Extract from a report to Hitler on naval strategy for the war, including an economic blockade of Britain, the need to use measures not authorized by existing international law, and an uncompromising response to protests from neutral countries

REPORT BY THE C. IN C. OF THE NAVY TO THE FUEHRER
ON THE 16.10.1939.
(present: Gén. JODL.)
1. Report on the operation of the "U-47" in the Seapa Flow.
Promotion of the B.d.U. to Admiral—Commanding Officer to come to Berlin to make a report and to be decorated with the Knight's Cross.
2. Report on the intensification of the naval war in connection with the memorandum which is handed to the Fuehrer: The Fuehrer permits:
a. The torpedoing without warning of all merchant ships clearly identified as belonging to the enemy (British or French).
b. Passenger ships in convoy may be torpedoed some time after it has been made known that this is intended.- The C. in C. of the Navy points out that passenger ships are already being torpedoed if they are sailing blacked out.
c. The Italian, Russian, Spanish and Japanese Governments are to be requested to make a declaration that they will not carry any contraband, otherwise they will be treated in the same way as other neutral nations. (This is being done.)
3. The C. in C.' of the Navy reports that the Russians have put a well-situated base, to the west of Murmansk, at our disposal, where a depot ship is to be stationed.
[signed] RAEDER.
545
UK-65
Berlin, 3rd November, 1939. Directorate of Naval Strategy ^
No. 1/SRC. A. I. 656/39 G Kdos
TOP SECRET
The enclosed memorandum contains the considerations of the Naval High Command regarding the Possibilities of an intensified^-tion of the naval war against England.
per pro
(signed) FRICKE
Distribution:
Fuehrer and Supreme Commander ...................No. 1
0. K.W. WFA/L ................................. No. 2
Ob. d. M..........._!...................:........No. 3
1. Dept. Ski................................. No. 4
1. Dept. Ski................................. No. 5
Foreign Office ................................-.No. 6
O.K.W. Dept. Foreign Countries...................No. 7
O.K.W. Special Staff of Admiral Schuster.........No. 8
The Fuehrer's Adjutant...................... No. 9
Group West, at the same time for the B.d.U..... No. 10
Berlin, 15th October, 1939.
Memorandum regarding the intensified naval war against , England.
A. Designation the aim of the war:
The Fuehrer's proposal for the restoration of a just, honourable peace and the new adjustment of political order in Central Europe has been turned down. The enemy powers want the war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time fully respecting the laws of military ethics.
Germany's principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The naval war at sea against Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the aim of destroying Britain's fighting spirit within the shortest possible time and of forcing her to accept peace.
The mediums for this economic war are all weapons that are suitable for it: Naval surface forces, U-boats, 'planes, political organs, economy and propaganda. But a lasting and probably decisive effect against Britain can only be expected from the Navy (and in particular from the U-boat arm) and the Air Force. The
546
UK-65
first condition for this is the carrying out of an extensive U-boat building program, which will mean the largest possible concentration of the active war industry on building U-boats, as well as an increased building up of that part of the Air Force which is suitable for the conduct of the War against Britain.
The principal target of the Directorate of Naval strategy is the merchant ship, not only the enemy's, but in genera^ every merchant ship which sails the seas in order to supply the enemy's war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Besides this, the enemy warship also remains a military target, because in it the enemy possesses a weapon with which he can counter a direct attack on the merchant ship.
Because of its direct effect on the life of the neutrals also, the prosecution of the economic war means a closer relationship between politics and the conduct of the war than in any other measure of war.'
It is the duty of the military leadership of the war at sea to use the military means at its disposal with the severity necessary for attaining success, and to achieve the complete strangulation of the enemy.
' It is the task of economic warfare clearly to recognize what results the military measures will have on our own economy to find ways and means of making up for the losses from other sources, and, where this is unavoidably necessary for maintaining the life of the German people, to voice any doubts as to the conduct of the naval war.
The political leadership and supreme command will then bring the demands of the naval warfare and those of our own war industry into accord with the political aim and the aims of the conduct of the war in general, and will make the necessary decision accordingly.
B. Estimate of the enemy's position:
The way in which the war has been waged to date has shown that Britain is unwilling to make large military sacrifices in this war, or to make full use of her military means. She therefore confines herself to a long term propaganda and economic war. Her measures aim at cutting Germany off completely from all her trade. Her control of trade, which is built up on a large scale and carried out ruthlessly, together with the strongest possible political and economic pressure, interferes with the neutrals' trade and forces them to support Britain's economic war against Germany. At the same time Britain's own economic position is difficult because of the extent of her dependence on supplies from
547
UK-65
overseas. This position would improve considerably if the United States of America with its large resources were to place itself economically and militarily fully on the side of the enemy powers.
Britain wishes to avoid economic sacrifices just as much as military sacrifices as much as possible. Economically too, the war is not to be "bad business" for Britain. Therefore she attaches the greatest importance to retaining her overseas trade to the largest possible extent. This is only possible through keeping up a great part of her export trade. By hindering British exports as well we will therefore hit Britain in a particularly sensitive spot.
The extent to which Britain depends on overseas countries, the particular bottlenecks of its economic system and the available alternatives are shown in appendix 1.
To combat German economic warfare, the following steps have been taken by Great Britain up till now:
Extensive formation of convoys protected by cruisers, destroyers, submarines and planes.
Deviations from the normal peacetime Atlantic trading routes for convoys and single ships.
Arming of the great majority of merchantmen and instructions to merchant shipping to make use of their armament against U-boats.
Admiralty orders to the British mercantile Marine to ram German U-boats.
Aerial reconnaissance on a big scale over all territorial waters and employment of planes against Ù-boats, partly in collaboration with destroyers and fishing smacks.
Employment of strong formations of submarine chasers against U-boats in the English channel, off the Norwegian coast in the North Sèa, along the French and Western Spanish coastline and in own territorial waters.
Employment of cruiser formations against German commerce raiders (Panzerschiffe) in the Atlantic.
If the present form of economic warfare is continued, one can count in principle on the present defense methods being maintained, though with a considerable intensification of safety measures, a more intensive anti U-boat campaign, a perfection of countermeasures against U-boats and a slow increase in the use of mines against our U-boats and surface vessels.
C. Possibilities of future naval warfare.
I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.
548
UK-65
Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success, can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness ; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of Neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law. In principle therefore any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.
The supreme War Council, after considering the political, military and economic consequences within the framework of the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, including the U.S. coming into the war which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the redrafting of the respective agreements with neutral state; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary. -II. How far are military requirements being fulfilled by the present form of economic warfare?
The deciding factor in the present conduct of economic warfare is that the existing laws of naval warfare particularly the laws
549
UK-65
concerning prizes are recognized in principle. Economic warfare is therefore governed at present by the following basic rules:
(a) Individual unarmed enemy merchantmen: stopping, searching, seizing as prize or, where that is impossible, sinking.
(b) Individual neutral merchantmen carrying contraband for the enemy: stopping, searching, seizing as prize or, where that is impossible, sinking.
(c) Enemy merchantmen in convoy and neutral merchantmen in _enemy convoy: sinking without warning.
(d) Troop transports: sinking without warning.
(e) All merchantmen resisting seizure or threatening our own ships: sinking without warning.
In view of the requirements of naval warfare and of the fact that a large percentage of enemy merchantmen have been armed and that such merchantmen have been clearly instructed by the Admiralty to make use of their armaments against U-boats, our U-boatS are already entitled to sink without warning the following categories:
(a) All enemy merchantmen which are clearly armed.
(b) All enemy or neutral vessels in enemy coastal waters which are blacked out or behave in a suspicious manner.
(c) All ships making use of their wireless on the surfacing of U-boats or during seizure.
At present therefore stopping and searching is still necessary in the case of all individual unarmed enemy merchantmen, all neutral merchantmen proceeding either individually or in neutral convoys.
The following are at present exempted from seizure and sinking:
1. Merchantmen of the friendly neutrals—Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia.
2. Passenger steamers and steamers capable of transporting a considerable number of passengers, even when travelling in enemy convoys.
3. Individual neutral ships not carrying contraband which behave in a completely correct manner.
Furthermore, the whole of English export trade, the throttling of which would have serious consequences for the maintenance of English foreign trade, is, according to the present international law, exempt from being taken as a prize when carried on neutral ships.
A further limitation of the effectiveness of the economic war has, at the moment, been imposed as the result of an economic agreement with Denmark, resulting in the raising of the ban on
550
UK-65
Danish exports of foodstuffs to England, in order to secure thereby the import of cattle food into Denmark via England, which will guarantee Germany important Danish foodstuff deliveries in the future.
England's main imports are being brought in under the convoy system which is now starting up. Our second wave of U-boats, which is now being marshalled, will therefore be used primarily against enemy convoys. The two U-boats which have up to now attacked convoys were in both cases successful in their attacks.
The results of the economic war to date, achieved by U-boats and surface vessels, are satisfactory from a military point of view, but the present form of economic warfare is completely inadequate for having a decisive effect on the course of the war. The stream of imports to England which has, as yet evaded confiscation and sinkings must, for the moment, be considered as quite sufficient for England's economic war needs.
The reasons for this are: '
1. The fact that the number of U-boats and Atlantic commerce raiders is still small at the moment.
2. The non-exploitation of all the possibilities presented by the special characteristics of the U-boat by virtue of its ability to dive, for instance the possibility of cancelling the enemy's superiority at sea to a very great extent.
3. The, as yet, incomplete exploitation of the air force for economic warfare as well as for the'destruction of the British import harbours.
4. The possibility the enemy has o-f guaranteeing a large part of his imports by way of employing the system of the "continued journey" on neutral ships via neutral receivers.
The observance by U-boats of the rules for determining the nature of ships as laid down in the laws governing prizes, (surfacing, stopping, examination) cannot be justified any more from a military point of view according to practical experience to date, especially in enemy coastal waters. The clear orders by the British Admiralty to British Merchant shipping to ram every German U-boat and to use their weapons, as well as the strong air cover and anti U-boat defences which U-boats have already encountered, show clearly the dangers to which U-boats are exposed in the vicinity of the enemy coast, when stopping'and examining merchantmen. Only in rare cases is it possible to determine through the periscope whether a merchantman has the armament which justifies sinking. One must further consider the possibility of the mis-use of neutral flags and identification marks by
UK-65
British Q-boats (U-boat traps) and merchantmen during the further course of the war. The prospect -of success of our economic warfare will be considerably increased by strengthening our U-boat arm and our commerce raiders operating in the Atlantic and by simultaneously perfecting measures for hindering the "continued journey", of contraband via neutral states. Even then we still cannot attain a decisive form of economic warfare.
To sum up, it must be realized that the military demands for ruthless throttling of all ingoing and outgoing maritime commerce cannot be achieved now or in the future, by the present form of economic warfare against England.
III. Possibilities of intensifying economic warfare at sea.
a., Intensification of the present form of economic warfare.
The fact that enemy merchant ships have been armed on a big scale, as official British and French reports have stated, and that the British Admiralty has called upon all British merchant ships to ram all German U-boats, forces us as a first step towards intensification, to declare the raising of the ban on sinking enemy merchant ships of all kinds and in all places without warning. The U-boat's chances of success will be considerably increased by the measure, since it lessens the dangers from enemy aircraft and submarine chasers to which the U-boat is exposed each time it surfaces. The reason for the order can be found, without any need for further arguments, in the publication of the British Admiralty directive, as well as in the reference to the fact that the arming of all enemy merchant ships had been concluded, which fact gives these ships a military character.
Neutral States are to be advised to forbid their nationals travelling on belligerent merchant ships in view of the fact that ships will also be expected to be armed and intend to resist. Over and above this, efforts are to be made to get these neutral States which have a coastline to forbid the entry of belligerent merchant ships into their ports. If these measures are carried out, the possibility of conflicts with neutrals resulting from the submarine war is considerably lessened and British shipping placed in a very difficult position.
Submarine warfare in this form would not give rise to objections by neutrals, and it could at the same time be expected to achieve a great part of the effects of unrestricted submarine warfare without the disadvantages of the latter. This measure has the particularly Valuable advantage of requiring no general declaration of blockade zones, which only cause a sensation, give
552
UK-65
rise to unrest and irritation among the neutrals and invite enemy counter-propaganda.
For the further intensification of the present form of economic warfare, the following additional orders are to be given:
1. Raising of the ban on the capture or sinking of Italian, Spanish, Russian and Japanese merchant ships. The measure is to be given a diplomatic justification and the governments in question are to be informed that in the interest of the German war effort we expect them to p.ut a strict ban on the delivery of contraband to the enemy powers.
2. The systematic laying of non-contact ground mines in British harbours and rendezvous points on the east and west coasts by submarines and surface mine-layers. ' The extension of the use of mines to places overseas, by the use of auxiliary cruisers, this affecting the ports from which imports into Britain and France set out.
3. Concentrated attacks by the operational air force on the
enemy's main ports for the handling of imports, with the aim of destroying the port and quay installations and the unloading appliances as military targets.
4. Accelerated large scale measures for keeping a watch on the neutral trade of the northern and neighboring states and also of Holland and Belgium in their export and import ports, for the purpose of stopping the re-dispatch of contraband goods.
5. The strongest political and commercial pressure on the countries in question to induce them to stop trading in contraband with England.
Despite the increase in the likelihood of success which can safely be expected, the economic war will still not satisfy the basic military needs even after the above-mentioned measures have been carried out. The system of stopping and searching merchant ships, in the way laid down in the Laws governing prizes, which is so dangerous for submarines, still remains in effect. It is not possible to sink without warning:
(1) in the case of all neutral merchant ships, including those carrying contraband when travelling alone or in neutral convoys;
(2) in the case of all merchant ships which are not clearly recognized as enemy ones, though it must be taken into account that the enemy may soon begin disguising his merchant ships as neutral vessels.
It is impossible to estimate the extent of this trade carried on by single ships still subject to being stopped. It is however possible that it still forms a considerable part of the total trade which
UK-65
would mean that it would be doubtful whether this economic warfare would lead to a decisive success. Experience must show how far it is possible to cripple British trade by the intensified measures for economic warfare as laid down.
b. Declaration of a state of blockade.
The sense of a blockade was laid down in international law in the London declaration of the 26th February, 1909. Its basic legal prerequisites are (a) that it should be limited to enemy ports and coasts, (b) that its real effectiveness should be assured and (c) that it would be publicly declared. The meaning of "effectiveness" is to be construed in the light of the conditions of modern naval warfare, which demand that naval forces be spread out over a wide area, while largely ensuring the effectiveness of a blockade, even when the number of submarines and surface vessels available is small, by the use of the air force. A blockade of the British and French coasts is capable, if sufficient blockading forces are used of cutting off trade between Britain and France completely. Difficulties arise in the execution of the blockade from the fact that Britain is not effectively cut off from the neutral states of Holland, Belgium and Ireland; and affect both the effectiveness of the isolation of England from all trade, and the necessity for leaving tirade routes open for the neutral states to destination overseas.
A blockade has the following advantages over the type of economic warfare applied to date:
1. Military: '
The military demands are to a large extent fulfilled, and the safety of submarines increased. After the ban on sinking all enemy merchant ships without warning has been raised, which can be done independently of a blockade, the actual declaration of a blockade would, in practice, only have a new meaning in comparison with the previous position:
a. in the case of neutral shipping not travelling in convoy, and
b. in the case of merchant steamers not clearly recognized as enemy ones.
Actually, even under a state of blockade, it is not possible simply to sink these ships without warning, but the task of the submarines is nevertheless considerably simplified, since they no longer need conform to the routine of stopping and searching, as laid down in the laws governing prizes, since any ship breaking the blockade can be sunk, after the crew has taken to the boats, without it being necessary to investigate the nature of its cargo. The crew can be warned from a distance, thus considerably diminish-
554
UK-65
ing the danger of the submarine being shelled or rammed by the merchant ship.
The air force, being freed from the limitations of the prize laws, is also in a position to take an effective part in the conduct of the economic war, and to sink merchant ships breaking through the blockade, by the use of bombs, after having warned them by firing in front of them or into their bows with machine guns.
2. Commercial.
The blockade will cut off the enemy coasts from trade almost completely if a sufficient number of submarines, bombers and surface vessels is used. It has the very substantial advantage that not only neutral merchant ships bringing in imports, but also all neutral ships leaving with exports can be intercepted by the blockading force.
3. From the point of view of international law.
A blockade is a legal state recognized by international law. When it is really effective, objections from neutrals are not likely and can in any case be rejected, attention being drawn at the same time to the legal state of blockade.
4. Political.
The harm done to the neutrals by the complete throttling of their trade with England, by the difficulties put in the way of their domestic economy and trade with the other neutral countries, and by losses in men and material is considerable.
However one need not expect that the declaration of a state of blockade based on international law will as a matter of course lead to an extension of the conflict by the entry of neutral states into the war against Germany. One must however reckon on America entering upon a policy of armed neutrality for the purpose of bringing convoys to England.
To sum up on the question of a declaration of a state of blockade, it is to be noted that:
A ruthless policy of attacking all merchant ships without warning, though required militarily, is not possible. Even when a blockade has been declared, submarines must surface to warn neutral merchant ships and those which are not clearly recognized as enemy ones.
To blockade the British and French coasts in a manner which fulfills the requirements of international law as to effectiveness, we need a greater number of submarines and aircraft than we at present have at our disposal. Until the submarine arm has been reinforced and a large scale air force built up, the complete isolation of the enemy coasts will remain an illusion, and the blockade
555
UK-65
will have no chance of asserting itself legally. The declaration of a state of blockade would therefore give the neutrals politically undesirable opportunities to protest, and would give a handle to enemy propaganda. After neutral merchant shipping has been frightened off for a short time, neutral trade with England and France will be resumed, as soon as the risk is seen to be small. The danger of a loss of prestige by the Reich is to be expected.
b. The "Siege of England".
A "siege from the sea" is a new concept, unknown to existing international law. It can be considered an intensification of a blockade, and therefore represents the most intensified form of economic warfare. It brings into the picture (a) the air arm, whose position with regard to the laws of naval warfare has not yet been clarified and (b) the conditions of modern naval warfare —the great effectiveness of anti-submarine measures and air patrols. The aim of this "siege" is to bring the available naval forces — surface vessels, submarines and aircraft — into action with the most ruthless intensity.
The "siege from the sea" is based on the realization that submarines and aircraft can no longer operate really effectively under the conditions of economic warfare laid down in the laws governing prizes, in the coastal waters patrolled by the enemy from the air especially when one takes into account the policy of arming merchant ships, and the British Admiralty directive to merchant shipping to ram all German submarines. It allows submarines and aircraft to sink without warning every enemy or neutral ship approaching or leaving the coast of England. However efforts should be made, in conformity with the ethical codes of war, to warn the crews of neutral ships before sinking them and to allow them to take to the boats.
1. The consequences of a siege in the fields of politics and international law:
The idea of a siege presupposes a geographical relationship between the besieged territory and the besieging forces. It however helps the prosecution of the war to tie oneself down as little as possible to a delimitation of particular zones at sea. If the German government publicly declares a "state of siege" of the British Isles within a definite, geographically limited area, it will thereby not only reintroduce the prohibited zone of the Great War, but will reintroduce it in an even more intensified form, since not only submarines and surface vessels, but also aircraft, would have to use only armed force within that zone. The results of such a declaration, clearly defining the limits of the prohibited
UK-65
siege zone, would be to irritate the neutrals greatly and cause them to protest vigorously. Such a declaration, particularly as it is not essential, should therefore be avoided as long as the besieging forces are not strong enough and as long as the neutrals continue not to take up a definite position, and especially as long as the United States continues not to come in unreservedly on the side of the Western powers.
On the other hand it seems necessary to point out to the neutral governments that the German government is making efforts to ensure the continuance of peaceful trade between the neutral states and to inform them of the ways and means of continuing their peaceful trade with other neutrals, unmolested.
Since the term "siege" has not yet received legal sanction, the neutral states will try, by pointing out the absolute impossibility of ensuring an effective siege (in the sense of investing a fortress), to make the public declaration of a state of siege appear a breach of international law. As against this, it can be pointed out that Chamberlain used the expression "a besieged fortress", with reference to Germany itself, in his speech before the House of Commons at the end of September, 1939, and that the French preps also spoke (at that time) of a besieging war against Germany. On the 12th October, 1939, the British Prime Minister further announced that England's full strength would be put into the war, i.e. that it would prosecute the war with all the legal and illegal means at its disposal. On the public announcement of a siege, with the declaration of a prohibited zone involving the sinking without warning of all merchant ships, one has to reckon with far-reaching political repercussions among the neutrals, in spite of the extremely favourable conditions for justifying it propagandistically. It is possible that America or other neutral states may rapidly enter the war on the side of the Western powers. There is no doubt that in April, 1917, it was the preceding introduction of total submarine warfare that was the direct cause of the entry into the war of the United States, but that this reason would not, by itself have led to war, if other important reasons, commercial and financial interests and an anti-German feeling among the public, to mention only a few, had not driven them towards war anyhow. It is probable that America is to-day again basically determined to support the Western powers if they are threatened by defeat, but that the time of America's entry into the war will be decisively influenced by incisive measures of economic warfare, such as the "siege of England". '
The public announcement of a "state of siege" accompanied by
693261—47—36
557
557
UK-65
the declaration of a prohibited zone, can therefore result in serious disadvantages in the fields of politics and of international law at the present moment, so that it seems right to exploit the term "siege" as propaganda, in the same loose way as the Western powers use it, but to avoid the formal legal announcement of a state of siege and of a prohibited zone.
Actually a strain on the Reich's political position is unavoidable, even without the public announcement of a "state of siege", since the practical effects of the intensified prosecution of the economic war, in the form of siege, the abandoning by the U-boats of economic warfare in accordance with the laws governing prizes, and the resulting breach of the Submarine Act of 1936 will in any case have a strong effect on neutrals.
However, by giving up the idea of announcing the concept "siege" publicly, we shall eliminate the possibility of the neutrals making protests based on international law and shall make it easier for the German Reich to reject all objections unambiguously.
2. Military consequences:
The aims of the "siege from the sea" fully fulfil the military demands for a completely ruthless prosecution of the economic war against England. It is however a military necessity that the public announcement of the intensest form of economic warfare i. e. that of a siege, should in no way cramp the decision of the directors of naval strategy, but should on the contrary leave them full freedom to take any military action demanded by the development of the situation.
The size of the forces at our disposal at the moment, especially the small number of submarines capable of Atlantic trips and of aircraft suitable for use against England, makes it completely impossible at present to invest the whole length of British and French coasts. Until about 150 submarines and a large number of aircraft suitable for the conduct of the war against England are ready in Spring 1941, the siege will be incomplete and will cover only a part of the total trade, which it will however be possible to attack with a good chance of success, owing to the removal of the regulations limiting measures to those laid down by the prize laws. It does not however, seem right from a military point of view, to make a public declaration of a state of siege, as long as the means available for carrying on the siege are still insufficient, so that the incompleteness of the declared siege inevitably becomes quickly apparent.
The directors of naval warfare must, whilst employing all available forces ruthlessly, try to adjust the strategic method to
558
UK-65
the potentialities of the forces on hand in each particular case. These forces—surface vessels, submarines, aircraft and mines— are, as a fundamental principle, to be used in such a way that the economic war cuts off enemy imports and exports as effectively as is possible, and is prosecuted independently of all legal concepts of economic warfare, on the basis of the military operation.
The declaration of a prohibited zone for the sinking without warning of all merchant ships does not seem desirable, if the neutrals are clearly informed that Germany intends using every means at her disposal to prevent all trade with England and France and that in the zone of operations around England and France every merchant ship coming in or going out exposes itself fully to the risks of war.
After the ban on sinking all enemy merchant ships without warning has been raised, which can be done at any time, independently of the declaration of a state of siege, the prosecution of the economic war in an intensified form during a siege raises the ban on the final possibility which is that of sinking without warning all neutral merchant ships travelling alone, and all merchant ships which are not clearly recognized as enemy ones. Where exactly sinking without warning is to be applied in the siege-area and in what form it is to be carried out is a matter for the supreme strategic command, and is governed by the possibilities of employing their forces as seen by the directors of naval strategy.
No definite assurance can be given that as a matter of principle neutral merchant ships will be warned before sinking, so that the crews can be saved. If this is possible under the particular circumstances without endangering the submarine or aeroplane, one must continue to aim at it, especially in the early stages of the intensified form of economic warfare, in accordance with the demands of the blockade. One must however expect that submarines especially will not be able to give a preliminary warning to merchant ships, owing to the grave danger to themselves resulting therefrom. .
Aircraft can give the warning by firing in front of or into the bows of the ship.
After a delay which is long enough to allow the crew to escape, the steamer becomes subject to sinking.
The prosecution of the intensified economic war is to be supported as effectively as is possible by air raids on the enemy's main import and export ports, aimed at destroying the dock in-
559
UK-65
stallations which are important for the war effort, and by ruthlessly laying mines right up to the enemy ports and coasts.
England's and France's measures of defense against the enforcement of a German military siege will probably include the following measures:
a. increased air patrols
b. perfection of anti-submarine devices
c. an increased use of mines to endanger the routes by which German commerce raiders set out
d. concentration of commerce into heavily guarded convoys
e. political and commercial pressure on all neutral states to support the commercial blockading of Germany
/. A ruthless propaganda activity.
One must also reckon on the American 'government hastening to build up the system of neutral convoys, thus entering upon a state of armed neutrality which will in practice primarily affect us.
3. Commercial consequences.
The enforcement of a siege aims at throttling the whole of England's and France's trade. The directors of naval strategy will therefore employ all the forces at its disposal to prevent all trade by the neutral states with England and France, without taking into consideration the type of cargo and without differentiating between export and import trade. We must expect England to use our declaration of a state of siege to throttle, in her turn, German exports in neutral ships as a réprisal just as she did in the Great War as a result of our declaration of a prohibited zone. The neutrals will accept this step by England with all the less objections if England points out to them that the Germans started the thing with their concept of a siege, which was a breach of international law.
Should a change in the American neutrality law take place in the next few weeks, in the direction of a réintroduction of the cash and carry clause for all goods shipped from America to the belligerent powers, the premises for the announcement by us of an intensified form of economic warfare would be all the better, since American interests would no longer be affected by the throttling of British imports.
IV. Political and economic measures in support of naval warfare.
For the prosecution of any intensified economic warfare all the relevant possibilities should be exploited and political and economic measures used in support. England's refusal to accept the Fuehrer's constructive peace suggestions may possibly lead
560
to a temporary anti-British and anti-French attitude amongst many neutrals; this múst be utilized by Germany to attempt to mobilize neutral countries against Britain as far as possible by insisting on Great Britain's sole responsibility for the continuation of the war and for the heavy economic pressure to which the neutrals are exposed. The aim of German economic policy must be to set up a continental European blockade directed against Britain. The economic system of neutral states -must be adapted quickly, and with far-reaching German help in organizing the change, to new trade Connections with Germany and other neutrals and to a complete stoppage of trade with Great Britain.
A question to be examined is, whether favourable premises for the German conduct of a ruthless economic war in the form of a siege can be created in America by referring to forthcoming American legislation and to the results of the Panama conference.
The draft of the new neutrality law submitted to Congress in-, tends to confer powers on the President to declare certain territories to be war zones,, ientry into which is forbidden for American ships and American nations. If and when this clause becomes effective it will be possible to refer to it and to suggest that it should apply to British and French coastal waters.
Such a suggestion can be suggested with a reminder that in the Pan-American conference the American state claimed extensive sea-areas, as their spheres of interest, wherein no warlike operations were allowed to take place. . -They should therefore recognize similar areas surrounding .the belligerent countries as being the spheres of interest ,of the belligerents and they are not justified in protesting if those belligerents make the utmost use. of the means at their disposal in those areas.
Should the political, leaders consider the recognition of the neutral maritime zone demanded by the American states, such recognition can be, made dependent on the American states undertaking on their part to forbid their merchant ships entering the operational zone around Britain and France.
Should the political leaders decide on a gradual intensification of economic warfare, it will be possible to create favourable psychological premises for Germany's action by agreeing in principle in Germany's reply to the decision of the Panama conference not to treat food products as contraband, providing reciprocity is ensured. The British refusal to give similar assurance, which can be expected with confidence, could be the basis for a more ruthless economic campaign against England, particularly in the form of a siege.
D. Conclusions.
1. The present form of economic warfare according to the law governing prizes does not correspond to the military demand for utmost ruthlessness.
A large part of the enemy's mercantile trade, including all exports in neutral ships, is not covered.
The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures in the enemy's westal waters. Economic warfare according to the law governing prizes has therefore to be limited and in the North sea and the Baltic must be left to surface craft only. In the Atlantic, U-boats in enemy westal waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning on convoys, troop transports, armed merchantmen and (once it has been approved) all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic warfare according to the laws governing prizes only in exceptional cases. The use of the operational air-force for economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted within the framework of international law and the possibility of a controversy with neutral states is ruled out.
If the supreme command for political reasons should not be able at the moment to decide to prosecute the economic war in the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy of throttling enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic war in its present form. .
2. For the future conduct of economic warfare the basic military requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of the "siege by sea" as most intensified form of economic war meet's this demand. Even without the public announcement of a state of siege after it has been clearly defined as a concept—a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and from the point of view of international law—and even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly possible at the moment, as has been explained in this memorandum to take military measures to introduce the intensest form of economic warfare and to achieve what is at present the greatest possible effectiveness in the interruption of enemy trade, without the directors of naval strategy being bound down in all cases to special forms and areas.
The suggestions for the announcement of the intensification
UK-65
UK-65
of economic warfare in the form of a siege, indicated in general terms, and the note to the neutrals are given in Appendix 3 and 4.
The decision as to what form the intensification of the war against merchant shipping is to take, and the timing of the transition to the most ruthless and therefore for this war final form of naval warfare, is of the most far reaching political importance. This decision can only be made by the Supreme Command, which will weigh up the military, political and economic requirements against one another.
APPENDIX 1
Economic situation—Great Britain I. Import requirements in peace-time.
Percentage of total 73% (of torequirements im- 75% tal value)
ported *
Imported quantities 23.9 million tons 35.2 million
1937 Details of Imports Many bulkfod- Many bulk
ier products and raw materi- highly concen- als, few
trated food manufac- products tured goods
96%
11.2 million tons
Mainly refined mineral oil.
Details of dependence on imports from abroad:
Food products:
Fats, tea, coffee, cocoa, semi-tropical fruit.......... 90-100%
Cereals .....1......................................... 80- 90%
Sugar ................................................. 70- 80%
Cheese, fruit ......................................... 60- 70%
Meat .................................................. 50- 60%
Raw materials:
Rubber, cotton, silk, jute, lime, bauxite, nickel,
antimony, mercury ................................. 100%
Copper, manganese, chrome.............................. 99-100%
Pyrites, wolfram ...................................... 98- 99%
Flax, zinc ............................................ 96- 97%
Wood, mineral oil .............-....................... 96%
Tin, lead ....:....._.................................. 92- 93%
Wool, skins and hides.................................. 71%
Iron ore (ferro-contents) .............................
563
UK-65
Only requirements of eoal and nitrogen are completely covered by Home production.
II. Import requirements in war-time.
The necessity of importing any goods can be very much reduced and can sink far below the peace-time requirements by the scaling down of civilian requirements and the changing* over, from the import of bulk to that of concentrated products, reduction of reserve stocks, increasing home production and administrative measures. On the other hand importing of mineral oils must be stepped up. Estimates carried out by the Trade Investigation Institute [Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung] by order of the German Admiralty (O.K.M.) yield the following picture: .
British import requirements in wartime (in million tons)
1937 1st year 2nd year of
of war war
Agricultural produce 23.9 19.0 16.2
Industrial imports 35.2 . 24.8 18.9
Mineral oils 11.2 21.8 24.2
70.3 65.6 59.3
If reports are to be scaled down and exports limited, an emergency measure which Britain may take, as she did in the World War, imports ean be further reduced to an extent dependent on
the throttling of exports.
Maintenance of industrial imports at half level
If exports are stopped altogether
Total import requirements
(in million tons)
1st year of 2nd year of
war war
60.0 53.7
56.5 50.2
One must therefore expect Britain to be able to scale down imports in case of need, probably up to 30% of her peace-time standards. '
564
UK-65
III. Tonnage requirements.
1. Dry goods.
The British mercantile fleet, excluding oil-tankers, amounted to 12.8 million gross registered tons in the middle of 1939; which was adequate for peace-time import requirements.
In war-time a number of efficiency-impairing factors will have to be taken into account, namely
a. Immobilization of tonnage through congestion in harbours.
b. Longer sea routes.
c. Longer duration of voyages.
d. Increased marine accident rate through convoy procedure, etc.
These are balanced by a number of efficiency-increasing factors such as
a. Centralized control.
b. Concentration of tonnage on the shortest sea-routes.
c. Full utilization of the carrying capacity of ships.
d. Elimination of incidents, etc.
Taking all factors into account, the following tonnage will be required for the war-time imports as laid down in Part II above:
Required tonnage in million gross registered tons
If exports are maintained up to: 1st year of war 2nd year of war
100% 7.5 5.9
50% 6.6 5.1
0 6.0 4.5 -A reserve of British tonnage, which fluctuates between 5.3 and 8.3 million gross registered tons according to estimated war-time import requirements, is therefore available for other needs, i.e.
a. requisition for military purposes,
b. total losses through marine risk (excluding war losses)
c. assistance of the allies (France)
2. Mineral oils.
The cargo capacity of the British tanker fleet amounted to 2.9 million gross registered tons in the middle of 1939 almost exceeded peace-time requirements by twice. The greatly increased requirements of mineral-oil for war purposes will demand
565
UK-65
approximately 2.6 million gross registered tons during the first year of war
approximately 2.9 million gross registered tons during the first year of war
There will therefore not be a reserve of British oil-tanker tonnage worth mentioning (but see under IV,1)
IV. Tonnage reserves.
1. Existing reserves:
The principal reserves for Great Britain from amongst the merchant navies of neutral countries is formed by the oil-tanker fleet of the U.S.A. amounting to 2.8 million gross registered tons and the merchant navies of the Nordic States and Greece with a total of 12.3 million gross registered tons, of which 2.1 million gross registered tons are Norwegian oil-tankers. It is difficult at present to forecast which proportion of that reserve Britain will be able to use in case of need.
Tonnage from the Dominions and Colonies (3.1 million gross registered tons) will presumably only be available to the U.K. to a small degree, since it can not be spared from local and inter-Empire traffic.
2. Output reserves.
The shipbuilding capacity of Britain and the U.S. is expected to reach 6 million gross registered tons per annum. However, this . output will only be reached in the third year of war. Shipbuilding in Britain alone may amount to 1.5 million gross registered tons in the first year of war and to 2 million gross registered tons in the second year of war, though this output may be reduced through aerial warfare.
V. Dependance on Nordic and Baltic States.
Great Britain imported the following percentages of her total imports from the Nordic and Baltic States in 1937:
Agricultural produce:
Bacon 70%
Butter 42%
Eggs Wood, including imports from Russia: 70%
Timber 65%
Wood pulp 90%
Paper, cardboard 55%
Iron ores 22%
The transfer of such imports for other supplier countries is for Britain simply a problem of shipping space and price. The elimi-
566
UK-65
nation of Nordic and Baltic supplier countries will not at present create a bottleneck in British war economy. -VI. North American Continent as a purveyor.
North America is able to cover more than 90 % of Britain's wartime import requirements, provided the U.S.A. put their resources fully at Great Britain's disposal, if necessary in some cases by limiting their own consumption.
1. Agricultural products:
Provided there are no bad harvests, requirements can be fulfilled by North America, where the market at present shows a strong tendency towards overproduction and reserves of fodder make a quick increase of cattle stocks possible.
2. Wood:
Requirements can be supplied by Canada.
3. Iron and steel.
Since the American iron and steel industries were only utilized up to 60% in August 1939, the U. S. would be able to cover Britain's total iron and steel requirements, provided full use was made of their industrial capacity and that supplies to other countries were held up where necessary.
4. Non-ferrous metals: '
Requirements of copper, nickel, zinc, lead and titanic iron can
be met in full.
5. Textiles:
Excluding the manufacture of high-class fabrics and yarns requiring Egyptian cotton, British cotton requirements could be supplied by the U.S., all the more since a 6 months' reserve of world supplies, i.e. 12 million bales, are held there.
6. Oil.
In view of the gigantic oil reserves and the possibilities of a quick increase in production, British requirements can be met by the U.S.without imposing a reduction of their own consumption.
North America cannot supply the following goods: '
Wood, flax, hemp, jute.....approx. 0.8 million tons
Manganese .................approx. 0.3 million tons
Rubber......-..............approx. 0.2 million tons
Lime ......................approx. 0.2 million tons
Tin .......................approx. 0.1 million tons
Bauxite .............-.....approx. 0.3 million tons
Total: ..............approx. 1.9 million tons
Mercury, chromium ore, antimony and wolfram are either not
UK-65
UK-65
available in North America or in sufficient quantities. These metals in view of the small quantities which are required, have little bearing on the tonnage position, similar to certain raw materials of a mineral or earth nature, furs and hides and chemical products which can only be partly supplied by the U. S.
Such far reaching deliveries to England by North America would considerably ease the protection of her trade by the concentration of sea communications in the Atlantic. At the same time, requirements of English tonnage would be greatly reduced.
APPENDIX 2
The military value and the position of international law in regard to warning areas and prohibited zones.
a. Warning areas come into consideration only where mines are being used against military objects. It makes no difference whether the use of mines is a defensive one in our own coastal waters, or whether they are being used in the battle against military objects in any other parts of the high seas. The use of mines in this manner is permissible under international law.
Mines that are laid endanger very naturally both enemy and neutral merchant-shipping. From this the question arises as to whether merchant shipping must be warned. The warning that mines have been laid is not an unconditional duty in international law; it is called for, where it is to be used as a means of determining merchant shipping; it is out of the question where it would lessen the moment of surprise against military objects.
The declaration of warning areas is therefore a question of military consideration. The declaration of a warning area does not allow the right to make use of any further mediums of naval warfare, and therefore not of U-boats either.
b. Prohibited zones only come into consideration where, for
military reasons, the navigation of particular maritime areas by warships and by all merchant ships must be hindered by the unlimited use of weapons. .
Prohibited zones for defensive purpose in ones own coastal waters are acknowledged in international law. As prohibited zones for the purpose of attack in the enemy's coastal waters has not yet been found general, though already considerable acknowledgment in international law, it is judicious to confine them for the time being to maritime areas where their, military purpose can be clearly recognized and can not be denied (naval ports, ports of military importance, straits, narrow seas). The damage to merchant shipping resulting from this is an unavoidable secondary
568
effect, which does not offer any considerable opportunity to the enemy's propaganda. Prohibited zones for the actual purpose of combatting merchant shipping is not permissible under international law; its declaration gives the enemy a first class weapon for their propaganda.
Contrary to the warning areas, there is the duty under international law to make a declaration in the case of prohibited zones.
According to the development of the military situation it may be possible to carry out extensions of the prohibited zones gradually for military reasons, so that merchant shipping can be progressively crowde4 into narrow and narrower shipping lanes that are easy to control. The success of such measures can only be expected, if the effectiveness of the prohibited zones can be guaranteed, and if merchant shipping is, as a result, deterred from navigating the prohibited zone.
Prohibited zones for the actual purpose of combatting merchant shipping, no matter what they are called or how it is going to be attempted to justify them under international law, can only then be considered, when political considerations for neutrals can be dropped.
APPENDIX 3
Draft for a proclamation by the Fuehrer
I have received an answer of refusal to my proposals for a just and secure peace, desired by. all nations.
The enemy's wish forces us to. continue a war, the absurdity of which must be clear to any sensible politician who is aware of his responsibilities and who is concerned for the welfare of his people. The sanguinary guilt for this crime rests before the world and in history with the warmongers who are in power in Britain and in France at the present time.
Britain is our mortal enemy. Her aim is the destruction of the German Reich and the German people. Her method is not one of honest war, but the one of dastardly and brutal starvation, nay, the annihilation of the weak and defenceless not only in Germany but throughout the whole of Europe. History proves it.
The head of the British Government remained true to this historical attitude, when, on the 26th September, 1939, he declared to the House of Commons that the blockade at sea against Germany that had now been declared by Britain was in no way different from a siege on land, and that never yet had it been customary to allow the besieged free rations.
We Germans will neither allow ourselves to be starved, nor
UK-65
shall we capitulate. But by paying back in equal currency we shall let Britain herself feel from now on, what it feels like to be besieged, so as to finally rid the world of the intolerable and undeserved British despotism and bondage.
Just as the head of the British government announced in his speech of the 12.10.1939 that he will employ Britain's active strength in this war, i.e. to fight with all legal and, as is already happening, with illegal methods also, so shall we also employ our weapons during the war which has been forced on us in the defence of our existence and our rights, with the utmost ruthlessness though under respect for military ethics.
The German government will take all measures to cut Britain and France off entirely from all supplies, such as is the case in every siege according to the words of the British Prime Minister.
From now on enemy ships met with in the operational zone around Britain and France—without consideration for its flag— exposes itself fully to the dangers of the war. The German government will keep up these military measures until such a time, as the certain guarantee< exists, that Britain is prepared for free and orderly relations with all the peoples of Europe.
APPENDIX 4
Draft for a note to the neutrals
In their desire to conduct the war which has been forced upon the German people by the British declaration of war in such a manner as to limit it to the use of military forces on both sides, and so as to spare neutral commerce as much as possible, the German government returned fully to the principles of the London treaty on naval warfare of 1909 in the new German law governing prizes, which was announced on the 3rd September, 1939, but revoking the additional measures that had become necessary during the Great War as a reprisal against the British measures at that time. In accordance with this, in the regulations concerning contraband only those articles and goods destined for enemy territory or for the enemy forces, which actually serve the arming of the army, navy or air force, were announced to be absolute contraband. For the time being the German government had refrained from compiling a list of conditional contraband altogether, and had instructed its naval forces not to take goods of this nature as a prize. However, after the British government had published a list of unconditional contraband on the 4th September, 1939, which went far beyond the regulations of the new German law governing prizes, and after the British
570
UK-65
government had, at the same time, published a list of conditional contraband and had included in this list foodstuffs and other vital goods, the German government felt obliged to adapt the German regulations regarding unconditional and conditional contraband to the British procedure.
In the Fuehrer's peace offer, proposals for further efforts to make war more human were made on the 12.10., however, the British Government, through the medium of the British Prime "Minister, not only turned down all efforts for peace, but it declared to the world that it intended, together with her ally France, to carry the fight to destroy Germany through to the utmost limits of British strength. In this present war Britain once again regards this starvation blockade as its strength. Thus the British Prime Minister expressly stated in the House of Commons on the 27th September, 1939, that Britain intended to carry out the blockade from a distance against Germany and felt herself entitled in doing so, contrary to the laws concerning blockades, and in no way different from a siege on land. Referring to this, a British prize court during the Great War expressly stated that it was not only directed against children, women and old men, but also against the neutrals situated in the besieged area.
In his answer to Britain on the * * * the Fuehrer told the
world, that after his constructive proposals for peace and his proposals for making war more human had been turned down, he was now also determined for his part to carry out the total cutting off of Britain and France from all overseas trade, with all the means at the disposal of the German armed forces, as a reprisal against British blockade methods.
In its note of the * * *, the German government has already requested the neutral governments to point out to the merchant ships sailing under their flags, that in their own interest, and so as to avoid being mistaken for an enemy warship or an enemy naval auxiliary, they are not to behave in any suspicious manner, such as altering course or sending wireless messages on sighting German naval forces, zigzagging, steaming blacked out, not following instructions, accepting an enemy escort, etc. As a result of the situation crested, by Britain's behaviour, the German government is now obliged to address the urgent request to all neutral states, that they should ask the merchant ships under their flags to desist from sailing in waters around Britain and France in every case, and to follow the example set by the U. S. A. and warn all their subjects not to use ships of the nations at war.
571
UK-65
The German government finds itself forced to take these measures, because
of the arming of enemy merchant ships and the instructions issued by the British Admiralty to all enemy vessels to attack all German U-boats by ramming,
of the commencement of escorting merchant ships by warships,
of the supervision of traffic by warplanes as well as the setting up U-boat traps,
these waters have perforce become an operational area, where naval actions must be reckoned with at all times, and where, as a result, neutral shipping also is faced by the utmost danger.
The German government is not in a position to accept any responsibility whatsoever for accidents that neutral ships or persons might meet with in this operational area.
The German government is endeavoring as much as possible to guarantee the maintenance of peaceful commerce amongst the neutral countries. She is therefore willing to inform neutral governments, whose countries are situated in the proximity of these waters that have now become an operational area, as to how and in what manner the continuation of their peaceful commerce can be safeguarded.