Memorandum of a conference of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Count Ciano, on the military situation in Europe, including the conquest of Poland and potential wars on other fronts, Italy's desire to delay conflict and concern about its vulnerability, and Hitler's determination to act against Poland

. II
MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HITLER, RIBBENTROP AND CIANO, OBERSALZBERG, AUGUST 12, 1939
At the beginning of the conversation the Fuehrer, with the aid of maps showed Count Ciano the present position of Ger-
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many from a military point of view. He particularly emphasized the German Western fortifications. There were the points at which in earlier times the French, for geographical and strategical reasons, had always attempted a "break-through". These points had now been protected with special care, so that a "breakthrough" was impossible at any of them. The western fortifications had been carried along the Luxembourg and Belgian frontiers to the borders of Holland so that a violation of the Belgian frontier would no longer bring any advantages to France, but would invoke the serious risk that Belgium, in order to defend her neutrality, and under pressure of the Flemish element in her population, would place herself on the German side. The one remaining possibility of attack was, theoretically, across the Netherlands, but, according to the view of the Fuehrer, the Dutch would defend their neutrality with energy because they knew that if they took part in a general war they would lose to Japan their almost undefended East-Asian colonies. Furthermore, in view of the' countless rivers and canals, and of the possibility of flooding wide areas of the lowlands, the Netherlands offered very unsuitable territory as a starting-off point for a great army. Germany would obviously invade the Netherlands, in the event of a violation of Dutch neutrality and, owing to the very short distance of the German frontier from the Meuse, could reach this river within a few hours. Finally the Rhine, which in Holland was I-IV2 miles broad, offered a natural protection against attacks from this direction.
The third possibility of an attack in Germany consisted in blockade by the British navy. In this connection it should be remembered that the great range of the latest German bombers brought the whole of England within their sphere of action and would allow them to attack the blockading ships from the air. There were no other possibilities of attacking Germany. The Scandinavian countries would doubtless remain neutral and they were certain that neither side would attack them because the occupation of countries as large as Norway and Sweden hardly came into consideration (it was not a practical question). Similarly Switzerland would certainly oppose to the uttermost any attempt on her neutrality.
In the East Germany had also erected strong defenses. The Fuehrer showed Count Ciano the various defense systems of East Prussia, On the other frontier strong fortifications were being constructed and as on the Polish frontier opposite Berlin was built up into an impregnable system of successor lines. The capital, however, was only 150 km. from the Polish frontier, and
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therefore exposed to air attack especially because, owing to its great size, could be bombed from a very great height without attacking particular targets but with a certainty that bombs would fall somewhere within the city area.
Turning to the military position of the Western Powers the Fuehrer pointed again to the vulnerability of England from the air. British aircraft production had made progress, but protected measures against raids were still much in arrears. It was known that England had decided only in the previous Autumn upon the definite type of anti-aircraft gun. The German experience of their own seven years of rearmament assured them that large scale production was possible only some long time after the selection of a prototype, so that no real anti-aircraft protection could come into existence in England for one or two years. Furthermore, London and all the large British cities and centres of industry suffered from the same disadvantage as Berlin in relation to air attack; bombing can be carried out from a great height and out of range of English antiaircraft guns with the complete certainty that the results would always be successful.
At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been , called to the colors. If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France at the most two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of their own country. With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland (which would not take long), Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought" that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.
The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of
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less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect. If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different, furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish state. Out of
34,000,000 inhabitants, l1/^ million were German, about 4 million were Jews and 9 million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less i,n number than the total population and as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.
Since the Poles through their whole attitu'de had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's Eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation. Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other, while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind. The Fuehrer had told the Prince Regent on his visit to Germany that, with special relation to Italy, he should make a gesture showing that he sided politically with the Axis and thought of a closer connection with the Axis and of the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed with the latter proposal. The Prince Regent had recently been to London and had tried there to reinsure himself with the Western Powers. He had thus taken the same line as Gafencu who had also been extremely reasonable during his visit to Germany and had repudiated an interest in the importance of the Western Democracies. It appeared that subsequently Gafencu had taken up an opposite standpoint in England. Of ¡the Balkan countries, the Axis could trust completely Bulgaria alone as to some extent a natural ally of Italy and Germany. Therefore Germany had supplied Bulgaria as far as possible with armaments and would continue to do so. Yugoslavia would remain
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neutral only as long as it was dangerous for her to come openly onto the side of the Western Democracies. If matters took a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, Yugoslavia would openly join the other side in the hope that she would then influence the course of events to take an official turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Roumania was afraid of Hungary and from the military point of view externally weak .and internally corrupt. King Carol would certainly abandon his neutrality if he were compelled to do so. Hungary was friendly and Slovakia was under German influence with German garrisons in certain areas.
Coming back, to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for;the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and north easterly direction of a German policy. The East and NorthEast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these Eastern regions. In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbor in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nürnberg of the north, an ancient German City awaking sentimental feelings for every German and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and there a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet, over anything of this kind.
Count Ciano in replying to the Fuehrer's statement first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion, the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his
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preparations for this event, he had made plans for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side but for various reasons he would Welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time. Ciano then showed with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war.
The Fuehrer commented that on this point there were differences of opinion. He personally was absolutely certain that the Western Democracies in the last resort would shrink from entering into a general war.
Count Ciano replied that he wished that the- Fuehrer were right, but that he did not think so, in any case it was necessary to consider the most unfavorable case that is to say a general war. Since the Abyssinian war, Italy had lived in a perpetual state of war and therefore needed a breathing space. Ciano then gave figures to show how great the material effort of Italy had been in relation to the Spanish war. Italian supplies of raw material were completely exhausted and it is necessary to allow time for their replacement. The Italian war industries' which were in exposed sites and must also be moved south for purposes of defense. The Italian artillery, especially anti-aircraft guns, greatly needed modernization. The long coast line and other exposed places were most insufficiently defended. The naval position was almost unfavorable. At present Italy could only provide two battleships to meet the eleven or twelve battleships of the combined British and French fleet, whereas, in a few years she would have eight more ships at her disposition. (These figures were disputed by the Fuehrer). Ciano said that the long Italian coast was difficult to defend and that the Anglo-French fleets had many bases at their disposition and particularly in harbors of Greece. '
Italy was especially vulnerable in her colonies although Libya was difficult to attack from Egypt, and the Italians might be able to reach Mersamatruh. On the other hand the position was very different in Tunis. The relation between the Italian-Arab and the Freneh-Arab population there was 1-20, while the strength of the European troops was 1-5 to the disadvantage of Italy. Furthermore, the Italian fortifications on the side of the French
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frontier were completely insufficient and new pillboxes were needed.
Abyssinia was almost pacified as far as certain areas along the frontier merging with British territory were concerned. Eng« lish gold and propaganda raised trouble upon the population. This pacification, however, was only superficial. In a general war it would suffice if a few English aeroplanes were to drop leafllets in Abyssinia maintaining that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would come back to cross the Abyssinian frontier. Furthermore, in the case of war Abyssinia would be completely cut off from Italy and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in the country would be completely uncertain. In a few days there would be an army of 4 to 5,000,000 men in Abyssinia able to advance successfully. In the case of war against the Sudan, Kenya and French Somaliland, the islands of the Dodecanese would be in a difficult position owing to the attitude of Turkey. Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years. Albania was a completely undeveloped country and could not for some years to come form a workable basis of operations against the Balkans, roads would have to be built and it would be necessary to exploit the mineral wealth, iron, copper, chrome and oil, after which a successful advance could be made to Salonika and other directions in the Balkans.
In the economic sphere Italy had plans of autarky which would take some years for realization after which she would be in a position to endure a longer war without difficulties. An additional reason for the Duce's wish to postpone the conflict, was the question of the Italians abroad who should be brought back to Italy according to plan. There were a million Italians in France from whom about 700,000 could be regarded as still belonging to Italy, the remaining 300,000, however, in the case of war with France would be used as hostages as was clear from the measures taken in France in September of the previous year.
Finally the Duce himself set great importance upon carrying through the Rome Exhibition in the year 1942 for which the large scale preparations had been made and from which in the economic sphere and particularly in the matter of foreign currencies favorable results were expected. ^
In addition to these considerations especially affecting Italy there were other factors of a general political kind tending to favor the postponement of a general war. According to the Duce's view the encirclement policy of the Western Democracies
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would certainly function at the present time but, after an interval of time, the points of difference and the fundamental lack of unity between the parties of the encirclement front would make themselves felt and the front would accordingly fall to pieces.
Finally the Duce was convinced that the present strong state of feeling in England and France would not last very much longer, especially in France the union sacree would break up in party quarrels if sufficient time were allowed on the side of the Axis. At the moment the Axis itself was responsible for the fact that party differences had been set aside in the countries concerned.
The position of Japan would also be considerably strengthened in two years time ¡after the expected conclusion of the China war, while the position of Roosevelt in America would be severely shaken after a period of external tranquility, so that he would not be elected to the presidency for a third time, whereas his election was certain if war broke out. Spain which had just secured a government friendly to the Axis needed a period of rest after the Civil War but in two to three years time would be in fact a considerable factor on the side of the Axis, e.g. within two years Spain proposed to build four battleships of 35,000 tons, the plans of which had recently been brought to Spain by an Italian General. This construction would take place at Ferrol.
For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany. This could be done through the publication of a communique which Ciano had already given to Ribbentrop (then follows the text of the proposed communique). Ciano said that the Duce had in mind a proposal for an international conference. The Fuehrer declared that if a conference were held, Russia could no longer be excluded from' future meetings of the Powers. In the German-Russian conversations, the Russians had made it clear with reference to Munich and other occasions, when they were excluded, that in future they would not submit to such treatment. In addition to the four great Powers and apart from Russia, Poland and Spain must also be summoned to a conference. That would mean, however, that Italy and Spain would be ranged against England, France, Russia and Poland, i.e. an unfavorable position. Ciano said that the Duce considered that the party would win at a conference which was ready in given circumstances to allow the con-TC-77
ference to fail and take into account the eventuality of war as. a result of failure. The Duce had, however, given consideration to the Fuehrer's view and had turned down his proposal. He was in favor of a peaceful gesture on the part of Italy and Germany saying that the Western Powers were not really ready for war. These Powers, however, according to the conviction of the Duce, who obtained very valuable information about the Democracies, would certainly begin war at the present time if they were in any way driven into a corner by the Axis and saw no other way out. The proposed German-Italian gesture offered an honorable way out which the democracies would certainly use for avoiding war. Wide circles warned them against war and the position of this (anti-war) party would naturally be considered strengthened by a peaceful gesture, Poland, from which the Western Powers would certainly draw apart, would be isolated after a certain time and be ready to accept reasonable solutions to the outstanding difficulties.
The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the .roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.
Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another, by the end of August. To the question of Ciano's: what solution the Fuehrer proposed? Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must com tribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since up to the present the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return for the political
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surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25 years pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia and even proposed to advance to Berlin. It was unendurable for a great power to tolerate a neighbor of such hostile disposition at 150 kilometers from its capital. The Fuehrer had therefore resolved to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form of an ultimatum, the brutal ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, an attempt to starve out Danzig or1 the invasion of Poland within 48 hours and in this way to leave the problem. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would also mean an incre'ase in strength. Ciano asked what action of this kind against Poland was to be expected because Italy must amply prepare herself for all eventualities. The Fuehrer answered that in the circumstances a move against Poland must be reckoned with at any minute.
During this exchange of conversation the Fuehrer was given a telegram from Moscow and a telegram from Tokio. The conversation was interrupted for a short time and Ciano was then told the text of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the despatch of a German political negotiator to Moscow. Rib-bentrop added that the Russians were fully informed of the intentions of Germany with regard to Poland. He himself at the Fuehrer's order had informed the Russian Charge d'Affaires, the Fuehrer added that according to . his opinion Russia would not be ready to take the chestnuts out of the fire for the Western Powers. Stalin's position would be endangered as much by a victorious as by a defeated Russian army. Russian interest was to extend her access to the 'Balkans. Germany had nothing against this. On the other hand, Russia would never interfere on behalf of Poland whom she hated whole-heartedly. The sending of the Anglo-French Military Mission to Moscow had only one purpose, i. e. to conceal the catastrophic position of the political negotiations.
After a further consideration over the communique proposal the Fuehrer said that he would consider this proposal and Ciano's
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news about the general situation for inter-aid. He therefore proposed that the discussion should be continued on the following day.
Ill
Memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg August 13, 1939
The Fuehrer said that since the last conversation, he had been considering the whole position. Ribbentrop had meanwhile told him that in the circumstances Ciano had decided not to conclude the conversations with a communique. The Fuehrer had agreed with this decision. The door was therefore open, no-one was committed and no course was blocked. '
The Fuehrer had also come to the conclusion, as he had said in a previous conversation, that the danger of delaying too long into the autumn was that Poland would be able to carry out its relatively limited aims. Danzig could be made to submit by slow pressure and the treaty position was extremely favourable to Poland. Danzig could be blockaded and slowly ruined or even starved out from the second half of September and particularly from the beginning of October. The Poles could easily occupy the place. This occupation would be followed by a re-conquest of the Corridor and Danzig on the German side but any further military operations would be impossible at the present time of the year. Danzig therefore would fall into ruin, and the heavily motorized German forces which were necessary for deep penetration into Poland could not be used. In a severe winter, it would be possible to undertake certain military operations, but the weather conditions would make the emergency landing places and the usual aerodromes unusable. If Germany used these aerodromes the flying distances would be much prolonged, more petrol would be consumed and a considerable less weight of bombs could be carried. It was therefore necessary that within the shortest time, Poland should clearly state her intentions, and no further provocation should be endured by Germany. If these provocations were just allowed to pass, the affair would be prolonged until October when tanks and aircraft could not be used. The Polish General Staff knew these climatic conditions and their effect upon the German forces and therefore Poland was playing for time. The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions, 1) in the event of any further provocation, he would
immediately attack, 2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so. It should not be forgotten that the test of nerves which the Poles had begun by means of continual instances of provocation had not lasted for three months. Any signs of giving way would, in view of ¡the Slav mentality, bring a violent reaction of over-confidence on the part of the Poles. Surrender would not, in any way strengthen the German position but would be regarded by every other country as a sign of weakness. If the Western Democracies had already decided to move against the Axis, they would not in any case wait for three or four years before carrying out their plan and attack only at a time when the Axis Powers had completed their necessary preparations, but they would pass the earlier conflict. If, however, they had not yet come to a decision in the matter (and the Fuehrer thought that in the state of their armaments they had not come to this decision), the best way of preventing them would be to deal with the Polish matter quickly. In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners, not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only strengthened Italian local interests but had also reinforced her general position, the same was the case with German actions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Here also not only had German local interest been strengthened but the general position had been re-inforced. The Axis had thereby won considerable victories. If one were to consider what would have happened if these individual operations had not been successful and to ask what the position of Germany would then have been, one reached a similar conclusion. The strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers. As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through lack of space, not only was there no more space but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possessors, they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western, Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which
the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point. The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Manzzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them. Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for (50?) years long she was incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could be settled. Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on. one point in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience. He (Ciano) quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of precaution and therefore Ciano would put the following question:—
The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland—1, if Poland were guilty of serious provocation and, 2, if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Fuehrer and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to times. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized that this date depended upon climatic conditions.
The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another 4 weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October these could be regarded
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as the dates. It followed therefore that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August. Finally Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth, he had favoured German-Italian co-operation and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration since there were no conflicts of interests between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.