and I am quoting Himmler:
I would like to express to you, Keppler, once more, in writing, how you have accomplished once again your very difficult task under very difficult conditions, so clearly and bravely for the Fuehrer.
I do not have to reassure you that it will he a joy for me to allow SS men to work under your leadership in the future for these tasks.
Putting the final seal of hypocrisy on this brutal conquest, the defendant Weizsaecker, on 15 March 1939, instructed all German diplomatic missions to declare that German action in Czechoslovakia took place, I quote Weizsaecker, "with the full agreement of the Czecholovakian government". Weizsaecker himself demonstrated how this attitude should be assumed three days later, when the French Ambassador attempted to deliver a note of protest on the Czechoslovakian affair. Weizsaecker himself recorded, and I an going to quote it:
"I put the note back into its enveloppe directly, and pushed it back to the Ambassador with the remark that I most decidedly refused to accept any kind of protest from him in the Czechoslo vakian affair."
And he continued:
"... I did not want to enter into any discussion of this matter with the Ambassador, I told him.
Legally seen, there was an agreement existing between the Fuehrer and the Czechoslovakian President of State.
The Czech President had come to Berlin according to his own desire and had immediately stated to the Reich Foreign Minister that he wanted to place the fate of his country in the hands of the Fuehrer.
I could not imagine", Weizsaecker continues, "that the French government would be more Catholic then the Pope and mix into matters which rightly were settled between Berlin and Prague.
DR. KEMPNER:Mr. William Cunning will continue with the permission of the Court.
MR. CUNNING:
With the final collapse of the Prague government, Germany was at long last able to level her heavy guns at Poland. Relations between Germany and Poland were governed by the non-aggression pact of 1934. Under this agreement, the two governments stipulated that, I quote:
Should any dispute arise between them, and should it not be possible to reach an agreement thereon by direct negotiations in each individual case, they will seek a settlement through other peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement.
.. Under no circumstances, however, will they proceed to use force for the purpose of settling such disputes.
But to Hitler and the German Foreign Office, this agreement meant nothing. The theme for aggression was now to be the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to the "rightful owner", Greater Germany, and the "emancipation" of "oppressed" German minorities. The strong Nazi element in Danzig was to serve as the opening wedge of the diplomatic campaign. During the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the German Foreign Office repeatedly assured Poland of Germany's peaceful intentions. But immediately after the occupation of Bohemia, and Moravia, diplomatic negotiations with the Poles took an arrogant, belligerent, turn. On 30 March 1939, in discussing the Polish question with the Italian envoy, Weizsaecker contemptuously remarked: "The Poles are still hard of hearing at the present time, but they will undoubtedly learn to show themselves more pliable."
The policy of the German Foreign Office was to put the blame upon the Poles for the worsening of relations between the two countries and to portray the Reich as a peaceful nation being menaced and threatened by Poland. On 5 April 1939, Weizsaecker sent a cable to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, as follows, I quote:
It is probable that Lipski (Polish Ambassador to Germany) will be received here once more before Easter.
On this occasion, the following points should be brought up with reference to the last discussion between Lipski and the Foreign Minister of the Reich:
Our offer made to Poland was made but once. Apparently the Polish government did not entirely comprehend the significance of this offer.
We cannot help that. The future will show whether Poland was well advised.
Lipski's counter-proposal has, as you know, been rejected already as a basis for negotiations by the Foreign Minister of the Reich.
No more explanations to Lipski. Weizsaecker further said;
It is requested not to go into any further discussions about the German offer and the Polish counter proposal.
We must prevent Poland from throwing the ball back to us and later on making out that we had disregarded a Polish offer.
Other im portant missions are likewise instructed not to enter any material discussion with regard to the Polish question, but rather to evade the issue clearly and give no indication as to German intentions in the future.
The following day Weizsaecker accorded an interview to Lipski, who endeavored to explain that the recent agreement between Poland and England was of a purely defensive character and that Poland desired to abide by the German-Poland non-aggression pact of 1934. A memo by Weizsaecker records the reply which he made to Lipski:
I have taken these remarks from Lipski with some laughter and then told him approximately the following.
.... Nobody in Germany except the Fuehrer could have had the great conception of the year 1934.
... Instead of joyfully seizing this opportunity, and completing the work of 1934, we have suddenly heard the rattling of the saber in Poland.
The offer by Hitler to the Poles was made once; the future will tell whether Poland has acted wisely in spurning it.
This statement well demonstrates the value of a career diplomat like Weizsaecker to the cause of the Third Reich. He knew all the tricks of the diplomatic trade. Emboldened by success after success, and by the rapid increase of German armed might, Weizsaecker's tactics grew increasingly brutal and ruthless. In April 1939, the late President Roosevelt sent an appeal to Hitler to preserve the peace of the world. The German Foreign Office endeavored to discredit Roosevelt's appeal by asking twenty-odd countries, not includ ing Poland, whether these countries considered themselves threatened by Germany.
Among other countries in the list were Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, all of whom replied that they had no cause to feel threatened by Germany, and all of whom within a few months had cause to feel very differently. Among the countries to whom Germany addressed this question was the little Baltic country of Latvia. Upon hearing from the German envoy to Latvia that the Latvian Foreign Minister was exhibiting some signs of caution in preparing his reply, Weizsaecker telephoned to the German Minister in Riga, I quote:
to tell him that Latvian Foreign Minister Munters' reply to our inquiry in the matter of the Roosevelt telegram was unintelli gible to us.
While nearly all of the other governments ques tioned had responded already, and that, of course, in a negative sense, Mr. Munters was making out of that ridiculous piece of American Propaganda a case on which he wished to consult his Government, If hunters did not answer our question with a down right "no" we should have to add Latvia to those countries which are making themselves wilful accomplices of Mr. Roosevelt.
The defendant Woermann could play the bully with equal skill. On 8 July 1939, he sent out a telegram to all German Legations, instructing them concerning the language they should use in discussing the Polish question. One could hardly hope to find a clearer statement of the threat that Poland must give in or await annihilation, I quote:
We do not want to surrender the hope that Poland would yet come to her senses, for we were not looking for conflict but for the solution of her problem.
We could hardly imagine that an in telligent Pole would wish to expose the fate of Poland to the lightning-like and annihilating German stroke of the fist, which would then have to be expected.
....
During July and August 1939, the international tension reached a fevered pitch. Cannon and small arms were smuggled into Danzig and border incidents were manufactured by the German authorities to serve as the match to explode the powder keg. Danzig custom officials were ordered to attack Polish border officials without provocation, and when the Polish government ordered their guards to defend themselves, Weizsaecker seized upon this Polish "ultimatum" as the pretext for telling the Polish Ambassador that Poland was threatening the free city of Danzig, and that the Polish "ultimatum" would lead to consequences:
the responsibility for which would fall exclusively on the Polish government and for which the government of the Reich must disclaim all responsibility at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: At this time the Tribunal will take a 15-minute recess.
MR. CUNNING:Yes, Your Honor.
(a recess was taken)
Court No. IV, Case No. XI.
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Caming, you may proceed.
MR. CAMING:Thank you, Your Honor.
With the stage set and Nazi diplomacy finally embarking upon a policy of conquest by war, Weizsaecker on 15 August made a last effort to dissuade England and France from fulfilling their alliances. He told the French Ambassador that "Poland, as a nation which is running amuck, is sealing her own doom", and in refusing arrogantly the British Ambassador's proposal for mediation, he said, "England --should hardly be inclined or obligated to be led into disaster by her Polish friends who have gone mad". But for the first time, the glib tongues of these agents of Hitler failed to sway anyone.
All this time the German Wehrmacht had been preparing its military plans for the invasion and defeat of Poland, and by the latter part of Ausust 1939, Hitler and his war lords were ready to strike. In order to create pretexts for the German attack, Weizsaecker, with Keppler's approval, sent the defendant Veesenmayer secretly to Danzig. On 22 August 1939, Veesenmayer dispatched by cable to Weizsaecker a fivepoint plan designed to provoke war with Poland:
The plan under consideration is as follows:
1. Long negotiations with Polish Customs officials would fail.
The blame would be put on the Poles.
2. Complete removal of all Polish Customs officials and lifting of the customs border to East Prussia.
3. The Poles will take counter-measures in one way or another.
4. Then will follow the arrest of numberous Poles in the area and raiding of numerous Polish stored weapons.
The discovery of these stored weapons has been arranged for.
5. If the Poles do not answer with sufficiently strong countermeasures, the Westernplatte will be attacked.
Two days later, Veesenmayer informed Weizsaecker that he had learned that four points of this program had been approved by Hitler. As Weizsaecker put it in a telegram to the German Embassy in Rome: "The situation has become acute in the meantime. A solution cannot be delayed any longer and will be had under any circumstances. If Poland does not give in, it will be eradicated. The Western Powers are in no position to aid Poland and attack Germany or Italy if they do not wish to risk their very existence."
On 25 August 1939 Veesenmayer was inquiring from the German Foreign Office whether, "on D-Day", the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig and the President of the Polish Harbor Commission could be "evacuated" from Danzig and their houses seized. On 1 September, the German Legions marched. Weizsaecker put his finishing touches on his masterpiece by instructing German diplomatic missions to declare that this was not a war, "but merely hostilities which were started by the Poles."
The invasion of Poland was but the first step in a long series of aggressions. German foreign policy dictated that country after country whould fall under the heel of the conqueror. During 1940, the German Legions marched in Western Europe.
In May 1939, Weizsaecker himself had negotiated the non-aggression treaty between Germany and Denmark, under which it was agreed that neither country should "resort to war or to any other use of force, one against the other." In August, 1939, just before the attack on Poland, Weizsaecker reassured the Danish Minister of Germany's intention to abide by the terms of the non-aggression pact. On 2 September 1939, after the outbreak of the war with Poland, Germany solemnly assured Norway of its respect for the integrity of the government and territory of the Norwegian State.
Again on 6 October 1939, Hitler gave further assurances to Norway.
At least as early as February 1940 Weizsaecker learned of Germany's military plans for the invasion and occupation of Denmark and Norway. Early in April 1940, long discussions were held between the leading foreign office officials, including Weizsaecker, and the highest military leaders, including Field Marshal Keitel. Of course, as the date for the invasion approached, the foreign office busily denied rumors of the impending attack as "British propaganda", and even the Italians were kept completely in the dark. When the invasion of Norway and Denmark actually took place in April, 1940, Weizsaecker was prepared with the usual spurious justification for this long premeditated crime; he explained to the world that "German troops do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies" and that "German military operations aim at protecting against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by the Anglo-French forces." A few months later the defendant Ritter was given the mission of bringing about an economic union between Denmark and Germany. When the naturally reluctant Danes asked for time to consider the matter and submit a new proposal to Germany, Ritter replied that a new proposal would only be considered if it did not deviate too much from German plans. Thus did the Germans bring liberty to Scandinavia.
Thirty-one days later, on 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht struck again, this time overrunning Belguim, Holland, Luxembourg and France. Behind the usual diplomatic smoke screen of friendly assurances to Belguim, Holland and Luxembourg, military preparations for the invation and occupation of these countries had been substantially completed in October, 1939, and the Foreign Office began to assemble alleged violations of neutrality that would serve as the pretext to mask the character of this invasion.
Throughout the period from October, 1939 to the Spring of 1940, the Wehrmacht was merely awaiting the most favorable moment to launch the attack. Weizsaucker enjoyed the closest personal relations with General Halder, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, and was well informed concerning the military plans. His main task was to lull the suspicion of the Low Countries. Thus, on 15 January 1940, he was visited by the Belgian Ambassador, who expressed some concern about German plans. Weizsaecker assured the Ambassador that: "The Belgian Government was letting itself be scared by unfounded reports, and was letting itself be forced into unilateral activities. I regarded this as unwise. I couldn't see, I told him, any special reason for Belgian nervousness." When the invasion finally took place, the "justification" issued by the German Foreign Office was, even more than usually, mendacious and hypocritical in its charges of neutrality violations by the Low Countries.
In the Fall of 1940, after long consideration and after the failure of Goering's Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, Hitler decided not to risk an invasion of England and began preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union which was to transpire the following Spring. Just as these preparations were getting underway, however, Mussolini most unwisely launched his war against Greece, which began on 28 October 1940. The Italian forces met with no success, and as early as November, 1940, Hitler issued a directive that military plans for a German invasion of Greece should be prepared.
Germany's military plans in Eastern Europe of necessity involved very complicated diplomatic preparations. After the destruction of Poland, Germany and Russia enjoyed a common frontier as far south as the Carpathians, but below the Carpathians, Slovakia, Hungary and Roumania law between the bountries of Greater Germany and the Russian Ukraine and, so far as participation in the Greek campaign was concerned, the only overland route from Germany to Greece lay through Yugoslavia or through Roumania and Bulgaria.
These circumstances made more necessary than ever careful coordination of activities between the Wehrmacht and the German Foreign Office, and the activities of the defendant Ritter, the liaison officer between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht, grew correspondingly more important.
Even before the opining of Italian hostilities against Greece, German troops becan to arrive in Roumania in large numbers. As is revealed by top secret reports initialed by the defendant Ritter, Field Marshal Antonescu of Roumania had agreed to permit the concentration of German troops in order to launch a push through Bulgaria into Greece. Subsequently the agreement of King Boris of Bulgaria to the passage of German troops through that country to the Greek frontier was obtained. The importance of synchronizing diplomatic and military plans is well illustrated by a memorandum by the defendant Ritter dated 27 January 1941. Referring to Field Marshal Keitel's statement that the attack against Greece was scheduled for early April, 1941, Ritter pointed out that the following actions in the field of foreign policy would first be necessary:
1. The renewal of the Bulgarian-Turkish non-aggres sion pact, 2. The signing and publication of Bulgaria's joining the Tri-Partite Pact, 3. Yugoslavia's signing the Tri-Partite Pace and non-aggression pact.
In the meantime, the defendant Erdmansdorff had reported that Hungary would permit the transportation of German troops across that country, and would restrict private railway traffic in order to facilitate the military movements.
Before actually launching the invasion of Greece, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pace was obtained, but the very next day the Yugoslavian Ministers who had adhered to the Pact were removed from office by a coup d'etat in Belgrade. As a result, German military plans in SouthEastern Europe were enlarged to include the conquest and occupation of Yugoslavia as well as of Greece. To ease the path of conquest for the German Army by stirring up the ancient hatreds between the Serbs and Croats, the defendant Veesenmayer was dispatched to Zagreb, in Croatia, a few days before the date set for the attack. Veesenmayer reported to the German Consulate at Zagreb, and the Consul was instructed to inform the Croat leaders "that Veesenmayer enjoys the full confidence of the Reich Foreign Minister." On 5 April 1941, the day before the actual invasion, Veesenmayer telegraphed to Ribbentrop the text of a proclamation of Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. This telegram, which was distributed to the defendant Woermann, Bohle and Ritter, stated, amongst other things:
"The Croat people wish to sever their ties with Bel grade, because they have strong political, cultural, and economic ties with the German people.
"The Croat people firmly believe that they can count on the help of Germany in proclaiming their indepen dence.
The representatives of the newly-created Croat State are asking the German Government for immediate protection and help."
On the following day, the Luftwaffe mercilessly bombed Belgrade which, as the German Foreign Office knew, had been declared an open city and was undefended by anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, German troops smashed into Greece and Yugoslavia from Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania, whose participation in aggression as satellites of Germany had been secured by German diplomacy.
While the campaign in the Balkans was being planned and waged, German preparations for the major campaign in the East -- the attack against the Soviet Union -- were proceeding apace. These plans were well known to all of the Foreign Office defendants, each of whom played his part in coordinating political preparations with the military plans. Thus on 13 March 1941, Ritter reported that General Warlimont of the High Command of the Wehrmacht had pointed out that certain Russian commissions then operating in Eastern Germany must be persuaded to terminate their work quickly and be sent home. After the 29th of March, no more Russuans could be tolerated in that part of Germany, "since strong contingents of German troops were already assembling in the northern sector and troop concentrations would become even stronger after the 20th of March." Of course, the German foreign Office was also kept busy denying all rumors of friction between Germany and the Soviet Union; even Germany's ally the Japanese Government was not informed until just before the launching of the attack. On 17 May 1941, Weizsaecker told the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, that German relationsships were unchanged, although: "We observe Russia with vigilance... We do not like everything the Russians have done during the last months. I do not speak of a condition of tension, however." At the same time, representatives of the Foreign Office were participating in the formulation of plans for the administration of occupied Soviet territory.
Just as Roumania had been used as a base for the attack on Greece, so was it now used as an important jumping off place for the Soviet campaign. On 23 May 1941, the defendant Ritter told the German Embassy in Bucharest to advise the Roumanian Government "that a new German Army of six to seven divisions will be formed in Roumania under the leadership of General Ritter von Schobert, who is to be introduced to Antonescu."
This was the famous German 11th Army, later commanded by the notorious von Manstein, which conquered the North coast of the Black Sea and sped all the way to Rustov before the winter of 1941-42.
On 15 June, a week before the attack, the defendant Erdmansdorff prepared the Hungarian Government for coming events; on Ribbentrop's instructions he told the Hungarian Prime Minister:
"In view of the strong massing of Russian troops on the German East border the Fuehrer will probably be forced to clarify the German Russian relationship by the beginning of July at the latest and in this to make certain demands.
As the result of these ne gotiations cannot be foreseen the German government consider it necessary that Hungary also on its side should undertake steps for the securing of its border."
The German Foreign Office was especially well informed concerning Soviet intentions, and knew full well that nothing was further from the Russian mind than an attack against Germany. On 24 May, 1941, the German Ambassador at Moscow had reported that Soviet foreign policy "is, above all, aimed at avoiding a conflict with Germany" and that this "is proved by the attitude of the Soviet Government during the last weeks, the tone of the Soviet press...and the fulfillment of the economic treaties concluded with Germany." The defendants Weizsaecker, Woermann, and Ritter all saw this report. The Foreign Office defendants, therefore, knew to be a fact what most men believed -- that the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June "without warning of any kind, and without the shadow of legal excuse, was plain aggression."1 Six months later, Germany's ally struck against the --------------------1. Volume 1, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Page 215.
United States in the Far East. Hitler and his advisors had originally been opposed to the involvement of the United States in the war but, during 1941, that view had been revised to the extent of giving Japan every encouragement to attack England and the United States in the Far East. In April 1941, Hitler had given the Japanese full assurance of German support in such a war. In September, 1941, the defendant Weizsaecker had stimulated Japanese belligerency by" telling the Japanese Ambassador that "I could not imagine that among the Japanese people, and in Japanese politics, the militaristic instincts should not finally gain the upper hand." And in November, Weizsaecker urged the German Ambassador in Tokio to encourage the Japanese by stressing that: "American tactics are designed, as they have been in the past two years, to deceive their opponents and hide their own weaknesses." When Japan attacked the United Spates at Pearl Harbor and Manila, the German Government, in pursuance of commitments previously given to the Japanese, entered the war at once on the side of Japan by declaring war against the United States.
The important part played by the other defendants in the invasions and aggressive wars which we have just described will be outlined presently. Before summarizing the charges against the several defendants seriatim however, we will outline the war crimes and crimes against humanity charged in Counts III to VIII of the Indictment, and the general manner in which the five groups of defendants participated therein.
Count Three of the indictment. Secondly, there are crimes committed, chiefly against civilians, in the course of and as part of the German occupation of countries overrun by the Wehrmacht. These include various crimes set forth in Count Five of the indictment, the charges of plunder and spoliation in Count Six, and the charges pertaining to slave labor in Count Seven. Many of the crimes in this second category constitutes , at one and the same time, war crimes as defined in paragraph 1 b) and crimes against humanity as defined in paragraph 1 c) of Article II of Law No. 10. Thirdly, there are crimes committed against civilian population in the course of persecution on political, racial , and religious grounds. Such crimes, when committed prior to the actual initiation of Germany's invasions and aggressive wars, are set forth in Court Four of the indictment; when committed thereafter, they are charged in Count Five. The crimes described in Count Four accordingly, are charged only as crimes againsthumanity; those charged in Count Five, for the most part, constitute at one and the same time war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Of course, these categories should not be regarded as watertight compartments. Political, racial, and religious persecution manifested itself abundantly in the German administration of the slave labor program and in the selection of property for spoliation in occupied countries, and Jews who were taken prisoner, particularly on the eastern front, fared far worse than other prisoners of war. We will sketch in very broad outline the types of crime charged in the indictment which fall into each category, before developing the criminal responsibility of the individual defendants under the entire indictment.
The crimes charged in Count Three involve eight of the defendants, and all the charges relate to the concept of the prisoner of war. For centuries, ithas been part of the laws of war that a defenseless enemy who surrenders himself to the mercy of the victor shall not be killed or wounded, but shall be taken as a prisoner. This principle is embodied in Article 23 of the Hague Conventions. Equally revered is the rule that
MR. CAMING:With Your Honor's permission Mr. Lyon of the prosecution will proceed with the reading of the Opening Statement.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Lyon BY MR. LYON:
Counts Three to Eight of the indictment charge the defendants with criminal responsibility for the Commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in paragraphs 1 b) and 1 c) Article II of Control Council Law No. 10. In Counts Three to Seven, the defendants are charged with participating in such crimes as principals, accessories, or in some other capacity specified in paragraph 2 of Article II of Law No. 10. Count Eight charges fourteen of the defendants with responsibility for such crimes on the ground that they knew of or participated in their commission as members of groups, organizations, such as the SS, which were declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.
Despite the staggering volume and horrible variety of crimes charged in these Counts, we believe that the evidence will abundantly demonstrate the essential unity of the entire criminal program and enterprise which the indictment covers. The history of the Third Reich is a history of crime from its very inception. Consolidation of the dictatorship and preparation for aggressive war were accompanied by and accomplished by crimes. The outbreak of war and the spread of the conflagration served to intensify the criminality of the Third Reich's policies and practices. As the IMT put it:1 .....in this conception of "total war", the moral ideas under lying the conventions which seek to make war more humane are no longer regarded as having force or validity.
Everything is made subordinate to the overmastering dictates of war.
Rules, regula tions, assurances, and treaties all alike are of no moment; .....The war crimes and crimes against humanity charged in the indictment fall into three broad categories.
Firstly, there are war crimes committed in the actual course of hostilities or against members of the armed forces of countries at war with Germany. These are set forth in ------------------1. Vol I, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 227.
prisoners shall be humanely treated, embodied in Articles 4 to 20 of the Hague regulations and in the Geneva Convention of 1929.
The principal examples of criminal refusal to take prisoners are set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 28 of the indictment. The Prosecution will be the first to urge the laws which require the taking of prisoners should be not be arbitrarily applied without due regard to the circumstances. In the heat of battle, and where the safeguarding of prisoners presents a threat to the security of the capturing forces, an unrealisticly severe standard of adherence must not be required. But the charges here are based upon general orders, deliberately drafted and widely circulated, to achieve the criminal purpose of killing defenseless troops under circumstances where, beyond any argument, the laws of war required that they be accorded the status of prisoners.
No defense, and no mitigating circumstances, can be adduced in connection with the proclamation encouraging the German civilian population to lynch Allied aviators who had been forced by military action to land in Germany, nor can any conceivable circumstances justify the infamous order of 18 October 1942 that all Allied Commandos, even if in full uniform and unarmed, should be "slaughtered to the last man" or murdered after a brief interrogation. In the case of the fliers, we will find the responsibility shared by defendants from the Foreign Office, the Reich Chancellery, the Ministry of Propaganda, and the SS. Execution of the "Commando order" was customarily accomplished by Wehrmacht troops or SS men, but here, too, we will find several of the Foreign Office defendants "covering up" these murders and concealing then from inquiries made by Switzerland, as the protective power.
Many prisoners of war taken by the German armed forces would have been just as well off, or perhaps even more fortunate, had they met the fate of the Commandos and been executed forthwith. The inhumanities to which prisoners of war in German hands were subjected often went far beyond the discomforts which any prisoner of war must expect in the hands of a country straining under the burden of violent and long-continued warfare.