Report on policy options for "the Czech problem," including Germanizing the valuable population and eliminating or deporting others

TOP SECRET
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.
No. 22/40 top secret; Prague, 15 October 1940.
TOP SECRET (through officers only)
Re: Basic political principles in the Protectorate
4 copies, 1st copy
TOP SECRET (through officers only)
1 Annex [Pencil marks] :
K [Keitel] 21/X
J [Jodi] Chief OKW
through Chief WFSt
W [Warlimont] 18/10
On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General
K. H. Frank spoke about the following:
Since creation of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.
After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three ways of solution were indicated:
a. German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia.
This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable space of time.
c. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e. absorption of about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint [blut-und sonst wertmaessig Bedentunghat]. This will take place among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district), in other words by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.
The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts of
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methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.
Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution c (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protectorate for years to come.
From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces. This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as annex).
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.
Distribution:
OKW-L—1st Copy OKH-O Qu V—2nd Copy Chief H Ruest and Bd E-Ic.-Draft—4th Copy
Signed : FRIDERICI
Infantry Lt. General
-3rd Copy