After the Franco-Prussian war, Krupp became a large supplier of railroad equipment and other items used to build the railroad nets in the United States.
In 1837, the Krupp inheritance passed to Friedrich-Alfried Krupp. The rapid development and expansion of the enterprises continued. New factories were built, and new resources of coal and iron were purchased in Lorraine and in Germany proper. Krupp's principal German competitor in the field of armour plate -- the Gruson works -- was bought out and absorbed, and with the acquisition of the Germania shipyards at Kiel, Krupp entered the shipbuilding business on a large scale.
Although these were years of peace, Krupp continued to devote great emphasis to the armament business. Questions of design and scientific research were given great attention and fostered by capital investment. Krupp's own firing ranges for the testing of its guns and projectiles were greatly expanded. And, through the Germania shipyards, Krupp became a vital figure in the German government's policy of naval expansion, which came into full flower after the dismissal of Bismarck by Wilhelm II shortly before the turn of the century.
With the death of Friedrich-Alfried Krupp, the last of the male line, in 1902, the proprietary management of the firm passed to his widow, and the heiress was his sixteen-year-old daughter, Bertha Krupp. Pursuant to Friedrich Alfried's will, the Krupp firm at this time was reorganized into a private limited liability company, Fried. Krupp A.G., with a stock capitalization of 160,000 shares valued at 1,000 marks each. All but four of the shares were held by Bertha Krupp, and the remaining four, distributed only in order to comply with legal requirements, were kept under careful control. In 1906, Bertha, Krupp married Dr. Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach; the Emperor Wilhelm II conferred upon the bridegroom the right to use the name "Krupp".
Expansion of the Krupp enterprises continued right up to the outbreak of the First World War.
Immediately after Friedrich Alfried Krupp's death, his widow built a huge new steel plant at Rheinhausen, on the left bank of the Rhine about twenty miles from Essen. The Krupp ceased to be purely a specialist in the manufacture of arms and special steel products and took its place in the front rank of the great German steel producers. The Germania shipyards hummed with activity as Krupp built a large part of the German high seas fleet. In 1906, Krupp built the first German submarine.
During the First World War, the Krupp firm, needless to say, was Germany's principal arsenal. It was no accident that, in 1916, when General Ludendorf asked two outstanding leaders of German industry to "join his train" to discuss war production, the two men invited were Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and Carl Duisberg of I.G. Farben. Guns, shells, and armour plate poured out of the Krupp factories. Warships and submarines were built, armed, and fitted at the Germania shipyards. Together with the other leading steel plants, Krupp supplied the finished and semi-finished steel for building, transport, and a variety of other industrial uses. The laboratory of war was an enormous stimulus to design and research. As a Krupp document tells us:
"The Armistice of 1918 found the Krupp artillery designing bureaus and the armament work shops at the peak of their efficiency and in full activity."
"As late as 8 November 1918, governmental orders had been placed and instructions had been given for the shipment of artillery equipment to the front.
In addition, numerous newly developed guns were being designed and in the course of being manufactured."
The Versailles Treaty The armistice which ended the First World War did not, surprisingly enough, end Krupp's armament activities completely.
Krupp continued to repair and recondition certain guns, and to complete the manufacture of new guns which were almost ready at the end of the war.
Krupp records show chat between the Armistice and July 1919, 238 guns were repaired, and 315 new guns were manufactured. Even after July 1919, the Krupp firm continued to work on one or two types of new guns until the arrival of the Interallied Control Commission at the Krupp plants in 1920.
In fact, Germany's defeat in the First World War, in and of itself, would probably not have radically affected Krupp's armament activities. But the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were quite another matter. These provisions confronted the Krupp managers with a major question of policy: whether to convert the Krupp enterprises into a steel combine, similar to those in Germany and other countries, with its principal foundation in a peacetime economy, or whether to make special efforts to preserve Krupp's preeminent position in the armament field.
The Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919. The provisions which were of special concern to Krupp, and are of special interest in this case, are those embodied in Part V entitled "Military, Naval, and Air Clauses". By Article 160 of the Treaty, the German army was limited to ten divisions consisting of not more than 100,000 men -- the so-called "100,000 men Reichswehr". Under the express language of Article 160, the exclusive purpose of the authorized German army was "the maintainence of order within the territory and the control of the frontiers." But the provision of most fundamental importance to Krupp was Article 168 relating to the manufacture of arms, which started in part:
"The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material, shall only be carried out in factories or works the location of which shall be communicated to and approved by the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which they retain the right to restrict."
"Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions, or any war material whatsoever shall be closed down."
Later provisions of the Treaty are also of great importance. Article 170 prohibited the importation of arms and munitions into Germany, and at the same time forbade the manufacture of arms within Germany for export to foreign countries. Article 171 flatly prohibited the manufacture in Germany of tanks, armoured cars, and "all similar constructions suitable for use in war." Article 181 stringently limited the size of the German navy, and Article 190 specified the rate at which the authorized naval units could be replaced. Article 191 forbade Germany to construct or acquire any submarines whatsoever, even for commercial purposes.
The above and other comparable provisions of the Versailles Treaty were to be enforced by Allied Control Commissions.
Article 208 of the Treaty set forth that:
"The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control will represent the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the military clauses."
"In particular it will be its duty to receive from the German Government the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified, works, fortresses and forts which Germany is allowed to retain, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations."
"The Commission will take delivery of the arms, munitions and war material, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected, and will supervise the works of destruction, demolition, and of rendering things useless, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty."
"The German Government must furnish to the Military Inter Allied Commission of Control all such information and docu ments as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the military clauses, and in particular all legis lative and administrative documents and regulations."
Under Article 168 of the Treaty, the allied nations subsequently determined that Krupp should be the firm licensed for the production at Essen of guns with a caliber greater than 17 centimeters. No other type of armament manufacture was permitted to Krupp. Smaller guns were to be manufactured by the Rheinmetall plants at Duesseldorf; ammunition, and other weapons and war material, were licensed to still other firms. The lists so prescribed by the allies were accepted by the German government by its announcement of 15 July, 1921. In the meantime, the Military Inter-Allied Control Commission, headed by the French General Nollet, established itself in Berlin, and, on 29 May, 1920, representatives of the Commission, headed by the English Colonel Leverett, arrived at Essen, at the Krupp plant.
The establishment of the Control Commission and the arrival at the Krupp Essen plants of Colonel Leverett's group signalized the opening of a long and bitter struggle between the Control Commission on the one hand, and Krupp, secretly supported and encouraged by the German Government, on the other hand. And it is in this setting that the chain of circumstances and course of conduct charged as criminal in Count One really begins.
We have mentioned that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the implementation of these provisions through the InterAllied Commission of Control presented the Krupp managers with a very fundamental problem of policy relating to the future of the Krupp firm. None of the defendants in this case participated in the solution of this problem; ultimate authority to settle that question resided in Bertha Krupp and her husband, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, who actually exercised the proprietary management. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen still survives, but is mentally and physically incapacitated. Three of the defendants in this case were associated with the Krupp firm at the time in question. The defendant Pfirsch was first employed by Krupp in 1902, and the defendants Janssen and Eberhardt joined just after the First World War, in 1918 and 1919, respectively. None of these three defendants occupied a sufficiently important position to justify charging him with responsibility for decisions taken before 1920, but all three of them, and others among the defendants, participated actively in events which flowed from and were a consequence of this early decision and which took place some time before the advent of Hitler's dictatorship.
In approaching this matter, we may well bear in mind that the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, whether wise or unwise, were legally binding within Germany. This was so not only as a matter of international law, but as a matter of German domestic law. A memorandum written in January 1927 by the Legal Division of the German Defense Ministry stated: I quote:
Furthermore, the Peace Treaty of Versailles is also a law of the Reich, and by reason of this it is binding on all members of the Reich at home.
This commitment ranks even superior to the provisions of the constitution of the German Reich since Article 178, paragraph 2, second sentence of this Constitution, provides that:
"The provisions of the Peace Treaty signed on 28 June 1919 in Versailles remain unaffected by the Constitution."
The members of the Reich government who participate in the preparations for mobilization of a Wehrmacht exceeding that sanctioned by the Treaty would make themselves guilty of an intra-state violation of the Peace Treaty promulgated as a Reich law, and, as a result of this, they could be indicted before the State judicial Court for culpable violation of their official duties under Article 59 of the Constitution at the behest of the Reichstag."
The same conclusion was reached in a memorandum written a few weeks later within the Armaments Office of the Reich War Ministry. This memorandum stated that "The Treaty of Versailles has been made valid as a law in Germany". These conclusions were reinforced when the German Reichstag enacted the "Law on Implements of War" on 27 July 1927.
The question which confronted the Krupp management as a result of the Versailles Treaty is vary well summarized in the report of the Direktorium of Krupp covering the year 1937-38; that is, the year in which the defendant Looser jointed the Krupp firm as a member of the Direktorium. The report in question states: I quote:
"With the and of the business year 1937/38, twenty years have passed since the World War.
Its unfortunate ending had fateful effects for us.
The "dictate" of Versailles prohibited us to manufacture armaments and army equipment almost completely and demanded the destruction of machines and installations necessary for their manufacture.
Under the supervision of the inter-allied control commission, approximately 10,000 machines, presses, furnaces, cranes and assembly shafts, over 800,000 gauges, die blocks, devices and special work tools, as well as the installations of the firing ranges in Essen and Meppen, were destroyed.
Our firm had to decide whether it wanted to renounce, for all time, the production of war material and continue the enterprise on the basis of the coal mines, the refined steel works in Essen and the foundry in Rheinhausen while discharging all superfluous workers and employees, or whether it would continue employing its personnel with a new production program and keep the shops operating with the pro duction of peacetime products."
The same report gives the answer to this problem, and sets forth the reasons for it:
"In spite of numerous doubts and contrary to the advice of outside experts, it, that, Krupp decided, as trustee of a historical inheritance, to safeguard the valuable experiences, irreplaceable for the armed strength of our nation, and through constant close ties with the works members to keep up the shops and personnel in readiness if the occasion should arise, for armament orders later on.
With this view in mind, we chose objects for the new program of manufacture on which the personnel could obtain and improve their experience in the processing and refining of material, even though the manufacture and sale of these products partly entailed bio losses.
The change-over was made more difficult by the occupation of the Ruhr and its effects.
But, after the inflation, the reserves built up by the very cautious evaluation of the property in the Goldmark balance, the proceeds from the coal mines, the Essen steel works and the foundry in Rheinhausen, as well as the renunciation of the payment of dividends, made it possible to overcome the diffi culties of this period of time so full of losses."
And,finally, Looser and the other Krupp directors were able to look back, after five years of the Hitler dictatorship and one year before the outbreak of the war against Poland, and view with immense satisfaction the decision taken in 1920: I quote:
"When, in 1933, we were again called upon to manufacture war material in large quantities, we were immediately ready to do so, and in addition, we were able to let other firms profit from our experiences, safeguarded and newly acquired by the use of our capital.
Workshops which had not been in operation for years or had only been operating on an insufficient scale were again put into operation, and after a short preliminary stage, were working at capacity.
Recognitions for holding out and rapidly going to work fill us with pride.
They prove that the sacrifices of the past safeguarded great values for our people.
"After having abandoned the production of all objects which were only meant to keep our personnel and our plants occupied, our production program today is a carefully balanced whole in which peace and war production are organically united."
The prosecution is not, therefore, indulging in empty chatter when it speaks of the importance of the Krupp tradition, and the light which Krupp history throws on later events. The same viewpoint is reflected in an article written by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen in 1941. After speaking of himself as "the trustee of an obligatory heritage", Gustav Krupp wrote:
"At the time (that is, 1919) the situation appeared almost hopeless.
At first, it appeared even more desperate if one was not-- as I was myself -- firmly convinced the Versailles did not mean a final conclusion.
Everything within me -- as within many other Germans -- revolted against the idea that the German people would remain enslaved forever.
I know German history only too well, and just out of my experiences in the rest of the world, I believed to know the German kind; therefore I never doubted that, although for the time being, all indications were against it -- one day a change would come.
How, I did not know, and also did not ask, but I believed in it.
With this knowledge however -- and today I may speak about these things and for the first time I an doing this extensively and publicly -- as responsible head of the Krupp works, consequences of the greatest importance had to be taken.
If Germany should ever be reborn, if it shouls shako off the chains of "Versailles" one day, the Kruppeconcern had to be prepared again.
The machines were destroyed, the tools were smashed, but the men remained; the men in the construction offices and the workshops who in happy cooperation had brought the construction of guns to its last perfection.
Their skill had to be maintained by all means, also their vast funds of knowledge and experience.
The decisions I had to make at that time were perhaps the most difficult ones in my life.
I wanted and had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all opposition, as an armament plant -- although for the distant future."
A further citation indicates that Krupp did not make this decision for patriotic reasons alone, or at least that he was anxious to be recompensed for the losses which the firm incurred as a result thereof. This observation is made in no spirit of criticism; certainly the desire to make a profit is far loss dangerous than the willingness to *---*m to the tooth the legions of a ruthless and aggressive dictator and launch upon the world a cataclysmic war. This next document was prepared by the Krupp firm in July 1940, and was transmitted to the High Command of the German Armed Forces; the details therein were prefaced by the following general observations: I quote:
"The following details .......are to provide the justifi cation for the increase in sales prices which the firm Krupp needs for its manufacture, as this increase in sales prices is the only meansby which Krupp is enabled to maintin the highest technical standard in its output.
......
"Without government orders, and merely out of the conviction that one day Germany must again fight to rise, the Krupp firm have, from the years 1918 to 1933, maintained employees and workshops and preserved their experience in the manufacture of war materials at their own cost, although great damage was done to their workshops through the Versailles Treaty, and employees and machines had in part to be dispersed.
The conversion of the workshops to peace time production involved losses, and as at the same time, the basic plan of a re-con version to war production was retained, a heterogeneous program was the result, the economic outcome of which was necessarily of little value; but only this procedure made it possible at the beginning of the rearmament period to produce straight away heavy artillery, armor plates, tanks and such like in large quantities.
The material losses which the Krupp firm is bearing amounted to several hundred millions of marks."
Finally, it must not be thought that Krupp stood alone or unsupported in the decision taken by his firm. As we will see, the chiefs of the German Army and Navy played exactly the same game and worked very closely with Krupp. So did various loading political figures of the Weimar Republic, Joseph Wirth, Chancellor of the German Republic in 1921 and 1922, wrote a letter to Gustav Krupp in 1920, in which the following appears: I quote:
"I recall with satisfaction the years of 1920 till 1923, when together with Kerr Direktor Dr. Wiedtfeld both of us were able to lay now foundations for the development of the German armament technique through your great and most signi ficant firm.
Herr Reich-President von Hindenburg, as is well known, had been informed of it.
His reaction also was very creditable though nothing of this has as yet been disclosed in public.
"I also write down these lines to add them to my files, which already contain the well known letter of Dr. Wiedtfeld of 1921, stating that your most respected firm was assured of 10 years' service for the government on account of my initiative as the Reich-Chancellor and Reich Minister of Finance, by releasing considerable means of the Reich for the preservation of barman armament technique.
"I report this matter in a purely personal and confidential way without thinking of making these lines available to the public.
The fact being that, approximately two years ago the Reich government made it known through the Ambassador in Paris, that any publication about previous preparations for the recovery of national freedom would be discouraged."
I come now Krupp's Violations and Evasions of the Versailles Treaty under the Weimar Republic; that is, from the period 1919 to 1933.
We have seen that Gustav Krupp and the other Krupp managers decided, after the Treaty of Versailles, that they would maintain Krupp's potential as an armament factory by retaining their skilled personnel, and utilizing these workers for "a now program of manufacture in which the personnel could obtain and improve their experience in the processing; and refining of material". This was merely one of a number of stratagems which Krupp adopted to frustrate the purpose of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, in preparation for the day when "Germany must again fight to rise". Krupp's attitude toward the Treaty and toward the Allied officers charged with its enforcement is also reflected in Gustav Krupp's article written in 1941: I quote:
"Without arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and preparations were undertaken.
Thus to the surprise of many people, Krupp began to manufacture products which really appeared to be far distant from the previous work of an armament plant.
Even the Allied snooping commissions were duped.
Padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, track repair machines, trash carts and similar "small junk" appeared really unsuspicious and even locomotives and automobiles made an entirely "civilian" impression."
Any successor which the officers of the Control Commission achieved were merely the occasion for bitter resentment and hostility on the part of the Krupp officials. A history of Krupp's artillery designing activities during those years, written by the artillery designing department of the Krupp firm, tells us: I quote:
"The uncouth, irreconcilable attitude, especially on the part of the French members of the Control Commission, as well as a widespread network of spies and denunciators made sure that the provisions were carried through completely.
One of the higher works' officials had to be discharged because through the exchange of a barrel number he had tried to save a good gun barrel for Germany.
Thus the hands of the firm were completely tied and not even the slightest deviation from the rigid regulations was possible.
"The concluding report of the Inter-Allied Control Commission was finally signed on 16 March 1926.
The Commission departed.
Although this did not yet mean the end of spying -- entailing the danger of international complications or of seeing the works closed, and its workers losing their livelihood -- this meant, nevertheless, an important step on the road towards freedom."
We shall not attempt at this time any exhaustive recapitulation of the numerous respects in which the Krupp firm secretly flouted and violated the Treaty of Versailles during the era of the Weimar Republic. As examples which are sufficient for present purposes, we will discuss briefly, in the naval field, the unlawful construction of submarines and, on land, the unlawful design and construction of guns and tanks.
With permission of the Court, Mr. Joseph Kaufman, Deputy Chief Counsel, will continue reading the statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
BY MR. KAUFMAN:
1. Submarines As we have noted, Article 191 of the Treaty of Versailles categorically forbade the construction or acquisition by Germany of any submarines whatsoever.
In 1937, the German Navy compiled a secret document entitled "The Fight of the Navy against Versailles." This document throws much light on the circumstances which made possible the rapid development of the German U-Boat arm after Hitler came to power.
It appears from this document that, in 1920, Krupp's Germania shipbuilding company, with the approval of the German Admiralty, sold its blueprints of projected German submarine types to Japan, and that Japan adopted these blueprints as the basis for the construction of its own submarine cruisers. The construction of submarines in accordance with these blueprints, at the Kawasaki shipbuilding company, was carried out under the supervision of German submarine constructors and under the personal direction of the chief submarine constructor of the Germania shipyards, Dr. Techel. A German naval officer, with extensive experience in submarine warfare, participated in the trial runs of these submarines and, of course, reported his observations to the German Admiralty.
A much more important step was the establishment, in 1922, of a dummy Dutch company called the "Ingenieurkantoor Voor Scheepsbouw" (commonly abbreviated I.v.S). A Krupp memorandum written just before the establishment of this company states that its purpose was "the preservation and further implementation of German U-boat experiences", and makes it clear that the connection of this company with the Krupp concern (through the Germania shipyards) was kept strictly secret in order to conceal the obvious breach of Articles 168, 170 and 179 of the Treaty of Versailles. The German Navy's secret history, referred to above, shows that this company was established in Holland with the approval of Admiral Behnke of the German Admiralty, and that the purpose of the I.v.S., from the standpoint of the Admiralty, "was to keep together an efficient German submarine office and, by practical work for foreign navies, to keep it in constant practice and on top of technical developments."
This cloaked branch of the Krupp shipyards fulfilled its purpose highly efficiently; it not only engaged in submarine research and design but actually built submarines for sale to other governments. Two submarines were built and sold to Turkey before 1927. Other submarines were built in Spain and Finland in accordance with designs developed by the I.v.S. in Holland.
The layman might think that this clandestine fooling with a few submarines in Japan, Holland, and Finland amounted to very little in terms of modern naval warfare. The German Navy, however, in its secret history, credited these projects with having made possible "astonishing facts" that: and I quote again:
"After the carrying out of the armistice conditions and the signing of the Versailles treaty, any practical continuation of the work in the field of the submarine arm was impossible in Germany. In spite of that, it was possible to put the first submarine into service only 3 1/2 months after the restoration of military sovereignty declared on 16 March 1935, that is on 29 June, and then at intervals of about 8 days to put new submarines continuously into service, so that on 1 October 1935, twelve submarines with fully trained personnel were in service.
"On 7 March 1937, during the critical moment of the occupation of the demilitarized zone on the Western border, eighteen submarines in service were available, seventeen of which had already passed the test period and in case of emergency, they could have been employed without difficulties on the French coast up to the Gironde." I end quote.
It becomes more apparent how deeply indebted Hitler and the German Wehrmacht were to Krupp and the I.v.S.
I come now to Artiller and Tank Design and Construction.
Gustav Krupp was not the only man who decided to undermine the Treaty of Versailles and prepare for a resurgence of German armed might. There was another man, not so well known to the world at large:
Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, Chief of the German Army Command from 1921 to 1926.
Late in November 1925, "His Excellency" General von Seeckt paid a five-day visit to the Ruhr primarily to confer with Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and to inspect the Krupp plants. The Krupp directors described to General von Seeckt the destruction caused by the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission and calculated the damages at 106,000,000 gold marks. General von Seeckt noted the "readiness of Krupp to oblige the military administration in order to gain experience in designing"armaments. The General learned about the close relations between Krupp and the Bofors firm in Sweden. The possibility of constructing a model of a "German tank" was also touched upon.
These ceremonious but secret discussions between Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and Generaloberst von Seeckt were concerned with a sustained and deliberate program and conspiracy, to which the Krupp directors and the German Army High Command were the principal parties, to maintain Krupp artillery designs and gun production potential at the highest possible level, in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The history of this conspiracy is set forth in a long document compiled in 1943 by the artillery department of Fried. Krupp A.G. which contains a detailed account of the development of army guns by Krupp from 1918 to 1933.
Just as in the case of submarines, Krupp's first move was to secure foreign basis for experimentation. This time the country chosen was Sweden, and the firm Bofors. The Krupp history sets forth, and I will quote:
"When, after the end of the war, it became a certainty that, for Krupp gun production would come to a complete standstill, Krupp concluded an agreement with Aktiebolaget Bofors, a Swedish firm - which made available to Bofors information on Krupp's experiences relative to the production of steel in certain fields, and especially of steel for the manufacture of guns - also a license agreement on the basis of which Bofors was authorized to duplicate some types of Krupp's artillery designs insofar as they were not classed as secret by the Reich.
Krupp combined with this the intention of benefiting by the experience gathered at that end. Bofors pledged itself at Krupp's request to permit Krupp employees admission to its works at all times and to supply them with all desired information." I end the quote:
The history goes on to tell us that Bofors took over several Krupp contracts for the delivery of guns to Holland and Denmark, the fulfillment of which in Germany was prohibited by the Versailles Treaty. The experience in the design and testing of these guns was made available in turn by Krupp to the Reich Ministry of Defense. The defendant Pfirsch visited Sweden in connection with these arrangements. In conclusion on the Bofors arrangement, the Krupp history tells us; and I quote again:
"On several occasions, Krupp also introduced German officers into the Bofors plant to inspect guns and munitions and who were present during firing tests. Bofors also made experimental ammunition for armored vehicles which was fired in Sweden in the presence of German officers. Thus the Krupp-Bofors relationship proved beneficial for the further development of the German Army's artillery.
"In 1935, the contract agreement between Krupp and Bofors was annulled because a new Swedish law prohibited the participation of foreign capital in Swedish armaments firms. The Krupp officials returned to Essen and since then are again working in the artillery designing department." This is the end of the quote and I end the quote.
Guns, however, can be designed and tested more secretly than submarines, and in the field of artillery, violations of the Treaty took place within Germany as well as abroad. Krupp activities within Germany were based upon a secret agreement on 25 January 1922 with the Reich Defense Ministry. Here, again, the story is told clearly and succinctly by the secret Krupp artillery history:
"We have seen how, by way of Bofors, Krupp could utilize its previous designs and could derive benefit for itself, and thus for from experiences gathered abroad.
In like manner, the film was also endeavoring to prove ineffective, in Germany itself, the unworthy provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and in some way or other to participate in the gleaning of experience. The same spirit prevailed with the German authorities..... During the first years after the war, an exchange of opinion took place repeatedly on that point. The common wishes and aspirations were finally consolidated in the agreements of 25 January 1922 which, for political reasons, did not constitute an official contract but a gentlemen's agreement.....
"These agreements of 25 January 1922 stressed that as a matter of mutual interest it was imperative to draw on Krupp's experience for the continued development of guns of a caliber of 17 cm and below, of munitions and of vehicles, as well as also to make available to Krupp the experiences derived by the RwM (Reich Defense Ministry) in this field.....
"These most significant agreements of 25 January 1922 are the first stop jointly taken by the RwM and Krupp to circumvent, and thereby to break down, the regulations of the Treaty of Versailles which strangle Germany's military freedom (Wehrfreiheit in the German.) Here I end this quote:
The remainder of the report is devoted largely to the activities of Krupp's artillery designing department under this secret agreement. It appears that the department was dissolved in 1919, but that a large part of its staff was retained on other work. Some fitful research on guns continued and, after the signing of the agreement with the Reich War Ministry, systematic work in cooperation with Army artillery officers began. This was chocked, however, by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; as a result, Krupp's artillery design work was moved from Essen to Spandau, near Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT:We will break off for a 15 minute recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHALL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT:You may proceed, Mr. Kaufman.
MR. KAUMANN:
On 1 July 1925, Krupp and the German Amy's Inspection Office for Arms and Equipment (IWG) established an artillery designing office in Berlin under the camouflage of the name Koch and Kienzle. The Krupp secret history lists a half dozen or more important artillery design projects which were handled in this clandestine fashion. In the meantime, French occupation of the Ruhr was terminated and, in 1920, the Inter-Allied Control Commission was discontinued and its representatives left Essen. Accordingly, at the end of 1927, the Koch and Kienzle office was dissolved and the Krupp designers returned to Essen, where the artillery designing department had been promptly reconstituted.
The Krupp secret report continues with a long tabulation of the more important tasks undertaken by Krupp in the field of military design at the behest of the German Army and in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Many of these tasks related to the design of specific types of guns, such as light and medium self-propelled guns and tank guns. Other tasks related to basic problems of artillery technology, such as the proper methods of gun barrel construction, research in breech blooks, and, as the importance of artillery mobility became more and more apparent, the development of gun carriages.
At about this time, several of the defendants in this case made their appearance as important Krupp officials, participating in this clandestine and unlawful rearmament.
Your Honors may wish to look at the chart for this.
We have already seen the defendant Pfirsch visiting Sweden in connection with the Bofors arrangement; in February 1928, we find him negotiating with the Army Ordnance Office on the matter of prices for the development of self-propelled gun carriages.