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Transcript for NMT 11: Ministries Case

NMT 11  

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Defendants

Gottlob Berger, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, Richard Walther Darre, Otto Dietrich, Otto Erdmannsdorff, von, Hans Kehrl, Wilhelm Keppler, Paul Koerner, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Paul Pleiger, Emil Puhl, Karl Rasche, Karl Ritter, Walter Schellenberg, Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, Wilhelm Stuckart, Edmund Veesenmayer, Ernst Weizsaecker, von, Ernst Woermann

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A.- Yes, but only by means of taking these Fuehrer decisions as handed to me by Bormann, and if at all possible and without deviating too strongly from their contents, before passing them on to the departmentally responsible ministers and other agencies, recasting them, so to speak, in such a form and giving them a new shape so that, as far as the receiving agencies were concerned, they were at least acceptable. And the agencies receiving these decisions had certain means of deviating from their contents. Very often, as far as I was concerned, as well as my officials who were handling these matters in the Reich Chancellery, this was not quite an easy job. It will be possible, I trust, to refer to some few specific cases subsequently when we enter into details and go into a discussion of the individual documents.

Q.- Witness, you testified that as a result of the development of the Party Chancellery, your position as Chief of the Reich Chancellery came to be more and more urdermined. Did you accept all this without raising any objections ?

A.- No. I very frequently complained to the Fuehrer on that subject, but, in the final run, my complaints were futile. It is true that he always assured me that he would adhere to regular procedure, but in practice, unfortunately, in most instances, he deviated from it, because I had the impression that he obviously preferred the channel via the Party, after all, rather than using the official governmental channels, because the Party channel was more convenient to him and more suitable and easier for him to take, and there weren't so many objections interposed in his road if he chose that Party Channel.

Q.- You said, just a little while ago, that starting in 1937, and from that time onwards, no meetings of the Reich Cabinet took place. You also said that the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor completely eliminated the Reich Government as legislative body. I would now like to ask you, did the Fuehrer choose to receive other bodies of men in order to inform them?

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A.- Yes, he did. At the top level, the Fuehrer always gave preference to the Party rather than to the State. Even in the most important official governmental matters, the Reich Cabinet was no longer given any tearing, it wasn't even any longer informed, despite the fact that, on very frequent occasions the Fuehrer had conferences with the Reichsleiters and the Gauleiters, in the course of which he informed them concerning the political situation, and sometimes also concerning the military situation. He developed his plans and projects to them, and he issued his orders and directives to them, and probably, in part, what he would also do would be to listen to the opinions expressed by the various Gauleiter.

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QDid you, yourself ever attend any such conferences of the Gauleiters?

ANo. The Reich Ministers did not attend any such conferences unless, at the same time, they combined their function with that of Reichsleiter or Gauleiters. Take, for example, Goebbels and Frick. I was not one of those holding that combined function. Therefore I had no right to attend and I actually never attended.

QWhat was the repercussion of this penetration of the entire governmental activity on the part of the Party and what were the practical results on your own position, as well as on the position of the departmental Ministers?

AThese Gauleiter conferences -- that is the name that they were given -- undermined the authority of the so-called Reich Cabinet entirely, because these Gauleiters, as a rule, were also Reich governors or provincial governors, Reich Defense Commissars, and so on, and were thus subordinated to the Reich Government; still, now they were better informed than the actual Reich Ministers and they received direct instructions from the Fuehrer himself, so they just simply referred to these Fuehrer directives in contact with the Reich Ministers and the Reich Ministers, on their part, did not even know or did not have any means of reliably ascertaining, what the Fuehrer had actually given orders to be done. This was a certain type of disorganization of the governmental and administrative apparatus which involved the entire government apparatus and resulted from the interpolation of the Party into the business of the State, and the Party activity deployed obstructed the development of governmental activity; naturally, as a result, my position as Chief of the Reich Chancellery suffered very considerably, because I was constantly driven to find out first what the Fuehrer had actually ordered and what he hadn't ordered.

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QIn the organization of the agencies, the Party Chancellery was not super-imposed above the Reich Chancellery but they were on an equal level. Now what was the effect in actual practice?

AThe orders which the Fuehrer assigned to me were pursuant to a specific directive of the Fuehrer prior to their enforcement and, as a matter of principle, had to be coordinated and correlated with the Party. In connection with matters that I had to deal with, I, in most cases, was tied down to the approval of the Party. The Chief of the Party Chancellery, on the other hand, it is true, outwardly was an agency of coordination but do facto, gradually he developed to a certain kind of superior. In any case, the Party Chancellery had predominant weight with the Fuehrer as compared with me, as Chief of the Reich Chancellery, merely as a result of the daily access that Bormann enjoyed with the Fuehrer, whereas I had access only at considerable intervals of time; and, above all, the Chief of the Party Chancellery had a much larger right of participating in all governmental affairs than I had. After all, in connection with all legislation, and with the issuance of any type of decrees, it was necessary to call in and to hear the Party first; whenever an instrument of legislation was proposed, it had to be said in it "The Party has agreed". Therefore, the Party Chancellery had great factual import on the entire apparatus of legislation. On the other hand, I, in the very best case, had only formalistic influence. Therefore, to such an extent there was a certain preponderant weight enjoyed by the Party Chancellery over the Reich Chancellery, which resulted clearly from the respective duties of the two Chancelleries.

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QWitness, this morning you said that the Reich Chancellery was a very small agency employing very few officials only. Now what about the Party Chancellery in this respect? Was that a very small agency too, or was it a very big apparatus?

AThe Party Chancellery was a gigantic apparatus. You can't possibly compare it with the Reich Chancellery. I was never myself in the Party Chancellery but still I know that they employed many hundreds of employees and they had subsidiary offices. After all, they were located in Munich but they had a subsidiary office in Berlin, and apart from that there was also the Chancellery of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP, located in Berlin in the building of the Reich Chancellery, whereas the number of officials that I employed was a little more than a hundred; in comparison with that, the Chancellery of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP, as far as I know, employed 500 to 600 people, and apart from that, outside of the Reich Chancellery building, they also had a number of branch offices.

QYou already testified that Reichsleiter Bormann was Secretary of the Fuehrer. Now what did that appointment of Bormann involve, inasmuch as your own position was concerned?

AThis appointment had the following repercussion: The small remnant of matters over which the Party Chancellery did not yet have influence, and in connection with which I had the right of unilateral action, now was lost to me too, in the end, because the institution of the position of secretary of the Fuehrer entailed, as a result, that Bormann's activity, which up to that time had actually been restricted to the Party sphere, as well as to the sphere of calling in the Party in governmental business - this activity of Bormann, as I said, now came to be extended in a very general manner to include the State sector of government.

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He now had the possibility of transmitting Fuehrer directives to all the Ministers, including myself, and I received the directive that all matters on which I was not able to report, I had to submit to the Fuehrer via Bormann. Finally, what happened was that my own reports had to be submitted in advance to the Secretary of the Fuehrer, he knowing exactly what I was going to report on because I had tendered a sheet showing the various items which were going to be reported; and finally what he did was to claim that he had the right to hand my reports to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer approved of that request. And whenever he had any interests involved, in most instances he was present when I reported to the Fuehrer, with the result that in those instances it was hard for me ever to speak an open and frank word, particularly as far as the Party was concerned.

QWas it necessary for Bormann to avail himself of your intermediary, so that orders and directives of the Fuehrer, which he had solicited from the Fuehrer, be transmitted to the Supreme Reich Agencies?

AAs far as I, particularly, am concerned, Bormann held the position of Secretary of the Fuehrer, and, as I said before, as a result he was able to transmit Fuehrer directives to all highest executive agencies with particular reference to the most important matters, and he was able to do this by simply deviating from my intermediary; he availed himself of this possibility very extensively, and particularly when the most important matters were involved; in the normal course of Business, such matters which he didn't like, or which were irksome to him, those were the matters which he would transmit to me.

QDuring the; war, wasn't Bormann also appointed to the function of Reich Minister?

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AYes, correct. In 1944 he was appointed Reich Minister but he made no use of that capacity and he did not carry this title.

QI will now pass over to your position, in connection with military matters. What do you have to say in regard to the participating part that you played in military measures? Particularly, what can you tell us as to whether you took any part in military discussions, or conferences with the Fuehrer, or with other executives?

AAs far as military consultations and conferences are concerned, which the Fuehrer hold in his capacity as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, in conjunction with the Reich Minister of War and, later on, with the Chief of the OKW, with the Supreme Commanders of the individual sector branches of the Wehrmacht, which included the Reich Marshal, too, with the Chiefs of the General Staffs, with other generals, and so on, - as far as all these conferences are concerned, I never took part in them.

QIt is a fact that from 1935 onwards, rearmament took place in Germany. Did you know of this rearmament?

AI never attended conferences concerning rearmament, either. The fact that rearmament was going on was known to me, as it was known to every other German. We saw that, in view of the troops and officers that were on the streets, shipments of troops, casernes, barracks, airplanes, and, obviously, military planes. That we could see. I did not know anything about it beyond that. As far as the dimensions and scale of rearmament were concerned, I was not able to procure any information. I did not solicit any such information, either. First of all, it was not any business of mine; secondly, as far as military agencies were concerned, I did not want to expose myself to the answer - "That is a top secret matter.

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I am not permitted to divulge it to you". The extent to which rearmament was going on could be seen from the overall picture in Germany, even if you were just a normal German, and whatever was kept secret in the way of rearmament, was kept so secret that I would never have come to hear of it.

QDid the Fuehrer inform you concerning military questions prior to the war and during the war?

ANo. Particularly prior to the war, in the period of time which comes into consideration, the Fuehrer never used anything but general terms of speech, approximately along the lines that in view of the geographical position of the Reich, and in view of the fluctuating foreign political situation, it was necessary for the German Reich to have a strong Wehrmacht, an armed state was a better guarantee for the maintenance of peace than a weak state. Occasionally, now and then, he may also have said that there was a possibility of Germany one day once again having to fight for its very existence. But I never, at any time, was able to gather from such terms of speech, that this involved rearmament carried on with the objective of waging aggressive war.

QDid the Fuehrer ever say anything to you, or did any other high ranking executive ever tell you of any plans concerning a war of aggression?

ANo, neither the Fuehrer nor any other persons ever said anything to me of that before the war.

QHerr Dr. Lammers, the IMT, in giving its opinion for its judgment pertaining to Counts 1 and 2, particularly referred to four secret conferences which Hitler conducted. I would like to hear from you whether you took part in these conferences, and I would like to ask you the following.

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First of all let us refer to the Fuehrer Conference which took place on 5 November 1937. Did you take part in it?

ANo.

QDid you take part in the conference which took place on 23 May 1939?

ANo.

QDid you take part in the conference that took place on 22 August 1939, on the Obersalzberg?

ANo.

QDid you take part in the conference which took place on 23 November 1939?

ANo.

QI now ask you further: Up to the time of the collapse of the German Reich, did you receive any memorandum concerning those conferences, or did you gain any insight into any one of the respective transcripts?

ANo.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Dr. Seidl, this is our usual time for recess. If convenient, we will take a recess of 15 minutes.

(A recess was taken.)

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THE MARSHALL: Military Tribunal IV is again in session. PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE: Do you have something, Doctor? DR. VON STEIN: I respectfully ask to have my client Darre excused for the preparation of his defense and because of his bad state of health -- his heart is in a very bad state -- for the rest of this week.

That is Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:It will be granted on condition that you have someone here to protect his interests in the meantime.

DR. VON STEIN:Thank you.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:You may proceed Dr. Seidl. BY DR. SEIDL:

QWitness, I am now passing to some matters concerning foreign policy. Were you called in to take part in the firecting of foreign policy?

AIn questions of foreign policy which the Fuehrer first arranged with Reichsminister Fuehrer von Neurath and later, with his successor Ribbentrop I was never called in.

In discussions con cerning foreign policy I was consulted neither by the Fuehrer nor by the two aforementioned foreign ministers . As long as von Nuerath was Foreign Minister he would, occasionally inform me, but only very superficially, about certain basic trends in foreign policy.

At this time too matters of lesser importance would pass from the Foreign Office to the Fuehrer through my hands and conversely back via myself to the Foreign Office. However from the moment when Ribbentrop became Foreign Minister, which is at the beginning of February 1938, my official contact with the Foreign Office was mostly restricted to purely subordinate matters, Especially such concern ing the promotion and pay of officials, and matters where the Foreign Office, in view of the ligislation, was participating in some way because some question of foreign policy might possibly have been touched upon.

The Reich cabinet, at least from 1937 on, when cabinet meetings stopped, no longer dealt with foreign policy, which shows that through these channels too I couldn't have come to hear anything about foreign policy.

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QWitness, we will come to details when we come to the documents which the prosecution has submitted under Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment. Here I would only like to ask you some basic questions. Were you concerned in preparing the events which led to the Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland , further to the entering into Czechoslovakia and finally to war?

AThese significant events which preceded the outbreak of war -that is the march into Austria and the Sudetengau, the occupation of Czechoslovakia -- I didn't play even the smallest part. I heard of the measures only when they were in the process of being taken or had already been taken. Only after accomplished facts lay before me did I have to participate in organizations concerned with constitutional and asministrative law which necessarily had to follow upon the accomplished facts.

QAs head of the Reich Chancellery, did you have any competency at all or responsibility in matters of foreign policy?

ANo, certainly not. That did not fall within my powers or competency and responsibility. To interfere in such matters, sespecially those you mentioned -- Austria, the Sudentengau, and so on -after I had heard of the accomplished facts, would have meant to attack from the rear successful events or at least events which seemed successful at the time. Any intervention on my part would have been quite useless accompanied by unforeseeable consequences for me personally. Anyway, I had no competency whatsoever and I never interfered in matters which were not within my competency.

QBut I have to put it to you here that you were a member of the secret cabinet council. This secret council was founded for the very purpose of advising the Fuehrer in foreign affairs. How about that?

AThe secret cabinet council is monething utterly insignificant. It is correct that it was founded by decree of 4 February 1938. It is also correct that I was a member of this cabinet council.

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It consisted of the president, von Neurath, and Goering, Hess, Bormann, Ribbentrop and Leitel, who were also members, and I was member in charge of the minutes. The functions of the secret cabinet council were supposed to be to advise the Fuehrer in foreign affairs. But the secret cabinet council could only be summoned by the Fuehrer himself. It had no right to call a meeting itself. The Fuehrer never summoned it, and this secret cabinet council never met. From the very beginning I had the impression, although at that time it was rather in the nature of an assumption, but it turned out to be right, that the secret cabinet council was founded just at the time when the Foreign Minister von Neurath left only in order to give the leaving Foreign Minister the honorary position of the president of the secret cabinet council and to make it look and perhaps especially for the benefit of foreign countries, as though no difference of opinion of an important nature existed between the Fuehrer and Foreign Minister von Neurath. In fact, however, the secret cabinet council never functioned at all.

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Q.Witness, you testified that this secret cabinet council never met. Wasn't there at least a constituant meeting?

A.Not even that because only the Fuehrer could have summoned it for that and he never did. And the president of the secret cabinet council, Herr von Neurath, too, never applied for a constituant meeting to be held or didn't even express a wish to that effect. The same applies to all members of the secret cabinet counsel. Probably, if Herr von Neurath had asked for the application it would have been refused, and if the secret cabinet council really had met then in my opinion there would have been grave conflicts between Herr von Ribbentrop and Herr von Neurath.

Q.Did the secret cabinet council then perhaps not function through written channels as the Reich Cabinet did after 1937?

A.No, not even that, because as secretarial member of the secret cabinet counsel I would have been bound to know it. In this capacity I never wrote a single stroke of the pen.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Doctor, it seems that we have exhausted this thing. The child was never born and never took any nourishment. Isn't that enough? Let's go on to another subject.

DR. SEIDL:I didn't have any more questions on this subject. I would just like to refer the Tribunal to two documents that we submitted concerning this subject. They are in Lammers Book 1. The first is the testimony of Goering, Document NOKW 311, which we have submitted as Lammers Exhibit 2. The second document is Lammers Document Number 40. This is an excerpt from the interrogation of Herr von Neurath -- that is the president of the secret cabinet council. We have offered it as Exhibit 7. BY DR. SEIDL:

Q.Witness, you testified that in military matters, matters concerning armaments and foreign affairs, you never played any part and that you didn't get any information on the subject exceeding the information of any ordinary citizen.

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But still you were Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery which was a supreme Reich agency. How can you explain to a foreigner who doesn't know the conditions of the Third Reich this really astounding fact.

A.In all such matters the strictest secrecy was preserved everywhere -- all matters concerning armaments, all important matters concerning foreign affairs were subject to a specially rigid secrecy and the Fuehrer's well known three commandments applied to them which were put up in every office. I can't give you the literal text but what they amounted to was -- first, don't tell anybody anything that he doesn't have to know; second, don't tell anybody more than he absolutely has to know; third, if somebody had to know something, don't tell it to him any sooner than is absolutely essential. These principles of the Fuehrer, which were his supreme commandments, were used constantly by him and especially towards me. But he also enforced these commandments upon all his associates -- especially his associates in confidential matters. That is why in these matters you mentioned and in many others I was never informed until such a time when my cooperation was needed. And then I was faced with accomplished facts or with facts about to be accomplished which could no longer be halted. The cabinet as such fared no differently, and so the majority of Reich ministers who were no initiated fared the same way. The famous Mossback Protocol is a typical example. That refers to the discussion mentioned by counsel which took place on 8 November 1937.

Q.May I correct you, Dr. Lammers. This conference, as far as I remember, was not on 8 November 1937 but on 5 November.

A.Oh, 5 November, yes. You are quite right. On 5 November 1937. And the protocol is named after the Fuehrer's chief military adjutant who write it down. At the beginning the Fuehrer expressly stated that the subject of this important conference was of such importance that in other countries it would have to be discussed at a cabinet meeting, but here the Fuehrer would have to dispense with that in view of the importance of the subject.

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He wouldn't have it discussed in the big circle of the cabinet. So, if the Fuehrer himself says that he didn't want to inform even the Reich cabinet of such matters and imposed strictest secrecy upon people attending this conference, then you can hardly be surprised that I didn't hear anything about it either.

MR. LEWIS:May it please the Court, the witness has testified to no attendance and no recollection of a memorandum on the Mossbach conference. The prosecution would like to know if then witness has now been reading from a document that is not in evidence. It seems to us he has been citing from the minutes of the Mossbach conference which has not been a document introduced in evidence against him.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Well, suppose he has. What is the difference?

MR. LEWIS:We would like to know if that is his recollection or he is talking from those minutes sir?

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Oh well, the Hossbach document has been referred to a number of times in this case. I don't recollect now whether it is in evidence or not. But if he has since seen it hear certainly can refer to it and make such comment with respect to his knowledge of it as he sees fit. I think the witness is within his rights in that respect. Whether it's offered against him or not the question is, did he have knowledge about plans or aggressive war. One of the matters of general knowledge and certainly referred to in the IMT judgement is this Hossbach conference and the fact that Hitler made some comment about in that document that he would not take it up at a cabinet meeting because of its importance is certainly some evidence at least to be reasonably inferred that he didn't discuss with the ministers.

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MR. LEWIS:That is right sir, but I just wanted to know if he was reading word for word what that minutes had for the purposes of the coming cross-examination.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Well, you undoubtedly have in your files the whole report and if it be any aid to you we will make the question. (To witness) Do you have a copy of the notes of that before you, witness?

A.No, I know this quotation from the IMT judgment. The printed edition of the IMT judgement contains it. That is where I heard of it for the first time or perhaps before through a newspaper.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:All right. You will now proceed, Doctor.

DR. SEIDL:Perhaps I might just say that we did not submit this document because it is expressly quoted in the IMT judgement and vie didn't think it necessary.

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE: All right. Let's go ahead. BY DR. SEIDL:

Q.Witness, we now come to your position with regard to the various ministries, the other supreme Reich agencies, and authorities which were directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. I don't want to list all these departments individually but just give the Tribunal an overall picture. So, what was your basic position with regard to the Reich departments?

A.The overall picture is always the same. As head of the Reich Chancellery I was only an intermediate station in communications with all these agencies and departments, unless the Fuehrer, for some reason, expressly took this intermediate position away from me. This type of position exists in more or less every state and in Germany it was the Reich Chancellery.

Q.Could you interfere in the various ministries and other agencies on your own authority?

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A.No, I couldn't. I only had formal influence, especially in matters of organization. But I had no factual influence. I have repeatedly said that the factual responsibility and influence lay with the Reich departments where I was not even allowed to interfere.

Q.Where was the preliminary work and the drafts for all the measures made and planned which the Fuehrer had to issue and sign.

A.It was a surpreme law for the method of work for the Reich Chancellery and all my associates, which as witnesses they will confirm, that the preliminary work of all drafts in principle for all measures to be taken by the Fuehrer, not only legislative measures, was to be done in and by the ministries. The Reich Chancellory wouldn't have been able to master all that work, and for the ministries --

PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Witness, just answer the question. The question is, where the work was done. If it was not done in the Chancellery and was done by the ministries just tell us that. That is sufficient. We don't have to have all this detail.

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A. (Cont'd) As a matter of principle it was done in the ministries. That was a matter of course for them and it was a law for me. Whatever came in was sent to the department to work out the draft for the Fuehrer. All I had to do was edit it. That was done under me and the formalities, although I admit that there were occasional exceptions. Here and there I did have a Fuehrer decree drafted in the Reich Chancellery when there was no time to send it to the ministry concerned, but usually only in cases whore there was no ministry to deal with such a matter.

Q. (By Dr. Seidl) But the documents show that you passed on Fuehrer instructions to the Reich ministries. How was that done?

A.That was my work. I would formulate the instructions. That was also my duty. As a rule I did it in the manner the Fuehrer wished. I have already said that when I got such orders via Bormann I frequently dressed them up a little and for the rest I did not pass on any instructions of my own to the ministries, and where it was a matter of organization the documents show that there again I did not give instructions because I was not allowed to do that, but expressly restricted myself to requests and suggestions.

Q.Under the circumstances you describe, did you have a survey of the overall situation in the state?

A.That was impossible, but in my position as head of the Reich Chancellery I had to put up with that.

Q.In a number of decrees it was expressly laid down that certain matters were to pass through you as chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Fuehrer. What can you say about that?

A.That's correct, but that was in accordance with my duties, and does not permit of any further interpretation. I always attached importance or all occasions to have such regulations included in definite decrees or ordinances although it was really a matter of course, but I attached importance to it, always again and again pointing out that this proper channel should be used, more especially in order to avoid the channel through the Party Chancellery.

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Q. In some regulations over and beyond that it is ordered that the Reich Ministers and other heads of departments should, in the case of certain measures, contact the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

Does this not contradict what you have been saying?

A. I don't think it does. I have already said that my interpolation took place for two reasons; the first, so that I on the one hand could see to it that the other ministers concerned should be heard which often had no happened in the past, again a purely formal task.

And in the second place, in order to make it possible for the Fuehrer to exercise control and intervention where necessary.

That is why it was necessary for me, before giving my approval, first to make sure of the Fuehrer's approval or to make sure that it was such an unimportant matter that it didn't matter at all whether such agreement was reached because it was obvious that the Fuehrer would not have the slightest interest in the matter.

Q. It rather strikes me that in some cases agreement with the Reich Minister and head of the Reich Chancellery and of the Party Chancellerywas proscribed, while in other cases either the one or the other was demanded.

How did this differentiation arise?

A. It is correct that these variations occurred. As I said the intervention of my approval was also necessary as a certain brake against arbitrary acts on the part of certain ministers who now and again were rather fond of riding roughshod over their colleagues and bypassing them altogether and who would even try to face the Fuehrer with accomplished facts.

That is why my approval was frequently put in, and incidentally I attached importance to being called in everywhere where the head of the Party Chancellery was already in the picture in order to form a counter-weight to him.

If the approval of the head of the Party Chancellery was not provided for, then I still attached importance to my approval expressly being put in because the head of the Party Chancellery could influence matters even if my approval was not provided for, because the Party had such outstanding influence, but I did not have the right to interfere unless it was expressly provided for.

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That is why I always attached a certain amount of importance to having my name put in whether the head of the Party Chancellery was in it or not so as to point out the proper channels, and if both out approval was in it, then I again was to some extent the counterpart to Bormann. He represented Party interests and I represented the interests of the Reich.

Q.Witness, I now come to another subject. That is the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. Were you a member of this Council?

A.I was. I was the secretarial member of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense.

Q.When was this Ministerial Council for Reich Defense founded and who were the members? What were its tasks?

A.It was founded on the 30th of August, 1939, shortly before the outbreak of war. The members were Goering as chairman, the Fuehrer's deputy Hess and Bormann later replaced him, the Plenipotentiary General for Administration, Minister of the Interior Frick, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy, that was Minister of Economy Funk, the Chief of the OKW, and I, as secretarial member.

Q.What were the functions of this Ministerial Council for Reich Defense?

A.According to the decree the only function of this Council was to establish legal norms, that is, to issue legal ordinances with the force of law. The Fuehrer thought that in setting up this Ministerial Council which was a small body, the chairmanship of which was independent of the presence of the Fuehrer, he thought that this body would quickly and effectively settle all legislative questions made necessary by the war.

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